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Voices near and far
Introduction
Mireille van Eechoud
Copyright laws are important regulators of cultural expression, because
they grant extensive rights to control the reproduction, adaptation and
communication of ‘literary’ and ‘artistic’ works. The twin concepts of
authorship and original work are central to copyright laws the world over.
They might not be clearly defined, and certainly not uniformly, but they
enjoy global recognition. That is evident first and foremost by the fact that
the Grande Dame of international copyright law, the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886/1971), has over 180
contracting states.
One might be forgiven to think that, being concerned with (the study
of) regulating creative practices, legal scholars of copyright as well as
policymakers are deeply interested in how works get made, how authors
operate.
But there is remarkably little in the way of academic publications and
policy documents to show that this is in fact so. In the past decade or so,
empirical studies of creative and innovation industries are on the rise.
They tend to foreground technological and economic aspects of production
and use, tracking in a sense the predominant outlook of IP policy makers.
That is at least the image that arises when one browses the articles in the
e-journal Intellectual Property: Empirical studies at the Social Sciences
Research Network. It is devoted entirely to quantative research, with a
strong orientation towards patents and litigation studies. In the copyright
domain, there is a growing body of work on income effects and working
conditions for creators in the media and entertainment industries (see
e.g. Poort et al., 2013, Kretschmer et al., 2011). Other popular topics include
the economic effects of music sampling, or file-sharing on markets for
copyright works, or spelling out what it is we do not know (Towse, 2011).
More concerned with actual practices, power relations and institutional
dimensions are sociologists and anthropologists, for example, the work of
Kelty (2008) queries collaborative practices in free and open source software
development, including community copyright strategies and norms. Reagle
(2010) studied attitudes to ‘ownership’ and collaboration in Wikipedia communities.

8

Mireille van Eechoud

The authors of this volume set themselves the challenge of identifying
how insights from a variety of humanities disciplines can help inform the
interpretation and construction of copyright law. We considered that legal
scholars – especially ones close to legal practices and policymaking – would
do well to take note of the accumulated knowledge of the arts and humanities as students of how and why works, pieces, performances get made,
what their significance is, how they are read, received, used. For reasons
detailed below, we choose to focus on two core concepts in copyright law:
the original work and authorship.
We embarked on a three-year research project entitled Of Authorship and
Originality. It was funded by a grant from the Humanities in the European
Research Area programme ‘HERA’, a joint effort of national research
councils and the EU, managed by the European Science Foundation. 1
One of the principal objectives of the HERA programme is to bring the
humanities into the European Research Area and promote humanities
research in the EU framework Programmes (the latest one being ‘Horizon
2020’, with an estimate budget of 70 billion euro). EU programmes have
until now had an overwhelming focus on (hard) scientific and technological progress and the development of businesses: an orientation that
dominates copyright policy also. Our effort thus mirrored, albeit in a very
small corner, HERA’s ambition to raise the contribution of humanities
research to help ‘address social, cultural, and political challenges facing
Europe’ (HERA 2009).
The goal of this introduction is to ‘set the stage’ so to speak for the
various explorations that follow, of notions of collaborative authorship
and original works in academic thought, societal practice and as legal
norms. To provide especially the readership not familiar with copyright
lawmaking with a useful backdrop, what follows is a characterisation of
the current state of copyright law in Europe. I shall briefly describe the role
of the EU as primary actor in copyright reform. We can then sketch what
the pertinent questions are on authorship and copyright subject-matter,
a.k.a. original intellectual creations, and how the authors of each chapter
have addressed these. The contributions in this volume all borrow from
different disciplines. This introduction concludes with some observations
on the many voices in academia that speak on creative practices, and on
their relative proximity to copyright scholarship. Although technology and
economics will continue to drive developments in intellectual property law,
humanities research can (and should) have real impact on the quality of
law and legal interpretation.
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Copyright reform EU style
In Europe, two major forces drive copyright reform: the realisation of the
internal EU market for goods and services, and technological change. The
workings of national copyright laws affect the operation of the internal
market and therefore in the past twenty years or so the EU institutions
have legislated harmonised norms piece by piece, in different parts of the
copyright and related rights domains. Directives have been the preferred
instrument.2 To date, most of the harmonisation effort has been in areas
where technological change was thought likely to result in diverging legislative responses by Member States.
The first-ever copyright directive was the 1991 Computer Programs Directive, aimed at ensuring that software was treated as a ‘literary work’ under
national copyright laws, at a common originality standard. To unequivocally bring computer programmes into the copyright domain was seen as
necessary for the development of software industries. Subsequent directives
also responded to exploitation models made possible by ‘new’ technologies,
e.g. on the right to control rental of copies on video, CDs and other media
(1992/2006)3, the right to control satellite broadcasts (1993) and of course the
dissemination of works over the internet (2001). The most recent directive,
on orphan works (2012), and the proposed Collective Management Directive (2012) also are direct responses to the impact of digital technology.
There are only two directives which we can safely say are not technology
driven. One is the Term Directive (1993/2006), which lays down rules for
(near) uniform duration of copyright and of the related rights of performers,
broadcasting organisations, film producers and record producers. The other
is the Resale Right Directive, which gives authors of art works (sculpture,
painting, photography, installations, and so on) a claim to share in the
proceeds of the resale of their work.
A much criticised effect of EU harmonisation is that all initiatives have
led to higher levels of protection, for more types of subject-matter, for a
longer period of time (Van Eechoud et al., 2009). It has proven to be nearly
impossible to harmonise ‘down’ to the level of protection in the most liberal
Member States. This is caused by the mechanics of policymaking at EU level
combined with the status of copyright as a quasi-property right in national
traditions and under the EU’s charter of fundamental rights. Harmonisation
is thus mostly upward. The focus on technological and economic concerns
does not of and in itself dictate certain outcomes of harmonisation processes.
Much is to be said and has been said about the intransparency of agenda
setting, the lobbying power of established stakeholders in the cultural and
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IT industries, and the quality of evidence on which changes to copyright
laws are ‘sold’. But that is not the topic of this book. The harmonisation
project continues, but especially with respect to author prerogatives – be it
exclusive rights to authorise, or merely claims for remuneration for certain
uses – harmonisation is by now fairly complete. Our interest is how all the
years of piecemeal harmonisation have influenced notions of authorship
and work.

Intellectual creations and their authors
Until a few years ago, the obvious impact of EU law on the issue of copyright
subject-matter seemed to be limited to computer programmes and databases. On both topics directives prescribed the standards for and scope of
protection. It was widely assumed that there was not a truly harmonised
notion of what qualifies as an original work in other areas of copyright.
Some countries operate stricter standards than others, and there is no
uniformity as to the types of productions that are eligible for protection.
Many genres are generally recognised as falling in the copyright domain.
These include for example all types of texts whether fiction or non-fiction,
practical or for entertainment; music, film, photography, visual arts, maps,
and applied arts. But there are also categories whose inclusion in copyright
is controversial, they may be recognised in some countries but not in others.
Examples include perfume, fashion shows, cookery recipes but also certain
forms of ex tempore speech.
On the topic of ‘work’ developments in copyright law have become
volatile with the Court of Justice of the EU’s judgment in the landmark
Infopaq case and subsequent judgments (BSA, Painer, Football Dataco).
The Court has started to construct an autonomous work concept based
on the notion of a work being ‘the author’s own intellectual creation’. The
terminology is borrowed from the Computer Programs Directive but can
be traced back to the Berne Convention’s article on the protection of collections, like anthologies for example, as literary works in their own right.
The judgments have sparked much controversy and have far-reaching
impacts on the legal systems of some EU Member States (Van Eechoud,
2012). Drawing upon the above cases, in the eyes of the Court a work is an
original intellectual creation of the author on condition that it is ‘reflecting
his personality and expressing his free and creative choices in its production’. In his contribution to this book Stef van Gompel critically examines
what the EU court could mean by ‘free and creative choices’ and what we
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can learn about constraints to creativity as identified in art studies and
other disciplines.
What seems clear from the Court of Justice’s case law is that an intellectual creation easily qualifies as original. In that respect, the judgments are
not exactly earth-shaking. In many copyright laws, the work of authorship
had already become a vessel that accommodated a very broad array of
works of the mind, from ‘high art’ to ‘low art’, from the purely aesthetic to
the predominantly functional or technical. The standard for protection
in many jurisdictions had evolved to the point where ‘original’ and ‘creative’ seemed to be synonymous terms, both meaning little more than ‘not
directly copied’ or ‘resulting from a modicum of freedom of choice’. Coupled
with a the ever-expanding scope of the reproduction right, what does this
imply for the linked legal concepts of ‘work’, ‘copy’ and ‘adaptation’? How
can we meaningfully interpret these terms in the digitally networked age,
with its possibilities of borrowing, sampling, reworking, appropriation at
unprecedented scale? These are questions raised in my chapter on Adapting
the work.
Equally important is the question: If everything is a work, does that
make everyone an author? The EU directives have little to say on exactly
who qualifies as (co) author or initial owner of copyright, beyond some
provisions for software, databases and film. There are shared notions of
authorship in national laws of course. At present, by and large, national
rules on authorship and copyright ownership are still based on the author
as an individual autonomous agent operating in relative isolation. This
model continues to work well for small-scale production, but is much more
problematic in other areas. Three of the chapters in this book are the fruits
of contrasting legal notions of authorship with those circulating in creative
communities.
How authorship status is attained in law, and viewed in the practices
of scientific publishing, literary editing and conceptual art is the topic of
Lionel Bently and Laura Biron’s contribution. Drawing on sources from
literary studies, and the history of science and art, they analyse discrepancies for these sectors between who copyright law recognises as author
(and therefore typically owner of rights) and who has authorship status in
social practice. As it turns out, copyright, they show ‘makes authors-in-law
out of social “non-authors”’ (and vice versa). In the domain of ‘digital’ arts,
Elena Cooper also explores the diverse ways in which relations between
contributors are perceived within creative communities. She does so on
the basis of interviews conducted with sixteen artists and poets who use
digital technology, considering how and why ‘authorship’ is attributed to
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some contributors but denied to others. Cooper’s fieldwork testifies to the
wide range of practices and notions of authorship among ‘digital’ artists
and their collaborators. It also brings out how technological change can
engender collaborations – as when digital technologies require highly
specialised skills – but also return work from collaborative to solitary when
technologies become ubiquitous and easy to use.
Collective production processes in the arts hardly began with digital
media and the world wide web. They have existed in key artforms such as
theatre, dance and music since the dawn of civilization. To contrast the
analogue and the digital, Jostein Gripsrud studied a theatrical production
at a national repertory theatre in Norway and in his contribution to this
volume compares the findings with those of fieldwork among younger
musicians/producers involved in professional and semi-professional digital
production of popular music. In historical work for the project Elena Cooper
uncovered how large-scale collaboration in the analogue age of print took
place, in a case study of the Oxford English Dictionary. Its early making
relied heavily on volunteer contributions, a Wikipedia model avant la lettre
in certain respects.

Many voices, confusing sounds
To ask how ‘humanities’ research can inform the construction and interpretation of copyright norms and concepts is in a way an absurdly broad
question: An additional reason for us to focus on notions of authorship,
originality and work, since these are areas where it is reasonable to expect
a rich body of relevant work within the humanities. Even so, a veritable mer
à boire remains. What then, are the disciplines that seem to hold particular
promise? Art history is one, albeit not for its traditional focus on artist
monographs. Instead, Laura Biron and Elena Cooper have considered
multiple authorship in copyright through the looking glass of institutional
theories of art (2014).
The ever-burgeoning fields of ‘creativity studies’ are not the predominant
ones we have drawn upon. This is because much of the research that attempts to model and describe forms of creativity and the circumstances
that support creative activity takes the perspective place of (cognitive)
psychology, education, or business studies, or sociology (e.g. Uzzi and Spiro,
2005) i.e. social sciences. Theories of creativity tend to focus on one of four
‘p’s: person, process, product, and press, that is external factors like the
environment (Torrance, 1993). Interesting for copyright is the well-known
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model of person-oriented creativity that distinguishes between big-C (the
creativity of a recognised genius), pro-C (expert-level creativity but not of
the kind that has legendary status), little-C (normal day- to- day creativity),
and mini-C, i.e. novel and meaningful discoveries each person has as part
of learning processes (J.C. Kaufman and R.J. Sternberg, 2010; Kaufman and
Beghetto, 2013). Stef van Gompel does consider a number of insights from
these perspectives in his analysis of the notion of ‘free creative choices’,
bedrock of the originality standard in copyright law.
Genius, or big-C creativity, is one topic where literary studies, history and
legal scholarship have met. The purported influence of Romantic notions
of authorship on copyright law has been a topic of rich debate in the US.
Twenty years ago, Coombe was happy to report that due largely to the
historical work ‘intellectual property law has at long last become a field
of engaged interdisciplinary inquiry’ (Coombe, 1994). In Europe too, the
history of copyright and intellectual property law more generally is going
mainstream. The recent establishment of the International Society for the
History of Intellectual Property (ISHTIP), whose annual conferences are
well attended, is testimony to the growing interest. Our understanding of
the historical trajectories of copyright laws will undoubtedly also grow as
a result of projects that bring together primary sources for academic use,
such as the Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900) project curated by
Lionel Bently and Martin Kretschmer (www.copyrighthistory.org).
That the meeting of literature, law and history leads to insights that can
actually help reform copyright is not a given. After reviewing the efforts
made in literary studies to reassess the Romantic image of the author,
historian Haynes (2005) concludes ‘… the historicist turn in literary studies
has done little to advance our understanding of the history of authorship
but has, in fact, often served to perpetuate the Romantic notion of genius
it purports to critique’. But even where the Romantic notion of genius has
been supplanted, the results do not readily translate into useful insights
for lawmaking. Erlend Lavik in his contribution critically examines how
literary discourse might have influenced legal discourse and sets out
the methodological difficulties involved in unpacking the interplay. He
also argues that the Myth of romantic authorship in copyright itself has
characteristics of a myth.
The critique of Romantic authorship is argued not just on historical
grounds, but also with reference to theories on intertextuality. Here literary
studies serve not just to deconstruct ideas of (original) authorship, but of
course even more the idea of a stable work itself. Musicology and popular
music studies are likewise domains in which critiques of the idea of music
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as a ‘work’ abound. In the chapter on Adapting the work, insights about
the artificiality of distinguishing the work (composition) from musical
performances are applied to other contemporary instances of ‘versioning’,
notably the process of constant rewriting (versioning) that characterises
wiki-style and open source software production. Also, genre studies are
brought to bear on the question of when law does (or should) consider a text
to be an adaptation rather than a copy, an important difference between
the two being that adaptations typically qualify as works in their own right
while mere copies do not.
It is near impossible to treat copyright’s notion of original creation
without turning to aesthetics. Drawing upon both history and aesthetics,
Stef van Gompel and Erlend Lavik in earlier work critically examine the
conventional wisdom among legal scholars and practitioners alike that the
legal concept of ‘original work of authorship’ must in no circumstances be
informed by an assessment of quality, merit or purpose (Van Gompel &
Lavik, 2013). Lavik’s contribution to this volume maps the confusion that
shows up in academic texts and court decisions on the role that aesthetics
does, can or ought to play in copyright law. He identifies where aesthetics and legal reasoning overlap, and what kind of contributions we could
expect humanities to make especially to the interpretation of standards
of originality and work.
It sometimes seems that no PhD thesis on copyright can do without a
chapter on philosophical justifications for intellectual property. Usually
Locke beats Kant and Hegel as the thinker whose work lends itself best for
a justification of copyright, especially in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. In her
chapter Laura Biron convincingly argues that many of the more popular
readings of these philosophers are askew, and that if one seeks to address
copyright expansionism, there is promise in the effort to distill from labour,
personality, and communicative accounts of intellectual property elements
‘that support the idea of authorship as an internally constraining process’.
From the above it is clear that the HERA project has brought together
more disciplines than law, literature and history. It has also brought
home just how difficult it is to translate insights from one discipline into
another. There is a growing openness in international communities of legal
scholars to perspectives from other disciplines beyond economics and
technology. The 2012 ATRIP (Association of Teachers and Researchers in
Intellectual Property) for example was devoted to methods and perspectives in intellectual property and featured contributions from cultural
studies, ethics and political science (Dinwoodie, 2014). No doubt the trend
towards multidisciplinary research that is evident across academia plays
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a role. Especially the disciplines oriented towards empirical studies are
the more likely ones to be able to exert influence on the interpretation
and construction of law.
In our day, copyright has spread its tentacles into every nook and cranny
of human production or as the modern critique would have it: all culture is
copyrighted. Lawmaking and interpretation are practices characterised by
constructing the general from the specific. It may prove to be of great value
to have insights in how cultural productions are created and circulated
across all copyright domains. Which actors are involved, what are their
relations, roles, authority, how do creative processes work, how do ideas,
styles travel? The developing field of ‘production studies’, a recent offspring
in the field of film/audiovisual studies, holds promise here. The growing
room for empirical studies in various other disciplines such as music studies
will yield useful insights too. What complicates matters immensely is that
the entire copyright system leans strongly towards generalised norms for
a broad range of cultural production types and practices, using ‘creative’
effort as a catch-all. It is non-discriminatory in that sense. Still, the transition to digital humanities might lead to just the mix of in-depth analysis
of individual instances of production and trend studies that would allow
enriched legal reasoning.

Notes
1.

2.

The project Of Authorship and Originality was financially supported by the
HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info) which is co-funded
by AHRC, AKA, DASTI, ETF, FNR, FWF, HAZU, IRCHSS, MHEST, NWO,
RANNIS, RCN, VR and the European Community FP7 2007–-2013, under the
Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities programme.
In the arsenal of EU legislative instruments, ‘directives’ are laws that oblige
EU Member States to adapt their internal law to meet the directive’s legal
norms. It is a result-oriented instrument, and is not necessarily aimed at
achieving complete identical legal treatment of issues throughout the EU.
A Directive might just set a minimum standard, or present a catalogue of
options. For example, the Computer Programs Directive of 1991 obliges
Member States to accord copyright protection to computer programmes as
literary works at a unified originality standard, but leaves Member States
the freedom to accord software producers additional protection under
unfair competition law or other norms. Another example: the Information
Society Directive (2001) contains a catalogue of some twenty permitted uses
of copyrighted materials (limitations and exceptions), but only one of them
is mandatory for all Member States.
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Where two dates are given for Directives, the first is for the year in which a
directive was first adopted, and the second for the latest version. Substantial
changes normally result in a new directive that replaces rather than revises
its predecessor.
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Creative work and communicative
norms
Perspectives from legal philosophy
Laura Biron
In consideration of the application of insights from the humanities to the
interpretation of core legal concepts in copyright, this chapter examines
three questions: first, what is a ‘work of authorship’, and why does copyright
law place such a strong emphasis on originality for determining what counts
as a work? Second, can and should we modify ‘romantic’ conceptions of authorship, to take into account the various ways in which authorial practices
seem to conflict with their highly individualistic and creator-centred focus?
Finally, how might copyright law make sense of the various ways in which
authorship is collaborative, in light of its somewhat restrictive definitions
of co-authorship?
This chapter will consider the contribution that existing philosophical
literature on the justification of copyright might have to these questions. It
begins by outlining three categories that have application to questions about
authorship – labour, personality and communication – and explaining a
deeper distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary accounts of
authorship which underlies these categories. It goes on to illustrate how
these differing approaches to authorship can be applied to the three questions under consideration. For reasons of space and practicality, the focus of
this chapter will reflect my expertise in Anglo-American copyright theory
and doctrine.

Philosophical accounts of ‘authorship’
Leaving aside utilitarian or consequentialist justifications for copyright,
which tend to focus more on incentivising acts of authorship than the nature
of authorship per se, there are, broadly speaking, three different theories
distinguished in the literature: labour theories, associated with John Locke;
personality theories, often thought to be linked to the writings of Hegel;
and communicative theories, taking inspiration from Kant’s writings on
intellectual property.
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It should be noted at the outset that these justificatory theories are not
usually directly applied to questions about authorship; indeed, the labour
and personality accounts are more conventionally viewed as theories of
property, rather than theories of authorship as such. The Kantian approach
may seem more directly linked to authorship, through its focus on communication and explicit rejection of proprietary language, but it is still at
an early stage of development in the philosophical literature. Thus, a central
question explored by this chapter is the extent to which communicative
accounts of copyright have more direct application to questions about
authorship than labour or personality theories. The chapter argues that
we should not fall into the trap of assuming that one set of theories (based,
for example, on communicative norms) can provide a complete answer to
the complex questions at stake, but rather that we should be aware of the
need to develop ‘hybrid’ theories of authorship, drawing together the key
premises from communicative, labour and personality theories which have
application to the questions at stake.
Before moving on to discuss the three sets of theories in more depth, a
further observation is needed about the role of the concept of authorship
in philosophical discussions. Although it might seem as though authorship
is one of copyright law’s most central concepts, Waldron points out that
policy defences of copyright are ‘seldom cast in purely individualistic terms.
Officially, the justification is supposed to have more to do with the social
good than with the individual rights of authors’ (Waldron, 1993, p. 848).
Why, then, does there seem to be such a strong focus on authors’ rights in
debates about the justification of copyright? Waldron draws attention to
many ways in which social defences of intellectual property become cast
in individualistic terms, and notes that ‘social policy, judicial and scholarly
rhetoric on the topic retains many of the characteristics of natural rights
talk’ (ibid., p. 849). Another explanation is given by Peter Jaszi, who argues
that theorists of copyright have become entranced by a ‘mythologised’
conception of authorship, viewing it as a privileged category of intellectual
activity, tied up with notions of self-ownership, personality and originality (Jaszi, 1991, p. 455). At the same time, Jaszi draws attention to the fact
that authorship is anything but a unified or fixed category of aesthetic
experience, something which could provide a ‘stable foundation for the
structure of copyright doctrine’; rather, he seems to agree with Waldron’s
observation that authors’ rights lie at the centre of a tension between social
and individualistic defences of intellectual property, describing authorship
as ‘the locus of a basic contradiction between public access to and private
control over imaginative creations’ (ibid., p. 457).
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What are the implications of these observations for philosophical conceptions of authorship? It seems fair to say that, in the philosophical literature
on authors’ rights, a similar tension exists between individualistic and social
theories of authorship. On the one hand, there is a tendency to assume that
the relationship between an author and their work can be viewed analogously to the relationship between an individual owner and an object of
property. Certainly, this is the assumption underlying most interpretations
of the labour theory of authorship, as we shall see below. This means that
authorship and ownership become intertwined categories, and authorship
is often cast as a matter of individual entitlement. Nonetheless, there are
justificatory theories of copyright that focus less on individual authors (qua
individual owners), and more on the social goals that acts of authorship
can promote – in particular, goals associated with communication and
public knowledge. This distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary
conceptions of authorship will emerge as we unpack some of the different
theories of authorship that have been said to be associated with labour,
personality and communicative theories.
Authorship and labour
Judges often appeal to labour in intellectual property rulings. A well-known
example is Justice Potter Stewart’s observation that: ‘The immediate effect
of our copyright law is to stimulate a fair return for an author’s creative
labour’ (Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 1975, para. 156). In UK law,
copyright’s originality requirement is even specified by reference to labour
(Bently and Sherman, 2005, p. 94). This has led to discussion about whether
such appeals could be grounded in philosophical theories of property based
on labour, and in particular the work of John Locke, whose account of
property will be considered in this section.
Locke’s theory of property has three central components: an initial commitment to common ownership, arguments for privatising the commons,
and a specification of some provisos that must be in place before ownership
is fully justified. The implications for Lockean accounts of authorship and
author entitlement vary, depending on which component of his theory we
emphasise. Indeed, a brief look at the literature on Lockean theories of
intellectual property reveals a divergence of views about the implications
of Locke’s theory for the justification of authors’ rights. According to Nozick
(1968, pp. 178–181), Hughes (1988, p. 291) and Becker (1993, pp. 610–612), Lockean arguments can be used to support strong intellectual property rights,
assigning authors expansive rights to control uses of their intangible assets
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by others. On the other hand, commentators such as Gordon (1993), Shiffrin
(2001), Damstedt (2003) and Hull (2009) stress the various limitations on
ownership of intellectual property that follow from Locke’s account, arguing
that his justifications for intellectual property would be weaker than his
justifications for tangible property. Although it is not necessary to choose
between these different interpretations, it is important to be aware that
there is no one definitive ‘labour’ account of authorship. In the remainder
of this section, I outline the four most popular interpretations of Locke’s
theory in the literature.
Interpretations of Locke’s account of copyright often begin with Locke’s
famous ‘labour mixing’ argument for the justification of property, according
to which ‘every man has a property in his own person’ and in ‘the labour
of his body and the work of his hands’ (Locke, 1689, book II: sec. 27). When
a person removes a thing from its natural state, he has:
[…] mixed his labour with it and joined it to something that is his own …
and thereby makes it his property … For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that
is once joined to (ibid., II: sec. 27).

The idea behind this argument is that, through mixing our labour with
what is available in the common for appropriation, we extend our natural
property in our persons to that which is available, thereby grounding
property rights in particular resources. If another person takes what you
have mixed your labour with, that person also takes your labour ‘which
another had no title to’ (Locke, 1689, Book II: sec. 32). Locke describes this
argument as providing the ‘great foundation’ of his theory of property (ibid.,
II: sec. 44). What are its implications for Lockean theories of authorship?
Although some commentators have been sceptical about the application
of labour-based arguments to copyright, arguing that labour ‘generates too
many indeterminacies and problems to provide a justification for intellectual property’ (Drahos, 1996, p. 54), others have been keen to ground
defences of authors’ rights on the basis of Locke’s labour-mixing argument. The first, most popular description of Locke’s theory is known as the
labour-desert theory. This suggestion is made explicitly by Becker (1993,
p. 620), Hughes (1988, p. 305) and Tavani (2005, p. 88), and even when not
explicitly made it is implied by the comment very often made that Locke’s
theory of intellectual property is a matter of rewarding authors for the
fruits of their labour. And the idea of intellectual property rights being a
‘reward’ for authorial labour has certainly been influential in the courts, for
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example: ‘Sacrificial days devoted to … creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate for the services rendered’ (Mazer v. Stein, 1954, p. 219). But
it is important to note that desert-based interpretations of Locke’s account
of authorship do not fit neatly with the spirit of Locke’s own discussion of
the justification of property through labour.
Indeed, Locke’s discussion of the relationship between a subject and
their labour seems to preclude it being wholly framed in terms of desert.
For example, he admits that the productivity of one’s labour can depend
on luck and other conditions that are independent of the labourer’s efforts whereas, of course, whether or not a person deserves a reward for a
particular action should depend on the effort they put in. The same can
be said – perhaps to an even greater extent – for the case of authors; after
all, authors benefit from talents that are in many respects dependent on
natural endowments (over which they have no control, and hence cannot
be said to deserve) and also on various social factors that reward certain
kinds of talents over others, depending on the context. In Rawlsian terms,
it would be ‘morally arbitrary’ for individuals to be rewarded for the fruits
of their talents because the natural and social factors that determine their
value lie outside of their control (Rawls, 1971, p. 74). It follows that it makes
little sense to ground a labour theory of authorship in a theory of desert.
This means that, whatever emphasis might be placed on the connection
between authorship and desert in judicial settings, such an emphasis cannot
find philosophical support in labour theories of property.
Setting aside desert-based labour theories of authorship, a second account of Lockean authorship can be termed the creationist account. Taking
its inspiration from interpretations of Lockean labour as God-like, ex nihilo
activity that does not depend on what comes before it (Tully, 1980, pp. 108–9),
the creationist account supports the view that Lockean natural rights to
intellectual property can be easily derived, since ‘it seems as though people
do work to produce ideas and that the value of these ideas … depends solely
upon the individual’s mental work’ (Hughes, 1988, p. 291).
Even though the creationist account of Lockean labour has been
criticised as limited in its application to tangible property (Simmons, 1991,
p. 259; Waldron, 1988, p. 199), it might nonetheless apply to questions about
authorship and intellectual property. After all, when Locke considered the
material common, he was thinking about an expanse of resources that was
‘given’ to mankind by God to be used and enjoyed by all, which makes it
difficult to see how individuals could labour ex nihilo without building
on pre-existing raw materials. But, arguably, the intellectual common is
not always construed as a given set of raw materials, because it depends
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crucially on activities by human beings over time, and this points to a
difference between resources that are given to us by nature and intellectual
resources that are given to us as a result of individuals creating, producing
and inventing them. If such a distinction can be maintained1, it follows that
creationist interpretations of Lockean labour – which focus on labour as
something not dependent on the prior labour of others – lead one toward
strong, creator-centred theories of authorship. The implications of this
account for the broader questions considered by this chapter are made
clear below.
A third interpretation of Lockean labour, which I have termed the intellectualist account, leads to a more balanced picture of Lockean rights of
authorship than is suggested by the creationist account. The first point to
note about this interpretation is that it views Lockean labour not in physical
terms, but as connected to Locke’s remarks on personhood. Indeed, Locke
speaks of an individual having property in their ‘person’, not their body,
which provides reason for thinking that labour should be understood as
fundamentally connected to our nature as persons – rational, reflective
beings capable of choice and self-awareness. This also connects Lockean
labour to the more general right to self-government – a ‘right of freedom
to his person’ (Locke, 1689, Book II: sec. 190) – which underlies his theory
of rights. If we understand Lockean labour as intellectual activity broadly
construed – or, in Simmons’ phrase, ‘purposive activity aimed at satisfying
needs or supplying the conveniences of life’ (Simmons, 1992, p. 273) – it
follows that, when a person mixes their labour with an object they do not
literally change that object, but the object becomes part of their labour
through being brought within their purposes, aims and actions. Provided
such labouring does not encroach upon others’ rights to self-government,
the object cannot be removed from the labourer without interfering with
their labour and thereby violating their right to self-government.
What are the implications of the ‘intellectualist’ account of labour for
Lockean theories of authorship? One interesting observation is that, through
connecting labour to personhood in this way, we actually move towards a
Lockean theory of authorship that has much in common with personality
theories (see below). This makes it possible to discuss ‘hybrid’ theories of authorship that blend elements of both labour and personality theories together,
and may be able to give us a more comprehensive theory of authorship than
when these theories are considered separately. A further, important element
of the Lockean intellectualist account is that, through grounding authors’
rights in rights of self-government, authorship (like ownership) becomes a
category that generates internal constraints on its scope and extent.
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That is to say, the intellectualist account of authorship states that authors
should be given opportunities to originate and control their works provided
that they do not violate others’ rights to self-government – by pretending
a work by another author is really the product of their own labour, or by
merely copying another author’s work without investing any new labour of
their own, for example.2 From the perspective of the intellectualist account,
limitations on the extent of appropriation are considered part and parcel
of what it means for an individual to mix their labour with an object, and
not external constraints on the activities of owners (or authors).
The three interpretations of the labour theory of authorship considered
above make use of an analogy between individual owners and individual
authors. The fourth, and final account, found in the work of Seana Shiffrin
(2001), is more radical, and attempts to move away from the proprietary
framework offered by labour theories. The key difference between Shiffrin’s
non-proprietary account and most other interpreters of Locke is that she
does not place a great emphasis on Locke’s argument that private property is
justified through individuals mixing their labour with unowned resources.
In her view, conceptions of authorship which focus on the importance of
labour give authors rights to their works that are too strong to be justified
on other Lockean grounds, such as material survival and subsistence, not to
mention Locke’s basic commitment to equality. Shiffrin argues that access
to intellectual products is not necessary for survival or subsistence and, due
to their non-rivalrous, inexhaustible nature, they can be used by an infinite
number of people without being used up. As she puts it: ‘The fully effective
use of an idea, proposition, concept, expression, invention, melody, picture
or sculpture generally does not require prolonged exclusive use’ (Shiffrin,
2001, p. 156). According to Shiffrin, this feature of intellectual products
precludes their privatisation from the common on Lockean grounds.
Shiffrin’s interpretation seems to give us a highly limited Lockean account of author entitlement: on her account, many of the property rights
that authors have in their works under the current copyright system are
unjustified. Her interpretation of Locke would favour systems of copyright
that provided very little proprietary protection for authors – authorship
would be seen as a shared endeavour, and most intellectual works would
be viewed as existing in a kind of permanent common, outside the scope
of propertisation. This view might be gaining support in certain ‘Copyleft’
movements, but it is not usually one that is seen as having philosophical
support from Lockean accounts. Shiffrin’s interpretation of Locke goes
against the grain of some standard accounts of Lockean authorship, then,
and this is largely because she chooses not to give Locke’s labour-mixing
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argument for the justification of property much prominence. In Shiffrin’s
view, labour plays a ‘subsidiary’ role in Locke’s account of appropriation,
‘justifying the appropriation by one individual rather than another once
private appropriation of the given sort of property is antecedently valid’
(2001, p. 144). Even if controversial as an interpretation of Locke, it might
nonetheless have interesting implications for copyright law’s definitions of
authorship and, in particular, it provides a way of bringing Lockean insights
into the burgeoning literature on non-proprietary accounts of copyright
(discussed below).
Authorship and personality
A different set of philosophical theories has been developed to support the
proposition that an author’s right to their work is justified on grounds that
it expresses their personality. Applied to tangible property, Radin (1982,
p. 957) has described this as the ‘personhood perspective’, noting that ‘to
achieve proper self-development – to be a person – an individual needs
some control over resources in the external environment’ (in the form of
property rights). In the context of intellectual property, the personality
theory requires that we grant creative works strong legal protection (against
misattribution, for example, or other actions which inhibit the author’s
control over their work). Not only is the personality theory said to be a
creator-centred theory, elevating the importance of the individual author
at the expense of both copiers and the public domain, but it is also assumed
to lead to stronger protection for copyright owners than other justifications
for copyright (Bently and Sherman, 2005, p. 39).
When we look further into the roots of the personality theory, however,
we find a confused and under-analysed picture of its philosophical lineage.
As Fisher notes, personality theories of intellectual property are thought
to be ‘loosely derived from the writings of Kant and Hegel’ (2001, p. 171).
However, such theories may turn out to be very ‘loosely’ derived from the
writings of these philosophers, and there is little scholarly work on personality theories in Anglo-American philosophical literature on copyright.3 As
Wendy Gordon notes:
[…] for investigation of whether and how the “personal” element [of intellectual property] should be important, we should probably look to sources
such as Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. At least in the English-speaking
world, although some valuable work has been done, application of those
schools of thought to IP is still at an early stage (Gordon, 2003, p. 10).
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Legal discussions of the personality theory so far have looked more to Hegel’s
theory of property for support and clarification than to Kant’s (Hughes, 1988;
Fisher, 2001; Netanel, 1993; Palmer, 1990). In this section, I consider whether
Hegel’s discussion of intellectual property justifies such a connection.
The personality theory of intellectual property is often said to apply
particularly well to the legal protection of artistic work. Indeed, it seems
especially well suited to support systems of ‘moral rights’ which include
artists’ rights to ‘control the public disclosure of their works, to withdraw
their works from public circulation, to receive appropriate credit for their
creations, and above all to protect their works against mutilation or destruction’ (Fisher, 2001, p. 174). These rights are said to be ‘perpetual, inalienable
and imprescriptible’, as is stated in Article L121-1 of the French Act on intellectual property (Code de la propriété intellectuelle). The personality theory
that underlies these legal protections, then, has two features: first, it gives
philosophical grounding to copyright law’s acknowledgement that some
intellectual property rights are inalienable. Second, it is a creator-centred
justification for intellectual property (Spence, 2007, p. 45). That is, the theory
is used to justify legislation that protects creators of intellectual works
against those who use, copy or modify their works.
Let us consider the first feature of personality theories – their focus on
the inalienability of an author’s personality. Hegel’s account offers a nuanced and complex perspective on this issue. His discussion of Entaußerung
(‘alienation’) at paragraphs 65-71 in the Philosophy of Right contains his most
extensive remarks on intellectual property. On the one hand, his comments
on the status of personality and mental traits such as ideas supports the view
that they are inalienable: ‘… those goods, or rather substantive characteristics which constitute my own private personality and the universal essence
of my self-consciousness are inalienable’ (§ 66). This seems to align closely
with the personality theory’s recognition of inalienable authors’ rights. On
the other hand, Hegel was prepared to view authors’ works as alienable
‘things’, despite the ‘internal’ or mental nature of intellectual production:
The distinctive quality of intellectual production may, by virtue of
the way in which it is expressed, be immediately transformed into the
external quality of a thing [Sache], which may in turn be produced by
others (§ 68).

Although it might seem that alienation of an author’s work is ‘alienation
of personality – a prohibited act in Hegel’s system’ (Hughes, 1988, p. 347),
Hegel goes on to argue that the author nonetheless remains the ‘owner of
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the universal ways and means of reproducing such products and things’ (§
68) suggesting that the author has a stronger right than the person to whom
they have alienated the external use of the object – a right to control the
various external uses of the work by others, in keeping with the personality
theory’s support of moral rights. This means that there is some support for
the notion of inalienable moral rights within Hegel’s account; however,
this is not because there is anything internal to the work which ‘embodies’
the author’s personality – the work is external, alienable property, unlike
personality which is inalienable – but rather because the author’s personality is inalienably connected to the work through the author’s control and
choice over the way it is used by others. The implications of this view for
copyright’s notion of the work are considered in more detail later below.
As regards the second feature of the personality theory – its creatorcentred focus – Hegel’s discussion begins by focusing on the legal protection
intellectual property offers to individual authors or creators:
The purely negative, but most basic, means of furthering the sciences and
arts is to protect those who work in them against theft and to provide
them with security for their property …(§ 69).

This suggests that Hegel viewed intellectual property as a system that
secured individual creators rights to their property; in keeping with the
standard personality theory, he viewed its purpose and goals from the
perspective of individual creators. Nonetheless, it soon becomes clear that
the central focus of Hegel’s account is the social nature of authorship:
The purpose of a product of the intellect is to be apprehended by other
individuals and appropriated by their representational thinking, memory,
thought, etc. Hence the mode of expression whereby these individuals in turn make what they have learned (for learning means not just
memorising or learning words by heart – the thoughts of others can be
apprehended only by thinking, and rethinking is also a kind of learning)
into an alienable thing, will always tend to have some distinctive form, so
that they can regard the resources which flow from it as their property,
and may assert their right to reproduce it (§ 69).

Hegel is implying here that individuals who ‘apprehend’ or ‘appropriate’
existing intellectual products can build upon them in such a way that it
might become very difficult to determine when repetition of ideas becomes
a special property of an individual, rather than part of the common pool of
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ideas. As such, his focus seems more balanced than standard interpretations
of personality theories would allow.
We should not be surprised that Hegel’s discussion moves away from a
purely creator-centred or individualistic account of authorship, since the
need for individuals to supersede or transcend subjectivity is crucial to his
philosophy. Hegel argues that the development of individual personality
involves some sort of ‘transition’ from the inner subjective world to the
external objective world, and that property is an important part of this
transition:
Abstract property contains the arbitrary moment of the particular need of
the single individual; this here is transformed … into care and acquisition
for a communal purpose, i.e. into an ethical quality (§ 179).

More generally, as the Philosophy of Right develops from abstract right to
Sittlichkeit, Hegel ceases to draw any distinction between the collective
interest of a community and the individual interests of the members of that
community. Hegel’s communitarianism and his developmental model of
personality mean that we should be cautious about describing his theory
of authorship as creator-centred and individualistic, along the lines of the
personality theory.

Authorship and communication
Before moving on to address the specific questions about authorship at
stake in this chapter, I shall briefly outline the final set of theories under
consideration: those rooted in a desire to steer discussions of copyright
away from proprietary frameworks, focusing instead on communicative
norms. In recent years, philosophers have engaged with some conceptual
issues raised by the very idea of intellectual ‘property’.4 Although some have
argued that it is perfectly coherent to treat works of authorship as works
of property (Biron, 2010), others have attempted to move the debate in a
more radical direction, seeking alternative (or supplementary) conceptual
frameworks for justifying copyright. Most theories of this sort are united in
the claim that works of authorship should be viewed not as commodities to
be owned but as vehicles of authorial communication. Often taking inspiration from Kant’s writings on copyright and linking them to his discussion of
public reason (Barron, 2012; Biron, 2012; Borghi, 2011; Capurro, 2000; Chiara
Pievatolo, 2008 and Johns, 2010) communicative approaches to copyright
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attempt to put forward principles of communication that can be drawn on
to distinguish an author’s legitimate communication ‘in their own name’
from their derivative communication in another’s name.
I have engaged with Kant’s writings on copyright, autonomy and public
reason in depth in previous work, so for the purposes of this piece I shall
provide only a brief summary of the communicative approach I have
defended elsewhere (Biron, 2012). Kant puts forward three principles of
communication in the Critique of Judgement (Guyer, ed., 2000, p. 173) –
principles I have termed authority, intelligibility and consistency – and they
can be applied to questions about authors’ rights in the following ways. First,
the principle of authority – to ‘think for oneself’ – points to the need for an
author’s speech to be non-derivative: the authority of the author’s speech
must not be derived from another person’s speech; rather, it must be carried
out in their own name. Second, the principle of intelligibility – to think from
the standpoint of everyone else – can be read as a necessary condition for
authorship that aims at public communication, not just self-expression.
Third, the principle ‘always to think consistently’ can be read as a demand
that authors adjust their communications to meet the requirements of
intelligibility consistently, depending on the interaction with and also the
scope of their possible audiences. As Garrath Williams puts it, this condition
entails ‘regarding oneself, first, as the genuine author of one’s judgments,
and second, as [epistemically] accountable to others’ (Williams, 2009, sec.
3:2). If principle [3] is in some sense regulative of [1] and [2], we can see that
public reasoning is not static but, just like all communication, dependent on
its audience, its interlocutors and the willingness of authors to reconsider
and re-evaluate their communications in light of the testing and mutual
questioning of their writings.
The above principles of public reason provide a way for copyright scholars
to engage with questions about the relationship between authorship, copyright and freedom of expression, but with some important modifications.
Indeed, Kant’s approach does not really warrant the label ‘expressive autonomy’ or ‘autonomy of expression’ (Treiger-Bar-Am, 2008, p. 1075), at least
to the extent that such labels emphasise a somewhat individualistic and
creator-centred approach to authorship. When we focus not on individual
acts of expression but more broadly on principles of communication – such
as intelligibility or consistency – we appreciate Onora O’Neill’s point that
‘freedom of expression can provide only one part of an adequate ethics of
communication’ (O’Neill, 2007, p. 169), because rights of self-expression
can be exercised without meeting other important principles of public
communication.
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We have now outlined three philosophical accounts of the justification
of copyright: based on labour, personality and communication respectively.
Interestingly, the extensive literature on labour theories has provided
room for a discussion of non-proprietary Lockean accounts of copyright;
the literature on the personality theory is at a less developed stage, in the
Anglo-American sphere at least, and still seems firmly rooted in a proprietary framework even if, as we have seen, Hegel’s writings do not support
the creator-centred standpoint that it is often taken to justify. Finally, a
Kantian approached based on principles of communication is explicitly
non-proprietary, and may seem to have more direct relevance to questions
about authorship; however, to fully appreciate the implications of these
theories, we can now apply them to the questions under consideration in
this chapter.

Author, work and originality
Let us begin with the question about originality and the ‘work’. Taking
the overarching distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary
conceptions of authorship, it has been argued that proprietary conceptions
of authorship are more committed to a notion of a ‘fixed’ work of authorship, understood analogously to a tangible object of property, and with
the concept of originality invoked to draw boundaries around it (Litman,
1990). Non-proprietary conceptions of authorship seem less focused on the
work as a fixed object and more focused on viewing the work as a process
of communication or a means to promote valuable social goals.
Let us now consider the above theories in more depth, starting with
Lockean conceptions of authorship. It is interesting that Shiffrin’s nonproprietary theory is the most ‘work-centred’ Lockean account, because
she begins her analysis with a discussion of possible objects of ownership
(or authorship), and then considers whether their nature is such as to justify
rights of ownership on Lockean grounds. Since she severs the connection
between labourer and product, she also seems to sever the connection
(important as it is to copyright law) between authorial originality (understood as origination) and the work. Once ‘the work’ is allowed to float free
of any connotations of authorial labour, Shiffrin is able to consider it more
in terms of its social value – the ways in which works of authorship might
stimulate others, be read or accessed by a range of different individuals and,
thereby, transformed and used in a variety of ways that promote valuable
social goals such as freedom of speech.
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The creationist labour account of authorship, on the other hand, would
seem to support a strong and intimate connection between authorial originality and the work. Indeed, it would support attempts to define originality
in value-laden ways – viewing works of authorship as shot through with
creativity and novelty. Of course, viewing originality in terms of ‘novelty’
is not at all in keeping with how copyright law defines the term: a work
of authorship ‘… need not be … novel or unique’ (CCH Canadian Ltd. v.
Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004, SCC 13) to count as original and thus
protected by copyright. But there have been some recent attempts in US
courts to specify copyright law’s originality requirement in terms of creativity as opposed to mere ‘sweat of the brow’ (most notably, the ruling in
Feist v. Rural Publications Inc., 1991). It might be argued that such appeals
to creativity have shifted the focus of copyright’s originality requirement
towards ‘the gospel of Romantic “authorship”’ (Jaszi, 1994, p. 34).5 That is
to say, appeals to creativity move beyond a fairly neutral specification of
originality in terms of origination and towards a more normatively loaded
conception of originality which could imply artistic merit, even genius,
thereby elevating the status of individual authors, and according them
stronger rights to control their works. Creationist conceptions of Lockean
authorship might indeed be invoked to support these more value-laden
conceptions of originality, though it must be noted that they offer just one
particular interpretation of Locke, and are by no means fully representative.
Finally, on the intellectualist labour account of authorship, there does
not seem to be a presumption that works of authorship are original in the
sense of being ‘novel or ‘creative’, even though there is still an important
connection to be drawn between an author’s labour and their work (unlike
Shiffrin’s non-proprietary account, which severs this connection). According to the intellectualist account, we should look at the author’s intellectual
input – such as judgement or choice in bringing raw materials within their
plans and purposes6 – to determine what counts as a work, and thus leave
room for a definition of originality that is more neutral than the creationist
focus on ‘novelty’ or ‘creativity’. How expansive this definition of originality
should be – and hence how extensively we might grant rights over works
of authorship – would be determined by considerations of the contours of
more general rights to self-government, held equally by authors and users
of works. Overall, then, labour theories of authorship offer a variety of
answers to the question of how copyright law could understand the ‘work’
and ‘originality’, and the most promising theories for addressing questions
about internal constraints on the scope of authorship are Shiffrin’s nonproprietary account and the intellectualist account outlined above.
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What are the implications of Hegel’s personality theory for copyright
law’s category of ‘the work’? We have seen that, far from there being an
intimate connection between an author’s personality and the work in which
personality is expressed, Hegel seems to sever the connection between
‘personality’ and ‘work’. As Netanel puts it: ‘Hegel regarded intellectual
works as external things rather than as extensions of personality’ (Netanel,
1993, p. 377). This goes against copyright law’s suggestion that works of
authorship can be delineated by looking for a ‘stamp of personality’ or
individuality as evidence for authorial originality. Hegel’s focus seems to
be not on the work itself, and the extent to which it displays the author’s
personality, but rather on the ways in which an author’s personality can
be expressed through various aspects of control and choice over how their
work is used. This means, of course, that Hegel’s account supports the idea
that authors’ works should be protected from mutilation, destruction or
misattribution, if so desired by the author. But that is not to say that there
is anything inherent to ‘the work’ that need display or contain the author’s
personality, and that personality is somehow ontologically built into a work
of authorship; personality, rather, is a category associated with choice and
control over how a work is used by others.
Finally, as I have argued elsewhere, copyright law’s originality requirement harmonises with the first principle of Kantian public reason outlined
above – the principle of authority. Copyright’s originality requirement applies
to both new and transformative work and, in both cases, the key to determining originality rests on the question of the source of the work: to count as
original for the purposes of copyright it ‘… must not be copied from another
work … it should originate from the author’.7 Understanding originality in
this sense as origination, we can revisit the distinction between derivative
and non-derivative forms of communication, which underlies the principle
of authority. A transformative work of authorship whose authority is actually
derived from a primary work cannot be classed as having ‘originated’ from
the transformative author – in this sense, works of authorship that count
as ‘derivative’ under the principle of authority would likewise not count
as ‘original’ for the purposes of copyright protection. On the other hand,
provided the transformative work’s authority is derived from the transformative author’s own communication, the transformative work would count as
‘non-derivative’ under the principle of authority – and, for the purposes of
copyright protection, it would count as original. Although a lot more needs
to be said about exactly how the contours of originality might be drawn, this
approach indicates that copyright need not base its conception of authorial
originality on a proprietary model, as is so often assumed to be the case.
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Romantic authorship
Let us now turn to some questions about romantic authorship, and the
extent to which the theories outlined above either reinforce or challenge it.
Exactly what copyright scholars mean by ‘romantic authorship’ is, of course,
a complex question to address. As Erlend Lavik notes in his contribution to
this book, the so-called ‘myth’ of romantic authorship, and its impact on
copyright law, requires detailed examination and is by no means settled.
For the purposes of this section, I draw on the interpretation of romantic
authorship offered by Martha Woodmansee, according to which authors
are solitary geniuses who, ‘blessed with unique insight, bring forth new
and original works of art into the world’ (Woodmansee, 1984, pp. 429–31).
There has been a tendency to view some Lockean accounts of property as
giving support to theories of this sort. As Netanel puts it, ‘drawing upon
a combination of Lockean labor-desert theory and nineteenth-century
romanticism … [it is argued that] copyright should be immune from exceptions and limitations’ (Netanel, 2008, p. 21). However, we have already seen
that the labour-desert theory of property, let alone authorship, is conceptually confused. And Shiffrin’s account – focused as it is on the maximal
use of intellectual products or works, rather than the labour of individual
authors – seems far removed from anything like a romantic conception
of authorship. Might the other interpretations of Locke – the creationist
or the intellectualist accounts – nonetheless be connected to romantic
conceptions of authorship?
To answer this question, we must return to the issue of the extent to
which we might view an author’s labour as dependent upon the prior labour
of others; according to the definition of romantic authorship outlined above,
a strong emphasis is placed on the input of the author as having created
something new and unique, unencumbered by external influences. And
this sort of view is not uncommon in discussions of authorship. Lawrence
Becker, for example, defines authorship as an activity in which the author’s
labour is ‘the beginning of the causal account of the product’ (Becker, 1993,
p. 614). Jeremy Waldron also makes a similar point:
What copyright appears to uphold are rights of pure agency, rights in
something that literally did not exist in any form before the author put
his mind to work (Waldron, 1993, p. 879).

The idea behind both of these claims is that holders of intellectual property
rights have rights to objects that might not have come into existence at
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all without their efforts. And this means that we can ask various questions about the ways in which they were invented or created, and imagine
that they might never have existed in the first place. If we simply left our
analysis of authorial labour at this, the most suitable Lockean theory of
authorship to support it might be the creationist accounts which focuses
on unencumbered acts of authorial creative labour, harmonising well with
romantic conceptions of authorship.
However, although the above interpretation of authorial labour as
essential to the formation of intellectual products might be an accurate
description of the ways in which authors labour to produce their works,
this is not to say that we should leave our analysis at that. Indeed, the two
quotations by Becker and Waldron leave open the (highly likely) possibility
that authors often mix their labour in ways that are dependent upon the
prior labour of others. Thus, we can acknowledge that authors do indeed
exercise ‘agency’ in producing their works, without sliding into a seemingly
strong proposition that they do so entirely unencumbered by external
influences. As Hettinger argues:
Invention, writing and thought in general do not operate in a vacuum;
intellectual creation is not creation ex nihilo. Given this vital dependence of a person’s thoughts on the ideas of those who came before her,
intellectual products are fundamentally social products (Hettinger, 1989,
p. 38).

Even so-called ‘primary’ authors are said to be transformative authors of a
kind, on this view, because their writings are nonetheless dependent on a
number of different background conditions, including works of authorship
that might have inspired and influenced them in their writing. It is still
important to have some way of recognising the extent to which a particular
act of labouring has transformed some previously existing idea or ideas
into something different – thereby enabling us to give recognition to that
author’s effort – but this is not to say that even the labour of primary authors
can be separated entirely from the prior labour of others. The intellectualist
account, as opposed to the creationist account, can leave room for this sense
of the ‘intertextuality’ of authorship, since it does not focus on the nature of
the work – i.e. whether it was created from nothing or from some previously
existing thing – but focuses instead on the author’s use of the work, and the
author’s labouring on it in the sense of bringing it within their legitimate
plans and purposes. As such, the intellectualist account can fit a wider range
of cases of authorship, and does not automatically support the questionable
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view – associated with some forms of romantic authorship – that authors
work in a kind of a vacuum, independently of the labour of others.
Turning now to personality theories, much of the literature assumes that
they are closely allied with romantic conceptions of authorship. Palmer,
for example, suggests that the traditional personality theory errs in its
excessive focus on the personality of the author and in its appeal to romantic
notions of creativity, which stress subjective experience and its expression, emphasising the sublime experience of the artist as opposed to the
experience of the user or copier (Palmer, 1990). However, our above outline
of Hegel’s theory revealed a more complex picture: although Hegel argued
that personality is an inalienable part of the self, he also thought that acts
of expression could transform inner personality into external, alienable
property. Moreover, he viewed the alienation of property as crucial for the
development of personality. This has the result that Hegel’s own account of
authorship is not individualistic or creator-centred, but thoroughly communitarian in its outlook. As noted above, Hegel argued that ‘the purpose
[Bestimmung] of a product of the intellect is to be apprehended by other
individuals and appropriated by their representation, thinking, memory,
thought, etc.’ (§ 69), expressing concern for the common pool of ideas,
not the legal protection of any one particular author or creator. As such,
the conception of authorship we should associate with Hegel is neither
‘romantic’ nor ‘individualistic’, but leaves room for the various senses in
which we might speak of authorship as collective, even when understood
within some kind of personality-based framework. It should be clear, then,
that Hegel’s writings cannot be used to give strong philosophical support to
romantic conceptions of authorship. This is a view echoed by Schroeder, who
argues that ‘the personality theory of intellectual property that dominates
American intellectual property scholarship is imbued by a romanticism
that is completely antithetical to Hegel’s project’ (Schroeder, 2005, p. 454).
A closer reading of Hegel’s account of intellectual property might also
challenge scholars to rethink the ways in which the personality theory
should be applied as a theory of authorship. Returning to Waldron and
Jaszi’s separate observations about authorship being at the nexus between
individual and social defences of copyright, Hegel makes some important
observations about the social goals that copyright can promote – for
example, his comment that legitimate copying can be a way of learning
or acquiring knowledge brings out a connection between copyright and
valuable social goals such as education. As Hegel notes, the ‘purpose
[Bestimmung] of a product of the intellect is to be apprehended by other
individuals … for learning means not just memorising or learning words by
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heart – the thoughts of others can be apprehended only by thinking, and
rethinking is also a kind of learning’ (§ 69). And Stillman points out that
people take possession of themselves, on Hegel’s account, through Bildung
(education), ‘acquiring the capacity to think of ourselves as persons by
regarding ourselves as members of a community of persons, a universal selfconsciousness’ (Stillman, 1991, p. 219). Theorists looking to strengthen the
connection between promoting authorship and encouraging desirable social
goals such as education might therefore find support in Hegel’s writings.
Finally, does a Kantian approach help to unpack and challenge copyright’s
alleged appeal to romantic conceptions of authorship? Kant’s writings on
copyright illustrate that he was committed to the view that the creative
process is in fact transformative; authors often use, copy and transform
existing materials in order to exercise their own communicative abilities.
This seems quite a different conception of authorship from the romantic
conception considered above. Moreover, in contrast to the emphasis on
‘authorial genius’ we often find connected to romantic accounts of authorship, Kant mentions the role of genius in his work on public reason as an
example of how genius must be independently governed and constrained
by the norms of reason. Rather than being a solitary exercise of individual
expression, that is, even the operations of genius must be constrained by
standards and principles. This is a far cry from the traditional ideal of the
romantic author-genius, sometimes thought to be responsible for so much
of the rhetoric surrounding the expansion of authors’ rights. Thus, neither
personality nor communicative approaches to copyright provide support
for romantic conceptions of authorship, and only one particular and limited
interpretation of the labour theory does so.

Collective authorship
Finally, we can turn to some questions about collective authorship. It is
important to keep in mind three different models of collective authorship
as we reflect on the extent to which these different justificatory frameworks
might be relevant to questions about multiple authorship:
i. transformative authorship, where an author or composer takes an existing work and transforms it into something else;
ii. multiple authorship, where a work might be divided into separate but
multiple contributions by different authors (such as an encyclopaedia,
classified in copyright law as a ‘collective work’); and
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iii. collaborative authorship, where it is not possible to distinguish ‘isolated’
contributions, and there is joint collaboration between authors towards
some shared end (in copyright law terms, a work of ‘co-authorship’).
The discussion of romantic authorship above has already addressed questions about transformative authorship; the focus in this section will be on
collective authorship as either ‘multiple’ or ‘collaborative’ authorship.
At first sight, it might seem that non-proprietary accounts of authorship
would apply well to collective models of authorship. But it would be a
mistake to equate ‘single author’ with ‘proprietary author’. After all, property rights can be held by groups and collectives – such as corporations
or co-operatives – as well as by individuals. In the case of a collaborative
work of authorship, why should we assume the authors in question would
be any less likely than single authors to view their efforts as requiring some
kind of proprietary protection? And there may be even more of a case for
allocating proprietary rights to multiple authors of the same work, since
boundaries would need to be drawn up making clear which elements of
the work belonged to whom, to ensure certain authors were not given
undue credit, or vice versa. With cases of transformative authorship, we
could see Shiffrin’s non-proprietary account having some application, but
it would still be important to analyse the sort of transformation involved,
and the challenge is to offer an appropriate theoretical framework for
doing this, if we assume that the primary author is not the ‘owner’ of the
primary work.
On the creationist account of labour, it would seem that any attempt to
make sense of collective authorship would be done with a strong presumption of proprietary control to the primary author. However, with the case of
a collaborative work, there is a sense in which the different authors of the
work together form one ‘single’ author. It is conceivable that such a group
of this kind could be viewed under the lens of romantic authorship – after
all, we might describe their work as creative, and we might assume that as
a group they worked together in a solitary way, in the sense that they were
unencumbered by the influences of others except themselves. With cases
of multiple authorship, however, the creationist account would analyse
the distinct contributions of each author in a particularly slanted way:
it would be unlikely to allocate a share of proprietary protection to each
author equally, but would instead look to give priority to the ‘star’ or ‘lead’
author, understood as having had the truly original idea which the other
contributors were merely embellishing or developing in some way. The
same would apply for cases of transformative authorship, as we have seen.
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According to the intellectualist account of labour, there would be no
problem arguing that intellectual production was a shared enterprise, as
with the case of collaborative authorship: a group could be given similar
rights of self-government to individuals. But there would be no need to
view groups as having produced their works ‘romantically’ or in a solitary
or unencumbered fashion. With the case of multiple authorship, there
would be no obvious need to prioritise the ‘lead’ or ‘parent’ author as with
the creationist account, but each would depend more quantitatively on
the extent of the labour involved. Finally, with regards to transformative
authorship, we would consider the extent to which the transformative
author had brought the (transformed) work within their own legitimate
plans and purposes, rather than merely ‘free-riding’ on the labour of the
primary author, thereby violating their right to self-government.
Turning now to Hegel’s account, it might seem as though the notion of
personality is strongly tied to particular individuals, which makes it difficult
at first sight to see how an individual’s personality could be ‘merged’ with
a group or collective, whilst still retaining its personal quality. However,
Hegel’s own developmental model of personality, which I discussed above,
draws a connection between embodiment of personality in external objects
and the development of individual personality. As Charles Taylor puts it:
[…] personhood involves recognition – that space of evaluation of the
person’s existence is intrinsically and inseparably a public space … The
very struggle to gain recognition is fated to self-frustration because it
can never be properly achieved until we achieve the kind of community
described in the passage which ends this section [§ 195] in the Phenomenology: a society where the I is a we and we is an I (Taylor, 1991, p. 68).

Thus, Hegel’s developmental model of personality provides an interesting
basis for personality theories of authorship to be applied to cases of joint
or group communication.
Finally, Kantian standards of public reason might be applied to groups
as well as to individuals – at least, there is no conceptual problem with
the idea of ‘group’ communication, and no obvious bias towards individual
communicators. Indeed, the point of grounding Kantian theories in principles of communication rather than individual autonomy is precisely to
guard against ‘individualistic’ readings of communications as ‘expression’.
For example, in cases of contested joint authorship – where one party
claims authorship and another denies it – standards of public reason might
be drawn upon to adjudicate between the claims. After all, copyright
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requires that a contribution of joint authorship be original – and, as we
have seen, this harmonises with the principle of public reason called the
principle of authority. Copyright also requires there to be collaboration in
the sense of a shared purpose of some kind: and this might be spelled out
using the principle of consistency, which focuses on the dynamic nature
of communication, and the need for an author’s communication to be
adjusted in light of input from others. In some cases, individuals who
enable communication to be adjusted might not be ‘authors’ as such but
rather assistants or aids to authorship. But in other cases, the input could
be significant enough that two such individuals share a common design
for the work, and thereby become joint authors. Thus, communicative
models of authorship enable us to broaden our inquiry about authorship
beyond a proprietary focus on the fixed ‘work’ and an exclusive focus on
the ‘creator’s’ role in its production.
Of course, further refinement would be needed to address fully the questions about which forms of communication are authorial and which are not,
short of very broad principles of public reason, but the brief sketch above
indicates that the communicative approach has resources at its disposal
for such a project.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined some different interpretations of the writings
of Locke, Hegel and Kant, under the headings ‘labour’, ‘personality’ and
‘communication’ respectively. It has considered the extent to which they
have application to three important questions about copyright’s conception
of authorship: originality, the work and collective authorship in copyright
law. We have seen that, under these broad headings, various conceptions
of authorship seem to follow: neither the labour nor personality theories
are unified, complete theories of authorship, but might be interpreted in
a variety of ways; even the communicative account I have outlined is just
one amongst many explanations for how copyright might be grounded in
communicative norms.
Thus, as scholars from law and humanities continue to grapple with
categories of ‘authorship’ and ‘the work’, they should be prepared to
challenge the traditional bifurcations we tend to create in philosophical accounts of copyright. Indeed, one important overarching question
to consider is whether scholarship on authorship in the humanities has
anything to say about authorship as a category that can generate its own
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internal constraints against so-called copyright ‘expansionism’, rather
than these constraints being imposed from outside (by focusing on user
privileges, for example). This article has argued that certain components
of labour, personality and communication do indeed support the idea of
authorship as an internally constraining process – one that may contain
within its very definition the power to generate limitations on the legal
rights that attach to its products. The next stage forward for researchers
in philosophy is to work through the issue of how we might blend together
these theoretical approaches which are so often wrongly presented as in
theoretical opposition.

Notes
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

The distinction could be challenged on the basis that the material common
is not completely static; people labour on land and raw materials to change
and ‘cultivate’ it. But there does seem to be a difference between resources
that are given to us by nature and intellectual resources that are given to
us as a result of individuals creating, producing and inventing them; the
difference lies, as Shiffrin notes, in the fact that the initial expanse of material resources exists ‘independently of human efforts’ (Shiffrin, 2001, p. 158).
Nonetheless, it must still be noted that this construal of the common does
not really explain the shared basis upon which individuals create (such as
linguistic conventions and ideas), and is silent on questions about how to
isolate one person’s labour from the shared basis upon which it depends.
I am grateful to Mireille van Eechoud for clarifying this point.
I am aware that these examples only relate to individual acts of authorship:
I discuss the implications for collective authorship further in the section
Collective authorship.
Although the personality perspective has obvious application to continental systems of copyright, here I consider their application to Anglo-American copyright doctrine and their discussion in Anglo-American copyright
theory. I am aware that personality theories have been discussed extensively
outside of the Anglo-American context, and regret that there is not scope in
this chapter to explore this literature.
See, for example, the collection of essays in the 2010 edition of The Monist
(93c: 3).
It is not clear that courts have in fact adopted this approach (Lavik and Van
Gompel, 2013). See also Lavik’s contribution in this book, especially the section entitled ‘A lack of interpretative constraint’. Regardless of its practical
implementation, I mention it here it to illustrate the theoretical possibility
of Lockean accounts being used to support such a position.
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6.
7.

For discussion of the ways in which an approach of this kind is adopted by
EU and Dutch Courts, see the chapter on ‘Creativity, Autonomy and Personal Touch’ elsewhere in this collection by Van Gompel.
Peterson, J., University of London Press Ltd v. University Tutorial Press Ltd.
(1916).
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Romantic authorship in copyright law
and the uses of aesthetics
Erlend Lavik

Every writer, as Jose Luis Borges says, creates his own precursors (an elegant
way of saying, amongst other things, that all intellectual history is post factum).
(Seán Burke, 2008, p. 8)

Scholars of the arts as well as scholars of copyright law – especially in the
US1 – have for decades struggled to kill off the ideology of Romantic authorship, though it is far from clear precisely what it consists of, or why and to
whom it poses such danger. The situation brings to mind film historian Tom
Gunning’s memorable observation in a different context that the persistent
attacks ‘begin to take on something of the obsessive and possibly necrophilic
pleasure of beating a dead horse’ (1998, p. xiii).
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part critically
examines the idea that the myth of Romantic authorship is deeply ingrained
in copyright law and has propelled its expansion. The second part explores
the broader but related issue of how insights from the humanities can
usefully inform copyright scholarship. Taking as its starting point Roland
Barthes’ famous essay ‘The Death of the Author’ it argues that it is extremely
demanding to find common ground, for even though the disciplines overlap
conceptually they are fundamentally at cross-purposes epistemologically.
I maintain that we must first identify where the aims and practices of
aesthetics and law actually converge, and deem it to be in the area of
interpretation and evaluation, which is obviously one of the core competences of scholars of the arts, and also something that courts resort to at
the infringement stage.

Part I
It is widely held that the ideas of Romantic authorship that took hold in
the late 18th century placed high poetic value on novelty and traced the
source of originality to the mind of the author. What was new about this
ideology was the degree of independence from tradition attributed to writ-
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ers. The Romantic era overflows with depictions that – at least when taken
in isolation – suggest that the highest forms of poetry emanate singularly
from the mind or soul of the author-genius. Thus Edward Young writes in
Conjectures on Original Composition (1759), one of the founding texts of the
new ideology of the Romantic author, that ‘The pen of an original writer, like
Armida’s wand, out of a barren waste calls a blooming spring’ (1918, p. 7).
It is also conventional wisdom that the rhetoric of Romantic authorship
both contained and came to blend with notions of ownership and claims to
rights, and that it gradually entered copyright law. How literary discourse
found its way into legal discourse is a more contentious matter. On the
one hand, causality is simply unspecified or abstracted: the texts of the
Romantic poets are treated as a kind of conceptual incubator that somehow
spread and took hold in other spheres. On the other hand, the discourse of
Romantic authorship is posited as a tool strategically conceived by writers
specifically in order to acquire legal recognition for, and thus profits from,
the fruits of their labour. Martha Woodmansee, for example, writes that
the modern concept of the author:
[…] is the product of the rise in the eighteenth century of a new group
of individuals: writers who sought to earn their livelihood from the sale
of their writings to the new and rapidly expanding reading public. In
Germany this new group of individuals found itself without any of the
safeguards for its labors that today are codified in copyright laws. In
response to this problem, and in an effort to establish the economic
viability of living by the pen, these writers set about redefining the nature
of writing (1984, p. 426).

There is evidence to suggest that the latter instrumentalist account is somewhat overstated, as the ideology of Romantic authorship arose in response
also, or even predominantly, to non-legal developments. Jessica Millen,
for example, notes that it was also a reaction against the advent of mass
production. Industrialisation and commodification brought on mechanical
reproduction as an extreme form of standardised and automated imitation
against which the uniqueness and authenticity of human creativity stood
out (2010, p. 93).
A much challenged influence
The extent to which the ideology of Romantic authorship actually informed
copyright doctrine has also been challenged. Trevor Ross argues that the
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1774 decision to reject the booksellers’ claim for perpetual copyright represented a rejection of Romantic theories, and that it represents ‘a growing
awareness of the status of English literature as a ‘tradition’, one whose
artistic vitality, it was felt at the time, could only be maintained by restricting the material privileges of authors’ (1992, p. 3). Similarly, Simon Stern
notes that: ‘Although some commentators on aesthetics treated literary
creativity and ownership as intertwined concepts, that linkage finds no
corollary in contemporaneous legal doctrine’ (2009, p. 69), and that: ‘Once
one looks for evidence of a link between aesthetic theories of creativity and
legal theories of literary property, it is striking how rarely anyone invoked
the concept of aesthetic originality during the eighteenth-century copyright
debates’ (ibid., p. 83).
For Oren Bracha the conventional wisdom that copyright law absorbed
the literary concept of authorship has a grain of truth, but such accounts
tend to be ‘incomplete or flawed’ (2008, p. 192). Examining the period in
the 19th century in which the concept of originality was embedded in US
copyright law, he finds that it was mobilised in highly contradictory ways.
One line of cases treated it as a substantial threshold requiring novelty or
merit. Another line of cases treated originality as a minimal requirement
on the anti-Romantic grounds that culture is inevitably cumulative in
nature (ibid., pp. 200–208).
Moreover, just as the literary notion of originality was shaped by developments outside of aesthetics, so the notion of originality in copyright was
shaped by developments outside the legal sphere. Bracha convincingly
argues that economic interests, especially, exerted a constant force against
demanding originality restrictions, but also that changing notions of the
legitimate role of government and the appearance of a market conception
of value played their part.
More contentious still is the assertion that Romantic authorship ideology
has continued to dominate copyright doctrine to this very day, and has
been a, possibly even the, driving force in the expansion of copyright ever
since.2 It is even more vulnerable to the same two main objections that
have been raised against the claim that copyright law adopted key tenets
of the ideology of Romantic authorship in the 18th and 19th century: First,
that important doctrinal structures of contemporary copyright law simply
are at odds with Romantic authorship, and second, that there are other and
better explanations for copyright’s expansion.
The first critique has been put forward by Mark A. Lemley, who points
out that the rules regarding the ownership of intellectual property rights
frequently privilege the interests of corporations rather than individual
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authors. The US work-for-hire-doctrine, according to which the commissioner rather than the creator of the work is deemed the author, is the most
obvious example,3 but doctrines of assignment and transfer too serve to
steer copyright from individuals to corporations (1997, pp. 882–883). He
also points to the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine to
make the more general observation that ‘many of the fundamental issues in
intellectual property law are shaped not by romantic authorship, but by the
desire to protect intellectual property adequately without overprotecting
it’ (ibid., p. 890).
The second objection has been most forcefully raised by Lionel Bently,
who injects a heavy dose of realpolitik into the claim that Romantic authorship has been the prime mover in copyright’s expansion. The most obvious
alternative explanation for Bently is the lobbying efforts of corporate
interest groups to gain copyright protection for new categories of works,
and to obtain stronger protection for works that are already eligible for
protection (2008a, pp. 26–41). Moreover, he notes that internationalisation,
particularly the establishment and enforcement of international norms
through treaties such as the Berne Treaty, and regional harmonisation, such
as the effort to create a European internal market, have played a key role
on the extension of copyright law (ibid., pp. 45–57). While there is nothing
intrinsic about either process that requires copyright protection to expand
rather than decrease, Bently lists a number of practical and political reasons
why internationalisation and regional harmonisation very clearly tend to
pull in just that direction.
Bently also breaks down how national economic and trade interests
and the rise of neo-liberal economic theory have given rise to stronger
copyright protection (ibid., pp. 57–62), and mentions other likely aiders
and abettors, such as resistance to unfair competition law, commitments
to natural rights conceptions, and the inclination to equate labour or value
with property (ibid., pp. 62–63). Finally, Bently offers several historical
case studies of copyright expansion, and finds that even at its height in
the 19th century the rhetoric of Romantic authorship was counterbalanced
by an awareness of the cumulativeness of culture and concerns for the
public good, and hence ‘did not carry sufficient persuasive power to win
the day’ (ibid., p. 78). In the 20th century, he argues, the main reasons
for copyright’s expansion largely lie elsewhere, as the influence of the
ideology of Romantic authorship seems to have been increasingly marginal.
Bently thus persuasively concludes that among the causes that have lead
to copyright’s overbreadth ‘The romantic author was, at most, a minor
accomplice’ (ibid., p. 21).
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In the following, I turn to the methodological difficulties that ensue from
the proposition that we can construct historical explanations by tracing
the influence of prevalent ideas as they somehow wander from one domain
(like the literary) to another (like the legal). I will call the argument that
copyright law has become infused with, or come to mirror, the ideas of
Romantic authorship propounded in the 18th century the ‘reflectionist
hypothesis’.
‘Influence’ as historical explanation
Philosopher Quentin Skinner has pointed out that the enterprise of ‘isolating
leading influences and tracing out connection in terms of them … seems a
good means of abridging the enormous range of facts with which a historian … is typically confronted’, but that the logical form of the proposition
that one idea influenced another idea or event is nevertheless ‘somewhat
peculiar’ (1966, pp. 203–204). On the one hand, the historian must establish
a relationship close enough to dissociate similarities from pure chance
and, on the other, loose-limbed enough to separate the connection from
brute causality:
The historian is not expected to provide a totally determined account of
any situation, but to allow both that his assessment of the influences at
work could always be disputed by the interpretation of another historian,
and that his own explanation could always in principle be upset by
the discovery of new facts. It seems, then, to be intended to point out
something at once rather obvious and yet curiously difficult to grasp
– that one idea or event is in some sense dependent on another yet not
entirely dependent; and that they are thus alike yet not exactly alike
(ibid., p. 204).

This is a challenge that faces all historical explanations, but it is one that
seems to be particularly acute in the case of Romantic authorship’s migration from aesthetics to law. Skinner notes that: ‘The judgment that [one
idea or event] P1 influenced [some other idea or event] P2 seems in effect
to entail that we see repeated in P2 the elements which also give to P1 its
characteristic form’ (ibid., p. 207). One obvious problem facing the claim
that the Romantic ideology of authorship has influenced copyright law is
the glaring divergence between literary and legal conceptions of originality.
Fundamental tenets of the Romantic era – for example that originality is
tied to aesthetic novelty and genius; to individual sincerity, to the ‘spontane-
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ous overflow of powerful feelings’, in Wordsworth’s famous phrase; that
the poetic gift is possessed only by a select number of individuals; and that
the poet is merely a vessel for creative energies beyond his control – are
simply absent from the legal discourse. This begs the question: Exactly what
are the core characteristics of Romantic authorship that have manifested
themselves in copyright law?
Skinner notes that the commonsense view assumes that it is a fairly
straightforward and uncontentious task to identify the key features or
doctrines of idea P1, but that:
[…] there is an obvious though apparently elusive sense in which such an
assumption is bound to be false. To see historical relationships in terms of
repeated patterns of thought or action is to imply not merely that thinking
or acting are uniformly purposive, but that they do characteristically
result in patterns. There is thus a very strong predisposition, particularly
evident in histories of thought, to ignore the difficulties about proper
emphasis and tone which must arise in making any sort of paraphrase
of a work, and to assume instead that its author must have had some
doctrine, or a ‘message’, which can be readily abstracted and more simply
put (ibid., p. 209).

As the final sentence suggests, Skinner thinks that the problem persists
even when the historian sets out to explain how the ideas of a single
individual influenced those of another, and even when they are engaged
in the same enterprise in the same domain: ‘The proposition that P2 was
influenced by P1, based on corroborating their characteristics, cannot
in principle explain P2 with any degree of proof. It will always remain
open to the sceptic […] to claim that the correlations are random, that the
features of P1 have been repeated in P2 by chance, that no necessary inner
connection has been demonstrated at all’ (ibid., p. 208). The historian is
ultimately ‘committed irreducibly to the language of betting and guessing’
(ibid., p. 211).
The problems Skinner highlights are compounded manifold in the
reflectionist hypothesis, as it is pitched at such a high level of generality.
It concerns not the influence of one thinker upon another, but rather a
whole group of thinkers upon another group of thinkers, who are, moreover,
engaged in a rather different enterprise, that of ruling in matters of the law
as opposed to investigating the origins and nature of poetic originality.
Accordingly, it is even more awkward to extrapolate the core characteristics
of P1, the doctrine or message that exerts some influence on P2, for the
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core ‘theory’ they allegedly share is buried under so much multeity. There
is always a danger that the historian not merely extracts the essence of
some coherent and pre-existing intellectual position ‘out there’, merely
awaiting discovery, but actively constructs it through the careful selection
and arrangement of compatible parts.
There are also tensions between various conceptions of Romantic authorship. For example, the presumption that poetic originality emanates from
within the author is hard to fully reconcile with notions of divine inspiration, yet these ideas coexisted in the Romantic period. Moreover, whenever
the writings of individual Romantic poets or philosophers are analysed
in greater detail, much more complex, contradictory, and idiosyncratic
points of view tend to appear. For example, Mario Biagioli argues that the
influential German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s concept of genius
focused on general processes of thought rather than on singularly original
textual objects. He thus uncoupled genius from notions of aesthetic quality
and novelty, and conceived of it as a trait shared by all. Fichte’s position is
quite similar to the modern notion of ‘personal expression’ in copyright
law, except that he attributed personal expression not just to authors, but
also to readers.
Thomas McFarland, meanwhile, writes that: ‘It is not the case, as one
sometimes hears, that earlier writers [i.e. before Romanticism] were not
concerned with originality; they were concerned, but not so deeply and not
so insistently as were the Romantics. It is merely a note of special intensity
that is sounded, not one without any cultural precedent whatever’ (1974,
p. 450). And though he finds that Conjectures on Original Composition most
unmistakably signalises this shift in emphasis, even for Edward Young
originality ‘is not an isolated conception, but one that occupies a place in
the relationship of individual to tradition. Originality is seen in fact as a
variant of imitation’ (ibid., p. 452).
Indeed, an awareness that pure originality is inconceivable, that to rob
and borrow is not only fair, but inevitable, surfaces throughout history,
among theorists as well as artists. In the 16th century, Italian poet Marco
Girolamo Vida called:
Come then all ye youths and, careless of censure, give yourselves up to
STEAL and drive the spoil from every source! Unhappy is he […] who,
rashly trusting to his own strength and art, as though in need of no
external help, in his audacity refuses to follow the trustworthy footsteps
of the ancients, abstaining, alas! unwisely from plunder, and thinking to
spare others (quoted in McFarland, 1974, p. 472).
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In his conversations with Eckermann, Goethe said that:
People are always talking about originality; but what do they mean? As
soon as we are born, the world begins to work upon us, and keeps on to
the end. What can we call ours except energy, strength, will? If I could
give an account of what I owe to great predecessors and contemporaries,
there would be but a small remainder (Eckmann, 1839, p. 147).

Thus he found the effort to trace the sources of a poet’s originality absurd,
for ‘we might as well inquire, when we see a strong man, about the oxen,
sheep, and swine, which he has eaten, and which has contributed to his
strength’ (ibid., p. 266).
Henry Fielding wrote in 1749 that ‘the ancients may be considered as
a rich commons, where every person […] hath a free right to fatten his
muse’ (Fielding, 1832, p. 275); Emerson in the 1830s that ‘There never was an
original writer. Each is a link in an endless chain. To receive and to impart
are the talents of the poet and he ought to possess both in equal degrees
(Emerson, 1959, p. 284); Mark Twain in 1903 that ‘substantially all ideas are
second-hand, consciously and unconsciously drawn from a million outside
sources, and daily used by the garnerer with a pride and satisfaction born
of the superstition that he originated them; whereas there is not a rag of
originality about them anywhere except the little discoloration they get from
his mental and moral calibre and his temperament, and which is revealed
in characteristics of phrasing’ (quoted in Vaidhyanathan, 2001, p. 64).
These sentiments are of course prevalent among contemporary artists
as well. In 2005 filmmaker Jim Jarmusch noted that:
Nothing is original. Steal from anywhere that resonates with inspiration
or fuels your imagination. Devour old films, new films, music, books,
paintings, photographs, poems, dreams, random conversations, architecture, bridges, street signs, trees, clouds, bodies of water, light and
shadows. Select only things to steal from that speak directly to your soul.
If you do this, your work (and theft) will be authentic. Authenticity is
invaluable; originality is nonexistent. And don’t bother concealing your
thievery – celebrate it if you feel like it. In any case, always remember
what Jean-Luc Godard said: ‘It’s not where you take things from – it’s
where you take them to (2004, n.p.).

It would be possible to put together a sizable volume of quotes from artists,
critics and theorists expressing similar sentiments. When the ideology of
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Romantic authorship is such a popular and easy target of criticism, then,
it is in large part because its detractors tend to attack a caricature or, as
Andrew Bennett calls it ‘a fiction of subsequent critical reception, a fantasy,
a back-formation or ‘retrojection’ produced through a partial reading of
Romantic poetics since in fact Romantic thinking around authorship is
precisely constituted in and by conflict, paradox, instability’ (2005, p. 71).
There is no reason to think that the Romantics believed that poets literally
created ex nihilo, or had made a clean break with art history, with generic
and linguistic conventions and traditions. Neither is there any reason to
think that such ideas have literally taken root in copyright law. As Oren
Bracha points out, to say, as Martha Woodmansee does, that ‘today a piece
of writing or other creative product may claim legal protection only insofar
as it is determined to be a unique, original product of the intellection of a
unique individual’ is ‘simply dead wrong’ (2008, p. 195). 4
Here the present discussion too comes up against the ‘difficulties about
proper emphasis and tone which must arise in making any sort of paraphrase’ that Skinner perceived, for it is certainly the case that the copyright
historians who claim that the ideology of Romantic authorship has found its
way into legal doctrine are also aware of these tensions and contradictions.
Consequently, in order not to create a straw man version of the reflectionist
hypothesis, we must acknowledge that its advocates also do not consistently
construct a straw man’s version of the Romantic author. They do seem
to do so on occasion, however, but the more deep-rooted problem is the
rhetorical contortions that ensue when they do not. For example, Peter
Jaszi’s commitment to the notion that ‘British and American copyright
presents myriad reflections of the Romantic conception of “authorship”’
leads him to admit that these reflections do at times ‘remind one of images
in fun-house mirrors’ (1991, p. 456). What Jaszi strives to come to grips with
here is of course the discrepancies between legal and aesthetic conceptions
of originality that threaten to undermine his account. Clearly, the obvious objection to his theory is this: If copyright law has adopted an idea of
originality premised on notions of poetic creativity as a gift bestowed on a
few geniuses, then surely we would expect it to be exceedingly difficult to
obtain copyright protection, yet the problem is precisely the opposite: it is
granted remarkably easily.
As Skinner points out: ‘There is a tendency in all historical discourse for
coincidences to be raised to the level of positive connections at any point
where explanations seem hard to find. When it is known in advance that
particular events did happen, or that particular ideas were cherished, it is
always easy to think of many possible connections to explain them’ (1966,
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p. 208). This observation is especially pertinent to the present analysis,
as contradictory notions of authorship and originality have coexisted for
centuries. Indeed, the concept of originality only acquires meaning when it
is understood in relation to some norm, to tradition, to imitation; similarly,
we cannot think of conventions as conventions absent an awareness that
it is possible to bend or break them, at least to some extent. McFarland
comes at what he calls ‘the originality paradox’ from a similar angle when
he notes that:
We cannot think of man except by invoking simultaneously the opposed
categories of individual and society. The ‘pivotal point’, insists Simmel, of
the ‘concept of individuality’ is that ‘when man is freed from everything
that is not wholly himself, what remains as the actual substance of his
being is man in general, mankind, which lives in him and in everyone
else (1974, p. 447).

The point is that authorship necessarily straddles both halves of the equation, and I want to argue that the writings of the Romantics could just
as easily, and possibly more easily, serve to explain a radically different,
severely restrictive, copyright doctrine. This begs the question: What parts
of the ideology of Romantic authorship are reflected in copyright law?
It is in trying to answer this question that the cracks in the reflectionist
hypothesis really come to the fore.
Unsurprisingly, moral rights are offered as an example of the Romantic
ideal’s presence in copyright law, especially the right of integrity, which
quite explicitly treats artworks as extensions of the creator’s innermost
being (Jaszi 1991, p. 497). However, when the notion of personal expression
is dissociated from genius and applied to trivial works, scholars disagree
whether or not to see it as an instance of Romantic authorship. Jaszi finds
that the decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company (1903)
plays down the author’s creative input when it posits that: ‘Personality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone’ (quoted in Jaszi, 1991, p. 483). This line of
reasoning, for Jaszi, both eradicates and generalises authorship, draining
the concept of meaningful content and of its traditional connotations, and
in effect sanctions copyright’s subsequent overbreadth (ibid., p. 483). Jaszi
actually seems to suggest, then, somewhat counter to his main thesis, that
copyright’s expansion resulted from a rejection of Romantic authorship. He
does recognise, however, that other scholars may take the facts to mean
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something rather different; for example, he refers to ‘a contrary interpretation’ by Benjamin Kaplan, for whom Holmes’s insistence on individuality
and personality has ‘an echo in it of the Romantic gospel’ (ibid., p. 483).
The confusion is most pronounced in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts (1951), which pushed the idea of the author’s irreducible individuality
to its very limit. The case concerned the copyrightability of reproductions of
various 18th and 19th century paintings in the form of mezzotint engravings.
Even though the author merely tried to faithfully replicate old masterpieces,
the court found that there was still a distinguishable variation from the
underlying works attributable to human agency. Judge Frank reasoned that
even if the discrepancy had been accidental, it would still bear the imprint
of the author’s personality and hence be eligible for copyright. For Jaszi, this
opinion is work-centred because it highlights material variation, not the
author’s substantive creative contribution, and hence it ‘implicitly rejected
the traditional vision of “authorship”’ (1991, p. 483). Ryan Littrell, by contrast,
identifies a different strand of scholarship, which sees Catalda as perfectly
in line with Romantic subjectivity, because the notion of a distinguishable
variation does not really focus on the work as such, but on the physical
manifestations of the author’s singularity (2002, p. 220).
Because they latch on to different parts of the myth, different scholars
also come to very different conclusions on whether the famous case of Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991) represents a return to
or a rejection of Romantic authorship. Jaszi sees the Supreme Court’s decision to deny copyright to a white pages book of residential phone numbers
arranged alphabetically by surname as a resurrection of Romanticism. He
finds that the court’s rhetoric ‘proceeds from unreconstructed faith in the
gospel of Romantic “authorship”’ (1994, p. 38). Similarly, Elton Fukumoto
considers Feist ‘the high water mark for the author ideology in American
case law’ (1997, p. 908). Littrell, however, sees it as a critique of the Romantic
ideology’s faith in pure authorial subjectivity, and as a gradual acceptance of
modern literary theories’ view of authorship as a more modest achievement
(2002, pp. 222–223).
The fundamental disagreement about where and how the myth of
Romantic authorship manifests itself in copyright law should lead us to
take the conclusions with a pinch of salt and, more generally, to look with
some suspicion upon historical investigations based largely on analogy.
The main problem is that there is a huge gap in these copyright scholars’
accounts in that they do not seek to spell out the mechanisms by which
aesthetic thinking about authorship finds its way into legal thinking about
authorship. The evasion of this issue means that the nature of the connec-
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tion between the two is highly elusive. As we have seen, there seems at
times to be an implication that there is a causal relationship of some sort, as
when Jaszi and Woodmansee describe the Romantic authorship construct
as ‘the chief engine’ of copyright expansion (1995, p. 772). At other times,
the connection appears to be considerably less strict, so that the aim of the
analyses is rather to trace terminological reverberations and reflections.
Thus Jaszi writes that he seeks to ‘draw out homologous relationships in
law and developments in literary culture – without insisting that one is
somehow determined by the other’ (1991, p. 457).
However, there is no way to convert observations about conceptual analogies between literature and law into evidence about causal connections or
influences. And the looser formulation, the suggestion that ‘the relation
between P1 and P2 is one of vague hints, echoes, reminiscences’ as Skinner
puts it, is ‘simply without content’ (1966, p. 211). To let go of the insistence
that P1 is a necessary source of influence on P2 is to concede that the similarities may just as well be down to chance. After all, an infinite number of
similarities hold between different phenomena, and it is hardly surprising
that from the fabric of historical facts and discourses can be woven all kinds
of symmetries and stories. But to privilege one selection of semblances is
arbitrary, and as Skinner writes, merely demonstrates ‘something that the
historian must already have known: that similar situations or interests tend
to presuppose similar language or directions of effort, and that apparent but
perhaps quite illusory historical patterns will tend in consequence to arise’
(ibid., p. 212). Consequently, ‘the claim to have discovered an influence of P1
on P2 becomes […] a remark neither about P1 or P2, but about the observer
himself. The observer in effect asserts that in studying P2 he is sometimes
reminded of P1’ (ibid., p. 212).
This seems to be an apt description of what is going on in the reflectionists’ accounts, especially seeing as the authorship arguments in aesthetics
and in copyright law are not actually all that similar, but require a certain
degree of abstraction, stretching, and paraphrase to appear analogous.
It is also worth noting here that Skinner’s scepticism towards historical
explanations based on notions of intellectual influence is largely related
to its tendency to overemphasise biography. Thus in addition to demonstrating that the most central ideas of philosopher A appear to show up in
the writings of philosopher B, historians will strive to pile up ever more
proof of the influence. They will, for example, seek to provide independent
testimony, or to show that philosopher A owned the works of philosopher
B, and read them, and talked frequently about them, and so on, in the hope
that the account sooner or later reaches a point at which the amount of
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circumstantial evidence renders the influence self-evident and its denial
absurd (ibid., pp. 208–209). Though Skinner finds this claim far from obvious, what is interesting for our purposes is the virtually complete absence
of such corroborating evidence in the studies of the influence of Romantic
authorship ideas on legal doctrine. They rely exclusively on analogy, on
tracing in P2 (copyright law) the most characteristic features of P1 (the
ideology of Romantic authorship) – often in severely distorted form.
The constructedness of authorship
Because the nature of the relationship is unspecified it is also rather ambiguous what problem is posed by the law’s adoption or acceptance of Romantic
authorship ideas. On the one hand, it seems to throw up certain practical
difficulties, as copyright’s notion of authorship fails to accommodate nonindividualistic creative efforts, such as folkloric works without identifiable
authors and serial collaborations (Jaszi, 1994, pp. 38–40). On the other, it
is implied that the Romantic authorship ideology somehow misrepresents
and misleads, because it provides an inaccurate account of how cultural
creation typically comes about. A recurring aim of the studies of Romantic
authorship is to show that it is a social and rhetorical construct, and hence
historically contingent, rather than some neutral, natural category (Boyle,
1996, p. 114; Jaszi, 1991, p. 459).
The point of historicising the concept of authorship is in other words to
de-naturalise it in order to enable change. When we come to realise that very
different notions of authorship have existed in different places and at different
points in time, it becomes clear that our current conceptions are not inevitable
and immutable, but dependent on the context we inhabit, on the presumptions
we carry, and on the perspectives we bring to bear on authorship practices.
Once we become aware of these contingencies, any inclination to think that
our beliefs about authorship conform to its true nature loses its grip.
I find this argument indisputable, but I am not sure who needs convincing
that authorship does not possess some timeless quintessence independent
of human perspectives and purposes. It is no doubt the case that copyright
law is full of inconsistencies and paradoxes, and ‘fails to achieve a stable
vision of authorship’ as Jaszi puts it (1991, p. 463). But scholars of literature
are no closer to such stability, so it is hardly surprising that everything does
not add up neatly in a system that is supposed to encompass poetry and
emails, paintings and computer code, movies and maps.
I also find the implication that courts and copyright scholars fail to
recognise the authorship construct’s ‘constructedness’, and mistake it for
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‘a real or natural [category]’ (Jaszi, 1991, p. 459) dubious. In fact, it is hard
to think of a better cure for the inclination to think that language cuts the
world at the joints (to borrow Richard Rorty’s phrase) than to engage in the
enterprise of trying to apply the same conceptual framework – specifically
the terms author, originality, and work – to everything from newspaper
headlines to mobile phone design to film screenplays to photography.
Moreover, the fact that the categories of works that fall within copyright’s
sphere of influence keep changing over time, and that some categories
– databases, say – are copyright-protected in some countries yet not in
others, are unambiguous signs that copyright law clearly has not hit upon
the true nature of authorship. And the legal procedures that come into
play at the infringement stage are liable to call further attention to the
artifice and arbitrariness of copyright’s notion of authorship. After all,
it seems reasonable to think that those who are charged with the task of
operationalising copyright’s key concepts and distinctions – to separate
idea from expression, say, or creativity from know-how, or functional from
expressive elements – in numerous difficult limit cases, will develop an
acute awareness of just how intensely pragmatic and non-natural these
borders are. I see no reason to doubt Judge Hand’s pronouncement on behalf
of copyright’s custodians in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. (1930) that
‘we are as aware as anyone that the line [between idea and expression],
wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary’ (quoted in Cohen, 1990, p. 221).
As I will argue in part II, though it does resemble one in certain respects,
copyright doctrine is not a philosophical treatise, as it also aims to accomplish specific objectives. While there is little agreement on copyright’s
main objective – as Diane Leenheer Zimmerman notes, some see it ‘as
an acknowledgement of the value of human authorship as an endeavor’;
others find that it is ‘to structure a sector of the economy’; and still others
give emphasis to copyright’s social benefit, that of ‘providing an adequate
supply of new works to the public’ (2005, pp. 189–190) – it is decidedly not
to capture the finer nuances of authorship in a philosophical sense. This
means that copyright policy is not necessarily an accurate or appropriate
reflection of actual theoretical propositions and beliefs.
Personally, for example, I find that copyright law’s originality requirement,5 especially the idea that authors leave some unique personal imprint
even on trivial works, quite dubious from a philosophical perspective.
Nevertheless, I think the originality criterion makes sense from a legal
perspective – not because it is anywhere close to perfect even from a purely
pragmatic point of view, but because I think alternative standards would
create even greater difficulties.6 The fact that I largely agree with the current
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originality requirement – and so assume a position that can be made to
look somewhat analogous to parts of the ideology of Romantic authorship,
for example through selective interpretations of Fichte – is merely a sign
that I consider it the lesser of several evils, and not a reflection of some
philosophy that exists outside of the legal context.
Copyright law simply covers so many radically divergent types of works
and authorial practices that we are never going to come even remotely
close to finding an ontological framework that accommodates all equally
satisfactorily. Moreover, it is calibrated to serve several purposes at once, so
it is hardly surprising that copyright’s vision of authorship is unstable. The
problem is that whenever we try to recalibrate copyright doctrine so that it
redresses an imbalance, it tends to create a new one somewhere else. Thus
the inconsistencies that look like flaws from a philosophical perspective
might, from a legal perspective, simply be the wriggling room courts need
to align copyright law with its diverse set of practices and purposes.
This is not to say that there is no room for improvement, of course. We
should seek to make copyright as coherent and predictable as possible,
and continually discuss and analyse its philosophical underpinnings as
well as the usefulness of its purposes. Consequently, I am not suggesting
that there is – or ought to be – no traffic at all between legal and literary
thinking about authorship. I will return to this complex issue in part II, but
first highlight some further problems with the reflectionist hypothesis by
trying to unpack just how ideas from literature might find their way into law.
A lack of interpretive constraints
As we have seen, the studies which maintain that Romantic notions of
authorship have shaped, and continue to shape, legal attitudes to authorship
do not seek to trace the steps of the ideology’s migration in specific cases,
except by analogy: Typically, some copyright decision is shown (or made)
to resemble some aspect of Romantic authorship, which is taken to suggest
some indefinable form of influence.
However, as long as the evidence of the influence remains at the level of
structural homologies there are hardly any interpretive constraints on the
enterprise. It is possible to identify resemblances between many things, but
that does not necessarily entail any kind of influence. When film scholars
talk about ‘Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho’ it might suggest some Romantic
inclination, but not necessarily. Even film historians who flatly reject the
auteur theory and insist that film is a thoroughly collaborative art form
are liable to talk like that, either as a form of shorthand or simply by habit
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or convention. When political commentators speak of ‘President Obama’s
health care reform’ they are certainly not implying that it was his idea
alone. One reason the Romantic author appears to be such a powerful and
persistent foe is that once one starts looking for signs of his reflection at the
level of analogy, his mirror image will inevitably crop up all over the place.
Now, no one has alleged that there is a straightforward causal connection
between literary and legal discourses; the argument seems to be that the
nature of the influence is rather like that of a Zeitgeist, and that certain
ideas and beliefs emerge and catch on in one area, and then gradually seep
into others as they begin to resonate and persuade. In a more recent article
which speculates that the ideology of Romantic authorship is finally starting
to give way to postmodern ideas of authorship in US copyright law, Jaszi
emphasises that while lawyers and judges who work on copyright are not
‘literally disciples of Lyotard’ or ‘self-conscious trend followers’, they are
still ‘participants in a larger cultural conversation, and what they derive
from it ends up influencing copyright discourse in various ways’ (2009,
p. 106). Clearly, it is practically impossible to reconstruct who says and
hears what, and to weigh the relative importance of all the contradictory
and crisscrossing voices in order to explain the nature of the influence. Still,
the typical procedure – to extract from the cacophony a few legal decisions,
and then to read them either as synchronic symptoms of collective beliefs
or as diachronic signs of the conversation’s general direction – seems to
me especially problematical. It examines copyright through a very narrow
prism that, despite cautious qualifications, constantly risks bringing to
light spurious correlations, and it is easy to find support for any number of
contradictory hypotheses.
There is something awkward about an explanatory framework with a
striking gap we are not supposed to contemplate or describe in any detail.
Jaszi’s observations on Judge Posner’s much-maligned decision in Gracen v.
Bradford Exchange is interesting in that they go beyond the mere identification of similarities between the decision and the ideology of Romantic
authorship to include also a little bit of context. In Gracen Judge Posner
rejected the copyright claims of an artist who painted porcelain plate
images drawn from still images from the film The Wizard of Oz on the
grounds that they were not original. Jaszi sets up his analysis by quoting
Jessica Litman’s contention that ‘To say that every new work is in some sense
based on the works that preceded it is such a truism that it has long been a
cliché, invoked but not examined’ (1991, p. 460). The point, it seems, is to hint
that even though we moderns think we have come to recognise culture’s
cumulative nature, this is not quite the case. Jaszi goes on to analyse possible

Romantic authorship in copyright l aw and the uses of aesthe tics

61

justifications for the decision and finds that none of them really hold up,
but concludes that it ‘does make sense, however, when viewed in light of the
Romantic “authorship” construct, with its implicit recognition of a hierarchy
of artistic productions’ (1991, p. 462), which leads him to conclude that
Romanticism ‘has a continuing grip on the legal imagination’ (ibid., p. 463).
While I agree with Jaszi’s misgivings about the decision, I find the effort to
link it to Romantic authorship troublesome. First, the ideology is abstracted
to the extent that it comes to equate simply the recognition of an artistic
hierarchy. This seems to me such a basic notion that it is an exaggeration
to take it as a clear manifestation of Romantic authorship ideology. I do not
think that the assumption that some works of authorship are either more
original or more derivative than others automatically implies some kind
of endorsement of Romantic authorship. It is only from the point of view of
poststructuralist theory – which radically challenges the very concept of
originality, and which Jaszi explicitly invokes – that such a commonsensical
claim appears disturbing, a position I will return to in part II.
Second, it is interesting to consider how Jaszi’s analysis deals with
biographical evidence that does not match the hypothesis. Jaszi concedes
that Judge Posner elsewhere has spoken out against the Romantic notion of
authorship, but merely remarks that Posner’s failure to practise in Gracen
what he preaches ‘reflects the inability of the law to achieve a stable vision
of “authorship”’ (ibid., p. 463). Thus he does not try to rationalise the inconsistencies in the judge’s thinking, probably because the only explanation
available when a court decision is viewed through the optic of Romantic
authorship ideology is the awkward one that Posner is somehow – against
his own better judgment – beholden to or misled by the myth of Romantic
authorship. I take this to be an indication that the persuasiveness of the
hypothesis calls for an absence of reflection upon the nature of the influence; once we try to flesh out the gap between analogies, the premise comes
to seem vaguely conspiratorial and not-so-vaguely improbable.
We should also note that the reflectionist hypothesis – the idea that the
myth of the Romantic author was so to speak inscribed into copyright’s DNA
from the start – tends to function as a self-fulfilling prophesy. The reason is
that mere basic assumptions about authorship – for example that it involves
creativity, and that it is possible to identify the efforts of the individual or
individuals who exert the most control over the final product – are seen as
evidence of Romantic authorship’s persistence.7
The problem here is that the very premise of the hypothesis – that Romantic authorship ideology lies at the core of copyright, and subsequently shows
up in ‘curiously distorted’ versions, as Jaszi puts it (1991, p. 488) – makes
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virtually any reference to authors and authorship a vestige of Romanticism.
In other words, the analytical framework evens out the difference between
Romantic authorship and authorship per se, and thus leaves very little, if any,
room for positions that seek to heed both sides of the originality paradox,
i.e. to be sensitive both to the contributions of individuals and to their debt
to tradition. Elsewhere, after all, it is quite possible to hold that authors do
innovate even as nothing comes from nothing; from within the reflectionist
point of view, however, signs of the first part of the equation are taken, by
a kind of hermeneutics of suspicion, as misshapen surface manifestations
of copyright’s primordial essence: Romantic authorship.
Of course, if one accepts that the rhetoric of the literary property debates that began in the 1730s were Romantic, it could be argued that the
ideology of Romantic authorship has shaped copyright ever since, in the
more modest sense that it handed down a conceptual and terminological framework within which subsequent developments have played out.
However, the existence of such a framework would not by itself compel
legal doctrine to change in any particular way, or even to change at all,
which leaves us no particular reason to think that Romantic authorship
has been a factor in copyright’s expansion. Consequently, the reflectionist
must commit to the stronger view – however cagily put – that we somehow
believe in, and are in some sense deceived by, the ideology of Romantic
authorship. Thus Jaszi is keen to stress that ‘law is derivative of cultural
attitudes’ (2009, p. 109) while Boyle insists that ‘the idea of the original,
transformative creator is coded deep into our speechways and our patterns
of thought’ (1996, p. 158).
Now, it would be pure folly to insist that the law exists in some kind of
vacuum, and remains completely unaffected by surrounding dispositions
and discourses. But to concede that copyright necessarily interacts with
other conversations in some way, and that some notion of authorship is
ingrained in the way we think about culture, art, and communication, is
not to consent to the claim that Romantic authorship ideology has infused
copyright law and led to its expansion. Indeed, it is not clear that it makes
much sense to try to convert the innumerable possible connections and
interactions between copyright law and society at large into philosophical
approaches to authorship. It seems to me that any effort to spell out how
the larger conversation has shaped copyright law would appear – in words
Richard Rorty once used in a very different context – ‘much more like
somebody’s description of how he or she managed to get from the age of
twelve to the age of thirty (that paradigm case of muddling through) than
like a series of choices between alternative theories’ (1991, p. 69).
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In other words, the nature of the influence is far too complex and accidental to allow for meaningful general descriptions. The reflectionist
approach is to take samples from the legal record at different historical
moments and then to examine copyright doctrine or case law through the
prism of authorship, often in terms derived from literary theory. But the
cultural, political, aesthetic, and social conversations that have no doubt
shaped these legal outcomes are made up of countless random ingredients:
debates about new technological products and practices; the things that
critics have had to say about new artistic practices; or whatever IP-related
issues major media outlets happened to pick up at a certain point in time,
to name just a few. In addition, of course, all the alternative explanations
listed at the outset have also affected copyright. The reflectionist seeks
to apply terms drawn from academic discourses – ‘Romantic’, ‘modernist’, ‘postmodernist’, or ‘poststructuralist’ – to the samples. To my mind,
however, these are not so much names of cultural attitudes and beliefs that
have suffused and then shaped copyright law as simply descriptive labels
that designate what the legal decisions – i.e. the outcome of all the actual
influences – may be said to look like from the point of view of someone
versed in academic authorship theories.
A more panoramic lens
Unfortunately, there is no quick and easy way to make sure that we get at
‘real entities […] rather than linked abstractions’, as Skinner puts it (1966,
p. 215). The solution he proposes is a decent starting point, however, namely
to ‘describ[e] as fully as possible the complex and probably contradictory
matrix within which the idea or event to be explained can be most meaningfully located’ (ibid., p. 213). Of the alternative accounts mentioned at the
outset, it is probably Bracha’s that comes closest to such an approach. He
shows, for example, how copyright law interacted with changing ideological
views of government and the judiciary, and he outlines the ways in which
the development of new markets, new industries, and new interest groups
seeking to gain market advantages helped shape legal doctrine.
The advantage that Bracha’s account has over the reflectionist explanation is that it examines copyright cases and statutes from a much broader
perspective, and dispels any notion that legal concepts of authorship and
originality are signs that we are still in thrall to the old romanticist myth.
Bracha clearly states that even though copyright law can be considered a
‘mystification’ in the sense that parts of it are removed from the realities of
authorship, ‘the point […] is not that anyone is being deceived’, but rather that
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copyright as a conceptual field ‘enables us to maintain deeply conflicting
images, commitments, and modes of argument’ (2008, pp. 266–267). Thus
he substitutes for the reflectionist account a purely functional explanation.
Of course, this is not to say that misconceptions about authorship and
originality do not exist. Undoubtedly, many people in all walks of life sometimes hold too rigidly romantic beliefs about authors and their works, and
it is important to seek a richer and more nuanced understanding by calling
attention to the other half of the originality paradox as well. However, it
is something else entirely to see ideas and intuitions about authorship
outside of the legal domain as an essential and recognisable agency in
copyright’s historical development. And even if we agreed, for the sake
of argument, that Romantic authorship ideology – either as an article of
faith, or a form of naivety, or false consciousness, or some amalgamation
of these ingredients – did exert an influence, it still seems ill-equipped to
explain both copyright’s expansion and the peculiar legal definition of the
key criterion: originality.
This is precisely where Bracha’s analysis excels. It does away with the notion that whatever ‘theories of authorship’ we become aware of in copyright
law on the basis of hermeneutic theories are meaningful reflections of
actual beliefs and assumptions ‘out there’. While early copyright statutes
might arguably have been informed by contemporary ideology, ensuing
doctrinal developments and adjustments seem a highly deficient barometer
of changes in social attitudes (copyright’s originality threshold, for example,
is pretty much out of step with any understanding of the term outside of
the legal context). Rather, the initial concept of authorship is principally
important because it established the conceptual framework – the ‘language
game’, we might say – within which subsequent contests over, and transformations of, copyright have taken place. Bracha argues that once authorship
rhetoric had taken hold, agents motivated by commercial purposes who
sought to make their case in public needed to avail themselves of the same
vocabulary and rationale. ‘The result’, he writes, ‘was that the preexisting
ideology of authorship was reshaped by interested parties in order to fit
their concerns’, though their arguments ‘were constrained by the need to
use terms and concepts taken from the lexicon of authorship’ (2008, p. 201).
Clearly, there is a lot of detail and data for future historians to fill in yet in
this narrative, but as a working hypothesis it seems much better equipped
to contend with copyright’s features and developments, such as the curious
rhetorical insistence on the significance of originality and the simultaneous
reduction of the term to a well-neigh technical minimum requirement in
practice. Similarly, Bracha convincingly argues that the concept of ‘the
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work’ as well as the idea/expression dichotomy in US doctrine can be shown
to belong to the language game of authorship, while at the same time allowing copyright to extend its reach. He also observes that copyright as
a conceptual field is highly flexible, and thus serves to alleviate tensions
between conflicting assumptions and arguments (2008, pp. 267–270).
Bracha’s functional approach to, and bird’s-eye view of, history provides
a more persuasive account both of copyright’s conceptual transformations
and characteristics, and of the mechanisms that underlie copyright’s expansion. The reflectionist hypothesis rests on an intuitively reasonable premise
– that copyright is shaped by surrounding attitudes and discourses – but
upon closer reflection the alleged connection turns out to be extremely
hard to spell out in a convincing manner. The method of looking for analogies through the somewhat arbitrary and quite narrow prism of literaryphilosophical notions of authorship generates results, but their reliability
is disputed, for once one signs off on the hypothesis and locks into its optic,
copyright history tends to appear brimming with distant reverberations
and contorted reflections of Romantic authorship. Those same phenomena
might well look rather more like straightforward representations through
a more panoramic lens.

Part II
I want now to return to the role of literary-philosophical approaches to
authorship in copyright law and copyright scholarship. I have argued
that copyright doctrine does not constitute a philosophy of authorship
comparable to those we find in the humanities, and that to map one onto
the other may confuse more than clarify. However, to say that copyright
law is not a philosophy of authorship is not to say that it is nothing like it at
all. It is in many respects reminiscent precisely of a philosophical system in
that it necessarily expresses and embodies certain general and systematic
beliefs and assumptions about the nature of creativity and creations, about
the properties of and interrelationships between works of authorship from
which concepts and categories are drawn, then defined and aligned so as
to be as internally coherent as possible.
However, unlike standard philosophical investigations, copyright’s
elaboration of things like authorship and originality does not – or rather,
not solely – flow from the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. For while
copyright doctrine ought to rest on disinterested contemplation of the
nature of the phenomena it covers, the relevant results of that activity – i.e.
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of doing philosophy proper – must not necessarily be incorporated indiscriminately, as there are numerous practicalities to consider that might be
hard to reconcile with the fruits of investigations conducted simply for the
love of wisdom. For example, copyright cannot hold as many fine-spun distinctions as philosophical investigations because the amount of exceptions
would be unmanageable. Also, the most philosophically refined concepts
and distinctions are not liable to lend themselves to legal implementation.
It is thus easy to see why literary studies might appear considerably more
discerning than copyright law. Literary scholars are free to explore inherent rhetorical presumptions or tensions, to critically examine the hidden
values upon which a dichotomy rests, and to interrogate terminological and
philosophical inconsistencies and ambiguities. As Judge Hand reasoned in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp the arbitrariness of the line between idea
and expression ‘is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a question such as courts
must answer in nearly all cases’ (ibid., p. 221). So while courts too must make
philosophical distinctions, they are also expected to actually apply them in
the trickiest circumstances imaginable: either to borderline cases or to new
categories of works that did not exist at the time the distinction was devised.
Humanities scholars also have the luxury of limiting their field of study
as they see fit, and may choose to simply avoid the fuzzy borders of the
categories and concepts they explore, or simply criticise the fuzziness
without proposing a fully-fledged alternative. Judges must apply copyright’s
concepts and distinctions not just to the central examples that make them
seem sharp and distinct, but also – and especially – to all the inevitable
peripheral examples that make them seem problematical, sometimes even
perverse. They must, in short, draw the line precisely where it hurts the
most, where it is most awkward and inelegant.
Copyright is also different in that it is constrained by legal precedent and
standards of interpretation: Unlike philosophers, judges are not simply free
to follow their intellectual conviction wherever it leads them, for they are
bound by the terminology and definitions laid down in law and elaborated
by their predecessors. While philosophers are at liberty to revise, or even
to devise from scratch, their ontological systems, courts must take into
account how any changes affect the real-world cultural and economic
infrastructure which has sprung from the current legal framework.
Finally, in order not to undermine the authority of law, judges must
probably convey a certain confidence in their own verdicts. They cannot
afford to follow the example of philosophers and literary theorists who
make a virtue of the inability to arrive at universally consistent concepts
and distinctions, and who make do with uncovering cracks and contra-
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dictions by self-reflexively foregrounding the radical indeterminacy and
contingency of all meaning.
Clearly, then, copyright law is not designed to make those who practise
it look good. But even though the definitions and distinctions judges are required to make sometimes seem naïve or even a little farcical from the point
of view of literary theory, they are not necessarily any less accomplished, for
copyright law is by and large geared towards different purposes. In other
words, copyright law forever straddles the divide between ontology and
utility: On the one hand, it must seek to weave a suitably tight-knit web
of assertions and assumptions about authorship without any gaping holes
in it, to devise an intellectually subtle and internally coherent conceptual
framework attuned to the realities of authorial products and practices; on
the other, it must keep in mind what is feasible and functional. The second
consideration is frequently irrelevant in literary theory and philosophy;
these fields meanwhile, tend to have their own uses and idiosyncrasies. So
while there is a lot of legal scholarship based on the assumption that literary
theory has made important discoveries about the nature of authorship that
copyright law has failed to take into account, we must keep in mind that
what has cash value in the humanities (or some enclave of the humanities)
may be no good in the legal domain.
All of this begs the question: What is the relationship between, on the
one hand, copyright law’s notion of authorship and originality and, on the
other, the ways in which the same concepts are mobilised and theorised
in fields like philosophy, aesthetics, comparative literature, musicology,
or film studies? It is one thing to argue, as I have so far, that copyright law
can neither ignore philosophy nor mindlessly mirror it – but can we spell
out the connection more positively, and in greater detail? I doubt that it is
possible to answer such questions meaningfully at a general level, as there
are simply too many variables to consider. We must instead proceed more
or less on a case-by-case basis, scrutinising the relevance and usefulness
of specific concepts and theories in specific contexts.
I want to highlight how challenging it is to bridge the gap between these
academic disciplines by offering some observations on the approach that
seems to be most often invoked in copyright debates about the persistence
of Romantic authorship ideology, namely post-structuralism. The more
specific aim is to call attention to the importance of recognising the distinctive protocols and purposes that guide investigations into authorship in
different fields and sub-fields, and to provide a starting point for more
general explorations of the value of perspectives from the humanities to
copyright scholarship.
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Raising the stakes – the death of the Author, of God, and of man
We should note at the outset that post-structuralism is not integral to the
argument that the ideology of Romantic authorship informs copyright law.
Boyle, for example, emphasises that he wants to separate his project from
post-structuralism’s ‘full-court author-bashing’ (1996, p. 59). Jaszi, however,
explicitly cites the influence of poststructuralist approaches (1991, p. 457),
and several commentators link the persistence of Romanticism to a gap
between legal and literary thinking, and especially to copyright’s failure to
take on board relevant insights from literary theory, in particular theories
that give emphasis to the intertextual relationships that necessarily hold
between all works.8
The most radical formulation of this vision of authorship appeared in
the 1960s in the work of a group of philosophers and literary critics based
in France, especially Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Michel Foucault, and
Jacques Derrida. It is important to keep in mind that the writings of these
thinkers do not add up to a single coherent theory (nor, indeed, do their
individual oeuvres). In order to make the analysis somewhat manageable,
then, I will focus mainly on the work of Roland Barthes, particularly his
‘The Death of the Author’. While the article is not representative of some
unified poststructuralist position, it is arguably the most well-known text
on authorship of the 20th century, it has often been alluded to by copyright
scholars, and its epigrammatic style is particularly well-suited to point out
the rhetorical and epistemological differences between poststructuralist
and legal scholarship.
Barthes’ image of the author, or ‘Author-God’ as he calls it, is very much
a caricature, as is his description of literary culture and criticism as ‘tyrannically centred on the author’ (2002, p. 5). The essay completely ignores the
many approaches prior to its publication that not at all deified the author, but
explicitly sought to bracket authorial subjectivity, such as Anglo-American
New Criticism, Russian formalism, and Prague structuralism. This is not to
say that poststructuralist authorship theories simply added a heavy dose
of hyperbole to old truisms. Earlier anti-authorial movements argued that
the study of literature ought to focus on the immanent properties of texts,
and were thus strictly limited to literary interpretation. Post-structuralism
too waged war on biographical positivism, as when Barthes laments that:
[…] criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire’s
work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh’s his madness,
Tchaikovsky’s his vice. The explanation of a work is always sought in the
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man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through
the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single
person, the author ‘confiding’ in us (2002, p. 4).

But at the same time, poststructuralist explorations of authorship were
part of a far more encompassing philosophical-political project at ‘the
intersection between phenomenology and structuralism [which] produced
an iconoclastic and far-ranging form of anti-subjectivism’ (Burke, 2008,
p. 13). This means that:
Barthes, Foucault and Derrida were not content with simply sidelining the
authorial subject as in earlier formalisms. A phenomenological training
had taught them that the subject was too powerful, too sophisticated a
concept to be simply bracketed; rather subjectivity was something to
be annihilated. Nor either could they be content to see the death of the
subject as something applying merely to the area of literary studies. The
death of the author must connect with a general death of man (ibid., p. 14).

Barthes’ essay is mostly devoted to literary matters, but does link the reading strategy it promotes to broader issues, as when Barthes writes that ‘by
refusing to assign a “secret”, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the
world as text), [literature] liberates what may be called an anti-theological
activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning
is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases – reason, science, law’ (2002,
p. 6). Such grandiloquence lends poststructuralist writings a remarkable
sense of urgency, a feeling that just about everything is at stake, but it is not
at all clear whether, or how, such statements are relevant to copyright law.
Post-structuralism’s strategic ambivalence
Part of the problem, then, is that poststructuralist works are inclined to
point in many directions at the same time. Of course, scholars are under
no obligation to adopt Barthes’ ideas wholesale; they may circumnavigate
the philosophical context that ‘The Death of the Author’ emerged from and
addressed, and pick up the ingredients that are relevant for their concerns.
Still, even the parts that are most narrowly focused on literature are highly
idiosyncratic and problematical to bring to bear on legal matters.
There are two related and vaguely formulated ideas in the essay that
at a glance seem of relevance to copyright law. First, as Woodmansee and
Jaszi note, Barthes inverts the conventional relation between author and
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reader, as when he reasons that ‘a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its
destination’ (Barthes, 2002, p. 7) and they seem to regret that this message
‘has gone unheard by intellectual property lawyers’ (Woodmansee and
Jaszi, 1994, p. 8). I must admit, however, that I have no idea what it would
mean for courts to take on board this idea.
As so often in the work of the poststructuralists, it is possible to follow
Barthes’ suggestive observation down two very different paths. On the
one hand, it seems to restate the, at least by now, rather commonplace
notion that meaning is not simply found but made by the reader. On the
other hand, and more speculatively, it is possible to relate it to the much
more radical idea that the critic takes priority over the author, which is
most explicitly formulated in Derrida’s deconstructive readings. Curiously,
though, as Burke explains, this approach is not nearly as anti-authorial as
is commonly presumed, and does not even heed the New Critical dictum
to ignore intention on the ground that it is irrelevant and unknowable:
If authorial intentions are to be deconstructed it must be accepted that
they are cardinally relevant and recognizable. The deconstructor must
assume that he or she has the clearest conception of what the author
wanted to say if the work of deconstruction is to get underway. The
model of intention culled from the text must be especially confident
and sharply defined since the critic undertakes not only to reconstitute
the intentional forces within the text, but also to assign their proper
limits. It is only in terms of this reconstitution that the deconstructor
can begin to separate that which belongs to authorial design from that
which eludes or unsettles its prescriptions. Accordingly, deconstructive
procedure takes the form of following the line of authorial intention up
to the point at which it encountered resistance within the text itself:
from this position the resistance can then be turned back against the
author to show that his text differs from itself, that what he wished to
say does not dominate what the text says, but is rather inscribed within
(or in more radical cases, engulfed by) the larger signifying structure
(Burke, 2008, p. 136).

Whichever path we take – the well-trodden one in which Barthes seems to
merely affirm ‘with supremely French intelligence, the pieties of English 101’
(Clairborne Park, 1990, p. 390), or the bolder one in which ‘the critic sets out
to show that he or she is a better reader of the text than its author ever was’
(Burke, 2008, p. 137) – Barthes is making an argument about interpretation
so far removed from the concerns of copyright as to be of no relevance.
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The other element of ‘Death of the Author’ that seems pertinent to
intellectual property scholarship is the challenge it poses to the notion of
originality. Barthes writes that ‘The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from
the innumerable centres of culture’, and that ‘the writer can only imitate
a gesture that is always anterior, never original’ (2002, p. 6). This observation too can be traced to either a highly orthodox or a highly unorthodox
conclusion. On the one hand, it is often seen simply as the idea that all texts
necessarily build on previous texts.9
This, however, makes ‘The Death of the Author’ just an esoteric paraphrase of the old notion, long familiar, as we have seen, to critics as well
as artists, that no one creates from nothing, that all art is derivative, that
‘masterpieces are not single and solitary births [for] the experience of the
mass is behind the single voice’, as Virginia Woolf put it.
Understood thus, post-structuralism offers nothing new, but merely
obsesses over the opposite part of the originality paradox that McFarland
described. Both extremes are equally flawed, and it seems inconceivable
that anyone would seriously commit fully to one side of the equation. It is
as absurd to deny that all authors draw on certain linguistic and generic
resources that are not of their making as it is to reject the idea that some
writers avail themselves of these assets more inventively than others.
But this commonsensical view is not – or not only – what Barthes has in
mind. He takes it upon himself to promote a way of reading that endorses
play and polyphony and resists closure. He proposes to attend to the surface
of the text, to stop trying to plumb its depth, or to listen to the voice ‘behind’
it. To understand what is at stake, though, we must read ‘The Death of the
Author’ in the context of other works by Barthes (which is itself testament
to the indispensability of the traditional notion of authorship). For when
Barthes deals with more experimental, non-representational avant-garde
texts, he has no issue with authors or intentions: ‘If a text has been “unglued”
from its referentiality, its author need not die; to the contrary, he can flourish
[…] What Roland Barthes has been talking about all along is not the death
of the author, but the closure of representation’ (Burke, 2008, p. 45).
Here we must keep in mind Barthes’ distinction between ‘work’ and
‘text’. The former has substance and exists in physical space whereas the
latter is ‘a methodological field’ (1979, p. 74), a space within which readers
can themselves become writers. This comes easiest when we encounter
challenging modernist literature, what Barthes calls writerly texts, which do
not purport to be vehicles of referential meanings and authorial messages, as
in the classical-realist novel, the prototypical example of Barthes’ so-called
readerly text.
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The distinction between work and text is linked to the distinction between ‘author’ and ‘scriptor’. The former term corresponds to the traditional
conception of the author as ‘the past of his own book: book and author
stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an after. The
Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists before
it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his
work as a father to his child’ (Barthes, 2002, p. 5). The scriptor, by contrast,
‘is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being
preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as
predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every
text is eternally written here and now’ (ibid., p. 5).
The death of the author, then, obviously does not refer to an empirical
fact. It is, as Burke notes, ‘a call to arms and not a funeral oration’ (2008,
p. 27). Barthes urges us to approach literary works in a new way: We should
seize the initiative as readers and not grant the biographical author mastery
of the text. We should think of all of literature as one massive text, an
interlinked fabric with threads to be traced in all directions, rather than
some chronology of distinct works with precise meanings we can unearth
one by one with the aid of each creator’s life and design.
This is a rather counterintuitive form of reading, however, and Peter
Lamarque is surely right that it tends to be ‘more interesting, more demanding, more rewarding for understanding, to consolidate meaning, to seek
structure and coherence, to locate a work in a tradition or practice’, and
that this preference ‘has nothing whatsoever to do with reinstating some
bullying authoritarian author. But then that figure was always just a fiction
anyway’ (2002, p. 91).
Even if we grant that the approach to reading that Barthes advances might
sometimes have its uses in a purely aesthetic context, it is surely diametrically
opposed to the concerns of copyright law. After all, the active reader-writer’s
effort to bring to light the plurality of texts within any one text are not bound
by the protocols of empirical and historical investigation: ‘Intertextual analysis is distinguished from source criticism both by its stress on interpretation
rather than on the establishment of particular facts, and by its rejection of a
unilinear causality (the concept of ‘influence’)’ (Frow, 1990, p. 46). To study an
author on this view is to cast aside concerns about progress and development
and rather traffic freely between works: ‘No longer a forward march from
fledgling texts to mature thought, the oeuvre becomes an arena or ellipse
in which everything is rhapsodic, nothing sequential’ (Burke, 2008, p. 35).
Intellectual property requires precisely the mindset that ‘The Death
of the Author’ wants to do away with, which sees authors as identifiable
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historical beings and works as their more-or-less distinct creations. That
basic premise does not mean that we swear allegiance to some supreme
Romantic Author-God; there is plenty of room for us to worry about the
inescapable porosity of terms like ‘author’ and ‘originality’. It is certainly
possible to adopt a different optic in the aesthetic domain, to think of
authors as scriptors and works as texts. It is not, however, a ‘theory’ that
can be ‘implemented’ in the legal sphere, at least not in a way that would
preserve copyright in even vaguely recognisable form.
Avant-garde theory
The reason poststructuralist theories of authorship have caused so much
confusion is that they tend to blur the distinction between methodology
and ontology. As Burke notes they ‘promote authorial absence as an inherent property of discourse rather than as merely one approach amongst
others to the problems of reading and interpretation’ (2008, p. 167). The
argument of ‘The Death of the Author’ only makes sense if we think of it
as something along the lines of a suggestion, an invitation, a manifesto, a
strategic hypothesis, or speculative experiment, yet it is largely framed as
a statement of fact. For example, Barthes writes assertively, as if he were
announcing a philosophical breakthrough, that ‘We now know that a text
is not a line of words releasing a single “theological” meaning (the “message”
of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of
writings, none of them original, blend and clash’ (2002, p. 6), that ‘it is
language which speaks, not the author’ (ibid., p. 4), and that ‘a text’s unity
lies not in its origin but in its destination’ (ibid., p. 7). Burke is right, however,
that ‘the decision as to whether we read a text with or without an author
remains an act of critical choice governed by the protocols of a certain way
of reading rather than any “truth of writing”’ (2008, p. 169).
Copyright law’s utilitarian function means that ‘ought’ and ‘is’ are
reasonably distinct most of the time, and we can bring either dimension
into sharp focus: First, we can adopt a normative perspective, and reflect
on what copyright’s primary purpose(s) should be, or on the fairness or
effectiveness of a certain provision. Alternatively, we can look at it simply
as what is. From this point of view, to analyse copyright is to consider what
is and is not allowed, which is to say that it corresponds to the mindset of a
lawyer in court, or any citizen charged with some infringement. ‘The Death
of the Author’, by contrast, merges the two perspectives. As Lamarque
notes, it ‘can be read either as a statement of fact or as wishful thinking’
and ‘waver[s] on the question of description and prescription’ (2002, p. 83).
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Post-structuralism is an especially boundary-breaking approach, a kind
of avant-garde theory that seeks to challenge received wisdoms, push ideas
to their limit, and transcend disciplinary conventions and distinctions.
Often it interrogates even the distinction between scholarly and artistic
practices. This is particularly evident in the case of ‘The Death of the Author’,
as it first appeared in Aspen, an American multimedia art and lifestyle
magazine published irregularly from 1965 to 1971.10 The double issue in
which Barthes’ essay appeared was edited by the conceptual artist Brian
O’Doherty 11 and was distributed to some 20,000 subscribers in the form of
a white box containing 28 items. Among them were experimental super 8
films by Hans Richter and Robert Rauschenberg, phonograph recordings of
William S. Burroughs and Alain Robbe-Grillet, a conceptual poem by Dan
Graham, and a musical score by John Cage on transparent sheets with dots
and lines that could be rotated over a piece of graph paper so as to enable
different performances of ‘the same’ work.
It is this avant-garde impulse which makes it so hard to pin down Barthes’
writings, to find in them a stable and coherent argument. In ‘The Death
of the Author’ and related works the scriptor seeks to ‘perform’ what he
preaches, to create a writerly text that eludes closure, that undermines its
own status as authorial and authoritative communiqué. As Dale Townshend
(1998) has shown, in his increasingly experimental efforts Barthes would
go on to tirelessly rename the central distinction between work and text
in metaphorical and ambiguous ways. His writings, individually and collectively, are like puzzles with too many pieces; the reader is free to assemble
them in multiple ways, but there is always something left over.
A pragmatist perspective
‘The Death of the Author’ is an extreme example, of course, but it serves
to bring out with particular force a more general point about analyses
of authorship and works of authorship in the humanities, namely their
penchant for addressing multiple issues at once. Even far more conventional
and less intellectually ambitious efforts than those of the poststructuralists tend to engage multiple and overlapping perspectives simultaneously,
to blend – explicitly or implicitly – descriptive, analytical, philosophical,
evaluative, political, ideological, ethical, historical, or biographical questions and discourses. Their relevance to copyright law, however, is simply
off the radar.
By far the most dominant authorship issue in the humanities is the role of
the author in hermeneutics: Does the creator’s life and/or intention provide
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a privileged point of access to what the work is up to? Does it determine
what the text ‘really’ means, or at least impose certain constraints on what
it can say, or is it of no consequence at all? Is textual coherence a function
of intrinsic properties or something readers impose? Does it invalidate the
work if the author fails to achieve his or her intention? Is it not the case that
there is always more in the text than what its author had in mind? And is the
author’s intent even accessible to us, or even to him- or herself in the first
place? Such questions – and the above are only the tip of the iceberg – are
mostly wholly irrelevant to copyright law, but I want to argue that certain
similar inquiries can be made relevant. First, however, we need to realise
that they are futile absent of some human interest, goal, or preference.
Often these theoretical explorations rest – sometimes knowingly; sometimes, I suspect, unknowingly – on more specific questions, usually ‘What
is the proper (or most rewarding) function of criticism?’, though also ‘What
is art (or literature, or film, or drama)?’, that remain unexposed. This is to
clothe a matter of opinion in the garments of ontology (which by and large
is what Barthes does in ‘The Death of the Author’). When no such context
is present even as an undercurrent scholars seek to locate an essence where
there is none.
It is not just that authorial practices and products, as well as the hermeneutic exercises they engender, are far too varied to bring under a general
description (though that alone should be enough to put us off the effort).
More importantly, the questions about authorship and interpretation that
scholars in the arts typically pursue cannot be answered in the abstract,
for the phenomena do not possess some immutable essence. Here I am
heavily indebted to Richard Rorty’s neopragmatist philosophy, which sees
language as analogous to a set of tools, and knowledge not as a matter of
getting reality right, but of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality
(1991, p. 1). While often accused of relativism, Rorty’s ideas are more properly
understood as anti-essentialist. He does not deny that the world and its
phenomena can cause us to hold beliefs, only that it cannot suggest beliefs
for us to hold. Objects and practices do not insist on being described in a
certain way, their own way (ibid., p. 83). This does not mean that we are free
to say or believe anything we like, for what we say and believe must still add
up – nonsense is still nonsense, and stands little chance of being adopted
by others unless it carries persuasive force, i.e. unless it chimes with related
beliefs and can be shown to be useful for some purpose.
Consequently, pragmatism itself does not provide any predefined answers to difficult problems; it is therapeutic rather than programmatic. It
makes the inclination to think of language as a mirror of an antecedently
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determined reality loosen its grip, and helps us to stop asking questions that
lead down blind alleys. It is not that dead-end investigations are devoid of
meaning; even the endeavour to identify the true nature of interpretation
has meaning ‘if you give it one. To give meaning to an expression, all you
have to do is use it in a more or less predictable manner – situate it within
a network of predictable inferences’ (Rorty 2007, p. 34). Rather, the sense in
which such debates are meaningless is that they have no bearing on practice
except by reference to some human interest.
Whether or not to bracket the author’s intention is not an issue that can
be settled philosophically. It is not just that some are persuaded by Barthes’
assassination attempt while others are uncomfortable with it12, or that some
approve of the kind of overreading that thinkers like Derrida, Deleuze,
and Zizek engage in, which wilfully and flagrantly exceed the meanings
supported either by the text or its author, while others find it silly.13 It is also
that it is virtually impossible to remain faithful to one’s philosophical ideas
about authorship on the ground, in practical criticism. To insist that the
author’s intention is always irrelevant is to deprive criticism of a potentially
valuable resource; to insist that it is paramount all the time is to treat the
text as a kind of code to be deciphered that is sure to produce barren readings. In practice, no one sticks to a single ‘theory of authorship’. Even the
staunchest anti-auteurists tend to drop their guard when they move from
philosophy to criticism. They mostly write about canonised authors and,
as Colin Davis has shown, frequently regard them ‘as prestigious individual
thinkers with opinions and intentions. In other words they are authors in
a quite old-fashioned sense […] The basic principle is: if it helps, use it; if it
doesn’t help, a discreet veil may be drawn over it’ (2010, p. 182).
I am not suggesting that metaphysical debates about authorship have
had no consequences whatsoever; no doubt a text such as ‘The Death of
the Author’ has inspired many critics to produce bolder interpretations of
poems and novels than they would have done had they never read it. But
that, I want to argue, is because they have been persuaded by the profits of
reading without the author, not because Barthes disclosed the true nature
of authorship or interpretation. The phenomena ‘in themselves’ will not
recommend the appropriate approach for us; that only emerges when we
put them to use for some purpose.
This can be hard to see, however, for scholars interpret works of authorship for a remarkable variety of reasons, and usually for several reasons at
the same time, and they are not necessarily fully present or fully articulated
either in the analysis or even in the mind of the hermenut. Some might
read a text for coherence and persuasion, others to see what it can yield, by
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any means, philosophically; some analyses are aimed at understanding or
historical contextualisation, others serve as ideological or political interventions. Indeed, the term ‘purpose’ frequently sounds too crude to describe
what motivates aesthetic investigations; their motivation may be highly
elusive – to somehow enrich experience or provoke reflection, say – in
which case it may be more appropriate to talk of ‘interest’ or ‘predilection’.
Of course, a philosophical or theoretical superstructure may inform a given
reading. The point is that philosophy and theory may provide traction for
some purpose, but it cannot select a purpose for us by granting access to
how the phenomena themselves really are, or really want to be or ought to
be described and employed.
Lessons
Now, what can all of this tell us about the role of aesthetics in copyright
law? First, and most generally, it serves to illustrate just how hugely challenging it is to ‘apply’ aesthetic concepts and theories in the legal domain,
for the endeavour requires of those who undertake it to master two highly
complex and specialised language games. ‘The Death of the Author’ is a
particularly enlightening example of the confusion that may ensue, because
it is particularly obscure about its intentions. It offers itself as a kind of
general theory of authorship but is, I believe, much more like a lobbying
effort for one approach to, or perspective on, authorship, interpretation,
and literature.
I think legal scholars realise more clearly than their colleagues in the
humanities that their concepts of authorship and originality are contingent,
for they are more obviously constrained by utility and compromise. They
look, it seems, at the more sophisticated and intricate explorations that
take place in humanities departments, and become tempted to indulge
in the fiction that the philosophical-theoretical dissections there might
allow them to get in touch with the true nature of the concepts they have
in common. They read Barthes and take from his concept of intertextuality
that all works build on previous works, not realising that they have in the
process adapted it to their own purposes (which are rather different from
those Barthes had in mind), and end up restating what they already knew
in more esoteric terms.
This brings us to the second, more specific and interesting point for the
present discussion about how the humanities may be of use to copyright
scholars: We need to recognise that philosophy and aesthetics will not provide courts with the means to ground law or legal decisions in foundational
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principles uncorrupted by historical context or human interests. To be sure,
one does not have to subscribe to Rorty’s pragmatism to reject the notion
that there is some magical metaphysical algorithm that may disclose the
way phenomena are ‘in themselves’. But this approach pushes further the
idea that we should think of concepts as tools for particular purposes, and
that to start with philosophy – with, for example, the theories of Locke,
Kant, and Hegel, to name three thinkers frequently cited by copyright
scholars – is to put the cart before the horse. The more specific problem
with aesthetic concepts and theories is that they are not designed to resolve
legal issues in the first place. They gravitate towards interpretation and
evaluation, and are generally better at putting things in question than at
asking ‘What’s the problem?’ If they are to be of any use outside of their own
domain, that is precisely where the inquiry should begin: Only by asking
‘How may this or that concept or approach serve this exact legal purpose?’
can we begin to say something meaningful about the role of aesthetics in
copyright law. This means that it is important to be clear about the purposes
of copyright. For example, if we think it is to reward those who deserve it
the most through their creative contribution, it would make sense to look
to sociological or anthropological studies of film, television, music, and
theatre production.
But what about aesthetic concepts and theories? Is it at all possible
to align their disciplinary purposes with the purposes of copyright law,
given that courts expressly and deliberately seek to refrain from artistic
interpretation and evaluation? In fact, while there are weighty reasons why
we should not make it the business of judges to rule on the meaning or merit
of works of authorship, I want to argue that aesthetics has most to offer
legal scholarship precisely as a set of hermeneutic and evaluative tools, but
only on the precondition that we take the purpose (or at least a purpose) of
copyright law to be something like the facilitation of cultural flourishing.
An enormous amount of legal scholarship already draws on work in aesthetics to argue that some form of borrowing is both inescapable and more
historically prevalent than we tend to assume. Such studies are eminently
sensible and highly valuable, but it seems to me that the humanities first and
foremost helps legal scholars come up with ever more examples of a general
observation that by now is quite uncontroversial, and that is in fact already
clearly recognised by copyright law. Different national legal frameworks
take various measures to safeguard the public domain, for example by striving to separate ideas and expression (and only granting protection to the
latter), through concepts such as scene a faire, or by creating exceptions for
parody and criticism. It is precisely because it would constrain the creative
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efforts of subsequent creators that such things as genres, styles, and stock
characters are non-protectable.
The cumulative nature of cultural creation is a crucial point that is important to keep pressing, but unfortunately the problem is not that this is some
insight that judges have failed to grasp and simply need to be reminded
of.14 Being or becoming aware of intricate connections between works
of authorship does not in itself suggest some better solution. I am afraid
that humanities scholars are unlikely to have anything in their toolbox
that would improve the situation. No doubt, philosophers could call into
question the distinction between ideas and expression in impressively
sophisticated ways, and literary scholars could easily demonstrate how
awkward it is to tell lawful uses of routine story elements from the unlawful
copying of original plot instantiations. This, however, is not the problem;
rather, it is to come up with more effective concepts, definitions and distinctions for the purposes of copyright law. Sadly, those that humanities have
devised for themselves are not designed to separate copyrightable from
non-copyrightable subject-matter, or legitimate from illegitimate uses of
existing works of authorship.
Take, once more, the poststructuralist notion of intertextuality. While
it very much defies any easy summary, we might say that what makes it
something more than just a cryptic paraphrase of the old truism that all
works build on previous works is its insistence that this holds true even
when we are completely unaware of it. The fact that some particular text
took inspiration from, or alludes to, some other particular text, or that
it belongs to and draws on certain generic conventions is too trivial to
merit attention, and is why it is so important for its theorists to distinguish
intertextuality from the study of sources, influences, and biographical
details. Instead, the idea is that everything is intertextual, even the very
building blocks of language. Thus, at the beginning of ‘The Death of the
Author’ Barthes quotes a line from Balzac’s short story Sarrasine describing
a castrato disguised as a woman: ‘This was woman herself, with her sudden
fears, her irrational whims, her instinctive worries, her impetuous boldness,
her fussings, and her delicious sensibility’ (2002, p. 3). As Graham Allen
observes, when Barthes goes on to ask ‘Who is speaking thus?’, his point is
that Balzac’s sentence ‘does not express a single meaning stemming from
an originary author; rather, it leads the reader into a network of possible
discourses and seems to emanate from a number of possible perspectives’
(2000, p. 13). The text itself does not determine who speaks, Barthes argues,
for it is conceivably either the thoughts of the protagonist, unaware that
the woman is really a castrato; the philosophy of Balzac the author; or a
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universal wisdom concerning women. Indeed, the single word ‘sensibility’
extends to numerous intertextual discourses beyond authorial intention; it
can relate ‘to psychology, eighteenth-century medical discourses, notions of
Romantic love, of ethical and social concerns, ideological commitments and
conflicts, literary conventions such as the novel of sentiment and sensibility
and so on’ (Allen, 2000, p. 13).
Similarly, Julia Kristeva, who coined the term intertextuality, argues
that all texts are made up of what she calls the social text, which consists
of pre-existing ways of speaking and thinking. As Allen argues, her point is
that language always already embodies social struggles over the meaning of
words: ‘If a novelist, for example, uses the words “natural” or “artificial” or
“God” or “justice” they cannot help but incorporate into their novel society’s
conflict over the meaning of these words. Such words and utterances retain
an “otherness” within the text itself’ (2000, p. 36).
The only significant distinction that emerges from these ideas runs
between ‘conventional’ texts and the kind of avant-garde texts that Kristeva
and Barthes champion: experimental writings that are self-conscious about
their own intertextuality, that foreground their own non-originality, that
so-to-say strive to think outside of ordinary language (which is one reason
their own texts burst at the seams with neologisms). I have no idea, however,
how the notion that the vast majority of texts reverberate with meanings
outside of themselves can serve any meaningful purpose in copyright law.
Aesthetic evaluation in law: pastiche and parody
Again, the poststructuralist perspective on authorship and originality is
extreme and much disputed. Often intertextuality is understood more
restrictively, as a catch-all term for the more direct ways in which texts
commonly interact with each other. Some terms are mostly descriptive, like
quotation, collage, sampling, adaptation, and rewriting; others are more
expressive, like homage, satire, pastiche, and plagiarism. These latter terms
are more likely to be of use in copyright law, for they suggest something
about the character and purpose of one work’s appropriation or evocation
of some other work or works. Indeed, several of them are listed explicitly
in various legal frameworks under the rubric of exceptions and limitation.
I believe they are of great value to copyright law, but primarily for their
ability to shed light on the kinds of practices that are worthy of protection
rather than for their ability to provide clear guidelines on how to protect
them.
I want to clarify my reasoning by commenting upon a specific suggestion
that I find useful, partly because it makes some enlightening observations,
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and partly for the ways in which I believe it is somewhat misguided. In
‘“Po-mo Karaoke” or Postcolonial Pastiche’ Zahr Said Stauffer discusses
the case of Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Muffin (2001) in which author Alice
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, a rewriting of Margaret Mitchell’s famous
novel Gone With The Wind from the slaves’ point of view, was found to be
parodic and hence fair use. Stauffer’s conclusion is that the court’s finding of
fair use was correct, but that the reasoning behind the decision was wrong,
as The Wind Done Gone is not really a parody. To classify it as such ‘puts too
much pressure on both legal and literary definitions of parody, and risks
diffusing the category beyond recognition’ (2007–2008, p. 44).
I find these observations convincing, and Stauffer provides a detailed
and astute analysis of Randall’s work in which she argues that the novel’s
value emerges more clearly and persuasively through the lens of postcolonial literary studies. From this perspective, The Wind Done Gone can be
seen to belong to a tradition that seeks to ‘control the direction of cultural
representations in the future and to correct those representations deemed
to be tarnishing or misrepresenting the past […], to take the dominant
figure’s language and use it, verbatim, in a context that channels power
back to the previously oppressed figure’ (ibid., p. 68).
This is clearly a hermeneutic argument, but at the infringement stage
courts frequently engage in both evaluation and interpretation already. For
example, in the case of Geva v. Walt Disney (1993), concerning an alleged
parody of Donald Duck, the Israeli Supreme Court found the appropriation ‘
“attractive and funny” rather than producing “artistic-satiric value” ’ (quoted
in Bently, 2008b, p. 371). In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc. (1994) concerning a rap parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman, the US Supreme Court
observed that ‘[the defendant] 2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings
of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand
for sex, and a sigh of relief from parental responsibility. The later words can
be taken as a comment on the naivety of the original of an earlier day, as
a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the
debasement that it signifies’ (ibid., p. 381). This is clearly an interpretation
of the work, and would not look out of place in an academic humanities
journal.
Indeed, merely categorising a work as parody (or satire or homage, for that
matter) inevitably comprises some measure of interpretation. It is not like
finding that a poem is composed in iambic pentameter or follows a certain
rhyming pattern, for it involves making a conjecture about what the text is
up to, and why. Sometimes this is entirely straightforward, in which case
it will seem that we are simply understanding what is clearly there. Other

82 Erlend Lavik

times a parody will be more subtle or ambivalent, and thus not lend itself
so easily to intersubjective agreement. Then we must spell out what we
believe the work takes aim at, how it goes about it, and to what purpose, in
which case we are more obviously making an interpretation (it is this kind
of account of non-obvious meaning the court made in the Campbell case).
The purportedly more objective alternative is to focus on quantitative
overlaps between the original and the allegedly infringing work. However, this does not rule out either uncertainty or subjectivity, for so-called
‘substantial similarity’ cannot always be measured precisely, especially
when we are dealing with complex, multidimensional works like films
or plays. More importantly, Stauffer’s analysis convincingly argues that
The Wind Done Gone’s critique of Mitchell’s classic novel, and of a more
widespread tendency in US culture to marginalise African-American
voices and perspectives, rests not just on the borrowing (and subsequent
recontextualisation) of significant parts of the underlying work’s setting,
characters and story, but also of pieces of dialogue, i.e. of its protectable
expression.
I am not quite as worried as Stauffer, however, that judges are ‘trying
to reinvent the literary wheel’ (2007–2008, p. 47), for ‘producing their own
literary criticism’ (ibid., p. 48), for creating ‘their own sometimes procrustean literary categories’ (ibid., p. 50), and for ‘using idiosyncratic terms and
tools’ (ibid., p. 52). She provides two examples of this. First, she claims that
copyright law draws a non-literary distinction between parody and satire
(ibid., p. 44). She points out that: ‘According to Campbell, parody targets an
underlying work, whereas satire targets something broader than a single
work, like an institution, a society, or an era’ (ibid., p. 45). This, however,
is pretty much how the terms are commonly used in aesthetics as well.
Admittedly, a parody does not have to target a specific underlying work; it
is possible to parody some aspect of a genre, for example, without invoking
any individual work in particular, but such cases are unlikely to raise any
legal issues since no recognisable work is being infringed upon.
Stauffer notes that Campbell did not actually specify how much latitude,
if any, satires should receive under copyright’s fair use analysis (ibid., p. 45),
but even though Justice Souter ‘may not have intended to draw a sharp line
between parody as non-infringing and satire as infringing, courts have
tended to interpret Campbell in those stark – and somewhat illogical –
terms’ (ibid., p. 46). The problem, then, is not so much that US judges have
failed to define parody and satire properly, but rather that they have failed
to take into account that works sometimes borrow from other works for
satirical purposes, and that some such borrowings may be socially valu-

Romantic authorship in copyright l aw and the uses of aesthe tics

83

able and so ought to be considered non-infringing. This is most obviously
the case when we are dealing with very famous works that have become
common frames of reference (like Gone With the Wind), where a critique of
the underlying work serves as a critique of what it represents more broadly
(like softening the cruelty of slavery, or keeping a lid on the perspectives
of the oppressed).15
Stauffer mentions a second example in passing, the (legal) concept of
transformative use,16 which is ‘based not on any literary criticism as such,
but on the work of another judge’ (ibid., p. 52). But as we have seen, critics
and creators have long appreciated that it is necessary to draw on previous
works, sometimes quite explicitly, and that the purpose of such borrowing is
not merely to take what is valuable from another author’s work, but to alter
it, make it one’s own. A good example is T.S. Eliot’s famous observation that
‘Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they
take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something
different’ (quoted in Julius, 1995, p. 130). Thus even though transformative
use is not a literary term, it is derived from, or at least consonant with, a vital
and widely held belief in literary studies, and hence a successful instance
of a reinvention of the literary wheel for legal purposes.
Stauffer also suggests that pastiche would serve as a better umbrella
term than parody, because the distinction between parody and satire is
imprecise and subjective. She is no doubt right that these terms are fuzzy
at the borders, and that they sometimes converge, but I find it unlikely that
pastiche is ‘much easier to recognise’, as Stauffer claims (2007–2008, p. 82).
She defines it as a mixture of contradictory and unorthodox elements,
styles, or modes, which does not necessarily seek to mock or criticise.
However, because it is so loosely defined (it can be applied to any mélange
of styles) and not tied to any specific purpose (it can be either honorific or
iconoclastic, but most typically the former) pastiche is in fact a far more
elusive concept than parody.
Moreover, I do not think it is entirely accurate to say, as Stauffer does, that
‘Pastiche is understood to be imitative at its core, but towards transformative ends’ (ibid., p. 83). In probably the most well-known account of pastiche,
Fredric Jameson distinguishes it from parody precisely by reference to its
lack of transformativeness and critical bite:
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic
style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But
it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior
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motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter. Pastiche is
thus blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs (1991, p. 17).

Thus for Jameson pastiche is characterised precisely by its failure to alter
that which it borrows. It is ‘the random cannibalization of all the styles of
the past, the play of random stylistic allusion’ (ibid., p. 18).17 So even though
pastiche tends to invoke past texts to celebrate them, the practice itself is
not universally celebrated in aesthetics. Indeed, in her historical study of
pastiche, Ingeborg Hoestery writes that it has been, and continues to be,
used in a ‘predominantly negative sense’ (2001: ix). This somewhat blunts
Stauffer’s claim that one reason pastiche is a more appropriate term than
parody in copyright law is that it provides secondary authors ‘a way to argue
that their uses were contributing to a recognised body of art’ (2007–2008,
pp. 85–86).
Of course, there are more positive accounts of postmodernism’s playful
recycling of past texts as well, and I agree with Linda Hutcheon that it can
serve as a form of critique. The point is not, then, that Stauffer gets it wrong,
and that parody is really the better umbrella term after all. Rather, it is that
there is no need for an aesthetic umbrella term in the first place. Parody is
useful because it typically identifies clearly critical and transformative uses
of an underlying work or works; however, it is too narrow to accommodate
all critical and transformative uses. Pastiche is useful because it draws
attention to more subtle and non-comedic transformations; however, it is
too broad in that the label encompasses non-transformative uses as well.
Stauffer too acknowledges this when she writes:
‘Qualifying as pastiche would not give secondary works a free pass
to copy, just as parodies do not automatically qualify for fair use’s affirmative defence […]18 Unlike parody, pastiche may be merely imitative
without ridiculing or criticizing, and it may be imitative without being
transformative. Importantly, then, a pastiche would need to meet Campbell’s transformative use test just as parody does now. Merely recycling
clips or extended passages from underlying works would not qualify as
fair use’ (ibid., p. 85).

I agree with Stauffer’s implication that the term pastiche in itself does not
provide any resolution in copyright infringement cases. It is interesting,
however, that the key criterion in her account too is the non-literary concept
of transformative use. To my mind this shows that there is no need to pit
parody against pastiche in order to find out which is ‘better’, for the only
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umbrella term we have use for is the judge-made one. ‘Transformative use’
is better suited to draw a distinction between infringing and non-infringing
borrowings than either parody or pastiche. It has the potential to do all the
work we require of it to serve copyright’s purpose of facilitating cultural
flourishing. If US courts have come to equate transformative use exclusively
with parody, then the problem is that it is being understood and used too
narrowly. Courts should be open to the possibility that a range of cultural
appropriations – including parody and pastiche – can be transformative
and culturally and artistically valuable. This is where aesthetics can be of
service. It can help fill the concept of transformative use with meaningful
content; it can maintain a conversation about, and provide perspectives on,
what constitutes cultural flourishing, and hence what is worthy of a fair
use defence. In Europe, which has no real equivalent to fair use, aesthetics
can serve to demonstrate the value of a broader and more flexible range of
exceptions and limitations.
From theories to practical skills
The broader point to take from this is that aesthetics would seem to be better
equipped to offer insights on copyright’s ends than they are to supply the
means by which to reach them. Of course, this conclusion merely restates
the perennial problem of the humanities, namely that any prospective
effects are likely to be long-term and indirect. Is there some way to make
them more immediate and hands-on? I believe there is, if we accept the two
premises this article has promoted: first, that copyright is supposed to foster
creativity (also for secondary authors); and second, that in infringement
cases courts already engage in evaluation and interpretation (or that they
should, for this is one area of copyright law in which it is worth sacrificing
quasi-objective criteria in the name of cultural policy).
However, we should not expect aesthetics to possess cut and dried tools
for legal analysis. What scholars of art and popular culture could bring to
the table is not so much existing terms and theories as a more broad-based
and eclectic expertise in recognising, and providing arguments for, cultural
and artistic value. It is by putting this competence to work on actual legal
problems that truly useful concepts, definitions, and distinctions might
eventually emerge. It would be a worthwhile undertaking to get literary
scholars, film scholars, art historians and so on to grapple with a broad
range of examples of cultural borrowings that raise tricky questions in
copyright law. They would have to work closely with legal scholars, who
would contribute in two main ways. First, they could identify relevant case
law. It would be useful to examine closely and systematically what kinds of
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works and issues have typically been brought before the court, what decision
judges have come to, and how they have reasoned. Copyright experts also
often express regret that some particularly interesting case has been settled
out of court, and such specimens would also be indispensable objects of
analysis. In addition, both sets of scholars are undoubtedly aware of new
types of works and practices, like fan fiction or amateur remixes, that raise
thorny legal issues, or call into question current terms and distinctions.
Together, they could offer informed analyses that would shed light on difficult limit cases.
This brings us to the second contribution that legal scholars would make,
namely to clarify the legal context within which the investigation of value
takes place. Practical matters of law must actively shape the hermeneutic
and evaluative input. It is by taking into account factors that literary scholars rarely need to reflect thoroughly upon – such as freedom of speech,
the commercial intent of secondary works (another factor in US fair use
analysis) and the moral rights of the first author (especially the rights of
paternity and integrity) – that aesthetic know-how would be disciplined,
and made to serve legal purposes specifically.
There is no guarantee of success, of course, but I believe we are much
more likely to achieve genuine results if we stop looking for ways in which
current terms and theories in aesthetics, no matter how suggestive, might
have some relevance in copyright law, and rather seek to exploit the general
competences of humanities scholars. Their sense of the history of different
art forms and artistic practices, and their sensitivity towards, and ways of
thinking about, social and artistic value must be confronted specifically
with the kinds of works that de facto pose problems in copyright law, as
well as with the full range of legal considerations relevant to the analysis.
Only then might new definitions and distinctions emerge that are actually
of any use to copyright.
It is not at all certain, however, that the most valuable contribution of
such a project is terminological. Infringement analysis is simply too complex
to tolerate much conceptual exactitude and fixed procedures. It is possible,
of course, to impose a fair degree of precision and predictability. Hypothetically, courts could decide that all secondary works that are commercial in
nature are infringing, or that secondary works must explicitly credit each
and every author they borrow from, or that authors are only allowed to
reproduce some specific amount from another work. This would still not
make the analysis entirely objective – for example, it might not always be
clear-cut whether or not a work is commercial – but more importantly,
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. The US fair use
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system seems to me to have a sensible amount of flexibility within certain
guidelines. European copyright scholars also seem to think so, as their calls
for a more flexible system of limitations and exemptions in EU copyright law
often refer to fair use US style (Hugenholtz, 2013, Senftleben & Hugenholtz,
2011). Analysis should proceed on a case-by-case basis, and precision and
predictability should come into view gradually as we amass ever more
good decisions.
Aesthetics can throw light on what makes a decision good, and provide
the most informed arguments available about why various forms of borrowings are worthy or unworthy of legal protection. Bright-line rules and
tests are frequently inadequate; good policy sometimes entails evaluation
and interpretation, or taking into account the reputation of the author,
or the cultural standing of the underlying work. I have no illusions that
involving experts in art and popular culture is going to make the task any
easier. I do think, however, that copyright is a matter of cultural policy, and
never more so than in the area of exceptions and limitations (whether they
are called fair use, fair dealing, the right to quote, or something else). I do
not think decisions in this extremely tricky region of copyright law should
take the form of extrapolations from strict definitions and distinctions,
but be guided by flexible umbrella concepts like ‘transformative use’ or
‘critical purpose’.
No one is better suited to fill these terms with meaningful content than
critics, historians, and theorists of art. Here the purposes of aesthetics and
copyright law are perfectly congruent, yet the means by which they habitually explore the critical and transformative functions of works of authorship
differ because they operate in different contexts, the main difference being
that the legal one is far more pragmatic, more epistemologically restricted.
It is typically only when they are called upon as expert witnesses in specific
cases that humanities scholars are brought into contact with legal perspectives on the works they study. Such random one-off encounters tend to
be of limited value because experts in aesthetics are unfamiliar with the
intricacies of copyright law. To truly make a contribution they would have
to be familiar with a range of difficult cases as well as the legal context
within which infringement analysis takes place. That is when their relevant
competence is geared towards legal purposes.
What I am suggesting, then, is that copyright law should not think of
aesthetics as some reservoir of terms and theories that may, with a little
tweaking, prove useful, but rather as a set of practical skills. In other words,
I believe the input of humanities scholars should be less top-down and more
bottom-up, less a matter of philosophy than of know-how.
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The current uncertainty about what borrowings and appropriations
courts actually allow is deplorable. The problem is not that copyright law
has failed to shore up its definitions and distinctions properly, however, but
rather a shortage of legal decisions. An interdisciplinary research project
involving both aesthetic and legal scholars might improve this sad state
of affairs somewhat by making public pronouncements on the legality
or illegality of as many relevant works of authorship as possible. While
their findings would not be legally binding, it would be beneficial to have
a catalogue of expert opinions about how copyright law ought to give
substance to concepts like ‘transformative use’ and ‘critical purpose’. Of
course, interpretation and evaluation in aesthetics is notoriously anarchic
and inscrutable, but relating it explicitly and methodically to the needs and
practices of copyright law should curb obvious excesses.
Maintaining a conversation about the transformative and critical functions of works of art is a fairly accurate description of what many academics
in the humanities do every day. As Jaszi notes, this conversation probably
already shapes legal attitudes. I remain sceptical of his analysis that the two
famous infringement cases involving Jeff Koons – the court rejected his fair
use defence in 1992, but found a similar work transformative in 2006 – tells
us very much about the wellbeing of the Romantic author; it is possible,
however, that the reversal owes a little something to the efforts of critics
to validate postmodern art in the intervening years. The problem is that
we do not really know. The aesthetic conversation could inform copyright
law more directly. In my opinion, the common ground between law and the
humanities is firmer at the level of hermeneutic craftsmanship than at the
level of theory. Keeping their shared interest in cultural value apart on the
grounds that one is objective and the other subjective deprives copyright
law of a valuable resource and obscures the utility of aesthetics.

Notes
1.

The struggle over Romantic authorship has been far more pronounced in
the US. In Europe copyright expansion has generally not been explained by
reference to the ideology of Romantic authorship, though there has been
resistance to the Romantic rhetoric that stakeholders frequently resort to,
especially the media, film, and publishing industries. The greater disinclination in Europe to see Romantic authorship as a root cause of copyright
expansion is somewhat paradoxical in light of continental jurisprudence’s
insistence that works of authorship are expressions of their creators’ personality. On the other hand, as we will see, this argument is often derived
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3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.
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from deconstructive ideas, which had a far more profound and lasting
impact in US universities.
Peter Jaszi writes that ‘On the whole, the full-blown Romantic conception
of “authorship” has a continuing grip on the legal imagination’ (1991, p. 463);
Margareth Cohn that ‘the construct of the romantic author still very much
influences copyright authorship’ (2012, p. 830); Martha Woodmansee that
‘In contemporary usage an author is an individual who is solely responsible – and therefore exclusively deserving of credit – for the production of a
unique work’ (1984, p. 426); and Elton Fukumoto that ‘Copyright law seems
to depend upon this Romantic conception [as] the statute makes originality a requirement for protection and imbues authorship with the ideology
of Romanticism’ (1997, pp. 907–908). See also Woodmansee and Jaszi (1994
and 1995); Boyle (1996).
Bracha too mentions this: ‘There is probably no more striking example of
how far modern copyright law travelled from its supposed grounding in
romantic authorship’ (2008, p. 249).
Mark Rose provides a similarly caricatured description of copyright
when he writes that it is ‘an institution built on intellectual quicksand:
the essentially religious concept of originality, the notion that certain
extraordinary beings called authors conjure works out of thin air’ (1993,
p. 142).
I do not have any particular originality criterion in mind as they are fairly
similar both across different national legal frameworks and international
treaties. As Elisabeth F. Judge points out, ‘originality standards are more
properly understood as constellations, rather than silos, where the surface
differences in wording mask similarities in both concepts and results’ (2009,
p. 403). Generally, the legal criteria are that a work must reflect an author’s
intellectual creation, display a modicum of creativity, and originate from
the author (ibid., p. 404).
See Lavik and Van Gompel (2013).
As we have seen, irreducible individuality is another criterion that is
sometimes offered as a symptom of Romantic authorship ideology’s
enduring presence in legal doctrine. The difficulty legal scholars have
identifying what Romantic authorship is, and their failure to agree on
what parts live on in copyright law and where, adds to the impression that
the reflectionist analytical framework is overly associative and accommodating.
Bently notes that for scholars such as Mark Rose, Martha Woodmansee,
and Jane Gaines, ‘a gulf had been opened up between copyright law’s notion of authorship and the new-orthodoxy of critical literary studies’ (2008,
p. 20).
For example, commenting on Justice Story’s decision in Emerson v. Davies –
where he states that ‘Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and
must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used be-
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10.
11.
12.

13.

14.
15.
16.

17.

18.

fore’ – Bracha notes that it only remains to ‘add some gloss of literary theory
[…] and a version of the poststructuralist critique of original authorship
emerges’ (2008, p. 202). Bently, meanwhile, calls the argument that musical
performers borrow their style from others ‘the poststructuralist strategy’
(2008, p. 108). To my mind the awareness of the collaborative and cumulative nature of works of authorship is a long-known (though no doubt often
soft-pedalled) commonplace rather than the discovery of modern literary
theory.
Barthes’ article came out in a double issue in 1967, and was only published
in French one year later in the literary journal Mateia.
The previous two issues were edited by Andy Warhol and Marshall McLuhan.
Lamarque, for example, finds that to treat a text ‘as an explosion of
unconstrained meaning, without origin and purpose [is] like trying to
hear a Mozart symphony as a mere string of unstructured sounds’ (2002,
p. 90).
Theatre director Jonathan Miller reckons that this is to make works of
authorship occasions for something else, to turn texts into pretexts: ‘It
becomes something which permits high jinks which happen to quote the
text, but doesn’t actually express it or mean it. And that seems to me hardly
worthwhile doing’ (1996, p. 164).
See the contributions to this book by Van Gompel on originality and by Van
Eechoud on adaptations and the EU exemption for parody.
This is not to say that The Wind Done Gone is a satiric parody, just that such
a work would clearly be possible.
Transformative use is an important possible justification for so-called fair
use under the US Copyright Code. As a rule, the author has the right to prevent the making of any work ‘based upon’upon his or her preexisting work
(the derivative right). Quoting or invoking a copyrighted work is less likely
to be deemed infringing under the fair use defencedefense when an author
not merely replicates some part of an underlying work, but rather somehow
adds something new to it, i.e. in the act of appropriation also alters or transforms it. That is, if the other factors of the fair use test, notably the effect
on the (market for) the source work. See Pierre N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use
Standard’, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990).
Perhaps Stauffer has Jameson in mind when she acknowledges in a footnote
that pastiche has ‘additional meanings in other art forms such as film and
the visual arts’ (2007–2008, p. 51). It should be noted, however, that Jameson’s analysis also includes literature.
In my view, though, a work is more likely to be overtly transformative if it
can be plausibly labelled a parody than when it can be plausibly labelled a
pastiche.
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Creativity, autonomy and personal
touch
A critical appraisal of the CJEU’s originality test for
copyright
Stef van Gompel
Copyright protects a wide range of productions in the literary, scientific and
artistic domains. This not only includes cultural creations, such as works
of literature, music, drama, film, photography and art, but also functional
types of subject-matter, such as computer programs, databases, industrial
design and works of applied art. As a rule, copyright protects works regardless of their ‘merit’ or purpose: the design of ordinary household items is
eligible for copyright protection just as much as creations of ‘high’ art. The
only threshold that must be satisfied for a work to attract copyright is that
its expression is sufficiently ‘original’, in the legal sense of that word.
Copyright law’s originality threshold is not a high-to-attain standard.
Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
confirms that copyright extends to subject-matter that is original in the
sense that it is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ (Infopaq International,
2009, § 37; Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 46; Football Association
Premier League, 2011, § 97; Painer, 2011, § 87; Football Dataco, 2012, § 37; and
SAS, 2012, § 45) and that no other criteria may be applied to determine its
eligibility for protection. In the Eva-Maria Painer case, the Court clarified
that an intellectual creation is the author’s own ‘if it reflects the author’s
personality’ and that this is the case ‘if the author was able to express his
creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative
choices’ (2011, §§ 88–89). This was reiterated in the Football Dataco case,
where it was once more emphasised that, for an intellectual creation to
be original, the author must have stamped it with his ‘personal touch’ by
making ‘free and creative choices’ during its production (2012, § 38).
For readers untrained in copyright law, the language used by the CJEU
may give the false impression that copyright law’s originality test is not at
all that easy to satisfy. The references to ‘the author’s personality’, ‘creative
abilities’ and ‘free and creative choices’ seem to suggest that only culturally
significant creations carrying an obvious personal stamp of the author
qualify for protection. This is not the case. Copyright applies to a wide range
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of culturally trivial objects with no unique distinctiveness, as the Eva-Maria
Painer case perfectly illustrates. This case involved a simple school portrait
photograph – indeed, those school portraits that are impossible to tell
apart, except for the images of the persons they portray. The CJEU found
that the creation of such photographs could involve sufficient ‘free and
creative choices’ to regard them as the own intellectual creations of the
photographer (2011, § 93). This shows that, in reality, the words defining
copyright law’s originality criterion differ considerably from what they
mean to convey in everyday speech.
The CJEU’s endeavours to define copyright law’s standard of originality
and to craft an EU-wide legal notion of copyrighted works came somewhat
unexpected. Up until the Infopaq International decision of 2009, it was
thought that the originality standard and the subject-matter definition of
copyright were largely unharmonised terrains that are not governed by
EU law but that instead fall to national regulation. Accordingly, the CJEU’s
appropriation of the work concept has consequences for Member States
that have traditionally applied other criteria to determine whether or not
creations are eligible for copyright, such as the United Kingdom (Alexander,
2009; Derclaye, 2010; Griffiths, 2011). Due to the CJEU’s harmonisation of
the originality standard, such national criteria will possibly need to be
reassessed so as to put them on par with the ‘author’s own intellectual
creation’-test. More specifically, it seems that the national criteria must be
brought into line with the ‘free and creative choices’ language, which the
CJEU has made a corner stone of its ‘author’s own intellectual creation’test. By accentuating the author’s personality as a key constituent of the
originality criterion, this test has been tied closely to the author as the
individual creator of a work.
Interestingly, the meaning and substance of the CJEU’s originality criterion has not yet attracted much analytical scrutiny. In particular, the limits
inherent in the CJEU’s originality standard have received little attention in
legal doctrine – let alone in court decisions (although that is probably not
where one would expect a critical review of the test be conducted in the
first place). This is remarkable, seeing that copyright regulates such a wide
variety of cultural production and may restrict the use of even the most
low-key, routine creations that surround us in everyday life.
A more critical and out-of-the-box reading of the ‘free and creative
choices’-language suggests that the CJEU’s originality standard may
perhaps impose more limitations than is currently recognised in legal
discourse. For one thing, authors are of course not autonomous creators
who work in a vacuum. Creative processes are contingent on many external
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factors. Cultural productions are usually made with audiences in mind
and individual creators operate within social, technical and institutional
environments with all of the attendant constraints. This implies that, in
reality, the autonomy of authors to make free and creative choices is often
naturally restricted.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the ‘author’s own intellectual
creation’-test is an appropriate standard for determining the eligibility
of protection of joint works. If free and creative choices imply that the
autonomy of the individual creator is a key factor, how then are works to
be rated that result from complex collaborative processes such as those
that online communities create (whether art, software or encyclopaedias)?
Whose free and creative choices count for this matter? Only those of the
main author or all choices made by individual contributors? The weaker
the connection between a work and the authors who created it, the more
difficult it seems to apply the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test as it
is currently defined by the CJEU.
Since ‘free and creative choices’ has become the mantra in decisions on
copyrightable subject-matter, it is high time for a considerate study of the
limits of the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test. Given that the originality standard is so easy to attain that even works of minimal creativity qualify
for protection, there is need for a more nuanced understanding of how the
‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test operates in law. That is where this
chapter aims to make a contribution.
This chapter consequently examines what the elements ‘free and creative
choices’ and the author’s ‘personal touch’ entail and how limits to creativity,
autonomy and the expression of personality in creative processes may
have bearing on the practical application of the CJEU’s originality test. In
so doing, it draws upon aesthetics and creativity studies to explain how
creative processes can be affected by conventions and constraints. As has
been remarked in the Introduction of this book, creativity studies is not a
homogenous discipline, but rather a complex of diverse specialisations and
approaches in the humanities and social sciences, each studying creativity
from certain perspectives. Between these specialisations, creativity may be
treated differently, depending on the specific strands that are examined
and the approach that is taken. Because this chapter covers diverse areas, it
necessarily takes a broad-brush approach to creativity and does not provide
such a detailed account of concepts of creativity as many specialisations in
the humanities and social sciences do.
For the most part, this chapter has the law as its object. Apart from the
CJEU’s case law, which is at the heart of the examination, I also discuss the

98 Stef van Gompel

rich case law on copyrightable subject-matter from the Netherlands. Dutch
courts not only tend to pass elaborately argued decisions, they often also
have an open attitude towards court decisions and doctrine from other
EU Member States. Furthermore, the Dutch originality test shows close
similarity to the CJEU’s ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test. In the
Zonen Endstra v. Nieuw Amsterdam case, the Dutch Supreme Court has
ruled that a work must have an ‘own, original character’ and ‘bear the
personal stamp of the author’ to attract copyright. This means that its form
‘may not be derived from another work’ and that it ‘must be the result of
creative human labour and thus of creative choices, so that it is a production
of the human mind’ (2008, § 4.5.1). The Supreme Court considers this to
be on par with the CJEU’s originality test (Stokke v. H3 Products, 2013, §
3.4(a); Stokke v. Fikszo, 2013, § 4.2(a); Hauck v. Stokke, 2013, § 4.2(a)) and so
do Dutch legal commentators (see, e.g., Koelman, 2009, p. 205; Visser, 2010,
p. 986; Hugenholtz, 2011). Accordingly, the Dutch case law can be considered
sufficiently representative for illustrating the limitations of relying on the
author’s ‘free and creative choices’ and ‘personal touch’ in copyright cases.
The chapter consists of four parts. First, it clarifies what the CJEU alludes
to when it uses the word ‘creative’. It will be seen that, in copyright law,
this notion has an entirely different connotation than it has in aesthetics
and creativity studies. This explains why insights from these disciplines
are difficult to apply for the purpose of reinterpreting or reconfiguring
copyright law’s originality test. Nevertheless, there are ways in which
creativity studies can help to refine specific elements of the test. This will
be elucidated in the next two sections on autonomy and personal touch.
I explore how creative autonomy of authors can be constrained and whether
such constraints are – or ought to be – accommodated for in copyright law’s
originality test. In addition, I show the difficulty of determining whether
the author’s personality is sufficiently reflected in works, in general, and
jointly created works in particular. The chapter concludes with a synthesis
of the main findings.

Creativity: a concept with diverse meanings
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, for readers unfamiliar
with law, the terms ‘originality’ and ‘creativity’ in copyright law may have
a somewhat surprising meaning. To illustrate this, this section contrasts
copyright law’s concept of creativity with that in aesthetics and creativity
studies and explains the reasons for the difference of approach. It concludes
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that it is not useful to reinterpret creativity in copyright law by drawing
upon the same concept in aesthetics and creativity studies, but that further
study of creative constraints and the imprint of the author’s personality is
necessary and desirable.
The creativity standard in copyright law
At first sight, the degree of creativity reflected in a work seems to be a
critical factor for accepting copyright protection. In multiple instances,
the CJEU has ruled that, for the author to achieve a result which is an
intellectual creation of his or her own, the author must have ‘express[ed]
his creativity in an original manner’ (Infopaq International, 2009, § 45;
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 50). If understood in the ordinary
day-to-day meaning of the word ‘original’, this language appears to suggest
that copyright only extends to intellectual creations that, at least to some
extent, are novel, innovative or unique in the sense that they depart from
conventional expression.
On closer inspection, however, this is not how originality in copyright
law is interpreted. The word ‘original’ merely signifies that the work must
originate from the author or, in the words of the CJEU, that it is the ‘author’s
own intellectual creation’. The CJEU does not specify when something is a
‘creation’ for the purposes of copyright. It seems to entertain the idea that it
covers a very broad array of productions of the mind. The CJEU neither tests
whether the subject-matter at issue belongs to the category of copyrightable
works, nor categorically excludes specific types of creations in advance. Accordingly, it has denied copyright to sporting events for the reason that they
‘cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as works’ (Football
Association Premier League, 2011, § 98), while accepting that copyright
may extend to other – non-aesthetic – creations, including graphic user
interfaces (Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 46), football fixture
lists (Football Dataco, 2012, §§ 29–45), programming languages and the
format of data files in computer programs (SAS, 2012, § 45).
On the whole, a work only needs to reflect a minimum level of creative input to attract copyright. It suffices that the author has made ‘free
and creative choices’ in its production (Van Eechoud, 2012, §§ 56–57). In
particular, it is not required that a work is new or that it possesses certain
quality or merit (Van Gompel & Lavik, 2013). The CJEU has explicated that,
for literary works, the author’s ‘free and creative choices’ can exist in the
selection, sequence and combination of words (Infopaq International, 2009,
§ 45) and, for photos, in fixing the background, pose, lighting and framing,
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choosing the angle and atmosphere and using developing techniques or
computer software (Eva-Maria Painer, 2011, § 91). Here it must be stressed
that copyright does not protect mere facts or ideas. Its protection does not
extend beyond the individual expression that the author has given to his
or her thoughts.
Interestingly, the CJEU has acknowledged that there are constraints to
creativity that need to be taken into consideration when determining the
eligibility for protection of works. It has explicitly ruled that copyright does
not protect features of a work that are predetermined by technique or function and therefore are not based on free and creative choices (Bezpečnostní
softwarová asociace, 2010, §§ 48–49; Football Association Premier League,
2011, § 98; Football Dataco, 2012, § 39; SAS, 2012, § 39). Yet, the CJEU is not
really clear on what the requirement to disregard technically or functionally dictated choices means. Given that often it is feasible to make small,
subjective deviations in the design of technical products (see Quaedvlieg,
1987, pp. 22–25), it is not at all so obvious where it has set the limit at which
the author’s creative freedom is too narrow for the work to attract copyright.
In general, the originality standard is very low. As observed in the introduction of this chapter, even regarding ordinary school portrait photos, the
CJEU has held that ‘the freedom available to the author to exercise his creative abilities will not necessarily be minor or even non-existent’ (Eva-Maria
Painer, 2011, § 93). This is also recognised at the national level, where there
is an abundance of examples of low level creative works having received
copyright protection. In the Netherlands, copyright has been conferred on
‘passport photographs, striped wallpaper, the design of simple games like
“four in a row” and designs of basic holiday homes’ (Hugenholtz, 2012, p. 44).
It remains unclear from the CJEU’s case law whether there are any
further constraints to creativity that may render creations ineligible for
copyright protection. Since the CJEU relies so heavily on the author’s free
and creative choices, it seems safe to assume that copyright does not extend
to too obvious or trivial creations that insufficiently express the author’s
creative abilities. That is at least how originality’s lower limit is traditionally
understood in most Member States. Here too, however, it is not easy to
draw a bright line between works that possess just enough creativity and
those that are too obvious or trivial to attract copyright, at least if courts
are expected to eliminate evaluation beyond the ‘author’s own intellectual
creation’-test of the CJEU (see Van Gompel & Lavik, 2013, pp. 219–229).
The final judgment in the Dutch court case of Zonen Endstra v. Nieuw
Amsterdam corroborates this. The case dealt with the question of whether
copyright subsists in (transcripts of taped) conversations. These conversa-
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tions took place during a series of secret meetings between police officers
and Endstra, a real estate broker who was later murdered. The tapes were
transcribed into off icial police reports, a copy of which found its way
to crime reporters who published a book of the transcripts, with minor
edits. The sons of the murdered businessman sought to stop publication
by claiming copyright in the conversations. The case made it all the way
to the Supreme Court (2008) and was ultimately remanded to the Court of
Appeal of The Hague. In 2013, this court ruled that Endstra’s conversations
with the police were not original works, because Endstra had expressed
himself in a nigh-endless sequence of incomplete, badly versed phrases
that involved insufficient creative labour. Copyright protection was denied
because Endstra had construed his speech in a form too ‘ordinary or trivial’
(§ 5.13). With this finding, some argue, the court makes, or at least comes
close to making, an aesthetic quality judgment on the coherence of Endstra’s
speech (Tsoutsanis, 2013; Grosheide, 2013; Cohen Jehoram, 2013). It can also
be argued, however, that the court actually sought to apply the originality
test as phrased by the Dutch Supreme Court by critically examining whether
Endstra had made ‘free and creative choices’ in expressing himself (Van
Gompel, 2013, p. 203).
Creativity standards in aesthetics and creativity studies
The low standards of creativity and originality in copyright law stand in
stark contrast with how these notions are understood in aesthetics and
creativity studies. Although, within and between these disciplines, there
are obviously many variations in the way these terms are used (Parkhurst,
1999), in general, the various definitions of creativity have in common that
they involve an element of novelty and an element of quality or usefulness
(Sternberg and Lubart, 1999, p. 3; Sternberg and Kaufman, 2010, p. 467).
That is, to be creative, a work must exhibit some sort of novel, original or
innovative outcome, either in its appearance or in its underlying ideas.
In addition, it must also be appropriate (significant, valuable or useful)
within the specific context (Mayer, 1999, pp. 449–450). As Amabile and
Tighe describe it, creativity does not merely rest on a work being ‘different
for the sake of difference’ but also requires it to be ‘appropriate, correct,
useful, valuable, or expressive of meaning’ (1993, p. 9).
Regardless of the common elements, the definitions of creativity and
originality vary greatly in detail. This can perhaps be explained by the variety of disciplines in which creativity has been studied, including psychology,
sociology, biology and economics, with a vast ‘panoply of perspectives on
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creativity’ within these disciplines (Kozbelt, Beghetto and Runco, 2010,
p. 21). Richard E. Mayer notes for example that creativity can be perceived
as a property of people, products or processes, as a personal or social phenomenon, as a common or exceptional incidence, as a domain-general or
domain-specific concept or as a qualitative or quantitative matter (1999,
pp. 450–451).
Despite the broad variety of disciplines and perspectives on creativity,
however, both aesthetics and creativity studies seem to have in common
that they treat creativity and originality as relative or comparative notions (cf. Moran, 2010, p. 75). That is, these notions are used as criteria to
determine how one person, product or process stands out creatively against
other people, products or processes within the same symbolic domain
(Csíkszentmihályi, 1999, p. 316). This is an important observation, because
it allows us to understand the fundamental difference with the way in
which originality and creativity are applied in copyright law. There, these
notions are treated not as relative or comparative, but as independent,
normative concepts.
Explaining the difference of interpretation and approach
The main reason for the difference of interpretation is that especially aesthetics and art studies on the one hand and copyright law on the other start
from completely different points when examining notions of originality and
creativity. At an abstract level, these points of departure can be described
as being one of assessing distinctiveness versus one of legal demarcation.
Having artistic evaluation as one of its principal objectives, aesthetics
clearly takes a relative approach to creativity by considering how original,
novel or unique a work is in comparison with other works within a specific
genre or cultural domain. That is not to say that aesthetic evaluation depends solely on how an artwork relates to similar works that precede it. It is
also relevant what contribution the work makes to the further development
of a genre (Levinson, 1990). As Sherri Irvin explains, if ‘the characteristics
for which a work is praised are … developed further by other artists … this,
in turn, will reflect favorably on the initial work’ (2007, p. 295). Whether
the significance of an artwork is evaluated retrospectively or prospectively,
however, it is evident that in making the assessment, other works within
the same genre serve as key reference points.
Other disciplines do not concentrate on aesthetic creativity or value
the superiority of one creative person, product or process over another.
Creativity studies can also be oriented on organisational creativity (Puccio

Creativit y, autonomy and personal touch

103

and Cabra, 2010), educational creativity (Smith and Smith, 2010), functional
creativity (Cropley and Cropley, 2010), et cetera. As a general rule, however,
the degree to which creativity or innovation manifests itself in organisational, educational or functional settings is also measured in relation to
other – sometimes hypothetical – settings to which they compare.
In copyright law, by contrast, the courts do not generally draw a comparison with other works to determine whether an intellectual creation
meets the required level of creativity. Because copyright law’s originality
test ‘is primarily concerned with the relationship between the creator and
the work’ (Bently and Sherman, 2009, p. 93) and not with how novel or
meritorious a work is compared with earlier works, originality is examined
solely on the basis of the work itself. Reference to pre-existing works is
usually only made if there is doubt about whether a work is truly the author’s
own intellectual creation, for example, if there are indications that the
author has copied parts of earlier works or draws upon unprotected ideas,
elements of style or materials that are in the public domain (Van Gompel
& Lavik, 2013, p. 217).
The reason why copyright law’s originality test is primarily authororiented and does not require a comparison of works with prior art is largely
historically determined. In the 19th century, the justification for copyright
was found to exist in protecting the labour and expense incurred by the
author in creating the work (the labour theory of copyright) or in protecting the author’s personality as manifested in the work (the personality
rights theory of copyright) (Buydens, 2012, pp. 258–309, 315–340). This was
reflected in the originality test being centred on the author as the creator
of the work (Van Gompel & Lavik, 2013, p. 215). Since copyright extends only
to the author’s individual expression and not to facts and ideas, an originality criterion that focuses on the author’s own intellectual endeavours in
creating the work was considered a sufficient threshold. For the purpose
of a legal demarcation of copyright, no further object-oriented criteria such
as novelty, quality or merit were thought to be required.
Restyling copyright’s creativity standard: an arduous task
Since the concept of creativity differs greatly between the humanities
and copyright law in terms of interpretation and points of departure,
reinterpreting copyright law’s originality test by using insights from the
humanities appears to be a difficult task. Although, in theory, the idea of
drawing upon aesthetics or creativity studies to rephrase copyright law’s
creativity standard in more positive terms looks sympathetic, in practice,
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raising the standard along these lines would seem to create far more
problems than it solves. As Erlend Lavik also argues in this book, aesthetics and creativity studies simply do not provide sufficiently well-defined
and coherent principles for the purpose of creating legal certainty in the
copyright domain. This has been explained in greater detail elsewhere
(Lavik & Van Gompel, 2013).
Without repeating the said discussion here, it is evident from the
comparison above that if copyright law were to move away from the low,
author-oriented originality criterion by adopting a higher creativity test
akin to the one applied in aesthetics and creativity studies, then this would
undoubtedly mark a departure from the core principles upon which copyright law rests. It would subject copyright to a novelty-like criterion and
would require courts to determine whether a work creatively stands out
against other, comparable works. Rather than centring protection on the
author’s own intellectual creation, it would require evaluating a work’s merit
vis-à-vis other works to ascertain whether it is worthy of protection. This
is undesirable, as it would completely upset the current copyright system
and the principles upon which it is based.
Still, this does not change the fact that creativity is part of copyright law’s
originality criterion and that it will remain a hollow term unless it is taken
more seriously. For this reason, the following two sections will examine
whether it would be practical and feasible to reinforce the current ‘free
and creative choices’-test by requiring courts to take full account, first, of
constraints that may restrict the author’s creative autonomy and, second,
of the bond between a work and its creator so as to determine whether his
or her personality is sufficiently reflected in it.

Autonomy: Exercising free choice within creative constraints
Creativity requires certain autonomy on the part of the creator. Without
autonomy, creators may lose the intrinsic motivation for creating works,
which can affect their sense of intellectual ownership (Amabile, 1998, p. 82).
Moreover, as Mark A. Runco writes, ‘[o]riginality implies that the person is
doing something that is different from what others are doing, and that is
probably easiest if he or she is independent and autonomous’ (2007, p. 288).
Hence, there is a certain relationship between the degree of freedom that
creators enjoy and the level of creativity evident in the works they produce.
This is also acknowledged in copyright law. As observed, the CJEU
has judged that copyright protection is granted only to works that result
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from the author’s free and creative choices. Conversely, it has ruled that
copyright’s originality threshold is not met when the creation of a work is
dictated by technical or functional considerations, rules or constraints that
leave no room for creative freedom (Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010,
§ 48–49; Football Association Premier League, 2011, § 98; Football Dataco,
2012, § 39; SAS, 2012, § 39). The CJEU has held that copyright extends neither to the functionality of a computer program, nor to the programming
language, the format of data files and the graphic user interface insofar
as these components are differentiated by their technical function only
(Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 48; SAS, 2012, § 39).
From a legal perspective, since the originality criterion requires a work
to express the author’s free and creative choices, it makes sense that courts,
in deciding on a work’s eligibility for protection, ignore elements that do not
result from autonomous creative choices by the author. However, the difficulty remains how the originality of a work as a whole is to be judged when
it contains technical, functional or other non-original features. This will be
considered in more detail below. In the Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace case,
the CJEU has further explained the importance of discounting technical or
functional considerations, rules or constraints when making judgment on the
originality of a work. It stated that, if the different methods of implementing
an idea are so limited that idea and expression become indissociable, then
the space for authors to express their creativity in a personal manner is too
narrow to create a work that constitutes an intellectual creation of their own
(2010, §§ 49–50). Although the way in which the CJEU brings in the idea/
expression dichotomy is odd, it clearly seeks to prevent that the originality
test is interpreted in such a way that it would enable a monopolisation of ideas
‘to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development’ (SAS,
2012, § 40). Competition or innovation must not be excluded by authors who
claim exclusive protection for elements of works that are merely technically
or functionally defined and that leave no room for creative choices.
Creative constraints also play a role outside the mere technical or
functional domains. At least, that can be inferred from the Football Association Premier League case, in which the CJEU denied protection to football
matches on the grounds that they ‘are subject to rules of the game, leaving
no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright’ (2011, § 98). It
would have been more straightforward had the Court denied protection by
reasoning why a football game is not a literary or artistic ‘work’. Copyright is
indeed not intended to protect football matches or, more precisely, to cover
sports techniques and tactics. If the Dutch athlete Epke Zonderland could
claim copyright protection for the three consecutive flight elements which
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he introduced and successfully completed in the men’s horizontal bar final
during the 2012 Olympics in London, then he could eliminate competition
and innovation in this sport by precluding others from performing the same.
The objective of sports being to attain maximum physical performance in
fair competition with other participants, any athlete may seek a competitive
advantage through physical training, mental preparation, refining skills,
better applying knowledge, using better equipment or developing new techniques. It would be unthinkable, however, if the one athlete has a competitive advantage over the other due to an intellectual property right over the
execution of sports elements (with the exception maybe of choreographed
movements in disciplines such as figure skating or free style gymnastics).
That is why it makes sense to exclude sports from the copyright domain
altogether, as they are commonly understood to be in most countries (Spoor,
Verkade and Visser, 2005, p. 127). It is somewhat surprising that, instead,
the CJEU applied the ‘creative freedom’-test to football matches, because
by doing so it seems to imply that sports events are in principle eligible
subject-matter. That in turn raises the thorny question of authorship. Who
qualifies as ‘author’ of football matches? (The players, captain, technical
staff, the coach, one team, both teams, all of the above?).
In practice, the challenge is to determine how much freedom authors
actually have for making creative choices. Creative processes and outcomes
are always contingent on conventions and constraints of some kind. These
may exist in various forms and may vary from soft, self-imposed restrictions
to hard limitations that are imposed from outside. This section first explains
how creativity and constraints interact and then sketches types of constraints
by which the author’s creative freedom may be inhibited. Because the object
is to illustrate that the author’s autonomy in creative processes is invariably
restricted, in these sections the copyright implications are not examined in
much detail. That will be done in the subsequent section, which examines
how courts deal with creative constraints when judging on copyright law’s
originality test. It will be seen that courts often only investigate the creative
space that is available, without observing how that space is used and whether
the author has been restricted in any way during the creative process.
The interplay between creativity and constraints
In creativity studies, there is extensive literature on how tradition, conventions and constraints affect creative processes. Most writings focus on the
intricate relationship between creativity and constraints, explaining that,
while the latter obviously restrict the creative freedom of authors, at the
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same time, they are an intrinsic and perhaps necessary part of creative
processes. If a sufficient degree of freedom is critical for artists to be able
to make creative choices, then creativity will be stifled if there are too
many restrictions. Yet, too much freedom can also paralyse creativity. If
authors are offered too many choices, then the creative space may be too
large to make adequate creative decisions. Linda Candy rightly observes
that, since ‘[a] totally free or unoccupied space in which to begin a creative
work is both unimaginable and probably undesirable’, constraints can also
be conducive to creativity by providing the author with ‘a more manageable
creative space’ (2007, p. 366).
For Igor Stravinsky, for example, rules and restrictions were an integral
and essential part of musical composition. He wrote:
The creator’s function is to sift the elements he receives from [imagination],
for human activity must impose limits upon itself. The more art is controlled,
limited, worked over, the more it is free. As for myself, I experience a sort
of terror when, at the moment of setting to work and finding myself before
the infinitude of possibilities that present themselves, I have the feeling
that everything is permissible to me. … My freedom thus consists in my
moving about within the narrow frame that I have assigned myself for each
of my undertakings. I shall go even further: my freedom will be so much the
greater and more meaningful the more narrowly I limit my field of action
and the more I surround myself with obstacles. Whatever diminishes constraint, diminishes strength. The more constraints one imposes, the more
one frees one’s self of the chains that shackle the spirit (1970, pp. 63–65).

Hence, in constraint theories, creativity is typically defined as ‘a process of
exercising free choice in the context of a range of existing constraints’ (Candy,
2007, p. 366). In a similar vein, Jon Elster interprets creativity as ‘working
within constraints’ and originality as ‘changing the constraints’ (2000, p. 180),
thus qualifying originality as a higher to attain standard than creativity. At
the very end of this spectrum is Patricia D. Stokes’ constraint model, according to which genuine artistic freedom is left only to artists like Motherwell,
Mondrian, Klee and others ‘who self-select and self-impose constraints on
their current successful solutions’ and, in so doing, pursue ‘a novel goal and
in the process of realising it [enlarge] a domain’ (2008, pp. 234, 235).
Obviously the way in which constraints affect creativity fully depends
on their nature. As in the example of Stravinsky, the restrictions are totally
self-imposed and therefore part of the creative process. This does not directly
upset creative freedom. In fact, it is creative autonomy that allows artists to
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set the boundaries within which they wish to create. However, every creative
choice, even if imposed by entirely idiosyncratic constraints, involves subsequent restrictions that may have an effect on the creative space available
to authors. For this reason, Jon Elster suggests in his book Ulysses Unbound
(2000, p. 176) that artistic creation must be envisaged as a two-step process,
i.e., as a ‘choice of constraints followed by choice within constraints’. The first
step involves voluntary choices of constraints that include, for example, the
choice to work in a certain genre or the choice of materials. Such choices
inevitably require authors to make subsequent – not necessarily voluntary
– choices based on the external constraints that working in a particular
genre or with the one or the other type of material implicate.
At the same time, there are also many external and internal constraints
to creativity to which authors would usually not submit themselves voluntarily. Examples vary from psychological barriers, such as writers’ blocks
and early creativity that limits future achievements (Goncalo, Vincent and
Audia, 2010), to external restrictions, such as fixed deadlines and limited
budgets. The former are personal and do not affect all authors, but the latter
are very common. Nearly all authors are somehow restricted by time and
money. In one way, these constraints are useful as they keep authors focused
on creation. Jon Elster (2000, pp. 210–211) writes: ‘For a movie director, an
unlimited budget may be disastrous. For a TV producer, having too much
time may undermine creativity’. On the other hand, the same constraints
may also restrict creative freedom, especially if the deadlines are too short
or the available budget too tight.
Table 1. Some sources of creative constraints

Internal

External

Voluntary/Autonomous

Involuntary

Choice of genre
Choice of audience
Choice of topic and content
Choice of medium, format, methods
and materials
Rules of the genre
Trends and audience expectations
Functional demands
Work environment, including creative
briefs and instructions, imposed
deadlines and available budget

Psychological barriers such as mood,
writer’s block, early creativity, etc.
Personality of the author, including
personal traits, habits and preferences
Barriers to understanding, such as
limits of language
Physiological barriers such as range of
hearing and vision
Limits to physical performance such
as musical performance
Properties of texture, strength and
structure of materials
Technical limitations
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Table 1 provides examples of internal and external constraints to creativity
and the voluntary or involuntary nature of them. Several of these examples
are dealt with in more detail in the next section on creative conventions
and constraints.
Conventions and constraints in creative processes
The previous section shows that, while different types of conventions
and constraints affect creative processes, not all of them truly inhibit the
author’s creative freedom. In fact, authors often exercise their creative
autonomy to actually impose restrictions on themselves. The voluntary
internal constraints indicated in Table 1 clearly illustrate this. Other constraints, such as the psychological barriers to create as a result of mood,
writer’s block or early creativity hinder the creative process, but copyright
discounts these factors because they are viewed as involuntary internal
constraints. Hence, for the purpose of establishing whether a work passes
or fails copyright law’s originality test, all internal constraints mentioned in
Table 1 are not directly relevant or useful, either because they do not impede
but rather facilitate the author’s ability to make ‘free and creative choices’
(the voluntary internal constraints) or because they are totally accidental
and unintentional (the involuntary internal constraints).
Having said that, the voluntary internal constraints are not entirely
irrelevant. They can serve as a useful starting point for laying bare the
external constraints to creativity that will affect the ability of authors to
make ‘free and creative choices’. This follows from Jon Elster’s depiction
of artistic creation as a ‘choice of constraints followed by choice within constraints’. Because every creative process requires authors to make creative
decisions (the voluntary internal constraints), these decisions eventually
will also inflict various external constraints on them. Therefore, this section
discerns three types of internal decisions that creative processes involve,
namely, the choice of genre, the choice of medium, format, methods and
materials and the choice of the audience that authors want to reach. It
ascertains how these choices may impose external constraints on authors
that limit their freedom of action. Next, it analyses how creative freedom
may be inhibited by external constraints that may arise in employment or
contractual relationships.
This approach differs from other ways of systematising constraints to
creativity. Jon Elster, for example, distinguished purely between soft, selfimposed constraints and conventions, on the one hand, and hard, intrinsic
and imposed constraints, on the other hand (2000, p. 190). Another division
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was proposed by Brian Moeran who, in his paper on cultural production,
creativity and constraints (2011, p. 16), differentiates between material,
temporal, spatial, social, representational and economic restrictions. While
these scholars engage in a treatment of how creativity is limited in a general
way, our intention is to categorise constraints that restrict the author’s
ability to make free and creative choices in shaping their work. That is why
the approach in this chapter differs.
At first sight, many constraints mentioned in the following sections
may appear not very problematic from a copyright viewpoint, since the
required originality threshold is so easily reached. However, the deeper
we dig into the constraints to creativity, the more we shall realise that it
cannot automatically be assumed – as courts sometimes do – that authors
have made ‘free and creative choices’ in producing their works.
The choice of genre
The specific genre in which authors create their works clearly imposes
a number of restrictions. While the term ‘genre’ has multiple meanings,
varying from discipline to discipline and sometimes even within disciplines,
in this section, it is used in a rather general fashion. It refers to any type,
class or category of literature, music or art – in the broadest sense of the
word – that is defined by shared characteristics of content, form, style,
mood, et cetera. Genres are necessarily formed retroactively, as they require
(informal) recognition of their shared characteristics by a specific artistic
community or culture. Genres are thus defined by established conventions,
the so-called ‘rules of the genre’. These are – implicit or explicit – norms or
understandings, to which nearly all authors in a particular genre submit
themselves. Blues compositions, for example, traditionally have a twelve-bar
chord scheme and a distinguishable A-A-B rhyme and lyric pattern.
Another example is Western movies, which comprise not only various
visual conventions, such as their location in the countryside or in towns
with saloons, people wearing wide-brimmed hats, high-heeled boots with
spurs, using rifles, riding horses, and so on (Buscombe, 1970, pp. 36–38).
Perhaps even stronger genre characteristics of Westerns are the recurring
repertoire of situations and events that draw on the history of the American
frontier, including ‘gunfight, drifters from a defeated south, confrontations
of cavalry and Indians, ambushes, gambling, cattle drives and railway building’ (Collins, 1970, p. 70). It is these and possibly other conventions that allow
audiences to recognise a film as belonging to the genre of Western movies.
In practice, it is very common that authors choose to work within certain
artistic conventions of genre. While this obviously is a free choice, it may
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restrict them in a way that is far more restraining than other constraints that
they impose on themselves. This is, as Elster argues, because artistic conventions are not invented by authors who submit themselves to the rules of the
genre (Elster 2000, pp. 175 and 196). For authors, artistic conventions can
be ‘normatively compelling’ in the sense that, in the view of other artists,
critics and the audience, they ‘embody the right way of doing things’ (ibid.,
p. 198). If authors would disobey the conventions, they risk being rejected
or misunderstood by the public whom they wish to address. Additionally,
authors may have no real incentive to deviate from artistic conventions,
because their works can only be evaluated by competent judges if a reasonable comparison can be made with similar works. This ultimately compels
all authors who work within a particular genre to conform to the same set
of artistic conventions (ibid., p. 199).
This does not mean that, by working in a specific genre, authors cannot
freely express themselves. With regard to blues music, Steven C. Tracy
writes:
[…] the blues provide a basic structure free enough to accommodate
individual temperament, abilities, and creativity. Far from being a limited
genre, it provides a structured but expansive place for the individual to
relate to and express the community, and for artists to touch home base
but still express themselves individually (2004, p. 124).

The rules of some genres are more strictly defined than others. In contrast
to Western movies, for which there are scores of – more or less – loosely
organised conventions (of which usually only part need to be included in a
movie to qualify it as a Western), some poetry follows clearly defined rules.
To give an example, a sonnet always consists of a fourteen-line verse with
a specific metrical structure and a fixed rhyme scheme (i.e. usually three
quatrains and a couplet or an octave and a sestet). Limericks and other
verse forms follow similar conventions. The rules of these genres ‘may
be so specific as to leave little room or necessity for elaborate rhetorical
planning’ (Flower and Hayes, 1981, p. 379). Still, the large variety of poems
that are created over the years reveal that these genres leave ample room
for individual expression.
The point is, however, that while genres may leave enough creative space
for personal expression, authors cannot disregard the rules and conventions that intrinsically define it. Certainly, authors may challenge certain
conventions or even abandon ones that have become too cliché. For ‘avantgarde’ works, pushing the boundaries of existing norms or genres is even
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an essential aspect. This allows artistic conventions to evolve or change
over time. Still, as it takes time to gain enough institutional momentum for
recognition and appreciation of new conventions in existing genres, such
progress can only occur slowly. To be understood and accepted, authors
cannot recklessly deviate from the conventions of a genre. They must
always remain somewhat traditional and conservative in their approach
(Csíkszentmihályi, 1996, p. 71). This suggests that a work ‘may bend or break
the rules, but it cannot simply ignore them’ (Lavik and Van Gompel, 2013,
p. 396). Authors must somehow obey the rules of a genre.
Copyright law recognises creative constraints imposed by rules of
genres in literature, film, visual arts, music, and so on, insofar as ‘style’ is
excluded from protection. This means that authors are free to use the shared
characteristics of form, content, style, or mood of existing genres, as long as
they refrain from copying the original expression of specific works within
those genres. However, as will be explained below, difficulties may arise in
copyright infringement cases when it needs to be determined how elements
of ‘style’ must be disregarded in comparing the overall impression of a work
with the allegedly infringing copy. Another problem may occur when a
new genre is born, that is, when an innovative style that emerged with one
particular artist is followed by other artists and retroactively defined as a
new ‘genre’. In such a case, separating the unprotected elements of ‘style’
from the protected ‘original expression’ of works created by a trendsetting
artist at the time when he was still the only person using his or her own
invented style may be very difficult (Verkade, 1996, § 9). This raises the
question whether (parts of) the trendsetter’s works would not gradually
degenerate into an unprotected style (Hugenholtz, 1999, § 3). This problem,
which is manifested particularly in fashion, industrial design and other
areas driven by trends, has stirred quite some debate in the Netherlands.
Some legal scholars have argued that copyright protection can indeed
‘dilute’ and degenerate into an unprotected style (see e.g. Quaedvlieg, 2004),
but the Supreme Court has denied that the scope of copyright protection
can diminish over time (Stokke v. Fikszo, 2013, § 6.3.6).
The choice of medium, format, methods and materials
Other than by the choice of genre, authors may be constrained by the choice
of the medium and format in which to cast their works and the methods
and materials that they will apply. Nowadays, authors have the choice
between digital and ‘analogue’ means of production and dissemination. This
has opened new possibilities, but also introduced new constraints. In the
digital arts, for example, while the space available for creative expression
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is enormous, authors must duly understand digital technology to generate
the desired outcome. Linda Candy (2007, p. 366) writes that producing
digital art often requires a trade-off between artistic aspiration and digital
constraints, explaining that ‘[t]he choice of whether to program or to use
a software application can be critical to how much the artist has control
over the character of the constraints to be specified’. The creative freedom
of digital artists is consequently limited to the extent that they run into
technological deficiencies of their own or of technologists with whom they
collaborate. Not only does this challenge the boundaries of creative partnerships and the perception of authorship, as Elena Cooper’s chapter in this
book demonstrates, but digital artists must also accept the limitations of
existing software applications and tools that they apply for creating their
works. Even with state-of-the-art technologies, they simply cannot always
create what they have envisaged.
Creative constraints may be stricter or looser depending on whether or
not a work also has a utilitarian function. For example, while architectural
works may be designed for aesthetic appeal, they ultimately must lead
to the construction of real houses or buildings. In the drafting process,
therefore, architects are constrained first of all by the utilitarian purpose
of a building. If it is meant for living, then it must have certain basic facilities, such as a living space, a kitchen, one or more bedrooms, a toilet and
bathroom, et cetera. Although there are various ways in which architects
may spatially organise these facilities, in the end, there must be a – more or
less – appropriate order between them if the architect wants the building to
suit the purposes for which it is designed (Hall and Hall, 1975). A building
must moreover have a firm construction. While any futuristic building
can be designed on a creation table, it is not a given that constructing it
is technically feasible. This will depend on the strength of materials, the
distribution of stress, and environmental factors, including the level of
hurricane or seismic activity in a region. Architects must use the right
combination of materials, composition structures and assembly methods
to ensure that their creations are durable and safe (Place, 2007). In practice,
architects must also handle a large number of external constraints. They
have to follow various statutory protocols and building regulations, such as
technical regulations about minimum ceiling heights and room sizes and
safety instructions about the place and number of fire exist doors in public
spaces. Furthermore, they may be bound to comply with urban planning
permissions, which not only have an impact on what can be built, but may
also impose (aesthetic) guidelines on how buildings must be shaped (Imrie
and Street, 2011).
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For other, more artistic types of works such as music, literature, photos
and f ilms, the creative freedom in choosing the appropriate medium,
format, methods and materials is usually much larger (unless the work is
commissioned to be cast in a specific form, as will be discussed further
below). Film directors, for example, can opt to shoot their movies with
specific cameras (varying from 8mm to HD to 3D), silent or with sound,
in colour, black-and-white or other toning effect, et cetera. Painters can
choose between particular surfaces (e.g. canvas, wood or paper), painting
sizes, types of paint (e.g. oil or acryl), specific painting techniques (e.g.
aquarelle or airbrush), and so on. For other visual artists, photographers,
music composers and novelists, the range of available media, formats,
methods and materials is likewise very broad.
This does not mean, however, that these artists are not in any way
constrained by the choice of medium, format, methods and materials.
Just as works of architecture are meant to be built, so are musical compositions meant to be performed. Composers must therefore realise that
there are limits to what musicians can physically perform (Elster, 2000,
p. 191). Furthermore, artists must take account of the specific nature of
the materials that they intend to use. Natural materials such as wood,
clay and stone have specific properties of texture, structure and strength,
which make them better or less suited for creating particular types
of works. Other materials, including metal and glass, require special
processing techniques like metalworking and glassblowing that involve
specif ic constraints of their own. This has signif icance for the way in
which authors can ultimately shape and cast their works (Moeran, 2011,
pp. 19–21).
Here too, creative constraints may be tighter once a work receives a more
utilitarian purpose. A good example is the creation of portraits, the object
of which is to display the characteristic features of a person. This requires
artists to compose the portrait in such a way that it enables viewers to
instantly recognise the portrayed person. This obviously limits artistic
freedom to some degree, but it certainly does not eliminate it. However,
where it concerns passport photos made for official purposes, the creative
freedom is almost certainly absent. To prevent crime, fraudulent uses and
identify theft, states prescribe strict requirements for passport photographs
in terms of size, photo quality, background, framing, exposure, position,
visibility of facial features and expression of the portrayed person. Such
regulations leave hardly any room for photographers to make ‘free and
creative choices’.

Creativit y, autonomy and personal touch

115

The intended audience
Limitations further derive from the anticipated relation to the audience.
In his book Values of Art, Malcolm Budd (1995, p. 11) writes ‘that the role of
the artist, properly understood, requires the artist, in the creation of her
work, to adopt or bear in mind the role of the spectator’. While this does
not prevent authors from making creative choices, it does limit the creative
space in one way or the other. Since most works are created with an audience
in mind, authors will somehow be constrained by their own expectations
about the expectations of intended readers, viewers or listeners. As Jon
Elster (2000, p. 188) argues: ‘Once the artist has constructed his idea of
the reader, he is constrained to write in a way that the reader will find
instructive, entertaining, puzzling, moving, disturbing, and so on’. The
same applies to painters, film directors, music composers and other artists.
They usually also paint for intended viewers, make movies for intended
spectators, compose for intended listeners, and so forth (although some
authors may only be interested in the act of creation, but this is irrelevant
for our present purposes because copyright presupposes communication:
no proprietary legal regime is needed for authors who merely keep creation
to themselves).
Authors must also understand that there are limits to what an expected
audience can rationally endure. This is certainly important for works that
attract a captive audience in theatres, cinemas and concert halls. As Thomas
G. Pavel (1986, p. 98) remarks: ‘a play cannot usually sustain the audience’s
attention for more than a couple of hours; a movie’s duration depends on
the eye’s tolerance to strain’. Such restrictions will thus define the average
length of a work within these genres. But even if the audience can freely
choose the time and interval of consuming a work, as is typically the case for
novels, then authors must still construct the plot and story line in such a way
that they keep the reader’s attention continuously alive (Elster, 2000, p. 191).
This certainly also imposes limits on length, style and order of story telling.
Especially on the Internet, authors are bound to communicate their
works as clearly and effectively as possible. Usability studies show that, on
average, it takes only a few seconds to grab the attention of website visitors.
If a page loads too slowly (Krishnan and Sitaraman, 2012) or visitors do not
promptly find something of interest to them (Nielsen and Pernice, 2010),
then the website is likely to be abandoned during the first couple of seconds
of interaction. Authors that create and disseminate their works online can
therefore easily lose (part of) their audience if a creation does not meet the
immediate expectations of viewers. While this may be different for works
that make greater demands on the audience’s patience, such as modern
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art, here too, there are specific challenges for engaging online users, as
experience with virtual museums and art exhibitions corroborates (Soren
and Lemelin, 2004; Soren, 2005). This means that websites not only need to
operate well. To satisfy online users, web developers and creators must also
take full account of online user expectations. For this purpose, they may
adapt online content to make it more appealing to the target audience, for
example, by including catchy headlines, writing short introductory notes,
or using specific colours that are favoured by most users (Bonnardel, Piolat
and Le Bigot, 2011).
Adaptations of such kind, although authors may freely apply them, are
not necessarily based on autonomous choices. If they are primarily guided
by user demands, it cannot truly be upheld that they result from the author’s
free and creative choices.
Constraints in employment or contractual relationships
The author’s freedom of action may also be limited in cases of commissioned
works or works created in the course of employment. A good example is
journalists who work for a newspaper, either as freelancers or in employment. They must typically conform to an editorial statute or ethical code
that guides them in writing their reports. Reuters (2008), for example, has
published an online Handbook of Journalism, which contains detailed
accounts on how to write a journalistic report, including rules on story
length, basic story structure, consistency of style, key words, language
that must be avoided, et cetera. While Reuters indicates on the homepage
that ‘the handbook is not intended as a collection of “rules”’ that seeks to
constrain journalism, its guiding principles do restrict creative writing in
the sense that journalists are expected to use the handbook ‘as guidance
to taking decisions and adopting behaviours’ (ibid.). Hence, they are not
allowed to make creative choices fully at their own discretion.
Likewise, ‘no creative team in an advertising agency starts out with a
blank piece of paper, but is given a “creative brief” by the client who directs
the strategy to be taken by a particular campaign’ (Moeran, 2011, p. 18).
Such a brief unmistakably leads the authors of the campaign in a particular
direction. Commercially this may be attractive, as it instructs the team to
draft a campaign that will satisfy the client, but artistically, it comes with
a number of restrictions. As Jeremy Bullmore (1999, p. 56) explains, a brief
may encourage creative thinking and ensure the relevance of the message
being conveyed, but it may also restrict creativity. Being informed by clients’
demands that often follow consumer beliefs and expectations, advertising
campaigns cannot be said to result from the free and creative choices of
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authors alone. The advertising industry clearly also follows consumer trends
and impacts (see e.g. Sinclair, 2012).
Other than creative instructions, authors may be constrained by the
available budget and imposed deadlines. Although there seem to be few
productions where time is not an issue, deadlines are obviously most critical
for authors who create works on regular intervals, such as writers of daily
newspaper columns or producers of daily or weekly TV shows (Elster, 2000,
p. 193). But time constraints are also common in other areas, such as film
production, where the schedules for shooting and production are to a considerable extent determined by factors like the availability of actors, access to
set and locations and, ultimately, the allocated budget (Barnwell, 2004, p. 50).
That budget matters in creative endeavours is clearly illustrated by film
and television production. Although there are many examples of low-budget
films that are regarded as highly artistic, as for example Alfred Hitchcock’s
thriller Psycho illustrates, there often is a strong correlation between the
available budget and what filmmakers can eventually put on the screen
(Barnwell, 2004, p. 48). While it certainly does not prevent creative choices
being made, the allocated money may have bearing on the creative freedom
of filmmakers (and other types of creators) in the sense that it may prevent
them from making the creative choices that they would have preferred to
make (see e.g. Affron and Affron, 1995, p. 16; Jørholt, 2010, p. 107).
For copyright purposes, these types of diverse financial constraints will
usually not be relevant for the question of whether there is a work, since
copyright law’s originality test is so low. However, they possibly are relevant
in copyright infringement analyses, for example, where film directors reuse
costumes, props or sets or even entire scenes or shots from earlier films to
cut corners in their production budget. Such ‘recycling’ regularly occurs in
the film industry, but will not easily lead to court cases, as films are often
produced by the same company that owns the reused materials.
Implications for copyright law’s originality test
As the preceding section has illustrated, authors may be invariably confronted with various restrictions during the creation of their works. For
this reason, it cannot be unquestioningly presupposed that a work results
from the author’s ‘free and creative choices’, as the CJEU’s originality test
for copyright requires. Therefore, one would expect that in the assessment
that courts make of the original character of a work, or the lack of it, ample
consideration is given to the presence and impact of constraints. This section examines recent case law of the CJEU and Dutch courts on this point.
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After some preliminary remarks and a short discussion of copyright and
creative constraints generally, specific attention is given to how the case
law handles technical and functional constraints and other constraints to
creativity in applying copyright law’s originality test.
Preliminary remarks
Before discussing the impact of creative constraints on copyright law’s
originality criterion, two observations must be made. First, it is important to
understand that, in practice, there are very few stand-alone cases about the
question of whether a creation is original enough to qualify as a copyrightprotected work. For obvious reasons, copyright’s originality test appears
as part of infringement analyses, where the defendant disputes that the
plaintiff’s work attracts copyright or claims that no copyright relevant
parts are copied in the allegedly infringing work. Accordingly, in such cases,
courts necessarily make a comparison between the plaintiff’s work and
the allegedly infringing copy. Even if a court finds that certain borrowings
(e.g. of technical or functional elements) are not infringing by themselves,
they may still find infringement if they see much similarity in the ‘overall
impression’ of the two works under consideration.
Second, it must be noted that manufacturers and designers of technical and functional products regularly claim copyright infringement as
a subsidiary fall-back option to obtain protection against competitors,
with infringement of registered design rights as the main claim. Before
Dutch courts, actions for design right and copyright infringements are
sometimes accompanied by an action in the tort of slavish imitation (slaafse
nabootsing). Copyright can easily be relied upon, as the right comes into
existence automatically upon the creation of an original work of authorship.
It does not depend on registration or any other formality. Moreover, in most
countries, the copyright term lasts for the author’s life plus 70 years which
is much longer than the usual 25-year term for design rights. If manufacturers and designers cannot rely on design protection because they failed to
fulfil the formalities required for acquiring or maintaining design rights, or
because the term has expired, or the use made is allowed under design law,
they often can still fall back on copyright protection. Such copyright cases
are primarily about thwarting competition, not about protecting artistic
or creative achievements.
Copyright and creative constraints
Some constraints to creativity are difficult to accommodate in copyright
law, because they do not restrict choice but merely limit creative freedom to
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a certain degree. That is the case, for example, with deadlines and budgetary
ceilings. While clearly limiting the freedom of action of authors, within the
time and budget that is allocated to them, authors can exercise considerable
autonomy to make creative choices of their own. Thus, time constraints
and limited budgets are of no relevance in determining the eligibility for
protection of works. As long as authors have made free and subjective
choices within the creative space that is available to them, their works
should benefit from the protection afforded by copyright law.
Other types of constraints, however, limit creative freedom to such a
degree that it is more difficult to assume that they leave sufficient room
for free and creative choices. Examples include cases where there are
limited possibilities to accomplish the same or a similar artistic effect or
utilitarian purpose, where the author’s choices are clearly informed by
audience demands or trends, and where creation is shaped by external
instructions, such as those imposed by law or regulation. This suggests
that courts should take such restrictions into account, since they might
impinge on the question of whether a work is sufficiently the author’s own
to be eligible for protection.
Technical and functional constraints
As observed above, the CJEU has explicitly recognised that copyright does
not extend to elements of works that leave no room for creative freedom.
This principle is widely accepted, as case law at the national level of the EU
Member States corroborates.
In the Netherlands, it is settled case law that functional or technical
characteristics of a work – i.e. aspects of form that are determined by
functional or technical demands – cannot attract copyright, as they fail to
reflect the author’s subjective creativity. This has recently been confirmed
by the Dutch Supreme Court in Kecofa v. Lancôme (2006) and Gavita v.
Puutarhaliike Helle (2010). Most published cases in which functional and
technical constraints play a role concern productions in the applied arts and
industrial design, e.g. furniture, upholstery, utensils, fashion accessories.
These categories of works reside more on the edge of copyright, as evidenced
by their optional protection under Art. 2(7) of the Berne Convention and
their special treatment in the copyright laws of countries such as Italy,
where they attract copyright only if they have ‘inherent artistic value’, and
the UK, where they receive copyright only if they fit the statutory categories
of ‘artistic’ or ‘literary’ works (Bently and Sherman, 2009, pp. 679–681).
However, they obviously are eligible for copyright protection, as explicit
in the Dutch Copyright Act (Art. 10(1) under 11).
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The Dutch Supreme Court even assumes that works of applied art are
subject to the same CJEU’s ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test as all
other creations, as is evident from three cases involving Stokke’s Tripp
Trapp children’s chair (Stokke v. H3 Products, 2013, § 3.4(b); Stokke v. Fikszo,
2013, § 4.2(b); Hauck v. Stokke, 2013, § 4.2(b)). In these cases, it was held that
copyright may extend to technical or functional design if the author had
sufficient room for making creative choices. Interestingly, the Supreme
Court further ruled that also a selection of individually unprotected elements can attract copyright if it bears the author’s personal imprint (Stokke
v. H3 Products, 2013, § 3.4(e); Stokke v. Fikszo, 2013, § 4.2(e); Hauck v. Stokke,
2013, § 4.2(e)).
The latter is remarkable and, from a doctrinal viewpoint, not necessarily
satisfactory. It testifies to the move of copyright’s originality test towards a
‘creative collection’-test. While before, creative collection was a concept at
the macro level, designating an outlier category of works like anthologies and
collections of texts, now it seemingly becomes a core concept at the micro
level of the originality test. Of course, it can be argued that all protected works
essentially consist of an ‘original’ combination of unprotected elements.
Literary works are also made up of individual words that, taken in isolation, are unprotected (Infopaq International, 2009, § 46) – safe perhaps for a
few exceptional cases where new words might attract copyright (cf. Spoor,
Verkade and Visser, 2005, p. 118). However, this comparison does not really fit.
The difficulty is to establish the units, elements or resources from which
to select. For example, saying that a written text is made up of ‘units’ of
a language (a system of signs that encode information) or that a musical
composition is made up of ‘elements’ of sounds (distinct manifestations of
frequencies audible to the human ear) is not the same exercise as constructing the ‘pool’ of possible units, elements or resources from which industrial
design may be composed. In the latter case, it is not only the object, but
also the function of the design and the constraints that this poses on the
eventual form and materials used (including functional restraints like e.g.
stackability of say garden furniture, and market-oriented restraints like
limiting production costs) that determine the relevant pool of resources.
The question is whether making such a distinction is feasible, as it requires
a comparison of works of industrial design to a theoretical pool of possible –
creative and/or functional – choices to ascertain whether the combination
of elements of which such work is composed would represent a sufficiently
‘original’ selection.
Legal reasoning on this point is not very well developed, probably because
copyright covers such a vast array of cultural production. The ‘unit’ problem
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is studied more in depth per category of work in other disciplines such as
literary studies, visual arts, and film studies. In copyright law, by contrast,
resort is made to more general statements and sweeping comparisons
that do not easily withstand scrutiny from expert domains within the
humanities. In practice, what happened in the three Stokke cases is that the
defendants unpacked various elements of form of the Tripp Trapp chair to
show that they could not qualify as ‘original’. The Supreme Court, however,
urged the Court of Appeal to look at the chair’s overall impression and
to repack all elements to determine whether the collection of elements
constituted an intellectual creation by the author. This question is often
resolved by assessing how much creative space a designer had at his or her
disposal when creating a work. Still, while the existence of creative space
is a prerequisite for an author to make an ‘original’ creation, this does not
of itself lead to the conclusion that the creation must therefore also be
original. Instead, as will be argued below, courts should distinguish the
presence of creative space from how it is used. An individual assessment
of the use of space in expressive form should thus be the ultimate test for
establishing originality.
Obviously, if a combination of unprotected elements is deemed sufficiently original to attract copyright, then protection would only extend
to the specific combination of unprotected elements. This means that
competitors can create similar products using a different combination
and/or a different set of protected or unprotected elements. The overall
impression of the product must differ from that of the original. This needs
to be determined by the facts of each case (Stokke v. H3 Products, 2013, §
3.4(e)(f); Stokke v. Fikszo, 2013, § 4.2(e)(f); Hauck v. Stokke, 2013, § 4.2(e)(f)).
While this assumes that the scope of protection granted is ‘thin’, in
practice, it is not without significance. Once a court in an infringement case
accepts that a work attracts copyright, this also has consequences reaching beyond the infringement case at hand. One important consequence is
that, unless a copyright exception or limitation applies, third parties are
prohibited from reproducing or communicating the work to the public (e.g.,
for advertising purposes or in a film documentary or TV special) without the
copyright owner’s consent. This may affect freedom of speech. It is unclear
whether the Supreme Court realised this when drawing the originality
criterion into copyright law’s infringement analysis, as it did in the Stokke
cases. From a doctrinal viewpoint, it would have been better if the Court
had more critically approached the question of whether copyright extends
to combinations of unprotected elements, especially where it concerns
products created under technical and functional constraints.
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Other creative constraints
Apart from functional and technical elements, the courts generally acknowledge that copyright does not extend to mere facts, ideas or elements
of style, but only protects original expression. In the landmark case of Van
Gelder v. Van Rijn (1946), the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that a style or
method of treatment that confers a specific artistic effect on an object – in
this case: applying burn and steel-brushing techniques to create wooden
sculptures – cannot attract copyright. This was reiterated in the Decaux
v. Mediamax case (1995), where it was held that style, trends and fashion
are not copyrightable, but that protection may extend to the author’s own
individual way of expressing a design in a particular style, trend or fashion.
In 2013, in the Broeren v. Duijsens-Kroezen case, the Supreme Court once
more underlined that copyright does not protect style and further held
that, save for exceptional circumstances, tort law does not grant protection
against slavish imitation (slaafse nabootsing) of style. Doing so would harm
the principle underlying the exclusion of style from copyright law, which
is to foster cultural growth by ensuring that authors have enough freedom
to build upon ideas and abstractions developed by others.
In practice, however, courts sometimes do recognise copyright in
creations that balance on the edge of convergence of idea and expression.
This includes productions like family board games and formats of TV
programmes (Hugenholtz, 2012, pp. 44–45). Illustrative is that the courts
in such cases often abstain from assessing whether authors, in expressing
their works, exerted creative autonomy or whether the creative choices they
made were rather informed by external considerations.
In the Impag v. Hasbro case (2001), for example, the Supreme Court upheld
the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam that, notwithstanding
the uncopyrightability of game concepts, the design of family games like
‘Jenga’ (a wooden tumbling stacking tower game), ‘Connect Four’ (a first to
get four-in-a-row game) and ‘Guess Who?’ (a flip-and-find face game) was
sufficiently original to attract copyright protection. As it concerned a case in
summary proceeding, the Supreme Court accepted that the Court of Appeal
had only briefly motivated its decision. Nevertheless, it is fairly remarkable
that both courts overlooked that the concepts of most family games are
based on early playing games that, if protectable, would be in the public
domain. ‘Connect Four’, for example, is a variant of tic-tac-toe and tower
building games have also been known for many centuries. Furthermore,
the courts too easily glossed over the fact that the simplicity of many game
concepts puts restraints on the execution of form. The creative choices
involving the design of a stacking block tower game like ‘Jenga’, for instance,
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leave little choice for variation. The blocks must be stackable, their height
must exceed the average diameter of a finger (but not too far), their surface
must be smooth enough to allow their removal from the tower, and so on.
In reality, therefore, the creative space for designing such a game is limited.
This raises questions about how much creativity the designer truly exercised
in creating the game, other than in developing and elaborating the game
concept along technical or functional constraints.
As regards TV programme formats, in the Castaway v. Endemol case, the
Court of Appeal of Amsterdam (2002) ruled that such formats might attract
copyright if they are sufficiently elaborated in detail and their specific
elements, which alone do not need to attract copyright, together form a
‘unity’ with an own, original character. This decision, which was upheld by
the Supreme Court in 2004, resembles the protection conferred on original
combinations of unprotected elements in the three Stokke cases discussed
above. In this case, which concerned the format of a reality TV show, the
court identified twelve elements of the format and concluded that, together,
these elements were sufficiently original to attract copyright. How the
court arrived at this conclusion is unclear, but nothing in the judgment
reveals that it examined how much of the format essentially resulted from
the author’s own, subjective choices and how much of it was based on
established conventions within the genre and thus resided outside the
author’s autonomy. That is disappointing, because it could have shed more
light on whether the format was really the author’s own intellectual creation. While in the end, the court did not find copyright infringement in this
case, the fact that it gave the format the status of a copyrighted work may
have consequences for third parties who wish to create similar formats for
other reality TV shows. In this regard, it should be noted that it is debateable
whether TV programme formats actually need copyright protection. As
Stefan Bechtold (2013) argues, despite the difficulty of claiming protection
for TV show formats under intellectual property laws, the international
trade in them is thriving. In practice, their protection is often jealously
guarded through contracts and industry norms (Kretschmer, Singh and
Wardle, 2009). This places question marks on the importance of copyright
for protecting TV show formats in the first place.
In cases concerning the copyrightability of websites, the courts also
look at the overall impression of webpages to consider whether they are
sufficiently original. Sometimes protection is denied because a webpage
mainly consists of elements that are also used on other websites (Social
Deal v. Wowdeal, 2012) or because the design and layout of a webpage are
too trivial and obvious to involve any type of creative labour (Union v.
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Calleur, 2012). Other times protection is granted if the court finds the text,
design and layout of a webpage to sufficiently reflect the author’s creative
choices, as the E2Ma v. Malicor case (2012) illustrates. Oddly, in this case,
the District Court of Utrecht based its analysis on the choice and arrangement of elements that, on closer inspection and save for individual texts
and pictures, are common and basic features of webpages, such as the
division and placement of texts and fields, the use of banners, arrows and
other indicators, the letter type, the colour pattern, et cetera. While such
elements can be combined in various ways, the question remains whether
the webpage design was the result of the author’s ‘free and creative choices’
or primarily informed by trends and audience expectations about how
websites are logically organised.
Courts’ overly one-sided analysis of creative autonomy
The above examples reveal that examining creative constraints is usually
not part of the court’s analysis when ascertaining the eligibility for protection of works. Dutch courts look at the creative space that is available,
without actually observing how the space is used and whether, in the course
of the creative process, the author has been restricted in any way. As a
result, they evaluate whether creative space exists and then apparently
assume that if it does, the way in which it is used automatically produces
an original result of the author.
The CJEU seems to sanction that. In the Eva-Maria Painer case (2011,
§§ 90–93), it generally observed that photographers of a school portrait
photograph, ‘can make free and creative choices in several ways and at
various points in its production’, thereby pointing at the possibility to fix
the background, pose, lighting and framing, choose the angle and atmosphere and use developing techniques or computer software. The CJEU then
concluded rather one-dimensionally that school portrait photographers
enjoy a considerable freedom to exercise their creative abilities, without
considering that making portrait photographs also involves various creative
constraints, as has been clearly demonstrated above. In the end, it was
left for the national court to determine whether the photograph was an
intellectual creation of the author reflecting his personality, but the positive
way in which the CJEU constructed the creative space available to the
author gives the impression that the national court could not simply deny
protection to it.
In the Netherlands, a similar one-sided analysis of creative freedom
led the district court of Haarlem to accept copyright in basic passport
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photographs (X v. Ringfoto Nederland, 2010). The case concerned ‘old style’
passport photographs which did not have to meet the strict requirements
for official passport photographs, e.g. no smiling, head kept straight, earlobes visible, plain background, no head attire. The Court ruled that, in
comparison to official passport photographs, the photographer had made
‘various autonomous, subjective choices’ in producing the photo, including
the cropping of the image, the posing of the portrayed person, the lighting
of the face, and the fixing of hair. It can be disputed, however, whether
these choices were really part of the photographer’s creative freedom: they
could have also been prompted by demands of the portrayed person, who
probably was also responsible for fixing his or her hair and perhaps even for
choosing the pose. Moreover, the making of passport photos is often a highly
standardised and automated process in a fixed studio setting, making it
questionable to what extent the photographer actually exercises creative
freedom. Nevertheless, the Court held that there was enough space for
making personal and creative choices and that the passport photo therefore
qualified as an own intellectual creation.
This line of argument is remarkable and unsatisfactory, because it gives
an incomplete picture of the creative autonomy exerted by authors. There
are several possible explanations for the approach taken. One reason seems
to lie in the low originality criterion itself. Since the design of creative
products nearly always leaves some room for small variations, it is arguably
harder for courts to establish that authors did in effect not exercise any
creative autonomy than that they did. Creative space thus seems easier to
demonstrate, or at least to assume, than creative constraints, especially
in the absence of a clear appraisal by the courts of the creative process. In
many cases, however, it is not feasible for a court to dig into every detail
of each case, particularly when it concerns summary proceedings or when
the list of judicial proceedings set down for trial is long. Judges may further be confronted with poorly defended cases, where creative freedom is
insufficiently put into question. This may also have to do with the cost of
expert witness testimonies and the fact that parties are not necessarily
eager to accept instructions of proof. Lastly, courts may sometimes also
be guided by notions of fairness or unjust enrichment, especially in cases
where copyright is used as an instrument against competitors. This shows
how policy considerations may affect the interpretation and application of
legal concepts such as originality.
This is not to say that courts always ignore limits to creative autonomy. In
the case of Doréma v. Isabella (1996), the Arnhem Court of Appeal declined
copyright protection to caravan awnings because of the lack of originality.
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The Court held that the different elements of the awnings, including the
austere lines and simplicity of the design, the combination of colours, the
dimensions, the circular canopy, and the layout of panes that creates a
special light effect, were either technically or functionally determined, or
elements of style, or existing features of known awnings produced by third
parties, or clearly designed to fit in with current trends in the awning industry. Further, it found that the selection and combination of unprotected
elements of which the caravan awnings were made up was insufficiently
original for vesting copyright. The awnings too much followed patterns and
trends that are common in the caravan awning branch to constitute own
intellectual creations eligible for copyright protection.
Similarly, in the case of Timans v. Haarsma et al., the Leeuwarden Court
of Appeal refused to grant copyright to the design of basic, low-cost holiday
homes, holding that the margins for designing them in an original way
were too limited. The Court argued that Timans’ design was very similar
to existing design traditions in holiday housing in the Netherlands and
that, generally speaking, holiday homes must satisfy the same functional
requirements. The Supreme Court, however, overruled this decision as it
found that the Court of Appeal had erred in putting these considerations
at the heart of its originality analysis (2006, § 3.7). It is unclear from the
Supreme Court’s ruling whether it reversed the decision because the Court
of Appeal had put relatively much weight to the ‘common fact’ of similar
holiday homes having been built under similar circumstances (thus giving
lesser importance to the specific facts of the case at hand), or because the
Court of Appeal had recognised that the creative freedom in this case was
marginal due to the constraints that designing basic holiday homes involves.
The latter reasoning would be odd, at least in light of the current ‘author’s
own intellectual creation’-test. If copyright is granted only to works that
result from the author’s free and creative choices, then it would appear that
protection must be denied whenever a court finds that the author’s creative
autonomy is restricted too tightly.

Personal touch: the author as key constituent of the originality test
A last key element of copyright law’s originality criterion is unmistakably
the author. Pursuant to the CJEU’s case law, an intellectual creation is
original if it reflects the author’s personality. To that end, the author must
have left a personal imprint on the work (Eva-Maria Painer, 2011, §§ 88–89).
This requirement applies not merely to cultural types of works, such as
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books, music and works of art, but also to functional and technical types of
works like computer programmes and databases, for which it seems difficult
to determine in which elements the ‘personal touch’ of authors can be found.
The CJEU has ruled, however, that such works must also bear the imprint
of the author’s personality to attract copyright (Football Dataco, 2012, § 38).
This directly shows that the requirement of a ‘personal touch’ or ‘personal
stamp’ is somewhat problematic. Only in certain aesthetic genres, such
as high-end visual arts and music, would an (trained) audience recognise
works as emanating from a specific person, or at least attribute it to him
or her. Apart from the creator’s own, individual way of expressing him/
herself in a specific work, therefore, the notions of ‘personal touch’ and
‘personal stamp’ cannot mean to signify an easily detectible ‘signature’ or
personal ‘style’ of a creator, such as the style of painting of Vincent van Gogh.
Similarly, these notions cannot be linked to individuality of personhood
as in personal traits, habits or preferences of a creator that can be actually
recognised in the work. Probably, the reflection of the author’s personality is
merely required to show that the work must be the author’s own individual
expression, i.e., that is must originate from the author in the sense of not
being copied (see Laura Biron’s chapter in this book on the meaning of
‘originating from’). Yet, this raises a broader difficulty. If copyright law’s
originality criterion is so tied to the individual author, how then must the
original character of large-scale collaborative works, such as Wikipedia
entries, be assessed?
This section examines how the courts deal with the requirement that
a work must bear the personal imprint of the author to attract copyright.
Do they first establish who the author is and what types of subjective
choices he or she has made in producing the work? The CJEU’s originality
test would arguably require such an analysis, but in reality, courts do not
seem to systematically examine the question of authorship in assessing
the originality of a work. This section then examines the question of how
the originality of large-scale collaborative works must be determined if
the co-contributors’ expressive marks are not readily ascertainable. This
question is highly relevant to the digital environment, where works are
increasingly produced in online creative communities or with the help of
audience participation.
Who is the creator? And does that actually matter?
As observed above, the justification of copyright is largely premised on
protecting the author as creator of the work. This personality-based justifi-
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cation materialises clearly in connection with moral rights, which concern
the immaterial interest of authors to receive protection against acts that can
damage or alter their work or harm their name or reputation. However, it is
also reflected in the originality standard, which subjects copyright to the
requirement that the work is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ that
exhibits his or her personality. This suggests that, to determine whether
a work is sufficiently original, it is of utmost importance to know who is
the creator and which subjective choices he or she has made during the
creative process.
In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court has also emphasised that the
bond between the author and the work matters in ascertaining originality.
In the Van Dale v. Romme case (1991), which concerned the copyrightability
of a list of headwords in a dictionary, it held that a collection of words by
itself does not satisfy the originality test, because it consists of no more than
factual data that as such do not attract copyright. It ruled that a collection
of headwords would be eligible for protection only if it ‘were the result of a
selection process expressing the author’s personal views’. By so ruling, it tied
the originality test closely to the author’s individual creative endeavours.
In practice, however, the courts – especially those adjudicating cases
at first instance and in summary proceedings – tend to disregard who
actually created the work. Instead of looking at the work and the process
that led to its creation to ascertain which creative choices have been made
by the author, they ask themselves the theoretical question whether it is
conceivable that two or more authors, independently from each other, create
exactly the same work. If they consider this to be (nearly) impossible, then
they typically assume that the work satisfies the originality test (Eek BV v.
Esfera, 2007). Otherwise, they will accept that the work lacks originality
and deny protection to it (Social Deal v. Wowdeal, 2012). In such rulings, the
courts clearly overlook the actual author in assessing whether a work is the
author’s own intellectual creation.
The courts’ reliance on a hypothetical situation, whereby a comparison
is made with other, f ictitious creators, seems to be based on doctrine
developed in scholarly literature. One of the leading treatises on copyright
law in the Netherlands suggests that, in practice, the courts can apply such
a pragmatic comparison as a rule of thumb to determine whether a work
meets the originality standard (Spoor, Verkade and Visser, 2005, p. 66).
While it may ease the originality analysis, such an approach is not entirely
satisfactory, since it virtually eliminates the author from the originality
test. Applying a hypothetical comparison of this kind means that courts
only consider whether subjective choices can be made, without actually
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examining whether creative choices have been made by the author during
the production of the work.
Therefore, it is undesirable if the rule of thumb is used as a stand-alone
criterion for establishing originality, as Spoor, Verkade and Visser (2005)
themselves admit. They warn against the risk that the courts may lose
sight of ‘the relationship between author and work, which is the foundation
of copyright’ (p. 73). Moreover, they argue that, if applied too strictly, the
rule of thumb may convert the originality test into an analysis of whether
a creation is considered ‘statistically unique’ (p. 66), which is an argument
about the distinctiveness of works, not about the author’s use of the available
creative space. In the Technip v. Goossens case (2006), the Supreme Court
also considered that the answer to ‘the question whether it is inconceivable
that two (teams of) scientists, working independently from each other,
would have arrived at the same selection … is but one of the viewpoints to
be considered in assessing [originality]’ (§ 3.5).
Nonetheless, since the rule of thumb is mentioned in a leading treatise on
copyright and the Supreme Court, by presenting it as ‘one of the viewpoints
to be considered’, has recognised that courts may base their originality
analysis on it, it is not unlikely that the rule enters the mind-set of judges
who must decide on the copyrightability of works, as the above cases illustrate. Thus, it cannot be excluded that courts assess the originality of a
work by ascertaining whether it is virtually unrepeatable, rather than by
examining whether it results from the author’s free and creative choices.
Still, there are examples of courts adjourning a ruling if they want more
information about the ‘chain of authorship to copyright owner’. In its interim decision in the case of Inspirion v. Pokonobe et al. (2011), for instance,
the District Court of The Hague required the defendant, the producer of the
tower game ‘Jenga’, to deliver proof of the chain of title. Although this was
not to examine the author’s role in creating the work but to demonstrate
copyright ownership, the final verdict (2012) reveals that, in the end, the
court took notice of the right owner’s statements on the chain of title about
how the author had made own, subjective choices in the process of creating
the game. However, this did not help the plaintiff who claimed that the
‘Jenga’ game could not attract copyright. The court found both the design
of the game and the elaboration of the game concept to be sufficiently
original to attract copyright, thereby arguing that ‘other choices are possible’. Competitors could, for example, make the tower round or rectangular.
As observed above, while other creative choices are probably feasible, in
general, the creative space for designing a game like ‘Jenga’ is restricted. A
round or rectangular stacking tower most probably has entirely different
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stacking properties, so the shape of the game clearly affects the play. Hence,
the court could have entertained a much more critical approach to the
question of originality in this case.
Moreover, there are cases where the courts deny copyright protection to a
work while the authorship status is obscure. In the Melano v. Quiges Fashion
Jewels case (2013), for example, the Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch
dismissed a claim for copyright in pieces of jewellery with interchangeable
coloured elements on the ground that the plaintiff insufficiently substantiated the authorship of the jewellery and the required personal stamp of the
author. This stands in contrast to the SEVV v. AY Illuminate case (2010), where
the District Court of Amsterdam held that the plaintiffs, of which it was
sufficiently convinced that they were the actual creators, had made creative
choices in designing decorative lamps with comparable, interchangeable
elements.
In the end, the outcomes of court proceedings will obviously depend on
a variety of factors, including the value of the case, the resources available
to argue it, the way the facts are presented to the courts, the strengths
or weaknesses of arguments entertained by lawyers defending the case,
et cetera. However, the manner in which the originality test is applied
and interpreted is clearly also of relevance. As can be derived from the
case law above, courts do not consistently and systematically review the
rudimentary questions of who is the author of a work and whether free
and creative choices have been made in the course of its creation. This is
remarkable. If courts need to resolve whether an intellectual creation is
truly the author’s own, as the CJEU’s originality test seems to imply, then it
would appear that these questions must be an integral part of the analysis
of whether or not a work qualifies for copyright protection.
Personal touch in collaborative works
The reflection of the personality of authors seems more difficult, if not
impossible, to identify in large-scale collaborative productions. Traditional
examples are film, TV and theatre productions. Often, but not always,
these are created within more or less tightly organised structures with
a more or less specified division of roles among the actors involved. In
the online environment, examples abound of productions that are cocreated within online communities. This includes open source software
and collaborative projects like Wikipedia and other wikis. Outwardly, these
projects have a less strict division of roles, but that does not mean that they
lack organisational structure. On the contrary, within Wikipedia, there
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is a complex hierarchical division of developers, stewards, bureaucrats,
administrators, registered users, and anonymous contributors, which is
not immediately visible (Pink, 2005; Reagle, 2010, pp. 126–127; O’Neil, 2011,
p. 314). Furthermore, online communities often share a set of norms and
ethics, guided by principles of etiquette on how to work with others in
the community and by requirements on attribution, modification and
exploitation of the output (Kelty, 2008; Reagle, 2010). This illustrates that
in online collaborative projects, there is also control over the manner of
participation of individual contributors.
Other examples are user-generated productions that involve the public
in creating a movie, book, song or other type of work. Sometimes, these
projects are led by known artists, such as Paul Verhoeven’s film project
Entertainment Experience, which won an International Digital Emmy
Award in 2013. This project involves the audience in creating the script and
scenarios, composing the music, acting, directing and filming and editing
the final product. In the end, two movies will be created: one completely
user-generated movie and one user-inspired movie directed by Paul Verhoe
ven and his team. Other examples are the twitter book Wie een kuil graaft,
which was drawn up by Simon de Waal on the basis of hundreds of tweets
of different people, and the Koningslied, a song composed by John Ewbank
for the instalment of King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands, to which
many citizens contributed by proposing lyrics. But there are also myriads
of examples of user-created productions that do not involve one or more
main artists directing, editing or finalising the end-results, but that purely
rely on self-governance and editorial control within creative communities.
When it comes to ascertaining the personal touch of authors in collaborative creations, it seems that a distinction should be drawn between works
created under the direction or guidance of one or more leading authors and
works of which it is nearly impossible to identify who of the authors were
in creative control. For the purpose of establishing whose personal touch is
reflected in the work, so as to resolve whether the threshold for copyright
is met, it is convenient if one of more creative leaders can be identified, as
it seems reasonable to assume that, one way or the other, they will have
left their personal imprint on the work. On the other hand, the fact that no
creative leader can be identified does not mean that works produced by
large-scale creative communities lack originality in a copyright sense. For
the latter types of works, it is more suitable to assess the group level creativity than to unpack the creative choices made by the various individual
creative co-contributors when it comes to ascertaining the existence of
creative space and how is it used.
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The personal touch of distinct creative leaders
Who counts as a leading contributor to a joint work depends on various
circumstances and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Legal rules
on co-authorship are not necessarily useful in drawing distinctions between
co-creators, as the focus must lie on identifying the natural creative persons
who are the source of the work’s original character. Furthermore, as Lionel
Bently’s chapter in this book clearly shows, there may be a disparity between
who legally counts as a co-author and who is recognised as a co-creator in
specific businesses or particular fields of practice.
In general, however, it seems that artists whose names are attached to
a work, such as Paul Verhoeven, Simon de Waal and John Ewbank in the
above-mentioned examples, can be reckoned among the leading creators,
unless they have merely lent their name and reputation to it for marketing
or identification purposes. Yet, if they are seriously involved in the creative
process, they probably have had an important, if not ultimate, saying in
the creative decision-making. This is relevant, because the personal touch
of authors who had a final say on the finished product is likely to reflect
better in a work than the personal touch of those who made relatively small
creative contributions.
This is also recognised in contemporary cinema, where the director is
often assumed to be the creator who has the ‘final cut’ and thus deserves
to be credited as the main author of a f ilm, even though many other
creators collaborated on it. According to this auteur theory, ‘there is a
guiding, dominant, creative identity that is responsible for the essence
and personality of the work’, such as the film producer or actor but, more
frequently, the director (Cahir, 2006, pp. 86-90). It is debatable whether
such an auteur cinema concept fits new forms of filmmaking, including
user-aided film projects like the Entertainment Experience. Probably it
would still fit the user-inspired movie that Paul Verhoeven directs, but
not the entirely user-generated version that comes out of the project. It
may not be easy to establish who counts as authors of the latter types of
productions, or whose personal imprints they reflect. As Paul Sellors has
argued with respect to collective authorship in film, the question of who
counts as an author ultimately depends on the contribution that is made
to the filmic utterance, whether that be ‘the film’s authorial body, [or] the
number of authored components that contribute to the overall film’ (2007,
pp. 269–270).
The fact that a main artist or director leads a project does not mean
that he or she is solely responsible for making creative choices. Except
perhaps for the twitter book, many individuals were creatively involved at
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different stages of the user-aided projects mentioned above. For example,
John Ewbank worked together with Dutch artists like Alain Clark, Guus
Meeuwis, Jack Poels and Daphne Deckers in arranging, editing and writing
the lyrics for the Koningslied. Paul Verhoeven’s Entertainment Experience
likewise involves a team of creative specialists including an art director, a
casting director, a scriptwriter, a script doctor, and a composer.
The question remains, however, whether the creators assisting the principal artist will necessarily also make creative choices that are expressed
in the final product’s form. Whether creative collaborators can thus leave
a personal imprint on a finished work depends on the nature and closeness
of the collaboration. Vera John-Steiner writes in her book Creative Collaboration that, through intellectual and artistic collaboration, individuals
can develop ‘thought communities’ in which the participants ‘construct
mutuality and productive interdependence’ with the aim ‘to develop a
shared vision as well as achieve jointly negotiated outcomes’ (2000, p. 196).
‘Thought communities’ of this kind vary from loosely organised distributed
collaborations with a common interest, such as online discussion forums; to
symbiotic partnerships dividing labour ‘based on complementary expertise,
disciplinary knowledge, roles, and temperament’; to steady family collaborations with flexible and interchangeable roles; to integrated collaborations
where partners interact during ‘a prolonged period of committed activity’
with a ‘desire to transform existing knowledge, thought styles, or artistic
approaches into new visions’ (ibid., pp. 197–204).
It seems that the stronger the creative collaboration is, the more the
final work will reflect the joint personal imprint of the collaborators. Eva
Novrup Redvall describes this clearly in her work on screenwriting in Danish filmmaking (2009). She followed the scriptwriting process of the feature
film Lille soldat, on which director Annette K. Oleson and scriptwriter
Kim Fupz Aakeson worked together ‘all the way from an original idea to
not only the final draft of the script, but also to the finished film with the
writer also often being brought in during the “rewriting” of the film in
the final editing’ (ibid., p. 36). The film being based on a shared vision of
director and scriptwriter, she concludes that such intense collaboration
challenges ‘the traditional notion of a film being the personal statement
of one auteur’ (ibid., p. 52). While the director still had the final say in the
decision-making, ‘the finished film is very much the unique result of two
people with complementary skills … creating something that they could
never have created by themselves’ (Redvall, 2010, p. 76).
This raises the question whether joint subjective traces of co-creators
also count as a reflection of the ‘personal stamp’ necessary for establishing
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copyright protection. It seems that copyright law indeed recognises a personal stamp, not only of individual creators, but also of groups of creators.
Otherwise it would be impossible to explain how it could protect works of
co-creators who constructed a hybrid subjective work on the basis of a joint
vision. At the same time, however, it seems that the larger the group creation
is, the more awkward it is to require a reflection of a ‘personal stamp’ of
the creators as a condition for copyright protection, as the next section on
large-scale (online) creative collaborations will illustrate.
The personal touch of contributors in creative communities
The requirement that copyright only vests in works that bear the personal
imprint of their creators does not correspond well with creations that are
produced by a myriad of different co-creators. How can the user-generated
movie created in the context of the Entertainment Experience project reflect
the personal touches of the numerous contributors who sent in their suggestion for a plot, the script, the music or perhaps even actual film footage?
How about the persons who submitted tweets for the twitter book or lines
of lyrics for the Koningslied? In these examples, it can still be asserted that
the principal artists have left their personal imprint in the work, but in
many other examples it is difficult to identify the leading contributors.
That is frequently the case with programmers developing open source
software and contributors writing entries on Wikipedia. Socially, culturally
or economically speaking, such group creations are certainly as significant
as other types of creations, but from a copyright perspective, they sit quite
uneasily with the requirement that they must reflect the personal touch
of their creators to attract protection. Although copyright has never been
denied on these grounds, because usually courts merely take account of the
existence of creative space without observing the contributions of actual
creators (as was set out above), it is fairly remarkable that such large-scale
creative collaborations are not well accommodated in the wording of the
‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test for copyright.
Even a small individual contribution can be copyrighted on its own
accord, if it is the author’s own intellectual creation that somehow reflects
his or her personality. In the Infopaq International case (2009, §§ 46–47), the
CJEU held that the expression of the author’s intellectual creation can be
reflected in isolated sentences, or even parts of sentences, of a work such as
a newspaper article. This means that, to the extent that copyright applies,
permission may be required for including individual contributions in a joint
work. For works created in online communities, such permission is usually
explicitly or implicitly given when the contributions are submitted. That
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is not to say, however, that authors whose contributions are used would
then immediately also be entitled to copyright protection in the joint work.
Whether that is the case depends on legal rules on co-authorship, which
vary between different jurisdictions (cf. Ginsburg, 2003; Van Eechoud, et
al., 2009, pp. 236–243; Margoni and Perry, 2012).
Irrespective of the rules on co-authorship, for the purpose of establishing
whether the originality threshold is met, it is immensely difficult to identify
the personal touch of each individual contributor in insignificantly small
parts of a final production, such as parts of a sentence in a twitter book
or in lyrics of a song, even if, in isolation, these parts would reflect (some
of) the author’s personality. In the broader creative context, such small
individual contributions merely constitute the building blocks from which
the final work is created. This may be different, however, if a personal
contribution is independently recognisable and occupies a prominent place
in a work, for instance, as the opening line or refrain of a song. In such case,
the work probably will reflect the personal touch of the individual creator
who contributed the specific lyrics.
The difficulty remains how to deal with large-scale collaborative productions, such as entries on Wikipedia and open source software, which are
often created by numerous, sometimes anonymous, contributors and which
are constantly being updated by other, subsequent contributors. Here,
the problem is not only to ascertain the identity of the different creative
co-contributors, but also to determine the ‘work’ or ‘unit’ of which the
original character is established. As is argued in Van Eechoud’s chapter
on adaptation in this book, for these types of works (as well as for drafts,
versions and spin offs of other types of creative works), there is an important
temporal aspect to the determination of originality. Because the group of
co-creators changes over time, the question is at which point in time is the
original character tested?
The example of Wikipedia can illustrate this. When a new Wikipedia
entry is started, it will almost certainly reflect the personal touch of the
first contributor (unless he or she has copied it from another person’s work).
The personal imprint of subsequent contributors that substantially change
the entry or add sections later on may perhaps also still be recognisable in
it. However, the more the entry is elaborated on, the more pertinent the
question becomes how much space is left for subsequent contributors to
leave a personal stamp on it. Being part of a group effort not only creates
restrictions for individual choice, but succeeding contributors also seem to
be constrained by the creative choices that others have made before them.
Over time, the entry may undergo changes by so many different people
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that recognisable personal imprints of earlier co-creators can completely
be erased by alterations of later contributors.
This shows that it can be very challenging to ascertain whether a Wikipedia entry is sufficiently original to attract copyright protection. Perhaps
this can be meaningfully done only at the stage of a copyright infringement
analysis, when it is exactly known from which version the allegedly infringing work is copied. However, even then, the requirement that Wikipedia
entries must bear the personal imprint of their creators to attract copyright
may raise difficulties. If this requirement is interpreted too literally, this
may imply that, through the course of time, an entry that once attracted
copyright protection may lose protection, should the personal touch that
links the entry to the various co-creators have evaporated due to successive
changes. Moreover, if too much weight were put on the constraints faced by
subsequent contributors who elaborate on existing entries, then copyright’s
originality test would arguably set a higher threshold for large-scale collaborative works than for single-authored works. It seems that these are
unjustifiable consequences, which copyright law does not wish to draw.
Accordingly, the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test seems inapt
for determining the eligibility for copyright protection of large-scale collaborative productions, at least as far as it requires an unpacking of creative
choices of individual co-contributors. If copyright would depend on how
the personality of individual co-creators is reflected in a collaborative
work, then this could have the unintended result that no protection may be
granted, if due to the large number of contributors or the successive changes
that have been made over time, the work unduly expresses the personal
touches of the various co-contributors. For large-scale collaborative productions, it would be better to focus on group level creativity when it comes to
ascertaining both the existence of creative space and how is it used. The
increasing body of literature on group creativity (e.g. John-Steiner, 2000;
Paulus and Nijstad, 2003; Sawyer, 2007; Mannix, Nealeand and Goncalo,
2009) can perhaps provide helpful guidance in this respect.

Conclusion
Originality in copyright law is a loose, but certainly not a meaningless,
criterion. To attract copyright, a work does not have to be new, innovative
or unique in comparison with other works in the same symbolic domain.
The only requirement is that the work is the ‘author’s own intellectual
creation’. Drawing upon studies in the humanities and social sciences,
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this chapter has reviewed copyright law’s originality test and the ‘free and
creative choices’ and ‘personal touch’ requirements that are part of it. It
follows from this analysis that copyright law’s understanding of originality
can only partly be informed by aesthetics and creativity studies. In these
disciplines and sub-disciplines within them, the meanings of ‘creativity’
and ‘originality’ are much more vague and plural than in copyright law.
Moreover, they generally apply a more novelty-oriented originality test
that requires works to creatively stand out against comparable works in
the same domain. Thus, other than in copyright law, where originality is
tested solely on the basis of a work itself, most disciplines in aesthetics and
creativity studies treat originality and creativity as relative or comparative
concepts. If a novelty-oriented originality test were introduced in copyright
law, this would completely overturn the core principle on which the system
rests, namely that a work attracts copyright as long as it can be regarded as
the own intellectual creation of the author.
Even so, the humanities can provide some valuable insights to reach more
fine-tuned decisions about protecting original works of authorship. If attention is focused on the autonomy that authors enjoy in creative processes,
then it becomes apparent that, in practice, it is not always a given that a
work results from the author’s free and creative choices. Creators are often
constrained by audience expectations (e.g. about a logical organisation
and order of things), trends, rules of the genre, utilitarian considerations,
et cetera. Apart from excluding from protection elements of works that
are technically or functionally defined or that resemble ideas rather than
expression, however, Dutch courts do not systematically examine whether
creative choices were made freely or whether they were informed by outside constraints. They merely look at the available creative space, without
observing whether the creative autonomy was inhibited in any way. That
is remarkable. If free and creative choices made within the available space
are part and parcel of the originality test, then courts need to acknowledge
this in their analysis of copyrightability and dismiss those elements of a
work that leave no room for creative choices or that are inspired by other
motives than creativity.
This does not mean that in cases where creation is guided by technical
or functional considerations or audience expectations, authors cannot
produce works with an own, original character, as the Dutch Supreme Court
confirmed in the MB v. Mattel case about the copyrightability of Barbie dolls
(1992). However, to determine whether a functional work attracts copyright,
it cannot merely be observed whether there was space for making free and
creative choices. Such space almost always exists, at least to some degree.
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To demonstrate originality, the question should be answered whether the
author has made use of the creative space to produce an intellectual creation
that can be considered the author’s own. For this purpose, courts should
take more account of the creative decision-making process. In addition, the
law could perhaps impose a higher burden of proof on authors who seek
copyright protection to better substantiate their claim by demonstrating
their use of creative space in expressive form.
Moreover, the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test for copyright is so
tied to the author as the individual creator of a work that it raises difficulties
for determining the eligibility for protection of large-scale collaborative
productions. The requirement that copyright only vests in works that bear
the ‘personal imprint’ of their creators is especially problematic for group
creations. Perhaps such a personal imprint can still be assumed if a joint
work involves one or more creative leaders who have a final say on the
finished product. However, if no main authors can be identified or if the
work is in a constant process of evolution, as is typically the case for Wikipedia entries and open source software, the current originality test creates
problems. A first difficulty arises in relation to the question at which point
in time is the original character tested. Since the group of co-contributors
changes over time, this is a relevant question if the individual contributions
matter for ascertaining originality. Taking apart the creative contribution
of each individual co-author would moreover create a supplemental set of
functional limitations at the level of the individual, because being part of
a group effort undeniably creates restrictions for individual choice. This
would imply a higher threshold for joint works than for single-authored
works. Since copyright must not punish group creation, when it comes to
ascertaining the existence of creative space and how is it used in large-scale
collaborative productions, the originality test should rather focus on group
level creativity than on individual creative choices.
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Adapting the work
Mireille van Eechoud
When the Dutch government commissioned official portraits in the run-up
to the investiture of Willem-Alexander as king of The Netherlands in 2013,
artist Iris van Dongen was among the twelve artists asked to make a study.
She based her work on a photograph she had found on the internet, without
informing artist-photographer Koos Breukel, let alone asking him permission. To the average observer the similarities are striking. Van Dongen and
two other artists went on to win the competition to make a state portrait of
the new king. Breukel was not amused to see Van Dongen’s study exhibited
in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. A public row ensued (Ribbens, 2014),
which ended not in court but with apologies and a settlement: Van Dongen
gave Breukel the study on loan (Mondriaanfonds, 2014).
More famous examples that did make it to the court room are controversies over art in the US. The high visibility legal actions against Jeff Koons
and appropriation artist Richard Prince come to mind. Both were sued
for taking pre-existing photographs and then turning them into different
artworks – Koons created the String of puppies sculpture, Prince produced
the collages and paintings in the Canal Zone exhibition using Cariou’s
Rasta images. Koons was held to have infringed Art Rogers’ copyright in
the photo (Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992)). In the Prince case the
district court found copyright infringement, but on appeal Prince’s fair use
defense was honoured. The appeals court found that under applicable US
copyright law standards most of the collages are sufficiently transformative
and therefore not infringing.1 The works give ‘Cariou’s photographs a new
expression, and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative
results distinct from Cariou’s’ (Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013),
p. 15). Of the five works which only show minimal alterations compared to
the source photographs, the appeals court remanded for the district court
to make the call on fair use (see Allen 2013 for a compilation of all court
documents). The court never had to because Prince and Cariou agreed a
settlement, the details of which remain undisclosed (Boucher, 2014).
These are US cases, and the European legal traditions that I will focus
on here recognise certain free uses that under US law would constitute
‘fair use’, such as parody and quoting for purposes of criticism or review.
But generally speaking, the copyright laws of European countries know
only a limited number of exempt uses, setting out exactly which acts do
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not require authorisation from the copyright owner. What this implies for
the legality of various kinds of borrowings, adaptations and appropriations
will be taken up later.
Most copyright lawyers in Europe would probably have little trouble arguing that takings of the kinds described above constitute an infringement
of the copyrights in the source works. Artists themselves obviously hold a
range of different beliefs about the freedom they have (or ought to have)
to borrow. Richard Prince challenges the notion of intellectual property
outright. That was never more obvious than from his recent piece, a faithful
copy of the first edition of J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye in all respects
but authorship credit: Prince substituted his name as author (Gordon, 2012).
Marlene Dumas based her painting Nuclear Family on a photograph by
(friend) Van Noord, who incidentally was rather pleased to find his work
had inspired hers. When asked whether this was not plagiarism Dumas
responded: ‘In my view plagiarism is a literary term. You can copy a text
literally, it stays the same medium, but my painting is built out of strokes
of paint, it is such a different “thing”. You can see this best when you show
a detail of the painting next to a detail of the photograph. Then the differences appear instead of the resemblances. They are two worlds.’2 (quoted in
Cohen, 2014). From the perspective of art this might be true. The medium
and genre in which a work is expressed matter to artists when it comes to
the acceptability of borrowing.
Copyright laws have much less nuance. The author has the exclusive right
of copying and adaptation, to which there are limited exceptions. In popular
culture too, the rigidity of copyright notions is at odds with social practices
of borrowing. The rise of ‘user generated content’ such as fan fiction, video
parodies, artifacts in virtual games, blogs and music remixes has led to
intense debate on the need for more flexible copyright law, a cause for which
Standford law professor Lessig is a celebrity champion, authoring influential
books such as The Culture of Ideas (2002) and Remix (2008). The rise of
social media platforms shows it is now common for individuals to construct
and communicate online identities. We do this not just by producing our
own texts. The copy/pasting and forwarding of image, text and audio is
an integral part of it too. The distinction between writing and rewriting
blurs. Continual processes of writing and rewriting are key features too of
what in recent years has become mainstream social production: large-scale
networked collaboration to create information resources (Wikipedia is a
prime example of course) and software. Copyright laws have not kept pace
with these developments.
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My focus in this piece is on the interplay between the legal concepts of
work, copy and adaptation in light of the now ubiquitous ‘new’ forms or
genres of works that online networks enabled. Can European copyright
law accommodate the increased fluidity of some of these work genres?
What avenues might be taken to attenuate the gap between legal and social
practices? Is a more flexible system of limitations enough? Or do we need
a wholesale rethink of the work concept? Might a more relaxed notion of
copying and especially of adapting suffice? What would that mean for the
kind of copyright infringement analysis courts engage in? My ambition is
to explore potential avenues for reform, and in doing so take on board some
insights from non-legal disciplines, notably genre and adaptations studies.
In the first part of this chapter I highlight the relationships that exist in
most laws between the status of copies and adaptations, and discuss some
challenges with the notion of adaptation when it comes to fluid works. In
the second part, the focus is on how precisely the relationship work, copy,
adaptation is encoded in copyright law. As all EU Member States share the
norms of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Liteary and Artistic
Property of 1886, I start there. But the Berne Convention and its satellite
WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 show the signs of being the product of more
than a century of multiple rounds of drafting and political compromise: its
treatment of adaptations is patchy.
The making of copyright policy is a thoroughly European affair because of
the effect diverging national intellectual property laws have on the common
market. Still, twenty-five years of piecemeal harmonisation has resulted in
a corpus of directives that leave plenty of uncertainty about the scope of
the right to control adaptations. I will therefore consider how a number of
laws of EU Member States shape the relationship between work, adaptation
and copies and how this affects infringement analysis. In the final third
part, I will examine some roads that might be taken to effectuate changes
to the law.

Fluid works, discrete adaptations
Transformative, derivative, secondary, reworked, reproduced, translated,
recast, altered, arranged works: these are but a few (translations) of the
terms used in law and beyond to describe what I shall denote as ‘adaptations’. For students of literature and film, the latter term might have a
strong connotation with the practice of creating a film on the basis of a
novel or play (or vice versa). But I use adaptation as the more general term
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that covers the realm beyond mere direct copying, that of the reworking of
works whether in text, image or sound. When I speak of ‘copying’ it refers
to taking verbatim or literal parts.
Traditionally, a distinction is made in law between copying a work and
adapting it. The exclusive right to copy (reproduction) essentially pertains
to the fixation of a work in a tangible form (Spoor, 2012, p. 206). Copying
then is the more straightforward act that requires the author’s permission.
It is the production of ‘mechanical’ copies of the work in the analogue world,
as well as digital ones. It might be a complete copy or a partial one. It might
involve a ‘technical’ kind of format shifting, like encoding a music file in
a different file-type, or resizing an image to make it fit a certain layout.
If the work is modified in other ways, as was done in by artists Koons,
Dumas, Prince and Van Dongen, the relationship between the earlier and
later work is more complex. The right of adaptation is about changing the
work as an immaterial object, that is the original intellectual creation that
is taken to exist seperately from the (physical) form. Whether modification
without permission infringes depends on the treatment of elements or
features that give the source work its original character. In a nutshell, if on
comparison enough characteristic elements of the source are recognisable
in the later work, the latter is infringing. A change of medium, or reworking
in the same medium offers no escape. Unless of course the source work
is no longer in copyright, or a defense is available under the limitations
recognised by the applicable law, for example on copying for private study,
on free use for parody purposes or incidental uses.
The distinction between copies and modification matters for two reasons. The first is that copying does not give rise to new rights, whereas the
making of an adaptation often will. Standards of originality required for
copyright protection are low, so the adaptation will qualify as a protected
work itself. The second reason is that copying without permission – in whole
or in part – will normally infringe whereas creating something on the basis
of another work without literal copying might not.
A modification might qualify as a protected work in its own right, the
second author being the copyright owner. A layering effect then arises,
because with each exploitation of the second work the rights in the source
work are at play as well. In principle this layering can build up over subsequent adaptations, of adaptations, of adaptations, until such time when
the resemblance between earlier and later works are so remote as to not be
legally relevant anymore. The notion of adaptation makes sense in situations where there is one source work, and a follow-on creation that comes
distinctly later in time. The concept becomes difficult to operationalise
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if there are multiple source works involved, or if a ‘work’ is continually
updated or consists of versions that are created simultaneously or in quick
succession. Think of the edits to Wikipedia entries, or daily updates of
many software programmes. Does it make sense to view each version as a
subsequent adaptation of the first version, or is there a web of adaptations?
In the sphere of the arts, collages are a good example. If a collage contains
bits of different pre-existing works, does that make the collage an adaptation of each source work? And what to make of interactive works, like
‘database documentaries’ that consist of a series of tracks or guided paths
through one or a number of (virtual) databases containing various types of
items (e.g. static text, image, sound, live feeds) that allow the reader/viewer
to ‘create’ his own documentary (Burdick et al., 2012)? Is each ‘path’ a copy
or adaptation, and of what exactly? What constitutes the work in such cases,
all of the potential instantiations combined? Copyright laws provide no
clear answers because of its traditional orientation on materially distinct
forms. Although what copyright ultimately protects is the (immaterial)
intellectual creation, for assessing the work’s boundaries it is still easiest
to consider a distinct material form.
In the history of copyright, technological developments have always
caused debate about how (and if) copyright laws should accommodate new
kinds of cultural production. But the problem was never really so much
with the form, the boundaries of new works. Notable instances are the
debates on photography in the 19th century, film in the early 20th century
and computer programmes from the 1970s onwards. In all these cases,
there was initial hesitation about bringing them into the copright domain
because of their perceived ‘functional’ or ‘technical’ character – as opposed
to aesthetic qualities. Ultimately all were accepted into the fold. Reasoning
by analogy proved a powerful tool: Photography is similar to graphic art,
painting, and other types of imagery that copyright already protected. Once
photographs were accorded work status, then surely films – sequences of
images – must benefit too.3 Computer programmes are forms of text, and
copyright protected all kinds of writings, so authors of this new form should
not be discriminated against, the argument runs.
What of the transition from analogue to digital then? Confronted with
new work forms spawned by digital technologies, copyright scholars in the
1980-1990s considered how ‘multimedia’ works consisting of image, text,
sound and software fitted in the copyright system, and whether computergenerated productions posed particular problems of authorship and originality. In the main, again through reasoning by analogy, the conclusion was
that there was no fundamental problem with work status. There might be
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difficulties with the application of national rules written for specific genres
of works, e.g. how to apply specific national rules for co-ownership in film
to multimedia productions, but no fundamental problems were foreseen.
What the transition from analogue to digital meant for the concept of a
work as a stable, clearly identifiable entity seems to have remained below
the radar of mainstream legal scholarship for quite some time. Although
in most instances, it will remain easy to identify a ‘discrete work in reality’
(Hyperion Records v Warner Music, cited in Griffiths, 2013), there seems to
be a growing number of situations in which it becomes difficult to do so.
Works become dynamic rather than static. The modular production of
works, constant updating and revising, and open-ended nature of creations
pose challenges to the concepts of work, copy and adaptation. David Sewell
(2009) recounts how since the 1990s the openendedness and incompleteness
of digital work(s) is often celebrated in literary studies and new media
studies. Academic publishers of course struggle to deal with these digital
born objects. The prevailing expectation among authors and readers alike
still is that a publication has to be ‘done’ before being published.
Especially in networked collaborative environments, the notion of a
stable, finished work is problematic. Legal notions of work and adaptation
might not have changed yet, but practice has adapted to the new realities
of networked digital production already, as is evident from succesful peer
production projects. The open-ended collaborative creation that characterises the famous encyclopedia Wikipedia and open source software projects
like Linux, but also modular e-learning resources like Openstax 4 is only
possible because of ‘copyleft’ collective management schemes: the inventive
use of copyright to impose standardised terms of use across communities or
contributors and users that foster follow-on creation and prevent contributors from making legal claims to control adaptation of their contributions.
These strategies make the identification of discrete intellectual properties
of less importance – although attribution of (author) credit is an important
element in open source and open content communities. Another view is that
the recourse co-creating communities have had to take to ‘anti-copyright’
models shows just how inapt core concepts of copyright have become for
these new forms of creation. Kelty (2008), Berdou (2010) and Reagle (2010) all
analyzed the role of ‘copyleft’ models in collaborative communities. Many
members have an extraordinary level of copyright knowledge, and need to
have this to sustain collaborative production.
The examples above illustrate that in today’s digitally connected world
we see large-scale open-ended intellectual creations that are perhaps more
accurately understood as processes, or information services, or libraries,
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than as discrete works of authorship. But at the same time, we also witness
increasing atomisation: short communications such as tweets, RSS feeds
of news headlines, alerts of all kinds. Short as they may be, these snippets
represent economic value and their use is increasingly the subject of dispute,
hence the tendency to accord them work status. Newsmedia in particular
claim protection against copying (or at least compensation), the Infopaq
case before the Court of Justice EU being a well known example. Copyright
laws generally protect short works, if they are long enough to show original
character, but a pertinent question is what constitutes an independent
work, and what is merely part of a larger work. As we shall see later, for the
assessment of whether copying constitutes infringement this is a highly
relevant question. I turn now first to the question how the right to control
adaptations is expressed in international norms and national copyright
laws.

The adaptation right in (inter)national law
On a conceptual level, a distinction between ‘mere’ copies, ‘adaptations’
and free uses shows up in many national copyright laws. But the way in
which these are given shape in concrete legal provisions, the terminology
used, and the level of judicial interpretation required to make sense of
them – especially in times of rapid changes in information markets and
technologies we might add – is quite diverse, as we shall see throughout
this chapter.
The Berne Convention
The 1886 Berne Convention obliges its signatories to protect foreign authors
by granting them a number of communication rights (public recitation,
broadcasting and the like, articles 10bis through 11ter) as well as the right to
authorise reproductions (article 9). The current general right of reproduction was not introduced until the Stockholm revision of 1967 (Ricketson
& Ginsburg 2005, at 8.104). From the beginning, the Berne Convention
contained provisions that dealt with certain kinds of adaptations, over time
the rights were expanded. Unlike the national laws of countries such as
France, Belgium and The Netherlands, the BC does not classify adaptation
rights as a subcategory of the reproduction right.
In its current wording, article 2 (1) of the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic property, lists as protected
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‘every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever
may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and
other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same
nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and
entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without
words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed
by a process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting,
architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works
to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to
photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and
three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture
or science’.

What the boundaries are of the domains of art, literature and science
was not an issue debated in the context of the negotiations on the Berne
Convention and subsequent revisions. The domains were copied from earlier
bilateral treaties. Ricketson & Ginsburg (2005, p. 406-7) suggest they might
be taken to refer to creations expressed as text (‘literary’) or image (‘artistic’),
while ‘scientific’ has no special significance but covers written expression
about scientific matters in a broad sense, since copyright does not aim to
protect scientific findings as such.
The list maps the kinds of works that many national copyright laws
already protected (Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2005, at 8.08). The initial list was
expanded in 1908 at the Berlin revision conference to include lectures and
other oral works as well as choreographic works. Cinematographic works
and photographic works, which were protected in some form already from
the beginning, were included in the work list following the 1948 Brussels
revision, as were works of architecture and applied art.
The text of the Convention shows the marks of the drawn-out battle over
adaptation rights. Five provisions in the current text deal with adaptations
(as works in their own right) and the right to control adaptations: articles
2(3), 2(5), 8, 12 and 14bis. They have been rephrased, renumbered and reclassified various times, as often the debate over what rights the author should
have to control the creation of derivative works went hand in hand with
discussion on the status of adaptations as protected works themselves. The
birth of new genres and their subsequent development into independent
art forms is reflected in the convention. The treatment of film is a good
example. Initially, film was regarded as an adaptation of a dramatic work
(i.e. play), and the making of a film an act that required permission from
the owner of the copyright in the play. But such films were also seen as
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a particular genre of dramatic work and were protected. Only later was
film considered a ‘stand-alone’ genre of work, to be protected regardless of
whether pre-existing works used in its creation (see Ricketson & Ginsburg
who discuss the development in the history of the Berne Convention, at
8.31–8.41).
The earliest and most pronounced disagreements over adaptations
concerned the proposed inclusion of a right of authors or their publishers to
control any translation of books and plays into another language. In Cosmopolitan Copyright (2011), Eva Hemmungs Wirtén ‘excavates’ the debate over
freedom of translation and shows how it is also linked to shifting linguistic
power relations in the 19th and early 20th century. Countries such as France
and the UK were net ‘exporters’ of literary works and supported broad translation rights. Importing countries on the other hand were interested in freedom
of translation and wanted very limited translation rights if any. In Europe
opponents of broad rights included Scandinavian countries and the lowlands
(Belgium, The Netherlands). The idea that it was important for authors to
control the quality of translations, and that this justified the extension of
copyright played a substantial role in the debate. The French delegations to
the various diplomatic conferences in particular fervently pushed this idea.
The Convention recognises that a ‘derivative’ production enjoys copyright
on condition that it meets the requirements for protection: it must be an
original intellectual creation in the domain of literature, science or art
(Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2005). The present Article 2(3), which dates back
to 1908, confirms the status of adaptations: ‘Translations, adaptations,
arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work
shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in
the original work.’
From this wording no test can be readily derived for establishing when
authorisation is required for borrowings. As for translations, all that is clear
from the legislative historical record is that the term denotes the recreation
of a work in another human language (whether this also includes spoken to
sign translation is uncertain, Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2005 at 8.78). Article 8
stipulates that authors have the exclusive right to authorise translations. In
addition, article 12 covers the right to authorise ‘adaptations, arrangements
and other alterations.’ The original provision in the 1886 Convention was
much narrower than the current text. Subsequent changes to it made for
confusing reading, and included enumerations of e.g. the dramatisation
of novels into plays as indirect unauthorised reproductions. Nonetheless,
it is common opinion that ‘adaptations’ should be constructed as a broad
category (ibid., at 8.79).
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Not specifically named as adaptations are collections of works. Article
2(5) accords work status to ‘Collections of literary or artistic works such
as encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by reason of the selection and
arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations’. Article
14bis recognises films as works, regardless of whether they are based on
pre-existing literary or dramatic works (and thus are adaptations).
The treaty further provides on the term of protection that ‘Authors of
literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall enjoy the
exclusive right of making and of authorizing the translation of their works
throughout the term of protection of their rights in the original works’ (Art.
8 Berne Convention, introduced in 1908). Authors of plays, operas and other
dramatic works enjoy ‘…during the full term of their rights in the original
works, the same rights with respect to translations thereof.’ (art. 11(2)).
As to the limits of adaptation and translation rights, the Berne Convention itself contains few permitted uses. The only mandatory limitation
is the right to quote of article 10(1) BC. It does not contain more general
defences that allow for free use or transformative use of the kind known
in e.g. Germany and the US. But article 9(2) BC provides that contracting
states are free to have exceptions to the reproduction right on condition
that they conform to the three-step-test (special cases only, not to conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work, not to unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author).
European laws
Despite a quarter century of harmonisation efforts by the EU, there still
are differences among national copyright laws in the European Union on
a number of aspects. One of the most striking is that the right to authorise
adaptations remains unharmonised for most types of works, computer
programmes and databases being the notable exceptions (Van Eechoud et
al 2009, p. 84). The author’s exclusive right to authorise or prohibit copying
(‘reproduction’) is subject to the common standard of article 2 of the 2001
Information Society Directive. But many do not regard that provision as
covering the right to authorise adaptations (Bently, 2011; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, 2011, p. 26; Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, p. 964; different: Griffiths
2013). While it is indeed difficult to find support in the legislative record for
the position that the EU lawmaker sought to harmonise adaptations rights in
the Information Society Directive, the recent line of judgments by the Europe
Court of Justice on the reproduction right (Van Eechoud, 2012) suggests that
it might in the coming years construct a pan-European notion anyway.
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As noted above, the legal terms used in national laws to capture instances
of borrowing that require the consent of the owners of rights in the source
remain quite diverse and tied up with the particular act’s structure. Historically, in France the adaptation right is seen as part and parcel of the right
to reproduce a work. The copyright acts of Belgium and The Netherlands
follow a similar approach, although in all countries a conceptual difference
is recognised between copying and adapting a work. The German copyright
act has a more elaborate system of rules, including a provision on adaptations that can be freely made. The Copyright act of the United Kingdom
has yet another structure. A separate provision governs common types of
adaptations, but since the right to prevent copying is interpreted broadly
alterations can also be prohibited on that basis.
The Netherlands
Article 1 of the Dutch copyright act (Auteurswet) defines copyright as the
right of the author to make the work public and to reproduce it. The right
to authorise adaptations or ‘bewerkingen’ is a sub-category of the broader
right to authorise reproductions laid down in article 13 (‘verveelvoudiging’,
literally: multiplication, see Spoor, 2012). The article stipulates that ‘The
reproduction of a literary, scientific or artistic work includes the translation,
musical arrangement, film adaptation or dramatisation and generally any
partial or full adaptation or imitation in a modified form, which cannot be
regarded as a new, original work.’ When is something a new, original work,
so that no permission of the copyright owner in the source work is required?
The standard is not easily met, but has in the past been successfully
invoked for parodies. The extent of copying allowed is determined by the
need to identify the work that is parodied and signal that the adaptation is
a parody. In contrast to the German Supreme Court (see discussion below),
the Dutch Supreme Court has held that in case of famous works, less is
needed to make clear which source is parodied; so for famous works the
level of copying allowed is lower. It can also be argued that works with
canonical status should if anything be protected less, precisely because
of their status. In response to the inclusion of a parody exception in the
Information Society Directive, the Dutch legislator enacted an explicit
exception that is somewhat broader than the one developed by the Courts
on the basis of the adaptation right (Senftleben, 2012). Another exception
of particular relevance to adaptations is the right to quote for the purposes
of ‘announcement, review, polemic or scientific treatise or a piece with a
comparable purpose’ (article 15a). Article 14 clarifies that any (additional)
fixation of a work or part of it constitutes reproduction as well.
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Germany
In Germany, the use of material copies of works is subject to the twin
rights of reproduction and of distribution (‘Vervielfältigungsrecht’ of art.
16 Urheberrechtgesetz and ‘Verbreitungsrecht’ of art. 17 UrhG). Any material
fixation that allows the work to be perceived by human senses triggers
application of these rights. The rights also extend to material fixations of
works in altered form, but adaptations are subject to specific rules (Loewenheim, 2010, p. 375-376). For making direct copies permission is required,
but this is not so for most work categories when it comes to adaptations
(‘Bearbeitungen’) or other transformations (‘Umgestaltungen’). It is not the
production as such, but the communication or exploitation of an adaptation
that requires prior permission.5 Article 23 names a number of exceptions
to this rule: dramatisation (to film), the execution of designs of sculptural
works, the imitation (by construction) of a building as well as the adaptation
of a database all require permission at the reproduction stage. The database
provision implements the adaptation right of the EU Database Directive,
presumably the other exceptions are the result of succesful lobbying.
The distinction between adaptation and other transformations is not
clearly established. Adaptations seem to cover instances where the source
work is altered only to enable a new form of exploitation while retaining
the work’s identity, for example by translating a text from one language to
another (Schricker, 2010, p. 512). Other alterations are ‘umgestaltungen’.
Like adaptations, they retain elements of the source that give it its original
character, albeit fewer. In both cases, the alteration itself can be a protected
work if it is original.
German copyright law recognises free transformative use: either a
transformative work is ‘dependent’ on its source and covered by the adaptation right of article 23, or it has ‘independent’ status under article 24
(‘Freie Benutzung’). In that case the owner of copyright in the source has no
claim in controlling its use. Which side of the divide a particular creation
is on must be decided on a case by case basis and has never been easy to
determine. Some 90 years ago Smoschewer (1926) already observed that the
division depends less on logic than on aesthetic feeling.
Landmark cases in which the German Supreme Court interpreted article
24 are Alcolix-Astérix (1993) and Perlentaucher (2010). The Alcolix case
concerned a parody on the famous Astérix comics. The plaintiffs claimed
that the use of the comic characters as such constituted infringement. The
use of a number of characteristic features of the Asterix stories – such as the
situation of the parody in a Gallic village and the use of fish as a weapon
in fights – were claimed to infringe as well. It was not contested that the
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characters of Astérix and Obelix are protected as works, separate from the
actual graphic representations (drawings).
Perlentaucher was an altogether different case: it is an online journal
that produced summaries of book reviews. Two newspapers sued for infringement. The Supreme Court held that that courts must assess for each
summary individually if it is distinct enough from the review it summarises.
Since only the expression of a bookreview is protected and not thoughts
expressed, it comes down to the question whether the original wording of
the book review is copied.
The free use is allowed when the second work foregrounds its individual
and distinct personal character to such a degree that the original characteristics of the source fade – even though some of its original traits might
remain identifiable. Of course, the more well-known the source work is,
the fewer the hints that are necessary to reference it. That the reference to
a (famous) work is clear does not mean that (too many) original elements
have been taken, or too little own character is developed in the new work.
If the ‘outer’ distance to the source is great (i.e. as regards form), the source
is in effect only an inspiration. If the outer distance is not great, e.g. as will
be the case in parodies for which the copying of some form aspects is typically required, but the ‘inner’ distance is great because of the independent
original nature of the second work, the transformative use is also free.
According to the German Supreme Court, the ‘inner distance’ test is a strict
one (Astérix). Whether there is a case of free use must be judged from the
perspective of (a hypothetical) observer who knows the source work but
who also has the intellectual capacity to understand the new work.
United Kingdom
Countries like Canada and the UK initially treated rights to control adaptations quite separate from the right to copy. The black letter text of the laws
still give the impression that a reproduction right and adaptation rights
exist side by side. However, the continuously expanded interpretation of
the reproduction right caused it to overlap with the specific adaptation
provisions (Fischman, 2007). These retain value mainly as examples of the
kind of derivative works that cannot be created without permission, and
that themselves will typically qualify as protected works.
Section 16 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’)
reserves to the copyright owner a catalogue of rights, among which are
the right to copy (para. a) and the right to make adaptations (para e),
both ‘in relation to the work as a whole or any substantial part of it’. The
substantiality test has over the past decade or so become a qualitative test.

158 

Mireille van Eechoud

Griffiths (2013) describes and critically assesses this development in depth,
in particular in light of the previous importance attached in UK copyright
to material form (see also Ginsburg, 2006: about similar struggles in early
French and US copyright to view the object of protection as immaterial).
Copying or adapting a ‘substantial’ part is not so much about the proportion
of the source work that is copied or taken (i.e. quantity, like the number
of pages in relation to the whole source work), but the quality of what was
taken: those elements that define the work’s original character, or ‘skill and
labour’ in English copyright language. The distinction between copying and
making adaptations fades in the light of this test.
Section 17 of the CDPA considers as an infringement unauthorised
copying, that is the act ‘of reproducing the work in any material form’.
Section 21(1) stipulates that the ‘making of an adaptation of the work is
an act restricted by the copyright in a literary, dramatic or musical work’.
The Act is quite specific in describing what qualifies as an adaptation.
For musical works it is an arrangement or transcription. For literary and
dramatic works it includes e.g. translations, conversions into non-dramatic
works and conveying action or story of a literary work into pictures (section 21 CDPA). Artistic works are not covered. But since section 21 further
provides that ‘No inference shall be drawn from this section as to what
does or does not amount to copying a work’, there seems ample room to
regard transformative uses of artistic works as acts of the copying rather
than adapting of substantial parts. It is indeed a criticism of UK courts
that they only consider what is taken rather than what is added, which
leaves little room for genres such as parody. There is only limited room to
protect parody, namely under the fair dealing provision for criticism and
review (Mendis & Kretschmer, 2013). The planned introduction of a parody
exception in the CDPA will remedy this.
France and Belgium
In the French copyright system, a division is made between two broad
categories of exploitation rights: the right to make the work public (le droit
de représentation) and to reproduce it (art. L 122-1 Code de la propriété
intellectuelle, CPI). The right of representation includes any form of communication to the public. The Act lists a few, including communication
by recitation, stage performance and (as a later addition) broadcasting.
Further instances have been elaborated by the courts, e.g. it also covers
the exhibition of (art) works (Lucas, 2012, p. 286–287). A reproduction is
any ‘fixation’ of a work in material form. What the minimally required
permanence should be was controversial (Lucas, 2012, p. 256–259), but the
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2001 Information Society Directive leaves no doubt it includes transient
copies (e.g. in cache, RAM).
French doctrine and courts developed the notion of a right of ‘destination’ to capture the copyright owner’s claim to control subsequent uses of
copies of a work, such as playing records in a club or broadcasting them
(Lucas 2012, pp. 259–277). This droit de destination then is wider than the
German notion of distribution right, and seems more akin to the Dutch
right to communicate to the public. Lucas criticises the French approach
and suggests the droit de destination be abandoned for a distribution right
German style, including an exhaustian rule (ibid.). Belgian copyright law
also retains the (implicit) notion of a destination right that was developed
as part of the old law’s broad reproduction right. To make matters more
confusing, since 2005 the Belgian copyright contains an explicit provision on the distribution right as harmonised by the Information Society
Directive (see F. Gotzen, 2012, p. 12–15). The exclusive right to authorise
reproductions also covers translations and other adaptations, says article 1
(1) Belgian Auteurswet.
Partial reproduction requires the author’s consent in both jurisdictions.
Examples from French caselaw include the copying of a few lines of a book
and the incorporation of an image in a film (Lucas, 2012, p. 300–302). An
exception to the reproduction right exists for parodies (art. L.122–5) and
quotations for among other things critical, educational or research purposes. A parody must be humoristic and not have the intention to harm
the economic or moral interests of the author of the targeted work (Mendis
& Kretschmer, 2013).
The copyright owner’s right to control the creation of translations and
adaptations are corrolary to the rights of reproduction and representation,
and thus not distinct. Only for computer programmes is this different due
to the harmonised EU rules (Lucas, 2012, p. 251, 303 ff).
The short overview of the rights of reproduction/copying, of adaptation
and the exemptions for parody and quotation given above make clear that
even within the harmonised landscape of the EU, adaptations are dealt
with differently. In Germany and the Netherlands, the assessment of free
adaptations not only considers what is taken from the source, but also what
is added. UK courts on the other hand tend to focus on what is taken and
thus seem more likely to find infringement. This takes us to the topic of
infringement analysis. How do courts go about establishing infringement,
and what are the particular challenges they face when they have to consider
source works that are not fixed and stable?
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Infringement analysis
Sanders (2006, p. 12) argues that the relationship between adaptation
and source text is ‘often viewed as linear and reductive; the appropriation is always in the secondary, belated position, and the discussion will
therefore always be, to a certain extent, about difference, lack or loss.’
For students of adaptation in film, literature and other arts it is better
‘to think in complex processes of filtration, and in terms of intertextual
fields of signifying fields, rather than simplistic one-way lines of influence
from source to adaptation (ibid., p. 24). These observations are interesting because they stand in sharp contrast to how lawyers approach this
relationship.
To lawyers, adaptations are not about what is lost, but about what is not
lost. Having to work with existing legal constructions, lawyers need to be
precise about identifying the ‘one-way lines of influence’. The predominant
view in law is that what matters is how much has been taken, not how much
has been added. As Stef van Gompel in this book elaborates: when courts are
called upon to decide whether a work is original, they tend to consider the
creative space that was available to the author in the case at hand. If such
space existed, the work is judged to be original. No particular comparison is
made with other creations to ascertain originality, the existence of creative
space suffices. If on the other hand courts are asked to judge whether a
work infringes, they will compare the later with one very specific earlier
work (Spoor, 2012, p. 207).
Any amount of direct copying will normally constitute infringement, for
example copying part of a text, or a few bars of a song. The lower treshold
is – according to the Court of Justice EU in Infopaq – where the material
presumably taken does not show the original expression by the author of
the source. With a low originality threshold, virtually any amount of literal
copying would infringe. The case is somewhat different in case of adaptations, i.e. if not the wording but themes, plot or characters are borrowed, or
when the alleged adaptation is in another medium or genre.
Some have taken the Court of Justice’s reasoning in Infopaq as saying
that copyright exists in snippets of text, that is: a snippet can be a work (I
have discussed the reception of Infopaq and later judgments extensively
elsewhere, see Van Eechoud 2012). Such a reading would allow copyright
owners to carve up their work in ever smaller units, with the result that
if such units were copied there would always be infringement. Laddie J.,
when confronted with such an attempt (before Infopaq) by a publisher
who argued various elements of a magazine cover were independent works
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judged that the cover could not be treated as a ‘millefeuilles’ with layers
of different copyrights (IPC Media Ltd v Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd).
In many ‘analogue’ cases there can be little doubt about what is the ‘unit’
of work, namely a focussed whole that the relevant public recognises as a
discrete entity.
Dutch courts increasingly apply an ‘overall similar impression’ test.
This test is in a sense a reverse test. The focus is not on first establishing what makes a work original and then looking for those elements in
the derivative work. Rather, the court compares the source and alleged
infringing work to determine how similar they are. If the impression is one
of overall similarity and difference on minor points only, the later work
is judged infringing. A major critique of this approach is that features of
the work that do not contribute to its original character – because they
are dictated by function, or style – should be ‘discounted’. They are not
protected thus copying them is free. If the courts are not dilligent in doing
this, the test favours plaintiffs. Initially the overall-impression test was
applied in cases involving industrial design, but increasingly it is also
used to decide cases on copying of e.g. TV formats and musical works
(Spoor, 2012, pp. 210–12).
The French courts approach to assessing infringement is to only consider
the taking of characteristic elements by which the (initial) author has personalised the theme/idea (Lucas, 2012, p. 309). Under Dutch copyright law,
the fact that only little is copied and much added is regarded as not relevant
for a finding of infringement (Spoor, 2012, pp. 208–209), although one might
speculate that in such cases the courts are more likely to moderate remedies
sought. Likewise, UK courts also stress that to find infringement what
matters is to what extent protected elements have been copied and not
how (dis)similar the works are (Griffiths, 2013).

Roads that might be taken
In this section I consider in a bit more detail what we might want copyright
law to do in light of the problems outlined above, and possible ways in which
change could be achieved, notably by looking to transplant certain national
solutions to the European level. For some questions solutions are relatively
easy to design within the current copyright system, even though achieving
reform might be a substantial political challenge. Others would require
more profound changes and as a first step will need to be researched more
in depth in a multi-disciplinary setting.
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Limits of the work concept
The recent line of cases by the Court of Justice of the EU has made clear
that the notion of ‘work’ is an autonomous concept of European law that
must be interpreted and applied in a uniform manner in all Member States
of the EU. As Stef van Gompel details in his contribution, the originality
test that the Court elaborated is that copyright protects the author’s own
intellectual creation, that is: the author must give the work a personal stamp
through the exercise of free and creative choices (Infopaq 2009, BSA 2011,
Football Association Premier League 2011, Painer 2011, Football Dataco 2012,
and SAS 2012). This focus on originality does not give us a comprehensive
definition of what a work is.
What are the boundaries of a ‘creation’? What def ines the domain of
intellectual creations that copyright covers in the first place? In Football
Dataco for example, the Court observed that football matches as such cannot be copyrighted because players must follow the rules of the game so
the requisite creative freedom is not present. By grasping at the straws of
creativity the court in my view dodged the more difficult questions of what
productions count as being in the ‘literary, artistic or scientific’ domain and
whether speech of any genre could be a ‘work’ (Van Eechoud, 2012).
As we have seen, the Berne Convention gives us examples of the kinds of
creations copyright protects, but not much guidance beyond. The domains
of art, literature and science are commonly understood in copyright to
be extremely broad and not (or no longer) tied to more limited meanings
they might have in everyday language. Some have argued the domain is
all things ‘cultural’ (Grosheide, 1986), or simply ‘information’ (Hugenholtz,
1989) but courts seem to stay away from pronouncing on the domain. In
the UK, the challenge for the courts was to fit new genres into one of the
work categories of the closed list of the Copyright act, which is why broader
domain questions probably did not arise. Anyway, for our purposes the
domain question is not the most problematic.
What is relevant is whether new forms of cultural production lead to
genres that can always be fitted into the work concept. Or must we recognise
more readily the limits of the work concept and not always seek to make
new genres fit through reasoning by analogy? For open-ended creations
I suggest just that. We might ask: Are open-ended ventures like Wikipedia
just enormous draft databases? Conceptually, the problem is not that the
first version created is not the ‘definitive’ one. After all, copyright laws have
long recognised that works need not be finished to be protected. No-one
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would deny the studies that the artists made for the Dutch King’s portrait
of state are works. The Computer Programme Directive states explicitly
that preparatory works are protected under copyright. If ‘drafts’ are denied
work status it is because the level of elaboration from idea(s) to expression
is too low, not because they are not the ‘finished’ work. The problem with
open-ended works is that they really are not like drafts – the notion itself
already implies that at some later stage there will be a finished work – but
a continuing work-in-progress.
We might more accurately conceive of open-ended ‘works’ as processes
or practices. What is interesting is that in (popular) music studies and
musicology the work concept – or to paraphrase Goehr, the objectified result
of a special creative activity that did not exist prior to compositional activity – has come under fundamental and prolonged attack. In her influential
book The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, Goehr (1992) unpacked the
specific historical, social and aesthetic conditions that gave rise to the work
concept in what we now categorise as classical musical works.6 She argues
it is neither necessary nor obvious to speak of classical music – let alone all
types of music – in terms of ‘works’, despite ‘the lack of ability we presently
seem to have to speak about music in any other way’ (ibid., p. 243).
Discussing the validity of the musical work concept in popular music,
Middleton (2000) argues that the focus in music copyright on the (written)
composition does not do justice to the process by which music is created.
Making music involves multiple creative contributors, who rely on common
stock models, tune families and riffs. A score is seldom used to transmit
pieces; rather this happens through oral/aural channels. The work concept,
it is argued, causes law to favour scored music over improvisation, melody
over harmony and rhythm, to give author-composers more power than
performers. It also throws up barriers to genres that rely on sampling.
To make a distinction between performance and composition is often
artificial. Similar criticisms are made by Horn (2000), Lacasse (2000) and
Théberge (1997).
Admittedly the idea of a work does not map onto all types of creative
practices equally well. Testing legal norms against creative practices should
be done more commonly, and the knowledge from disciplines outside law
can be immensely helpful. A problem with much of the criticism voiced in
humanities disciplines – be it music studies, literary studies, film studies or
another field – is that it only helps to deconstruct legal concepts. Replacing
them with a better alternative is another matter. What would it mean for
the law for instance, to treat music production (and consumption) or openended peer production as a practice, or process? What is the implication of
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resisting the urge to fit them into the work of authorship concept? Possibly
it means that rather than having the author-work relationship at its core, the
focus of law would be on regulating the information relationships involved
more directly: between contributors, editors, users, and competitors. For
some of these relationships we might look to special areas of law, notably
consumer law and unfair competition law. But I must admit I have trouble
conceiving of alternatives that still fulfil the primary function of copyright
today: safeguarding exploitation rights to foster creation. I have fewer
problems imagining how moral rights might be protected separate from
the notion of work (but that is material for another article).
Versioning
Distinct from the open-ended nature of internet-based peer production
projects is the frequent updating or versioning aspect, which characterises
many other internet-based content as well. Is a continuously refreshed
Facebook profile just a sequence of adaptations? Is the rapid versioning of
software merely a hugely accelerated type of publishing editions?
Versioning is by no means a recent phenomenon. Musicologists’ research
on the manuscripts Chopin prepared for publishers shows that he often
produced three different versions of the same composition for his German,
French and English publishers; he did not regard one as the authentic one
(Rink, 2012). In literature, Dickens and Arthur Conan Doyle are famous
examples of authors whose work was routinely published in serial form.
In broadcasting, the continuous, drawn-out narratives of radio soaps and
other long-form narratives were deployed to create a regular and faithful
audience (Hilmes, 2012, p. 279).
An important difference between old and new kinds of serialism is the
sheer volume (caused by open-endedness), the short interval between
versions and the fact that older versions are changed. In the case of the
radio-soap and publication in instalments, the later part adds to what came
before but is not meant to replace the earlier. There is no adaptation of
earlier instalments.
Kelty (2008) argues that different genres are affected differently by the
changing ways in which information is created, stored and distributed.
In his view music production has not changed much because even with
new composition and recording technologies, musicians largely mimic
previous practices. Much online publishing also recreates something that
looks like traditional print (e.g. e-book, magazines). But for open source
and other collaborative projects the change from editions to versioning
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and forking – ‘breaking away’ to continue a separate project based on the
same source materials – ‘raises troubling questions about the boundaries
and status of a copyright work’ (Kelty, 2008, p. 278).
A particular problem is caused by the dominant method lawyers apply to
establish infringement, which is as we have seen a one-to-one comparison
of works. Furthermore, whether updates or revisions qualify as a copyright
work themselves – because relative to the source an original contribution has been made – will depend on how frequent updates or edits are.
If updates are very frequent, changes are more likely to be minor and the
latest version as not original. Obviously, ‘saving up’ modifications over a
longer period (as is done in traditional book publishing) leads to a more
substantial change from one version to the next. Therefore each new version
is more likely to be protected as a separate work. Current copyright law
favours slow change over rapid change. It is obvious why this is so, but not so
obviously justifiable. Particularly when it comes to establishing authorship,
a contributor that makes frequent but small contributions is less likely to
be recognised as author than someone who ‘saves up’, for example. Also,
it becomes more difficult to establish the point in time at which the new
version is not just a copy but an adaptation protected in its own right. What,
in other words, is the cut-off point for determining originality?
How might copyright better recognise the incremental nature of new
forms of production? One possibility is that the one-to-one comparison of
the penultimate version (source work) and the latest version (derivative
work) to establish work status is replaced by comparison across a range of
editions. This might sound harder to do than it is. Version control is a key
feature of collaborative production platforms. All modifications can be
tracked and archived. In principle then, it should be possible to compare
versions and establishing which changes were made by whom over time.
Another possibility is to consider a more nuanced system of rights of
attribution, a system that reflects the social norms in communities rather
than the rather myopic view of authorship that traditionally characterises
copyright laws. Bently and Biron suggest just that in their contribution to
this book. But also beyond authorship status norms there might be more
that could be done to ensure copyright law supports modern forms of collaboration. Society has an interest in fostering collaborative continuous
creation of knowledge and tools, so has an interest in a legal system that
enables collaboration. The development of copyleft systems for the management of collaborations in a way shows that copyright seems to do this
quite well. The fact that rights can be licensed allowed copyleft models to
be developed. As the use of such collective licensing schemes continues to
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expand – from open source software to education, research and the arts – it
is time for lawyers and field experts to consider whether there are legal
norms need fine-tuning (or a radical overhaul for that matter) to safeguard
the continuity of copyleft systems of copyright management.
A reigned in reproduction right
Although as was noted above, the general opinion among scholars still
seems to be that the adaptation right is not harmonised, there are clear signs
that the reproduction right of article 2 Information Society Directive lends
itself to such broad interpretation that it usurps all types of copying, borrowing and reworking. Recall that the provision says that it is ‘the exclusive
right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part’ of a work
of authorship. The provision has no internal normative brake so to speak,
that prevents it from applying to uses of minor economic significance.
Especially if the reproduction right will be constructed as including the
adaptation right by the Court of Justice, its lack of normative meaning
is troubling. We have seen that in a number of countries (Netherlands,
Belgium, France) the right of adaptation is regarded as part of the exclusive
right of reproduction, whereas in other countries it is viewed as slightly
more separate (Germany, UK).
The reason why in the end adaptation and copying might be judged as
being essentially similar acts by the ECJ is best illustrated by the Advocate
General’s approach in the Painer case. The Advocate General’s opinion in
Painer implies that the reproduction right of article 2 Information Society
Directive does include the exclusive right to authorise adaptations. In Painer,
one of the questions (in the end not directly addressed by the Court) was
whether a photo-fit made on the basis of a simple portrait photo infringed
the copyright in the portrait photo. The Advocate General observes (para
129): ‘The publication of a photo-fit thus constitutes a reproduction of the
portrait photo used as a template only if the personal intellectual creation
which justifies the copyright protection of the photographic template is
still embodied in the photo-fit. In a case where the photo-fit was based on
a scan of the photographic template, this as a rule can be assumed.’ Clearly
the thinking here is that reproduction covers both direct copying and
transformative ‘copying’. In Infopaq, the first case on article 2 Information
Society Directive, the court had ruled that the reproduction right protects
against the copying of parts of a text (potentially even parts of sentences in
the text in question) if such parts ‘convey[ing] to the reader the originality of
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a publication such as a newspaper article, by communicating to that reader
an element which is, in itself, the expression of the intellectual creation of
the author of that article.’ In Infopaq the dispute was about the taking of
11-word long snippets of newspaper articles. The copying was literal.
If the test for infringement of both the reproduction right and the adaptation right is: were characteristic elements of the source taken, then it seems
to make sense to view the reproduction right as overarching. However, this
leaves no room in the infringement analysis to have regard for what has
been added in the adaptation. In my view, if the adaptation in its overall
impression is so different from the source(s) that the source works only play
a minor part in the whole, the adaptation should be a free use.
We have seen above that the German concept of ‘Freie Benutzung’ allows
transformative uses but the test is also quite strict. If original elements
of the source work are recognisable, the derived work must have a great
distance in terms of genre and purpose in order to be free (e.g. a parody).
The test I suggest is less strict. It is more akin to the free adaptation Lionel
Bently (2011) proposes, namely ‘where as a result of the adaptation or arrangement, a new work with a substantially different meaning, or of a
significantly different genre, is thereby created.’ Perhaps combined with the
added test that the exploitation of the new work does not significantly harm
the commercial interests of the original creator or copyright owner, this
seems a good alternative. One thorny question is how such a free adaptive
use limitation plays out in entertainment industries where trans-media
storytelling is an increasingly important business model. The strategy is
to take intellectual properties (such as comic characters, or a story, a toy)
to multiple markets, rather than bringing a work developed for one market
(say fiction books) to another market once it is successful. Examples are
toymaker Mattel (Bulik, 2010) and comic publisher Marvel’s ventures in
filmed entertainment (Johnson, 2006). Obviously, the more trans media
a company is, the less room there would be for free transformative use.
Limitations
The continued expansion of the exploitation rights of authors in European
law has not been accompanied by equally robust claims to fair uses. The call
for a stronger and more flexible system of limitations has become louder
over recent years (Van Eechoud et al., 2009, Geiger et al, 2010, Guibault, 2010,
Senftleben, 2012). In terms of feasibility, it is much more likely that more
room for ‘borrowing’ will be effectuated through broader limitations, rather
than through a narrower right of reproduction. Law professors united in
the European Copyright Society have called for making limitations manda-
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tory and more flexible, by giving courts the ability to develop tailor-made
solutions (European Copyright Society, 2014).
In the field of limitations and exceptions, the introduction of a defence
for user generated content might go some way to accommodate the by
now common practice of individuals to create their own text, video and
music through remixing and adapting existing works. It stands to reason
that the limitation would only apply for non-commercial uses and only if
there has been a substantial adaptation of the source works. Otherwise
user generated content could compete with the source work. Legal scholarship could benefit from media studies to get a fuller understanding of the
role user generated content plays in entertainment industry commercial
strategies because the dynamics are largely unknown to students of the
law. Scolari (2013) for example analysed UGC surrounding the successful
TV-series ‘Lost’. He found boundaries between commercial industry and
non-commercial user generated content to be porous; some UGC can be
acquired and elaborated by industry.
The limitations for parody and pastiche and on quotation are other
obvious candidates that can be propped up so as to enable more liberal
transformative uses. The European Court of Justice could take a broad
reading of the exception for parody of article 5(3)(k) Information Society
Directive, which leaves Member States the freedom to allow free ‘use for
the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche’. National courts so far have
tended to demand that the parody or pastiche target the source work. But
as Dyer argues in his in-depth examination of pastiche, it is an artistic
imitation of other art, not necessarily of one particular work of art, and
not necessarily critical (Dyer, 2007, p. 2, 157). Erlend Lavik observes in his
contribution to this book: ‘Courts should be open to the possibility that
a range of cultural appropriations – including parody and pastiche – can
be transformative and culturally and artistically valuable. This is where
aesthetics can be of service. It can help fill the concept of transformative
use with meaningful content.’ Likewise, Julie Sanders invites us to bring
(literary) adaptation and appropriation ‘out of the shadows’, not to view
them as merely ‘belated practices and processes; they are creative and influential in their own right. And they acknowledge something fundamental
about literature: that its impulse is to spark related thoughts, responses and
readings’ (Sanders, 2006, p. 160).
Lastly, there is the exception ‘for incidental inclusion of a work or other
subject-matter in other material’ (art. 5(3) sub i Information Society Directive) that might be expanded. How likely the Court of Justice is to take the
lead is uncertain however, since it has repeatedly stated that the exceptions
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laid down in article 5 Information Society Directive are to be given a narrow
interpretation.
There are we have seen, several potential routes. Some can be taken by
courts; others would need to be taken by the EU legislator. Whatever the
route to be taken, a less all-encompassing right to control copying and
adaptation is called for, if the law is to keep at least remotely in step with
today’s practices of cultural production.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

For my purposes, I shall not go into the details of the US fair use defense.
The Cariou v. Prince case has drawn much attention among copyright
scholars and in art circles because the district court gave a narrow reading
of fair use. It held that no defense is available if the secondary work does
not somehow comment on the source work, its author or popular culture.
The appeals court ruled that the law does not require such comment. The
four factors that must be considered when assessing whether a use infringes
or is fair are (1) the purpose and character of the use (including commercial nature); (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work (Section 107, 17 U.S.C.).
Dumas gave the interview in Dutch. She said: ‘Plagiaat is mijns inziens een
literaire term. Een tekst kun je letterlijk overnemen, het blijft in hetzelfde
medium, maar mijn schilderij is opgebouwd uit verfstrepen, het is zo’n
ander “ding”. Dat zie je het beste als je een detail van het schilderij laat zien
naast een detail van de foto. Dan verschijnen de verschillen in plaats van de
overeenkomsten. Het zijn twee werelden.’ Vrij Nederland, 13 February 2014.
At the international level, the protection of computer programmes and
databases was secured through the TRIPs Agreement (1992) and the WIPO
Copyright Treaty (1996), which essentially oblige contracting states to them
as literary works and collections within the meaning of the Berne Convention.
Openstax (formerly: Connexions) is an example of an online collaborative
system designed to promote the sharing and reuse of educational content:
teachers/authors can contribute ‘pages’ (learning modules) that can be
adapted and combined into collections (text books, readers). Content is
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license, making it freely reusable on condition that the author(s) are credited. See http://cnx.org/.
The German Copyright lists exceptions to this rule that the creation of an
adaptation does not require permission, but only its subsequent communication or trade (art. 23 UrhG), e.g. turning a work into a film does require
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prior authorisation, as does executing a work or art (after a plan), or copying a work of architecture through building, or adapating a database (as the
EU Database directive imposes such a rule).
Looking to the historic development of UK music copyright and the influence some scholars attribute to Romanticism on notions of work, Barron
(2006) concludes that changes in thinking about property, notably the
inclusion of intangibles is what caused the musical work concept (as scorebased) to develop. The rise of a ‘middle class’ with an appetite for buying
sheet music is the more likely cause. About the difficulty of establising
causal links between Romantic ideas in the arts and the development of
legal concepts, see Erlend Lavik’s contribution to this volume.

References
Books and articles
Barron, A. 2006. ‘Copyright Law’s Musical Work’, 15 Social & Legal Studies 101–27.
Bently, L. 2011. Exploring the Flexibilities Available to UK Law. Submission to call for evidence,
independent review of intellectual property and growth’. London: IPO 2011. Available at:
<http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview.htm>.
Berdou, Evangelia, 2010. Organization in Open Source Communities: At the Crossroads of the Gift
and Market Economies. London: Routledge.
Boucher, Brian, 2014. ‘Landmark Copyright Lawsuit Cariou v. Prince is Settled’, ArtinAmerica
Magazine 14 March 2014. Available at: <http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/newsfeatures/news/landmark-copyright-lawsuit-cariou-v-prince-is-settled/>.
Bulik, Beth Snyder, 2010. ‘Mattel’s got a monster holiday hit, but will franchise have staying
power?’ Advertising Age, Vol. 81, Issue 43.
Burdick, Anne, Peter Lunenfeld, Johanna Drucker, Todd Presner and Jeffrey Schnapp, 2012.
Digital_humanities. Cambridge: MIT press.
Cohen, M., 2014. ‘Foto’s schilderen: plagiaat of “fair use”?’ Vrij Nederland, 13 February 2014.
Available at: <http://www.vn.nl/Archief/Media/Artikel-Media/Fotos-schilderen-plagiaatof-fair-use.htm>.
Dyer, Richard, 2007. Pastiche. London/New York: Routledge.
European Copyright Society, 2014. European Copyright Society Answer to the EC
Consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules. Available at: <http://www.ivir.nl/nieuws/
ECS_EC_consultation_copyright.pdf>.
Fischman Afori, O., 2007. ‘Copyright Infringement without Copying - Reflections on the Theberge
Case. 39 Ottawa L. Rev. 23 (2007-2008).
Geiger, C., Hilty, R, J. Griffiths, & U. Suthersanen, 2010. ‘Declaration A Balanced Interpretation
Of The “Three-Step Test” In Copyright Law’. JIPITEC, 1 (2) 2010. Available at: <https://www.
jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-2-2010/2614> (urn:nbn:de:0009-29-26212).
Ginsburg, Jane C., 2006. ‘Une Chose Publique: The Author’s Domain and the Public Domain in
Early British, French and US Copyright Law’. 65 Cambridge L.J. 636.
Goehr, Lydia, 1992. The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works : An Essay in the Philosophy of Music.
London: Clarendon Press.

Adapting the work

171

Gordon, Kim (2012). ‘Band Paintings: Kim Gordon Interviews Richard Prince.’ Interview Magazine
21 June 2012. Available at: <http://www.interviewmagazine.com/art/kim-gordon-richardprince>.
Gotzen, F., 2012. ‘Basisbegrippen’. In: Brison, Fabienne, Hendrik Vanhees, De Belgische auteurs
wet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar (Hommage à Jan Corbet). Larcier, Brussels.
Griffiths, J., 2013. ‘Dematerialization, Pragmatism and the European Copyright Revolution’.
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 767–790. doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt017
Grosheide, F.W., 1986. Auteursrecht op maat. Deventer: Kluwer.
Guibault, Lucie, 2010. ‘Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to Harmonisation: The Case of the
Limitations on Copyright under Directive 2001/29/EC.’ JIPITEC 1 (2) 2010. Available at: <http://
www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-2-2010/2603> (urn:nbn:de:0009-29-26036).
Hemmungs Wirtén, Eva, 2011. Cosmopolitan Copyright. Law and Language in the Translation
Zone. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet.
Hilmes, Michele, Horace Newcomb, and Eileen Meehan, 2012. ‘Legacies From the Past
Histories of Television’. Journal of Communication Inquiry 36, no. 4, pp. 276–87.
doi:10.1177/0196859912459749.
Horn, David, 2000. ‘Some Thoughts on the Work in Popular Music.’ In: Talbot, Michael, The
Musical Work: Reality Or Invention? Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Hugenholtz, P.B., 1989. Auteursrecht op informatie. Deventer: Kluwer.
Hugenholtz, P.B. and Senftleben, M., 2011. Fair use in Europe. In search of flexibilities (report).
University of Amsterdam / Free University Amsterdam.
Mendis, Dinusha and Martin Kretschmer, 2013. The Treatment of Parodies under Copyright
Law in Seven Jurisdictions A Comparative Review of the Underlying Principles. IPO report
2013/23. London: IPO
Johnson, Derek, 2012. ‘Cinematic Destiny: Marvel Studios and the Trade Stories of Industrial
Convergence’. Cinema Journal Volume 52, Number 1, Fall 2012.
Kelty, C.M., 2008. Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software. Durham [etc.]: Duke
University Press.
Lacasse, Serge, 2000. ‘Intertextuality and Hypertextuality in Recorded Popular Music.’ In:
Talbot, Michael. The Musical Work: Reality Or Invention? Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press.
Lessig, Lawrence, 2002. The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. New
York: Vintage.
Lessig, Lawrence, 2008. Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy. New
York: Penguin Press.
Loewenheim, U., 2010. In: Schricker, G., and Dietz, A., Urheberrecht: Kommentar. Munich: Beck.
Lucas, A. et al., 2012. Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique. Paris: Litec.
Middleton, Richard, 2000. ‘Work-in(g)-Practice. Configurations of the popular music intertext’.
In: Talbot, Michael, The Musical Work: Reality Or Invention? Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press.
Mondriaanfonds. ‘Afspraak Van Dongen, Breukel en Mondriaan Fonds.’ 14 February 2014. Available at: <http://www.mondriaanfonds.nl/Nieuws/item/Afspraak_vanDongen_Breukel/>.
Reagle, Joseph, 2010. Good Faith Collaboration: The Culture of Wikipedia. Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press.
Ribbens, Arjen, 2014. ‘Fotograaf: Kunstenares pleegt plagiaat met statieportret’, NRC 20 January
2014.
Ricketson, S. & Ginsburg, J., 2005. International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne
Convention and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

172 

Mireille van Eechoud

Rink, John, 2012. ‘The distinction between “work” and “performance” in music history and
theory’. Presentation given at HERA workshop Authorship Dynamics and the Dynamic
Work. University of Cambridge, 15 December. See <http://www.ocve.org.uk> for the Online
Chopin Variorum Edition.
Sanders, Julie, 2006. Adaptation and appropriation. London and New York: Routledge.
Schricker, G., Loewenheim, U. and Dietz, A., 2010. Urheberrecht: Kommentar. Munich: Beck.
Scolari, Carlos A., 2013. ‘Lostology: Transmedia storytelling and expansion/compression strategies’. Semiotica. Issue 195, pp. 45–68.
Smoschewer, Fritz, 1926. ‘The Law of Moving Pictures in Germany’. 8 J. Comp. Legis. & Int’l L. 3d
ser. 250 (1926), pp. 250–254.
Senftleben Martin, 2010. ‘The International Three-Step Test. A Model Provision for EC Fair
Use Legislation’. JIPITEC, 1 (2) 2010. Available at: <https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-2-2010/2605 > (urn:nbn:de:0009-29-26057).
Senftleben Martin, 2012. ‘Quotations, Parody and Fair Use’. In: P.B. Hugenholtz, A.A. Quaedvlieg
and D.J.G. Visser (eds), A Century of Dutch Copyright Law: Auteurswet 1912-2012. Amsterdam:
Delex.
Sewell, David, 2009. ‘It’s For Sale, So It Must Be Finished: Digital Projects in the Scholarly
Publishing World.’ Digital Humanities Quarterly 003, no. 2.
Spoor, Jaap, 2012. ‘Verveelvoudigen: Reproduction and Adaptation under the 1912 Copyright
Act’. In: P.B. Hugenholtz, A.A. Quaedvlieg and D.J.G. Visser, eds. 2012. A Century of Dutch
Copyright Law: Auteurswet 1912-2012. Amsterdam: Delex.
Théberge, Paul, 1997. Any Sound You Can Imagine: Making Music / Consuming Technology.
Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press.
Van Eechoud, Mireille, 2012. ‘Along the Road to Uniformity - Diverse Readings of the Court of
Justice Judgments on Copyright Work’, JIPITEC, 3(1), p. 60-80.
Van Eechoud, M.M.M., S.J. van Gompel, L. Guibault, B. van der Sloot and P.B. Hugenholtz,
2011. Report of the Netherlands for ALAI 2011 Study Days (Dublin). Available at: <http://www.
alaidublin2011.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Netherlands.pdf>
Van Eechoud, M.M.M., P.B. Hugenholtz, S.J. van Gompel, L. Guibault and N. Helberger, 2009.
Harmonizing European copyright law: the challenges of better lawmaking. Alphen aan den
Rijn: Kluwer Law International.
Walter, M. and Von Lewinski, S., 2010. European copyright law: A commentary. Oxford: OUP.

Legislation
Auteurswet (Dutch copyright act)
Code de la propriété intellectuelle, Loi no 92-597 du 1er juillet 1992 (French copyright act).
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK copyright act)
Wet betreffende het auteursrecht en de naburige rechten, 30 June 1994 (Belgian copyright act).

Adapting the work

173

Cases
EU
Case C-393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] ECR I-13971.
Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH (CJEU, Third Chamber, 1 December
2011).
Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v Karen Murphy
(CJEU, Grand Chamber, 4 October 2011).
Case C-604/10 Football Dataco & others v Yahoo! UK & others (CJEU, Third Chamber, 1 March 2012).
Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECR I-6569.
Case C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd. (CJEU, Grand Chamber, 2 May 2012).

National cases
Astérix. BGH 11 March 1993 (Astérix Alcolix), case I ZR 263/91, BGHZ 122,53.
IPC Media Ltd v Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd [2005] FSR 20, [23].
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
Perlentaucher. Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) 1 December 2010, case I ZR 12/08,
Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 2011, 151.
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).

Reassessing the challenge of the digital
An empirical perspective on authorship and copyright
Elena Cooper
Policymakers have long noted the challenges posed by new internet and
digital technologies to copyright’s category of authorship. As the European
Commission expressed at the advent of the internet, in its Green Paper
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society of 1995:
The traditional picture of the author as a craftsman working more or less
in isolation and using wholly original materials is contradicted by new
forms of creation. The new products and services are increasingly the
outcome of a process in which a great many people have taken part – their
individual contributions often difficult to identify – and in which several
different techniques have been used […] (European Commission, 1995,
p. 25).

The perception that creative practices of the digital age often involve the
contributions of many people is thought to complicate the task of identifying the author.1 In addition, scholars noted how digital technology, in
facilitating collaboration, was ‘hastening … the demise of the illusion that
writing is solitary and originary’ (Woodmansee, 1994, p. 25). As Martha
Woodmansee expressed, this was a development that sat uneasily with a
proprietary notion of authorship:
Electronic communication seems to be assaulting the distinction between
mine and thine that the modern authorship construct was designed to
enforce (1994, p. 26). 2

This chapter3 explores these perceived challenges of the digital for copyright,
through ideas about authorship that underpin so-called creative practices
today. It does so through a qualitative empirical study that involved semistructured interviews with ‘artists’ and ‘poets’ who use digital technology.4
The interviews sought to uncover the extent to which the participation
of many people was characteristic of the interviewees’ work and their
views about ‘authorship’. For example, is authorship of any significance to
interviewee ‘artists’ and ‘poets’? If so, who do they consider to be the author?
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In situations where many have contributed, how and why do they attribute
authorship to some contributors while denying it to others? Finally, why is
authorship important to the interviewees, if at all, and does this bear any
relation to copyright’s proprietary author?
The interviewees were those listed as ‘notable individuals’ on Wikipedia
entries for ‘Digital Art’ and ‘Digital Poetry’ accessed in May 2011.5 No claim
is made that the interviewees are representative of all ‘creative’ practices
involving digital technology. Notwithstanding this, I will argue that the
interviews provide a basis for questioning the common assumptions noted
above, thereby facilitating a more nuanced understanding of the implications of the digital.
By way of introduction, over the past decades practices involving digital
technology have been characterised by what interviewee Joseph Nechvatal
termed to be an interdisciplinary ‘conversation’ between ‘computer science’
and ‘art’, the result of which is that the parameters of ‘artistic practice’
changed and gave way to a ‘third culture’: ‘… these two fields are rubbing
up against each other and they used to be thought of as … discrete and
separate activities and now there is a kind of third culture that is emerging
out of the combination of these two areas of interest’.
In this context, Nechvatal observed that ‘it’s been a growing thing for
creative artists to have computer science at [their] disposal and collaboration’. In the early years of computer technology, such work was inherently
collaborative, involving multiple contributors each with different areas
of expertise. The pioneers of such work in the 1960s and 1970s, such as
Lillian Schwartz at Bell Labs,6 David Em at Jet Propulsion Labs7 and Herbert
Franke,8 all entered a highly technical environment in order both to obtain
access to technology that was not readily available, as well as to come
into contact with ‘scientists’ who knew how it worked. By contrast, today,
technology has become ubiquitous, with the result that in many instances,
work that was formerly collaborative has now become solitary. Today, David
Em is able to work alone from his studio or garden at home. As he explained,
technology is so easily accessible that ‘I don’t need all those programmers
and I don’t need a big facility’.
Further, in certain spheres, the favoured approach is for solitary work,
rather than collaboration. Loss Pequeño Glazier is director of the Electronic
Poetry Center, the world’s largest collection of electronic poetry which was
founded in 1994,9 as well as being the first ‘digital poet’ to hold an academic
chair (recently awarded by the University of Buffalo, USA). Glazier questions
whether the involvement of many in producing a work of ‘digital poetry’
(or to use his term, ‘digital poesis’) can work, as it can, for example, in the
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case of film, as the process of creation or ‘poesis’ requires involvement in
all levels of the digital poem, from the computer coding, to the words and
images. In Glazier’s view, these are therefore best composed by one person
working alone.
Notwithstanding these movements towards solitary working practices,
the interviews revealed a number of instances where current practices using
digital technology give rise to the involvement of many people. These are
explored in this chapter in five detailed case studies.
First, there continue to be instances where ‘artists’ enter a highly technical environment, in order to gain access to powerful technology that
is not generally accessible. An example of such a practice is explored in
Case Study 1, which concerns the collaborative work of ‘artist’ Donna Cox
and the interdisciplinary team at the National Center for Supercomputing
Applications, Illinois, USA, who produce what she terms ‘visualisations’ of
scientific data. Inspired by the philosophy of the Renaissance, which saw
a convergence in the goals of science and art, Cox articulates a concept of
co-authorship which encompasses the contributions of all members of the
team: as she described, both those with authority over ‘artistic decisions’
(for example, ‘colour or timing or viewpoint’) and those responsible for the
‘computer science’ and ‘formatting’ of the data.
Even beyond the environment of the so-called ‘supercomputers’ there
are other frameworks in which the interdisciplinary nature of the venture
results in the collaboration between specialists in different disciplines.
Case Study 2 concerns the work of ‘artist’ Joseph Nechvatal at Louis Pasteur Atelier, France who has worked with computer programmers so as
to develop applications of computer virus algorithms, as a metaphor for
biological virus attacks on cells. Nechvatal characterised such work as ‘an
equalised exchange’ between ‘art’ and ‘computer science’: a ‘collaborative
union’. Yet, when it comes to determining authorship of the resulting work,
this rests with Nechvatal alone because, as he explained, he is the ‘project
director’ who has ‘control’ over the ‘aesthetic demands’ (which he sees as the
emotional effects of colour and form). In contrast to the views articulated
by Cox, therefore, in this context, the computer scientist is termed a ‘technician’, not an author.
In Case Study 3, we turn to an example of a so-called ‘digital art collective’: the OpenEndedGroup based in New York, USA. The collective brings
together the three Group members, along with external participants,
described as ‘collaborators’, ‘consultants’ and ‘contributors’, with expertise
in a variety of different areas such as computer programming, art, film
and dance choreography. The Group organise these participants in what
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they consider to be a ‘strict’ ‘taxonomy of collaboration’, so as to restrict
involvement in ‘artistic decisions’, the latter determining who are credited
as the ‘artists’ of the piece. While attribution as ‘artists’ is important, the
interview revealed that the Group feel uncomfortable with any notion of
authorship tied to ‘creation’. As Group member Marc Downie expressed, in
part due to the role of technology as ‘collaborator’, the Group see themselves
as engaging in a process of ‘discovery’, over which they never have complete
‘control’, a position that contrasts, in particular, to aspects of that taken by
Joseph Nechvatal (in Case Study 2).
Another practice giving rise to the participation of many arises in the
work of those who engage in what is sometimes called ‘the art of not making’: the ‘artist’ takes on the mantle of ‘art director’ and delegates some or
all of the skilled tasks, including computer programming and other digital
technological tasks, to others.10 This is a process of delegation, rather than
an ‘equalised exchange’ (as Joseph Nechvatal’s described his approach in
Case Study 2). Case Study 4 looks at two examples of such works by ‘artists’ who delegate tasks to different degrees. First, we consider the talking
animatronic sculpture installations produced by New York based ‘artist’
Ken Feingold, which employ artificial intelligence technology and digital
synthetic voices. Feingold delegates specific tasks, for example, the making
of the animatronic heads or the computer programming. This is in contrast
to the broader delegation of tasks by Greek website ‘artist’ Miltos Manetas,
in the second example that we consider which Manetas presents as ‘collaborative’ work: www.jesusswimming.com. In both cases, the interviewees
drew analogies with the position of the director of a film, to support their
claim to sole authorship. This is a standpoint which contrasts with that
taken by Cox, in Case Study 1.
Finally, Case Study 5 looks at the active role of the audience or user, in
interactive digital works. Tracing the early history of interactive works in
the pioneering laser-disc work called Lorna by California based ‘artist’
Lynn Hershman Leeson, the case study turns to consider an example of an
interactive poem by Loss Pequeño Glazier, as well as the huge interactive
installations produced by Don Ritter, a Canadian ‘artist’ based in South
Korea. There was a general consensus amongst interviewees that the
audience’s participation did not amount to authorship and we look at the
justifications for this position.
As is apparent from this overview, the interviews revealed a diverse set
of practices, and consequently a diverse set of ideas about authorship. Accordingly, this contribution resists simplistic conclusions about what these
ideas should mean for law. Instead the final concluding section makes more
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general observations. In addition to addressing how the interviews might
refine our perceptions of the challenge of the digital, this chapter draws
out some unexpected results: while there was no evidence of any influence
of copyright law in informing the techniques which interviewees used to
identify the author(s), law did appear to underpin a number of interviewees’
understandings of authorship as proprietary. Therefore, one conclusion is
that far from always a challenge, law sometimes in fact supports or even
informs certain aspects of the interviewees’ ideas about authorship.

Case Study One: Donna Cox of The National Center for
Supercomputing Applications, Illinois
The National Center for Supercomputing Applications (or NCSA) at the
University of Illinois was established in 1986 as part of a national program
aimed at providing powerful and high performance computing facilities to
researchers of science and engineering. Supported by the state of Illinois, in
addition to federal grants, the NCSA has developed a worldwide reputation
in ‘scientific visualisation’. Using the computer facilities and expertise at
the NCSA, simulations are made of complex natural phenomena, such as
how galaxies collide and merge, how molecules move through a cell wall,
and how tornadoes and hurricanes form.
Donna Cox11 is the Director of the NCSA’s ‘Advanced Visualisation Laboratory’. She works as part of a team comprising ‘artists’, ‘technologists’ (such
as computer scientists) and ‘scientists’, who work together to transform
scientific data into graphic visualisations such as computer animations
called ‘visaphors’. Cox refers to the team as a ‘Renaissance team’, so drawing
a parallel with the convergence of the goals of science and art in the time of
Leonardo Da Vinci. Asked about this analogy, Cox explained that drawings
by Da Vinci, while ‘amazingly beautiful’ were also visual representations
of scientific information about anatomy or botany: a ‘mirror of nature’. In
a similar vein, the ‘visaphors’ produced by Cox’s Renaissance team today
are seen as ‘digital visual metaphors’ of scientific data. Yet, as Cox explains,
as with Da Vinci, there is also ‘an art … in how we turn these numbers into
pictures’. More than ‘just a translation or representation of data’, the creation
of a ‘visaphor’ involves ‘interpretation and design’ and ‘art choices’.
For example, the team produced a ‘scientific visualisation’ of hurricane
Katrina, which caused devastation in Louisiana in 2005. The team comprised ‘artist’ Cox, ‘cinematographer’ Bob Pattison, as well as ‘computer
scientist’ Stuart Levy. The project began by the team visiting external
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scientists at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, Colorado, to
obtain scientific data concerning the hurricane, recorded in numerical
form. The initial meeting with the external scientists was an important
one: ‘We as visualisation artists needed to understand more completely
about what was important about the numbers … the question that we asked,
was what is the most important feature in this current hurricane of the
data that we can help to show with the data, that tells the public why this
hurricane became so deadly.’ The team’s goal, therefore, was to produce a
visualisation of the data, to capture the scientific processes that cause the
‘enormous power engine of the oceans to build up’: ‘as the planet warms,
the oceans heat and it feeds this enormous hurricane…’
In producing the ‘visualisation’, the members of the team were ‘all playing
kind of distinctive roles’, reflecting their particular expertise in computer
science, cinematography and art. For example, Stuart Levy’s role was to
‘handle’ the data; it was obtained from the Colorado scientists in numerical
form and it needed to be formatted so it could be used by the team. Bob
Patterson, as ‘cinematographer’, oversaw ‘the settings on a lot of the shots’.
Cox’s specialism was the use of colour, for example, in suggesting that the
piece shows ‘the sun rising and setting and the moon rising and setting and
the stars to give the timeline of the life span of this hurricane’.
The result of these different areas of specialism is that ‘artistic decisions’
were generally seen as in the domain of Cox and Patterson, rather than Levy:
So, you have the person who deals primarily with the data, he does some
graphics but leaves all the artistic decisions up to us – Bob and I. And Bob
and I will get into struggles sometimes over colour or timing or viewpoint
but we work it out and usually results in a compromise on something
that satisfies both of us.

Despite the greater authority of Cox and Patterson in ‘artistic’ matters,
decisions are seen as made by the team collectively. Cox described this
process as a ‘negotiation’ between all team members. For example, there
was much discussion over how to present the ‘hot towers which feed the
hurricane’, the source of its deadly consequences: ‘There are different ways
of representing hot towers. We had choices … We had different types of
software that can represent the data. We had lots of dials. We can turn these
dials to make some of these clouds brighter or they can just be outlines
instead of dense fog … all of those are negotiations …’
The result of the negotiations was a ‘compromise’ that satisfied all team
members, in the light of the overall goal: to produce something which is
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‘jaw droppingly beautiful’ while also ‘informative’ in ‘[communicating]
something essential about the science’. As the aim was clear, Cox considered
that reaching a compromise was not difficult: ‘we definitely are willing to
compromise’. Facilitating this are team dynamics of ‘mutual respect’ and
‘really listening’ to each other. As Cox explained:
You know … whatever we are producing together, we want it to be the
best and sometimes that means that your first ideas might not be that
great anyway, and you see how it might play out in another way, and you
just sit back and say “well that other way does look better” … or “I’ll give
you this if I can have this”. That kind of negotiation … but the ultimate
goal for the team is that it looks good and it represents the data well, and
accurately […]

The model of the ‘Renaissance team’, which operates today at the NCSA,
stems from collaborative work dating back to the late 1980s. For example, in
1988, Cox collaborated with Professor of Mathematics George Francis, and
a computer scientist, in producing computer graphics software that would
create images visualising Francis’ mathematical theories. As Cox explained,
the basic principles for successful ‘Renaissance teams’ were formulated at
this time. Cox published widely on this subject in the 1980s and 1990s, and
she considers that those principles have continued to underpin ‘Renaissance
teams’ from that time to today.
One of the most important prerequisites for a ‘successful team’ is that
it ‘has to be egalitarian’, that is all members of the team must be ‘equal
players’. The consequences of this ‘egalitarian’ framework for ‘authorship’
are that all of the team members are considered ‘co-authors’ of the resulting
‘visualisation’. This conclusion flows from the characterisation of the team
‘as a unit’, comprising ‘in and of itself … the collection of very unique guilds’
such as ‘artists, film makers, software writers’. As Cox accepted during the
interview, this is a concept of authorship which appears closer to Arts and
Crafts ideas which circulated in the 1890s, involving recognition for every
contribution, as opposed to the single author model of authorship implicit
in, for example, some interpretations of the Auteur approach to film. As
she explained:
[…] what I don’t like and I have a real prejudice against, is when I see
artists, so single artists, who can pull together teams and take the sole
credit, and sometimes the team is not even listed on the work. I have
always been against that director “Auteur” approach. … The authorship
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has to be shared in these larger collaborations. It is a kind of plagiarism
when an artist will say: “I have ‘hired’ that programmer to do this work,
I conceptualised it, I could have hired another programmer to do the
work”. I just take issue with that. The best work comes when you recognise
that team […]

Later in the same interview, Cox returned to this point:
[…] Artists … finally say “right, I’m going to work with technology” and
they want to keep the technologists like technicians, and they want to
retain that ownership, but for me and my early career, what I recognised
early on … that through the collaborative process the outcome would be
so much better than what I could do by myself […]

In this way, as Cox explains: ‘… the group shares authorship because the final
artefact could not have come into being without the collective partnership
and the collective authorship of working together and making the final set
of sequences or digital images.’ And, later in the same interview: ‘I consider
now the very sophisticated work that we do as a group of professionals that
we are all co-authors because it simply could not have come about otherwise
… the final artefact was so totally dependent on that collaboration that
I don’t think you could separate them out …’
This notion of ‘collective’ authorship, including ‘computer scientist’
members of the team, in addition to those with authority over ‘artistic
decisions’ (Cox and Patterson), stems from the ‘Renaissance’ inspired
view of the work as a ‘mirror of nature’, encompassing both scientific and
artistic aspects. As Cox agreed in interview, this is a concept of authorship
conducive to capturing collaboration between practitioners of ‘art’ and
‘science’, in contrast, for example, to the Romantic concept of the author
as a ‘lamp’,12 which in privileging contributions of ‘personal expression’ or
‘creation’, might confer authorship status only on Cox and Pattison, and
deny it to the ‘computer scientist’ members of the team, for example, Levy.
While Cox considers all members of the team to be co-authors of the
‘visualisation’, the ‘creators of the data’ that the team uses are not co-authors
of the visualisation, because their ‘intent’ in creating the data was ‘to do
research on that data’. This is in contrast to the ‘final intent of the final
creator’, who is using that data as ‘part of an art work … [who] does so for
a very different audience and very different purpose’.
The concepts which the ‘Renaissance team’ employ to determine authorship of the ‘scientific visualisation’ seem to be uninfluenced by copyright
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doctrine. First, Cox’s ‘Renaissance’ or ‘mirror of nature’ approach, which
accords parity between contributions of artists and scientists, provides a
different emphasis to tests of co-authorship in US copyright law.13 Secondly,
where convergence exists with the test of co-authorship in US law, this
appears to be coincidental. For example, Cox’s test of authorship based on
‘intent’ might, at a first glance, appear to converge with the US legal test
of co-authorship, which following the Second Federal Circuit decision in
Childress v. Taylor (1991) requires that the contributors intended to regard
themselves as joint authors (which also involves the court considering a
number of ‘objective indicia’ of intention, such as whether the contributors
were billed as co-authors). However, this was a commonality with the law of
which Cox was unaware.14 Instead, she explained that her notion of authorship based on ‘intention’ came from her studies of art history, particularly
conceptual art. Here Cox drew on the practices of the American artist
Robert Rauschenberg (1925–2008), who came to prominence in the 1950s
for his collages of ‘found objects’. Just as Rauschenberg would ‘walk around
the streets of New York and find objects and include them in a final original
work’ so scientific data is an object which the artist uses; ‘the authorship
is about the invention of this new sum of the parts that becomes a new
kind of thing’.
Notwithstanding the independence of the team’s concept of authorship
from that contained in law, the consequences of the status of authorship
are firmly tied to copyright law. This stems from changes in the channels
of distribution of ‘scientific visualisations’ since the mid-1990s. By way of
background, in the 1980s, ‘Renaissance teams’ operated outside the commercial environment. As Cox explained:
These early Renaissance teams … were not budget driven. They were
driven by curiosity. They were driven by people trying to get something
back out of that new kind of research: out of creating graphics, out of
exploring something that would give them their own rewards in their
own systemic systems. … They didn’t get rewards other than academic
feedback and academic rewards …

This changed in 1994, when Cox was approached by the Smithonian Aerospace Museum, who sought a ‘scientific visualisation’ that would form part
of an IMAX movie Cosmic Voyage. The film had a budget of USD5 million
and was funded by a ‘commercial partner’: Motorola. It was ‘the first time
ever’ that the ‘visualisation of computational science’ was provided for the
cinema. Cox has continued to work on projects such as these ever since.
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For example, the ‘scientific visualisation’ of Katrina formed part of the film
Dynamic Earth, produced for the Denver Museum of Nature and Science,
as an illustration of the film’s narrative about the ‘story of the complex
systems of the earth’.
In this way, the ‘egalitarian’ concept of authorship which underpins the
‘Renaissance team’ entered into a commercial environment regulated by
intellectual property agreements. For Cox, it was of great importance that
co-authorship status as understood by the team was translated into both
attribution and an ownership interest in the copyright in the visualisations,
and she was instrumental in ensuring that the legal contracts secured this:
‘I was drafting the first contracts here at the University, I could write into
the contracts … the credit and the ownership. I hand wrote it first and then
they drafted it on paper. … I made sure that we as a team got the appropriate
credit … [and] ownership, so the collaboration as a true collaboration had
to be preserved, and that was preserved through the funding model’.
Accordingly, Cox’s analysis of authorship (outlined above) underpins
the ‘intellectual property agreements’ that are ‘vetted very carefully with
lawyers’, and concluded for each project involving Cox and the team. These
provide that copyright in the final visualisation images is to be co-owned by
Cox and the other team members, the University of Illinois and the company
seeking to exploit the visualisation (e.g. IMAX Corporation). The same
agreement specifies that any intellectual property arising as part of the
production process, for example, copyright in software, is to be co-owned
by Cox and her team. Further, the owners of any intellectual property in the
underlying scientific data sign a ‘data release form’, making it available for
use by Cox and her team for any purpose, whether academic or commercial.
In this way, for the ‘Renaissance team’, co-authorship is bound up with
the consequences that flow under legal contracts and copyright law: coauthorship status within the team results in ownership of copyright and
entitlement to royalties. As Cox noted in relation to the hurricane Katrina
project: ‘each of the co-authors – each of our team – … we all get royalties
from the production … we are co-creators on the hurricane Katrina and
we own it …’15 Further, the provision of ‘ownership’ and ‘royalties’ to all
team members, are matters which Cox considers instrumental in promoting collaboration. As she explained: ‘My philosophy is that you build that
organism and it really becomes an active creative organism, by people
having personal buy-ins and ownership and rewards out of the product …’
In this context, therefore, copyright’s proprietary framework is employed
such as both to support and reinforce a spirit of ‘egalitarian’ collaboration
amongst multiple authors.
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Case Study Two: Joseph Nechvatal and the Computer Virus
Projects
‘Artist’ Joseph Nechvatal has worked on a number of Computer Virus Projects which involved him collaborating with two ‘computer scientists’ skilled
in computer programming. For Nechvatal, this is an ‘equalised exchange
between disciplines’ of ‘science and art’, as ‘each side has gained something
and feels a positive growth coming from the exchange’. The result of ‘art and
science … sharing and collaborating together’ in this way, brings about ‘beneficial things on both sides of the equation’: the ‘arts’ are ‘greatly enriched’
in ‘engaging with science and new technology’, while ‘the scientist gains
… challenges to do things that they may not have conceptualised before’.
The first Computer Virus Project was completed in the early 1990s while
Nechvatal was artist-in-residence at the Louis Pasteur Atelier and Saline
Royal/Ledouz Foundation lab in Arbois, France. The project involved the
development of computer software, written in Basic, by a computer programmer, Jean Philippe Massonie. The program enabled the launch of a computer
virus onto Nechvatal’s database of visual works stored on a computer. From
this process, Nechvatal selected a series of still images capturing various
stages of the virus ‘attack’. These images were then transferred onto canvas
using a robotic painting technique (conducted by a third party company),
which involves the mechanical application of paint to canvas via the spray of
an air-gun/nozzle pigment delivery system driven by a computer program.
In addition, Nechvatal selected a series of moving images comprising part
of the virus ‘attack’, which was exhibited as an animation.
The second such project, Computer Virus project 2.0, involved Nechvatal working with another computer programmer, Stéphane Sikora who
specialises in ‘Artificial Life’ technology. The software, written by Sikora,
launches unpredictable virus operations on Nechvatal’s images that occur in
real time, thereby creating a form of ‘artificial life’ (or ‘A-life’). The resulting
work was exhibited by Nechvatal in a solo show called cOntaminatiOns
at the Château de Linardié in Senouillac, France. The exhibition featured
digital prints and paintings (created by the robotic technique outlined
above) of images which Nechvatal selected from the virus ‘attack’. It also
included two live electronic virus ‘attack’ art installations entitled Viral
Counter-Attack which enable the audience to watch an attack in real time
thereby simulating life and death-like phenomena on screen.
The ‘collaboration’ between Nechvatal and Sikora started out as a
conversation at a conference called Virtual Worlds held in Paris in 2000
about virtual reality. Following this they met in Sikora’s studio. Nechvatal
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explained how he outlined the ‘basic premises’ or ‘bigger ideas’ of ‘the vision
of the project’ to Sikora: ‘I want to have an art work that can be penetrated by
a computer virus-like algorithm that will treat my image as an ecosystem.’
Nechvatal then left Sikora for a few days, to allow him to ‘execute my vision’.
Sikora would then be ‘back and forth’ from meetings with Nechvatal to
programming, showing Nechvatal what he had achieved so far, and giving
Nechvatal an opportunity for critique: ‘I would say “yes” or “no” basically.
“Yes, that’s what I’m looking for” or “no, that’s not what I’m looking for”, to
help him shape the result. And of course this is a cumulative process over
several months. And in the end we reached the first plateau, where I was
rather happy with the results … ’
Nechvatal described his ‘aim’ as to provide ‘aesthetically pleasing
results’. While the computer programmers might ‘understand’ that aim,
and be ‘great partners’, it is Nechvatal alone who determines what meets
that aim. This understanding is consistent with Sikora’s account of his
work with Nechvatal, described in a paper published online (Sikora, n.d.).
Sikora concludes the paper as follows: ‘Above I have outlined the software
architecture governing the simulation bases of J. Nechvatal’s Computer
Virus Project. This software permits the exploration of complex dynamics
while adhering to Nechvatal’s specific aesthetic demands.’
Asked what these ‘specific aesthetic demands’ were, Nechvatal explained
as follows:
[…] like I want to have an emotional effect of aesthetic quality that
revolves around a certain set of colour or has an aesthetic relationship
between colours, between the forms and the form of the virus and the
form of the host … because it is the imagery that you are really seeing,
in terms of the still images, and of course I have complete control over
that, so it is about how the virus interacts with that host, what is the form
of the virus, what is the colour of the form of the virus, how the images
interact with the preceding and following image … These are the kind
of aesthetic demands that I put … Now I want it to be more transparent,
now I want it to be more colourful, this one is going to be black. These
kinds of specifics.

Nechvatal described this ‘collaborative’ process as based on ‘goodwill and
mutual respect’ and he could not think of a single instance where they
had disagreed: ‘I cannot think of one instance in which we have clashed
over anything … It has been an amazing collaborative union.’ If Sikora had
disagreed, Nechvatal considered that it would have been ‘tough’ for their
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project to continue: ‘he is … helping me execute my vision, and if we weren’t
going towards what I wanted to do, there would be no point in us working
together any more.’
Asked about how he would characterise the computer programmer’s
contribution, Nechvatal said it was a ‘creative’ task. As he explained: ‘I am
demanding things that they have not done before, in fact perhaps that no
one has ever done before. So they need to bring all their creative powers to
the enterprise.’ As he said of Sikora, ‘his talent to be a programmer at that
level is a form of creativity … ’ However, his view is that this did not amount
to authorship or co-authorship. Instead, the works are solely authored by
Nechvatal. As he expressed:
[…] I am the sole author and my name is always on the work that we
produce. I always credit my collaborators, but because the concept came
from me, the desire came from me the context of the work came from me
and continues through me, it is about my approach to art so generally it is
my name on top and their name second. So they get credited, but it is my
work and I own everything that comes out of the work, and again, it is a
kind of respect and acknowledgement but this is my art work, and they are
kind of helping me, collaborating with me to help me develop my work.

In the same interview, Nechvatal justified his position as ‘sole author’, on
the basis that he is the ‘director’ of the project (a position which contrasts
to that put forward by Cox in the previous Case Study):
What I do is to throw out big challenges and ideas and I also say “no” a lot.
They show me what they did, and I say “no that’s not what I was interested
in or where I’m going.” Or “that’s not acceptable for aesthetic reasons or
other reasons.” So, I am the project director and I am controlling what
comes out of it, it came from my original intentions and my name is
going to be on it, so I have to be the one that is completely pleased with
the end result.

This understanding of ‘authorship’ is also present in other works on which
Sikora has collaborated with ‘artists’ other than Nechvatal:
Stéphane has worked with other artists, and they are always the author,
almost always the sole author of the work … So he is accustomed to this
procedure … He doesn’t have a creative vision himself but he loves to work
with artists and do creative work, and he has a big appreciation for art
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and music and culture, it is just that he needs someone to direct him as to
what the project is, what the goal of the project is. So he is the technician. 16

As regards to those involved in making the arrangements for the robotic
painting technique, Nechvatal considers them to be neither ‘creative’, as
they are ‘merely fabricating to my specification’, nor ‘authors’, on the basis
that they are providing a paid commercial service.
One issue explored in the interview was how the role of technology in
Nechvatal’s work (e.g. the role of the computer viruses in acting on his ‘body’
of visual work) might limit human authorship. Nechvatal has previously
described the relationship between ‘human agency’ and ‘non-human processes’ in his work, as ‘a dialogue … conversation or dance’ (Roniger, 2012).
Asked what he meant by this, Nechvatal placed his work in the context of
avant-garde thought of the 20th century, in particular John Cage’s approach
to music and art which ‘embraces chance operations’. As he explained:
‘What you want to do is, you author the work and control it tightly but then
you leave it open for chance, for things to happen, or actually you design it
rigorously so chance can happen. That is what I did with the program with
Stéphane. What we do is we … allow and dictate that chance will happen.
So it is just a way of making the work more unexpected and a little more
unusual than might be possible’.
While Nechvatal accepted that ‘chance’ might ‘fuzzy the edges a little bit
of authorship’, he remained of the view that ‘authorship’ was an important
concept: ‘I don’t see how that precludes the authorship of the work. It just is
a technique for making work really.’ Therefore, while technology played an
important role in his work, it still made sense to speak of ‘human authorship’:
[…] because … it is me that is making selections and choices and presentations and within a certain context of my choosing, so again the chance
element is just another angle of opening up the work but it is no way
destroying its connection to me. … I think it is very important that the
human is dominant and I don’t for one second want to be dominated
by non-human processes, of machines … particularly in aesthetics, I do
not for one instance want to be subjected to dominance by machine
processes, and I think part of our work, part of my work, is an attempt
to resist that tendency.

Indeed, Nechvatal considered his ‘authorship’ of the work, to make it his
‘property’, on the basis that it would not exist without him: ‘Do you consider
your work to be your property?’ ‘Yes, absolutely.’ ‘And why do you feel that
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way?’ ‘I never really question it, because I make it from nothing and because
it wouldn’t be there without me. And I sign it, and now I even sign it with
my DNA so there can be no forgery. I never even question that it isn’t mine,
because without me it wouldn’t exist!’
Consequently, if his work was copied without his consent, he said he
would be ‘shocked and dismayed’, regardless of whether he was attributed
or not. Notwithstanding this, he would not mind his work being copied
if there was an ‘educational context’ for the use or if the use amounted
to a ‘new work’. As regards the latter aspect, Nechvatal related this to his
understanding of the US legal test of transformative use:
[…] if they are artists and they are putting their art on the market and
they are using appropriation as part of their work, I can accept that.
I know other artists that have done that successfully, Richard Prince
most famously, and many others, say Jeff Koons, Warhol. Sometimes
it is a question of degree and I believe that the legal view, especially in
the United States is “was a transformation created’, did the other artist
transform the work or not.

Asked whether he felt that this approach was appropriate, Nechvatal
responded: ‘I do. Then there is a creative process that is happening, and
I think that we have to be open to appropriation as part of the artistic
dialogue because we live in such an image conscious culture.’ In fact, the
legal concept of transformative use, which stems from judicial interpretation of the first factor of the ‘fair use’ test set out in section 107 of the US
Copyright Code, is not cast in such broad terms. Notwithstanding this, these
comments indicate that while Nechvatal’s art practice might not bring him
into proximity to lawyers (as in the case of Cox’s copyright exploitation
contracts) copyright terminology resonated in his understanding of the
limits of the control denoted by authorship, albeit in a form more accommodating of appropriation art than is currently contained in US law.

Case Study Three: The Open Ended Group, a ‘Digital Art
Collective’
The OpenEndedGroup (or ‘OEG’) comprises three members: Marc Downie,
Shelley Eshkar and Paul Kaiser. Established in 2001 and based in New York,
the OEG exhibits in galleries, public spaces and the stage, in both the USA
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and Europe. This often involves installations involving projections produced
using motion-capture technology.
A recent project was the production of huge floating 3D imagery that
was projected onto the stage of a performance of Mark-Anthony Turnage’s
opera Twice Through the Heart at Sadler’s Wells Theatre, London. The
opera concerned a housewife abused by her husband, and the ‘ethereal’
imagery, visible to the audience wearing 3D glasses, sought to capture her
sense of ‘fear’. The imagery was produced from photographs which the
members of the Group took of the interior of a 1980s-style Council flat in
Dartington. The photographs were then processed by software, written by
the Group, which could locate where the photographs were taken within
the geometry of the room. The resulting images were then displayed on a
computer screen, with all three members of the Group working together
to produce the final imagery. Downie described this process of working on
the imagery as follows:
You capture a glimpse of an interesting shape or juxtaposition or mistake
in the computer’s recognition of an object, and you go back and try to
craft that particular angle, that particular moment, that particular shape
by either changing the photographs that you put in, or changing the way
the material is revealed. … You really are trying to work in dialogue with
an algorithm, something which produces something unexpected. You
are trying to take control over it, but it is not a situation where we are
completely in control.

Asked about the different ‘roles’ of the various Group members, Downie
explained that each brings different expertise. Downie’s grounding is in
natural science and physics, and he specialises in computer programming.
Eshkar’s emphasis is on drawing, computer graphics and the ‘exploration of
human motion’, in particular through the use of motion capture technology.
Finally, Kaiser’s background is in filmmaking and art history. The OEG
members’ different backgrounds means that, as Downie acknowledged,
‘there are some core things that we are each much better at that the others’.
However, ‘other than that it’s a flat organisation’, with the core activities
performed by the three of them, working together as ‘equals’. As Downie
explained: ‘If you were to be in the room while we’re working you would see
three people staring at 3D projectors, shouting out opinions about the way
that things are drawn until we agree that what we are looking at is good …
When we are actually being creative it’s usually us staring at something,
changing it, and shouting out our opinions’.
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At another point in the interview, Downie expanded on this further:
Really the bit that is us making art is about the three of us sitting in
front of the screen shouting out things at it. That is the core of what we
do. The drive that we have had to make pieces and distribute them has
all been about maximising the time we spend together, as three artists
staring at something and changing it. The common thread through all
of our work, is that the reason that we write code is to be able to work in
real time, even if what we are making is just a film, so you don’t have to
have code, but it has to be in real time so the three of us can sit in front
of it as equals and change it.

As regards dynamics between Group members, Downie said that there is
always a ‘broad level of agreement’ as to ‘what a piece is going to be about’.
Where disagreements arise as to particular issues, such as ‘is this image
good?’, this ‘simply leads to us working harder at it’: ‘If one of us thinks
that an image is good, but another thinks it isn’t there yet, we continue
to manipulate it until we reach a consensus’. However, he considered
disagreements that could not be resolved through consensus to be ‘very
rare’, a matter which he attributed to the fact that they all have ‘very similar
aesthetics’: ‘We broadly agree about what images are good and what images
aren’t. If you put us in for blind testing and flashed images at us, and asked
us to say which images we liked, we would actually end up with fairly similar
conclusions. I think we would end up with different reasons for what we
liked. So that then is the balance that we can reach similar end-points by
different means with different justifications’.
Asked what would happen if an instance arose where no consensus was
reached, Downie considered that the Group would probably ‘abandon the
work’; ‘that would be the end of the piece’. As Downie concluded ‘working
by consensus is the only way that we can really work’.
Where expertise or assistance is required from outside, the OEG have
developed a ‘taxonomy of collaboration’, which designates the parameters
of the external person’s participation. Downie described this as follows:
Well we internally have a taxonomy of people we work with. “Collaborator” is top of the pile. Collaborator is where there is an equality. We are
equal with collaborators, though we might have different responsibilities.
Collaborators are the ones who at least have the freedom to give ideas
quite directly for what we are working on. But beneath that, or different
to that, are “contributors”, and beneath that still are “consultants”. So
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a “consultant” is where you have a very particular technical issue that
we need a fairly constrained answer on. And there is almost nothing a
consultant can do to surprise you. The answer to a technical question
will be either “yes” this is how you do it or “no” that’s actually impossible.
A “contributor” is somewhere between those things, in that they could
surprise you with the quality of what they do, but they are working
within a fairly confined space, a space that you have pre-determined.
What they are working on is not up for change. A sound designer for
example might be a contributor. You have chosen the material that they
will use and provided them with the actual piece of music or track, and
simply you need someone with sound engineering competence to realise
it and make it sound good in a gallery. So that would be an example of
someone contributing to the art work. So they’re important because if
they screw up it sounds awful and if they are not there it is left to 3 people
that aren’t particularly good at sound devices, but it is not an open-ended
equal class structure, in that sound designers aren’t allowed to say “why
don’t you do that, it would be better”, because that’s not what they are
being brought in to do. So that is the taxonomy of collaboration from
our point of view.

‘Collaborators’ are credited alongside the OEG as ‘artists’, for example
when the work is displayed, unlike ‘consultants’ and ‘contributors’.
Downie explained the purpose of the ‘taxonomy’ as follows: ‘It is about
accurately curating the voices in the room when you are all looking at
something shouting out “that’s right”, “that needs to be over there” or
“that’s awful” or “that’s really good, that bit there” or “we need more of
that”. So whoever is barking out those opinions at the crunch moments
when we are really trying to discover what we’ve got, what we could make,
so it’s an invitation as to that, as that moment has to be very carefully
constructed’.
The taxonomy of collaboration is very strictly enforced by the OEG, and
‘collaborators’ are ‘[selected] … very carefully’ to ensure consensus with
OEG members will be reached. Asked whether ‘contributors’ or ‘consultants’
ever sought to exceed their roles, Downie remarked that they stick to their
taxonomy so rigidly ‘that no one tries to exceed their role’. This contrasts to
an earlier project, How long Does the Subject Linger on the Edge of the Volume
(2005), when the Group was ‘less experienced’, where ‘engineers’ who were
merely meant to ‘provide engineering support’, assumed they were ‘equal
participants in all artistic decisions’. As Downie explained: ‘… in that case
we weren’t nearly clear enough which caused a certain amount of heart-
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ache amongst everyone. So since that point we’ve been much clearer about
the status of people involved … So we’ve been more careful in choosing
our collaborators and more careful in making sure that people who aren’t
collaborators know it …’
An example of the OEG’s work with a ‘collaborator’ is Stairwell, displayed
at the Hayward Gallery in 2010. The ‘collaborator’ in that instance was the
dancer and choreographer Wayne McGregor. McGregor’s movements in the
space of the stairwell at the Hayward were recorded using specially designed
motion-capture technology. The final work involved the 3D projection of
that footage into the space of the stairwell. Downie described this process
of working as follows: ‘And that involved the three of us challenging Wayne,
to do something in the particular curve of the stairwell, round the corner
or vertically this way. Sort of giving him regions of space to work in and
to improvise within them, a region marked out by cameras.’ The footage
was then edited by the three members of the OEG: ‘After all of that … it
was just me, Paul and Shelley sitting around the screen editing footage in
real time, and then all of it is saved and sent off-site so it could be put on
three screens – one at the bottom, one in the middle and one at the top of
the stairwell. On site we continued to revise our editing. Finally the whole
thing was played back in stereo.’
McGregor was, according to Downie, ‘the motor of the piece’ and the
status of ‘collaborator’ denotes the influence and freedom which he was
allowed to exert. As Downie explained in relation to his work with another
dancer/choreographer ‘collaborator’: ‘we were all influencing very strongly
what each of us were doing, so all four of us had responsibility for the way
the piece worked and we were all allowed to blurt out ideas, and we were
all allowed to say “that’s crap” or “this bit here, that’s the good bit”. We were
all allowed to make those statements.’
This contrasts to ‘contributors’ who, while creative in the tasks they
perform, are ultimately working under the control and direction of the
OEG:
For example every time we need to film something, where we might care
how it looks, so it’s not just data capture, especially if it’s in the US, there
are a couple of camera men that we like so we’ll bring them on, and they
will be in a contributor role. They know how to hold a camera and have
vastly more knowledge about where to stick the lights than us, about
what to do. And they will be there on-site, with us directing. We have a
very good rapport with them. So that would add two to the project but
only for a few hours. Only for the shoot.
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In this way, the OEG’s taxonomy of ‘collaborators’, ‘contributors’ and ‘consultants’ can be seen as a way of restricting the number of participants
that deserve equality of status with the OEG members, in the making of
‘artistic decisions’. As Downie noted, ‘the status of collaborator marks that
relationship as different.’ For Downie, ‘artistic decisions’ are:
[…] when we are responding to material, and manipulating it, and navigating through possibilities, we are working very quickly, shouting out our
initial responses to what we are seeing. There is a tremendous amount of
instinct in that. The three of us and every other artist that we’ve worked
with are capable of producing opinions about material very very quickly
… we are very quick in evaluating things. … I think you have to marry
that with the vision of being able to see the long-term consequences or
potential of those things. So you see an image and you don’t really like it
but there is something in it that offers a glimmer of hope. … So, if this is
good it goes into the piece, or we grow that out into a section of a piece […]

While the Group (and any collaborators) make the ‘artistic decisions’, and
are credited as ‘artists’, Downie felt uncomfortable with any notion of
authorship that denoted ‘creation’:
[…] the sense of discovery, the sense that you are mining something out
of material, weakens my claim to have authored it in a direct way, in the
sense that I have had this idea, this idea has come from me, and I have
given this life in the world. It is hard to be completely convinced about
that when you feel like you have discovered something’.

In part, the resistance to the view of ‘author’ as ‘creator’ rests with the role
of the technology itself as a ‘collaborating agent’. As Downie explained
(in a manner which differs in emphasis, from Joseph Nechvatal’s views at
Case Study 2 above): ‘… when you are working like this, it really does feel
like there is an additional agency, be it of the algorithm or of the material
as seen through a lens you have constructed, and even if you write your
own code, or even if know intimately how things work, when this way of
working is good is where there is an additional agency – you are working
in collaboration with material or in collaboration with an algorithm.’17
Further, Downie felt uncomfortable with the suggestion that the work
might be the OEG’s ‘property’. In his view, the work felt like ‘property of
the world’, again stemming from their work being ‘more like discovery
than creation’:
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Quite often when things are going really well, the way that we work
in particular, it feels less like creation. So you build some complicated
system or analytical way of looking at some object in the world, and you
craft it and change it, and suddenly you see something on the screen that
you find surprising. Those are the moments which keep you going. It feels
more like discovery than creation. You have found something that you
have always suspected that was there, but you’ve found it. It’s not like
we’ve made it up. It’s not like the process of drawing where a person uses
his talents to create something from the blank page.

While unauthorised copying might ‘upset’ Downie ‘slightly’, this was not
something which concerned him. In part this was due to the fact that the
technical complexity of their work made close copying implausible:
[…] an exact copy of our work, short of someone breaking into your
computer and stealing it, is just so highly implausible. The indirection
that goes into making a piece is so great, that defends off against many
of these sorts of duplications. If someone stole all of my computers and
then asked me to duplicate Stairwell, I’d have a pretty hard time doing
it. We’d have a hard time copying ourselves.

Notwithstanding this, the attribution of the Group (and any collaborator) as
the ‘artists’ of a particular work, was a matter of significance, as attribution
ensured accurate ‘critical discourse’ about ‘who did what’ in the field:
One of the things that makes me upset … right now, is the quality of the
critical discourse in our particular area of art. One thing is that if I’d feel
that the world, or art historical record, is not getting the biography of
the story straight, that would make me upset in that way. So when the
critical history of the field can’t figure out who did what. So I feel upset
in the sense that people were getting the wrong idea in the sense of the
genesis of something and can’t figure out who did what.

Indeed, if the OEG’s work was copied by another artist, in making a ‘new
work’, they would want ‘a general acknowledgement in any critical secondary literature’. In this way, while ‘attribution’ is important to Downie,
like Cox the OEG’s engagement with ‘computer science’ results in their
distancing of their activities from any concept of ‘authorship’ as ‘creation’.
Yet, unlike Cox, the implications of this for Downie are that ‘authorship’
denoting ‘ownership’ or ‘property’ appears irrelevant.
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Case Study Four: Ken Feingold’s installations and Miltos Manetas’
jesusswimming.com
Ken Feingold is based in New York. He specialises in installations using ‘animatronic’ sculptures of human heads or ventriloquist puppets, programmed
using speech recognition and artificial intelligence software so they can
have conversations with each other. Each character is programmed to have
its own personality, so there are certain parameters to the conversations,
but no one conversation is the same. Feingold has exhibited widely for
example at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, the Centre Georges
Pompidou in Paris, and at the Tate Liverpool in the UK.
Feingold explained that his ‘animatronic’ installations stem from his
residency at the Zentrum Fur Kunst und Medientechnology (or ‘ZKM’) in
Karlsruhe, Germany. This brought him into contact with computer programmers who, over a period of three years, developed complex software
providing a series of modules for enabling pieces of language to interact with
visuals. The software is used by Feingold, along with artificial voice technology by researchers at the University of Edinburgh which is made available
for use on an open source basis. The installations also involve physical
sculptures. Sometimes these are ‘found’ objects, for example ventriloquist
dummies that are bought from a car-boot sale. More frequently, however,
they involve new sculptures, occasionally, as in the case of Self-Portrait as
the Center of the Universe, involving casts of Feingold’s own head which
are made at a workshop by a group of ‘sculptors’. This involves moulding
in latex and casting in silicone, to which fibre glass ‘skin’ is applied in such
a manner that the mouth and eyes can open and close. Once this is done,
stubble, facial hair and the feint appearance of veins is added using needles.
Feingold described his interaction with these computer programmers and
sculptors as ‘very close-up at times and other times very long distance’. With
regards the programmers, Feingold usually develops ‘a flow chart’ to ‘show the
programmer the chain of events that have to happen’, then leaving them to ‘go
through and write all the routines and the functions’. In the case of the sculptors of the ‘animatronic’ heads, Feingold provides them with photographs or
drawings to give an example of what is required. The sculptors then produce
a head in clay, as a model for the cast that will eventually be made in silicone.
Feingold described the process of working on the clay model as follows:
I would work with the sculptor who was essentially my hands, because
she had a skill to be able to sculpt in clay in a photographic way. I mean
her abilities are extraordinary. She would be able to make things look so
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realistic and do things that I could never attain the skill to be able to do.
So it would be very simple kinds of suggestions on my part, like let’s make
the lips fuller, let’s make the chin narrower, let’s make the jaw line squarer.
And then she would do that and I would say “yes” “no” “less” “more”.’

More than just ‘technical skill’, Feingold saw the programmers and sculptors
as providing ‘special knowledge’, which placed them in a position ‘occasionally’ to make ‘suggestions’. For example, he described how, on one project,
the sculptor made a ‘suggestion’ about the size of the ears of a particular
head. Feingold wanted the head to be of someone in their forties or fifties,
and the sculptor had ‘special knowledge’ about that: ‘she was right and that
was what I wanted.’ Similarly, the programmers have ‘special knowledge’
of mathematics, for example, as to the algebra required in order to move a
figure in virtual space in an oval.
Feingold characterised the tasks performed by the programmers and
sculptors as ‘creative’:
I depend a good deal on the creativity of the people that I work with,
they have a tremendous influence on the outcome of the project, and
it is a quite interesting process to collaborate in that creative moment
with computer programmers and with sculptors, because even the ones
that are life cast have imperfections and they have to be adjusted in the
making of them, both the physical moulding and the painting and the
kinds of expressions that the faces have, lend a lot to what the experience
of the work is.

However, the ‘programmers’ and ‘sculptors’ are not authors or co-authors;
Feingold is the sole author. Indeed, the ‘art part’ consists of the tasks which
Feingold performs in his studio alone:
[…] so the work is physically put together and then set up in my studio
where I then undertake the actual art part, which is working and reworking, writing, editing images and seeing how things work, how they sound.
Spending time with the work, watching it unfold, noticing that it does
things that I don’t want it to do, taking things out that I don’t want it to
do, putting things in that I do want it to do that it’s not doing […]

Feingold explained his position as sole author, by drawing analogies with
certain interpretations of the Auteur concept of authorship of a film by a
film director:
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I would say that it is collaborative to the extent that people were helping
me, but I always took it as one might think of a film director, that it
was my project, I was not seeing this as co-authorship, neither with the
programming nor with the sculptural factors, and so the works would
be fabricated for me, the physical object would be fabricated for me and
sent to my studio at which point I would assemble them into sculptural
objects which appear in the final work.

At another point in the conversation, Feingold elaborated further on this
analogy:
I think about things in the framework of film-making to give myself a
precedent for groups of people working towards an end to accomplish a
particular person’s vision. Auteur cinema where you have the director
who is also the writer and who also does a lot of the camera work who
also sits in or does quite a bit of the editing, some sound and creates the
entire film, still there are many people who work on the project and they
are considered contributors, absolutely, and valuable contributors, but
the notion of authorship is the person who is the director as the person
who is the individual who takes responsibility for the entire thing 18 […]

As Feingold concluded, this ‘is a monotheistic view of authorship, not a
polytheistic view’. During the interview, Feingold referred to the ‘author’
as having an ‘authority’ as ‘the primary creator of a particular work’: ‘…
this is the work that I’ve made and it’s finished, I’ve done it. I’ve made this
work and its mine’. Asked whether the reference to the art work as ‘mine’
denoted that it was his ‘property’, Feingold’s answer was informed by his
understanding of copyright law:
We are talking about intellectual property … I would say that art work
has certain laws surrounding it. If an artist makes something they have
the copyright. So how do we identify who it belongs to? Right now I think
it has to do with who owns the copyright to it. Does that mean that
that person has exclusive rights to do anything with it forever and ever.
Perhaps legally yes, but ethically? I don’t know.

Feingold said that he would object to unauthorised copying of this work,
‘to the extent that it interfered with my economy’; his works are made in
‘limited numbers’, so their commercial value is ‘in part due to their scarcity’
(the installations having physical as well as digital attributes). In outlining
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the kinds of copying he would consider unobjectionable, Feingold’s answer
was informed by his understanding of US copyright principles of ‘fair use’:
[…] not to rely on the law but just to think which factors had been in the
notion of fair use, one of them is whether or not it competes economically
with the original work,19 and I need to survive, this is what I do for a
living, to a certain extent, you know my work as an analyst is one aspect
and my work as an artist another, and these are my economic bases so
if someone was to take one of them away because they found a way to
commercialise something and I wasn’t benefitting from that it would
harm me and it would harm my ability to make other works. It would
force me into another kind of working that I would then have to go into
competition with someone who was changing my economy because of
the way they were doing things.

Feingold’s implicit endorsement of the general principle of copyright,
contrasts with the very public denouncement of copyright law by the other
interviewee in this Case Study: Miltos Manetas. Manetas is from Greece
but is currently based in Rome. He founded the web art movement called
Neen in 2000, which promotes the view of websites as art objects. As each
URL is unique, each piece of website art is a ‘unique edition’ in that sense.
The URL, therefore, provides the art work with a physical property that
can be bought and sold by art collectors, through trades in ownership of
the domain name at the various domain name registries. Indeed, Manetas
sees the act of buying and owning the website, as ‘ “initiating” the artwork’:
the ‘most important step’ towards ‘becoming the creator of the website’
and the ‘most important, because it’s yours’. Therefore, while the Neen
movement is characterised by emotive claims about the ‘struggle to get
free from the slavery of intellectual property and copyright’, it advocates a
different notion of ‘property’ – the ‘real estate’ of URLs (Manetas, 2002). On
the point of Manetas’ stance against copyright, it was interesting to note
that one of his income streams is the licensing of applications based on
his website art to i-phone. When asked what he was being paid for, he did
not connect this to copyright; rather he considered it as akin to receiving
a conference fee for speaking.
In the art gallery environment, Manetas projects his websites onto blank
canvas hung on the gallery wall. One such example is jesusswimming.com
hosted at that URL, which was displayed in 2006 by projecting it onto a
canvas 120 x 90 inches. The website depicts a simple animation of a bearded
figure swimming slowly in the sea, accompanied by music. The toolbar of
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the website reads ‘Jesus Swimming by Miltos Manetas’, but the website
manetas.com, providing an overview of his work, states the following: ‘Jesus
Swimming, created by Miltos Manetas. Credits: Mark Tranmer (music), Joel
Fox (animation)’.
When asked about these credits, Manetas explained the process of ‘collaboration’ as follows:
[…] many times us artists work in collaboration. So I wake up with an
idea, of jesusswimming.com. So I call up an animator, and I say could
you please produce a Jesus swimming. I then call up a composer, and
I say could you please compose music for him. Yes. Ok. And then I make
the work. It is absolutely mine. It is a work of art by Miltos Manetas only,
but in that work there are credits. Animation made by this person, music
made by Joel Fox.

When asked what his instructions were to the ‘animator’ and ‘composer’,
Manetas explained that they were ‘not very detailed at all’: ‘The departure
point for Jesusswimming.com was exactly the name of the website “Jesus
swimming” and I just asked from the composer to write a music that brings
in mind Jesus when he swims … [and to the animator] “please draw for me
a Jesus swimming” …’. While the ‘composer’ and ‘animator’ were given little
detailed guidance, Manetas retained the right to reject the contributions:
‘if I didn’t like the music or the animation, I wouldn’t have used it’.
In Manetas’ view, neither Tranmer nor Fox are co-authors; they are merely
assistants working for a ‘master’, a practice which he analogises with the
work of Michelangelo. Instead, Manetas is the ‘sole author’, a claim he supported by analogising his position to the ‘director’ of a film. After drawing
attention to the fact that he had paid the ‘assistants’, he continued: ‘Well,
it is my art work. In that case, I am totally the artist 100%. It is my total art
work. Because it is my creation. It exists only because of me’. At another
point in the interview, he repeated that he was the sole author on the basis
that: ‘The artistic idea is completely mine in that case … the idea of the
Jesus swimming’. In this way, for Manetas, ‘authorship’ denoted being the
‘director’ or person who ‘created’ the idea of the piece.
In addition, it was apparent that Manetas’ views of what it meant to be
an ‘artist’ were informed by perceptions in the wider ‘art world’. As Manetas
described in relation to jesusswimming.com, when he registered the URL,
he did so ‘as a private person, but ‘not … as an artist’: ‘to own it as an artist
I have to claim its artistic value, to somehow create interest around it and
make it an artwork’. These comments were consistent with his view of an

Reassessing the challenge of the digital

201

‘artist’ as stemming from some form of ‘art world’ recognition: An artist
defines himself as an artist and then if other people agree with him and he
has a commercial success, he is an artist; if not he is just someone who has
fantasies’. And does it matter who that other person is? ‘This is the business
of culture. Of course it matters. If it is the postman, it is one thing, but if it
is the director of a museum, it is another thing. And if it is 10 directors of
museums, then suddenly our conversation goes to the metaphorical.
As we noted above, the Neen approach to the work as ‘property’ relates to
the property in the URL. Copying the content of the website is not something
of concern. Instead Manetas appeared to be concerned with the use of his
name, or the gallery display of the website at the URL by another ‘artist’.
As he explained, using one of his other website pieces, maninthedark.com
as an example:
If now you will invite people to see the exhibition of Miltos Manetas at that
gallery, I would sue you. If you will invite the people, to see maninthedark.
com, again, I will sue you. But if you will invite the people to see an exhibition of yours, and you have a simulation of my maninthedark.com there [i.e.
an exact copy of the website, which appears to be hosted at maninthedark.
com, though it is not at that URL], this is your art work, it is not mine.

Manetas’ position, therefore, includes expectations of attribution in relation
to the registered domain name (rather than the website content).

Case Study Five: Interactivity and the role of the ‘audience’ or ‘user’
Interactivity is frequently noted to be an important aspect of digital technology as a ‘creative’ medium (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 60 and Paul, 2003, p. 8). As
the art historian Frank Popper expressed in a much publicised interview,
‘On the Origins of Virtualism’, the emphasis on interactivity, that is, ‘the
work’s openness to reciprocal creative action’ by the spectator or user, is
an important feature of such work (Nechvatal and Popper, 2004, p. 71).20 A
number of examples of this were encountered in the interviews.
The very first interactive works were developed by Lynn Hershman
Leeson, an award-winning ‘artist’ based in California.21 Her work Lorna from
the late 1970s was issued in limited edition on a laser disc (later moved to
DVD in 2002) and exhibited in galleries on a screen in a space that depicted
Lorna’s living room. Using a remote control, the audience could choose
which steps Lorna took in her fear-dominated life. Other early forms of in-
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teractive work were in the form of ‘hypertext poetry’ which, as Loss Pequeño
Glazier recounted, involved users clicking on particular words triggering
a different page to come up on screen. Most commonly, this would involve
the ‘user’ choosing between different events in the story. 22 More recently,
one of Glazier’s own digital poems, COG, relies on the viewer to click on
various coloured ‘cog’ shapes, which turn and release further words, letters
or phrases into the poem. Similarly, Jason Nelson’s recent work Game, Game,
Game and Again Game involves the user ‘playing’ thirteen computer-game
style levels, which contain his drawings and poetry.
Interactivity is also a central component of much installation work
using digital technology. Don Ritter, a Canadian ‘artist’ currently based
in South Korea, recently created a large-scale installation called Vested
which involves a visitor putting on a military vest and walking in front of
a 14 metre-high projection depicting a panorama of famous international
buildings. When the visitor pushes a red button on the vest, a large explosion
takes place on the projection triggered by complex digital technology. The
interaction enables Ritter’s work to capture the schadenfreude phenomenon
and draw attention to the mass media’s vested interest in depicting images
of human tragedy. Similarly, Joseph Nechvatal has also displayed aspects of
his Computer Virus Projects in the form of an interactive gallery installation.
Under the title Viral Counter-Attack, the progress of the virus in ‘attacking’
Nechvatal’s body of work was displayed in real-time on a touch-screen. Up
to two members of the audience could touch the screen simultaneously, to
influence the movement of the virus ‘attack’.
A number of these interviewees noted the central importance of the
position of the audience to these works. As Glazier notes, in respect of his
own interactive poem COG, the ‘reader is essential because if you just turn
on the piece, there is nothing there’. Notwithstanding this, all interviewees
were of the view that the ‘user’ is not a co-author of the work, pointing
to the limited number of choices which users are faced with. As Leeson
expressed, users might be active and also perhaps creative in their choices
but they were not authors:
Because it is pre-set. You know, somebody walks through a building, they
are not the architect. But they could choose how to walk through it. The
structure is already there, implanted. So in order to be an author, they
have to start from scratch. Even though you can alter something and
even if an interactive piece requires you to alter something, you haven’t
designed it, or come up with a conception, then you don’t author it, then
you are not really the original author.
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Further, in Joseph Nechvatal’s view, the role of the audience was ‘mildly
creative’ in the ‘choices’ made and in ‘helping explore the piece’, but this
did not make them authors or co-authors: ‘Oh, no, [the audience is] not even
close [to being authors]. … Derrida … claims that a reader is as much the
author, as the author of a book, but I can tell you that that’s not really true!
… Yes, they are using their consciousness and are anticipating an art event,
but they are not creating an art event, they are receiving it’.
Similarly, Don Ritter thought that a participant in his works might be
‘creative’ in relation to their own experience of the work, but this did not
amount to authorship. It was akin to deciding how to walk through a gallery
displaying paintings and how long to spend in front of each work.
Indeed, a number of interviewees expressed the challenge of interactive
work as located in how to constrain the audience’s freedom of action, so
as to ensure that their contribution forms part of the ‘artist’s vision’. Ken
Feingold’s early installations, for example, enabled gallery visitors to have
conversations with the animatronic figures. However, he was unhappy with
the result, as visitors tended to have open-ended conversations about their
own concerns, rather than allowing Feingold’s work to steer the conversation:
I did find a certain shifting point where I was no longer particularly happy
about the ways in which viewers become participants, would interact
with works, and found that people wanted things from works, because
of the metaphors that were involved, essentially you thought if you really
were interacting in an open-ended way with an open-ended character
you could talk about anything and it started to feel like crafting a very
particular musical instrument, and putting it on a stage and inviting the
audience up to let them play music. Now I wanted to play the music, so
the more recent works involved computers interacting with each other,
or programs within computers interacting with each other.

Other interviewees noted that the key to a successful interactive work was
to ensure that the scope for audience participation is fairly constrained.
For example, the OpenEndedGroup’s Into the Forest, which opened for
exhibition at the Museum of the Moving Image in New York in January
2011, involves a 3D projection of painterly imagery which enables the public
to sense the daydreams of childhood. For one minute in every three or
four, the piece projects the public’s stereoscopic shadow back through a
spotlight, thereby inviting the audience to respond to the work’s projections.
As Downie explained, the reason why this only happens for one minute
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in every 3 or 4, is because ‘we didn’t want the interactivity to become the
point of it.’ As he elaborated:
So, I mean I think you use the word “user” which is exactly the sort of
relationship we want to avoid, and exactly the noun that I’d hope would
never apply to any of our interactive pieces, especially a piece that uses
computer vision of any kind. … People actually act quite silly in most
interactive pieces, and the relationship that they have is extremely noncontemplative, and they are trying to bring attention to them, and they
are trying to push the boundaries of what the computer can see, so they
start moving quickly to see if the computer can still follow them; they
move in extreme ways. And none of that is what we want. If you stick a
microphone in front of someone people will generally start making very
silly noises, it is some sort of human desire to see what the envelope of
interaction is, rather than paying attention to a particular piece. So the
interactive pieces we’ve made have all tried to be completely autonomous,
to have integrity by themselves, so the interaction is quite constrained
in time like it was in In the Forest, or optional or invitational.

Instead of ‘user’ of an interactive work, Downie prefers the term ‘participant’. In his view, this provides a different emphasis. As he explained, a
‘participant’ denotes a person ‘who accepts the invitation from the work;
who has accepted the invitation to walk into the spotlight and to follow
and be part of the piece’.

Conclusions
As we noted at the outset, a perceived challenge of the digital for copyright
stems from the assumption that the ‘creative’ practices of the ‘digital age’
involve the contributions of many. Not only is this thought to make the
identification of the author more difficult but the presumed collaborative
nature of such practices is thought to pose problems for authorship as a proprietary category. As we have seen, the interviews revealed that technology
has in many cases in fact facilitated solitary work: as technology becomes
ubiquitous, a number of interviewees today work alone on processes which
in former times were collaborative. Further, as solitary work is now feasible,
in certain spheres it is considered to be the working practice of preference.
Where collaborative practices do prevail, the case studies revealed
diverse ways in which relations between contributors are understood,
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reflecting diverse ideas about authorship. Indeed, a number of interviewees
articulated positions which were diametrically opposed to each other. For
example, Donna Cox juxtaposed her ‘egalitarian’ notion of the whole team
as authors of the ‘visualisation’, against the solitary view of authorship
inspired by Auteur cinema, of the ‘artist’ as ‘director’. This was the very
‘monotheistic’ view of authorship, adhered to by interviewees such as Ken
Feingold.
Another point of difference of opinion was on how the role of technology
impacted on authorship. For the OEG, technology is a ‘collaborating agent’
restricting the ‘control’ that the Group felt over their work. The result is that
the Group felt as if they were engaged in a process of ‘discovery’, and Marc
Downie was uneasy with any concept of authorship related to ‘creation’. By
contrast, the language of creativity frequently featured in the interview with
Joseph Nechvatal, who saw technology as subject to his human ‘creative
vision’.
The diversity of ideas about authorship revealed in the interviews means
that it would be simplistic to use the views articulated by any one interviewee, as the basis for the reform of legal tests. For example, while the views
of interviewees such as Joseph Nechvatal might accord with the legal test
of originality as ‘free and creative choices’, explored by Stefan van Gompel
in his contribution to this volume, other interviews such as that with Marc
Downie, revealed the difficulties of a test that defines ‘creative choices’ in
opposition to constraints: for the OEG the constraints posed by technology
are an intricate part of their process of making ‘art’. Notwithstanding this,
a number of more general concluding observations can be made, with a
view to presenting a more nuanced account of the perceived challenge of
the digital.
First, authorship is an important category for the ‘artists’ and ‘poets’
interviewed. This is the case, even in the face of interactive technologies
enabling audience participation which was the very development which
scholars had thought would pose the most significant challenge to authorship (Woodmansee, 1994, p. 26).23 Indeed, while there may be differing positions as to the degree to which technology limits human action, as is evident
from his much publicised interview ‘On the Origins of Virtualism’ with art
historian Frank Popper, the over-arching theme of ‘digital art’ discourse
is ‘how technology is – or can be – humanised through art’ (Nechvatal
and Popper, 2004, p. 72).24 In this way, the discourses of ‘digital art’, with
their focus on humanising technology, contrast to what one commentator
thought to be the implications for copyright’s concept of authorship of new
technologies: the ‘struggle over the soul of copyright’ when the law protects
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the products of machines, rather than human authorship (Ricketson, 1991–2,
p. 2).25 The implications of this for law are that tests that defer to some
extent to social understandings of authorship, such as the US requirement
of ‘intention’ as to co-authorship, remain relevant in the ‘digital age’, as
‘authorship’ remains a meaningful category.
Secondly, in some instances (though not all), it was striking that the
law actively contributes to concepts of authorship. As we saw in the above
case studies, law contributed to certain interviewees’ understandings of
authorship as denoting ‘ownership’ (in Case Study 1), or to the demarcation
of the limits of authorial control (in Case Study 2 and Ken Feingold in
Case Study 4), though, as we noted, the interviewees’ understandings did
not always accurately reflect current copyright law. Other interviewees
directly resorted to copyright law to give their views on authorship as
a proprietary, normative force. For example, David Em commented on
his relation to his work as follows: ‘Do you consider the work to be your
property?’ ‘Absolutely.’ ‘And what do you mean by that?’ ‘If you take seriously the idea that there is such a thing as intellectual property, who else
does this belong to, it came whole cloth out of my head, no one else could
have come up with this, in a million years. And that makes it mine …
when it comes down to it, this is what I’ve made. This is the only thing that
I can attach my thumb print to in a sense and say this is something that
I created. Nobody else created this. And I am very strong about defending
that.’
Similar comments were made by Casey Reas26 and Herbert Franke.27
Moreover, copyright also appeared to influence other interviewees who, at
a first glance, rejected proprietary authorship. For example, Jason Nelson
initially rejected the idea that his work was his ‘property’ because: ‘I want
my work to spread and I love that notion that you have people in strange
corners exploring my work’. Yet, later in the same interview, when asked
how he would earn a living if he did not have his current academic position
(at Griffith University, Queensland), he referred to revenue streams that
are dependent on copyright. As he commented:
I think that digital artists, especially net-based artists, are better positioned for making a living than a lot of other artists, and the reason for
that is that there is beginning to be more streams of revenue for that sort
of thing, so for example making an app, an i-phone app sort of thing …
the ability to charge a dollar or two dollars for people viewing or playing
around with your work is beginning to be an amazing stream of revenue
for artists working in this genre.28
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While these examples29 illustrate that copyright law influences certain of
the interviewees’ understandings of authorship, the connection between
‘art’ and law should not be overstated. As we saw in Case Study 1, even where
‘artists’ conclude legal agreements about copyright, ‘vetted very carefully
with lawyers’, the criteria which they use to determine who is an author,
appears uninfluenced by that in law. Also, other interviewees, such as Miltos
Manetas, articulated ideas which were antithetical to copyright concepts.
Drawing this chapter to a close, what is the significance of these observations for how we understand the challenge of the digital for authorship? As
noted at the outset, no claim is made that the interviewees are representative
of all practice involving digital technology. Indeed, a number of other qualitative empirical studies are currently in progress, investigating different
‘spheres’ of practice using digital technology and preliminary indications
are that these uncover quite different experiences. For example, a recent
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) funded study which is being
conducted by Smita Kheria and Penny Travlou at Edinburgh University on
Creation and Publication of the Digital Manual: Authority, Authorship and
Voice, is examining authorship in the context of digital ‘manuals’, which
function as resources for online communities, for example in providing
a platform for online performances or instructions for using open source
software or a medium for exchanging information about farming practices.
The ‘manuals’ involve the contributions of many in the online environment.
Travlou and Kheria’s preliminary conclusions are that the interviewees
‘struggle with the term author and the notion of authorship’. Further, a
European Research Council-funded project in progress Music, Digitization, Mediation: Towards Interdisciplinary Music Studies (MusDig), lead by
Georgina Born at Oxford University, has uncovered, amongst other things,
the views of a younger generation of ‘digital musicians’ who would rather
describe themselves as ‘researchers’ than ‘authors’, with the consequence
of a lessening of feelings of authorship as an ‘exclusionary’ or ‘boundary
making’ category.
In this way, placing the observations of the current study in the context of
these other qualitative studies reveals a complex picture about authorship
in practices involving digital technology. On one level, these differences are
unsurprising: the interviewees of the current study were taken from a list of
‘notable individuals’ and were all ‘artists’ or ‘poets’ whose work is directed
towards fora for which authorship is well established as a structuring category. Donna Cox, for example, explained that ‘the marketing model for art’
in the ‘high end art market’ is geared towards ‘the artist as a sole producer’,
and that she instead preferred working on films, as these had ‘established’
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models for multiple authorship. Similarly, Joseph Nechvatal presented
‘digital artists’ as working within the context of ‘historical precedent’:
I think when someone is audacious enough to call themselves an artist
… you put yourself in the context of all the artists that have come before
and have come after and that are contemporary with you, so you have
already conceptualised your activity […]

This empirical study, therefore, encompasses interviewees whose channels
of work differ significantly from those engaged in making digital ‘manuals’
for use by online communities (interviewed by Kheria and Travlou), or
musicians at the PhD stage (interviewed, amongst others, by Born). This
suggests that the challenges to authorship may stem from the objectives
of particular practices, informed by their context (e.g. online community
resource as opposed to art gallery display), rather that the use of digital
technology per se. Indeed this may go some way to explaining why a number
of the ‘digital’ case studies explored in this chapter (e.g. Case Studies 3
and 4), evidence greater affinity with the hierarchical divisions between
contributors described by Jostein Gripsrud in his empirical study of the
‘analogue’ practices of theatre (in this volume), than with each other. As
well as indicating the variety of digital practice, placing the current study
in the context of others, may therefore lead us to a more nuanced analysis
of the challenges currently facing authorship.

Notes
1.

2.

This is, of course, not a new challenge. See, for example, the nineteenth
century case of Nottage v. Jackson (1882-83) concerning authorship of a portrait photograph: ‘The idea of photographing the Australian Cricketers no
doubt was the idea of one of [the photographic firm’s] managers. The man
who went to the Oval was the man who took the photograph. They said, ‘Go
to the Oval and photograph the Australian Cricketers,’ and he had to do it.
Well, he goes to the Oval. What had he to do? He had to arrange the group,
to put them in the right position and the right focus. But he does not do it
all, because I suppose there is another man who gets the plate ready; and
there is another man who, when the thing is ready, takes the cap off. It is
difficult to say who is the author of the photograph.’ (Per Brett M.R. at 632).
Similar observations were expressed by Georgina Born in a paper entitled
‘Composer and Work Revised: Ontological Politics in Digital Art Music’ at
the conference Music and Digitisation held at Oxford University in January
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2013. In the context of qualitative empirical interviews with ‘musicians’ who
use digital technology, Born presented, amongst other things, the views of
a new generation who saw themselves as ‘researchers’ rather than ‘authors’,
with the consequence of a weakening of the exclusion or ‘boundary making’ denoted by ‘authorship’.
Aspects of this paper were presented twice at the University of Amsterdam:
in December 2011, at the HERA workshop Trends in Authorship: Empirical
Studies and Legal Implications and in April 2013, at the HERA conference
Creativity That Counts. I thank Lionel Bently, Paul Heald, Martin Kretschmer
and Charlotte Waelde for their comments.
The general structure of each interview was as follows: the interviewees
were first asked to introduce their work and how they use digital technology. Following this, interviewees were asked to give an example of a recent
work and talk through how it was made, who was involved, whether it had
an ‘author’ and if so the justifications for why ‘authorship’ was conferred
on some contributors but not others. The interviewees were also asked
whether they considered their work to be their ‘property’ and about how
they had felt/would feel when/if their work was copied without their
consent. In relation to the latter, the interview explored the different factors
that impacted on how they felt, in particular whether or not they were attributed and whether the copying was exact or modified.
The names were verified as genuine by Simon Biggs of Edinburgh College
of Art, the Project Leader of the ELMCIP project, a HERA funded sister
project to Of Authorship and Originality. No claim is made that the sample
is representative of all creative practice in the digital arts. However, it was
considered by Simon Biggs as providing a good spread of examples. I was
also grateful to Nicholas Lambert of Birkbeck College, London and Bronac
Ferran of the Royal College of Art, London for early discussions regarding
project design. The full list of interviewees is as follows: Philippe Bootz,
Donna Cox, Marc Downie (of the OpenEnded Group), David Em, Ken Feingold, Herbert Franke, Loss Pequeño Glazier, Lynn Hershman Leeson, Miltos
Manetas, Michael Mandiberg, Joseph Nechvatal, Jason Nelson, Casey Reas,
Don Ritter, Lillian Schwartz and Alan Sondheim. The interviews took place
in August 2011. A second round of interviews was conducted in August/
September 2012 with interviewees whose work today frequently involves
the contributions of others: Donna Cox, Marc Downie (of the OpenEnded
Group), Ken Feingold, Lynn Hershman Leeson, Miltos Manetas and Joseph
Nechvatal. Philosopher Laura Biron participated in the second round of
interviews, asking a separate line of questions about the interviewees’ views
on ‘relational’ theory concepts, which relate to the subject of a separate
paper.
Lillian Schwartz joined Bell Labs, the research and development arm of
AT&T in the late 1960s, where she worked closely with a number of computer scientists such as Kenneth Knowlton. See further Schwartz, 1992.
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7.
8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

Jet Propulsion Lab, Pasadena, USA, specialised in the creation of visualisations from data collected by NASA missions. David Em was ‘artist in
residence’ from 1977 to 1984.
Herbert Franke was based at the Academy of Fine Arts, Munich from 19731997, and is author of one of the earliest books on the subject of ‘computer
art’, which was published in 1971 under the title Computergraphik – Computerkunst (Franke, 1971). Speaking through his translator Franke explained:
‘[collaboration] was in former times very usual. Because all these machines
that he was using in former times were not accessible to him without
collaboration. Always a scientist or a programmer is, in early times where
you haven’t had a PC at home, where he had to go in laboratories, to the
industry, in new research centres, and he asked, “is it possible to get your
instruments to do some artistic work with those instruments?”, instruments which had a totally different purposes, for medicine for instance. So
scientific research tools… in the medical field, or big computers for space
flight and so on, and he got there and got the possibility to work there at
night for instance, he had to find somebody there who would be interested
in working with him together, and with those guys together he did work. It’s
changed in the last twenty or thirty years.’
The website of the Electronic Poetry Center can be found at: http://epc.buffalo.edu/. See further Pequeño Glazier (2002).
See Petry (2011), who traces this practice back to the work of Marcel Duchamp, who in 1917 famously submitted a mass produced porcelain urinal
signed ‘R. Mutt’ for exhibition at the Society of Independent Artists in New
York.
Donna Cox is also Professor of Art and Design at the University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign (UIUC).
For a detailed exploration of these differences see Abrams (1971).
In the USA, the ‘scientific visualisations’ will be copyright subject matter, as
audiovisual works (S.101 US Copyright Code defines ‘audiovisual work’ as a
‘series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the
use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers or electronic equipment…’). The statutory definition of ‘joint work’ is contained in s.101 of the
US Code: ‘a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole.’ Amongst other things, the US doctrine of ‘joint works’ requires that each co-author’s contribution is ‘independently copyrightable’,
such that it amounts to an ‘original expression that could stand on its own
as subject matter of copyright’. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre (1994, para.
46). In this way, for example, if the computer scientists contribution to the
‘audiovisual work’ is merely to facts and ideas (e.g. to background research
or to technical facts regarding the scientific principles which the still/moving images illustrate), they may not be co-authors as a matter of law. This is
illustrated by the facts of Childress v. Taylor (1991) where it was held insuf-
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ficient for joint authorship of a play to merely contribute facts and details
about the play’s leading character. Further, following the Ninth Circuit District Court decision in Aalmuhammed v. Lee (2000), co-authorship doctrine
in the case of audiovisual works focuses on the question of ‘creative control’
and it might well be held that this rests with the ‘artistic decisions’ of Pattison and Cox, and not the ‘computer scientists’.
When explained that the legal doctrine of co-authorship includes a requirement of ‘intention’, Cox responded: ‘No I had never heard of that… The
reason why I talk about intention is because in my art history, when I was
taking classes at Madison, intention in the books that I’d read, was the
definition that really changed artists in the 1970s. It was why certain artists
could put stripes on trains and call it art… And it is my understanding
that these conceptual artists that would do these large projects, or… have
piles of dirt inside an art museum, it was their intention, their intention to
contextualise, or Marcel Duchamp, it was his intention to contextualise the
urinal or a bicycle to make it art. That’s where I got that.’
Other comments made by Cox during the interview, illustrating this tying
of co-authorship/co-creator status to copyright ownership are as follows:
‘I co-author with my group and I share all the royalties with my group’. The
‘final images of that work are co-owned by the company with whom we are
contracting and the University of Illinois, and with myself and members of
my group who are the primary creators because we create the visualisations
from the numerical data….’
Cf. Cox’s critique of treating ‘technologists as technicians’ above.
This is explored in detail by another member of the OEG, Paul Kaiser in Kaiser (2004): ‘you also collaborate with your materials, onto which you do not
simply impose your vision, but rather discover it there… The responsive and
even intelligent quality of our “material” (ie, the program itself) deepened
my sense of tools and materials as active collaborating agents. Who can
doubt that this sort of man/machine collaboration will only intensify in the
future?’
Also on the comparison with the film director, Feingold explained: ‘… in
the sense that we talk about it in art, in a way again I use the analogy of a
film, people have roles, and who would call the film theirs, generally the
director…. yes there are a lot of people that worked on it, but you would say
that this is a new film by so and so, Jean Luc Godard has made this film. We
know that he had camera people, lighting people, sound people, make up,
costume, sets you know people who were moving the equipment around
and who drove the trucks to bring it from one location to another. People
who made the food you know, people who edited it, people who made the
copies and who distributed it, but still we say this is a film by Jean Luc Godard.’ Another analogy that Feingold used is with the position of a writer of a
literary work, who may rely on the skill of those with knowledge of type-setting, yet will still be accepted as the author of the book: ‘the analogy I might
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use is if you are going to do an old fashioned book, where you have to take it
to a printing-press, and you needed someone to set the type. So they might
suggest using Baskerville instead of Times New Roman for the book because
it is going to read better or because the ink sits in the paper better, or they
might suggest a certain binding or page size or something like that. And
you would rely on their experience and their ingenuity to present you with
choices and I like making choices, I like it when someone would say “we
could do it like this or like that”, and then I’d say “oh, that’s good, what about
doing it like that?” And then they’d say “oh I can do it like this” or “I can’t do
that”, and if it wasn’t possible we would come up with a solution.’
This is most likely a reference to the fourth ‘fair use’ factor set out in Section
107 US Copyright Code, which requires the court to consider, amongst other
things, ‘the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.’
See also Popper, 2007, p. 1, after terming developments in the relationship between ‘art’ and ‘technology’ as giving rise to ‘virtual art’: ‘virtual art
represents a new departure – new in its… emphasis on interactivity, its
philosophical attitude toward the real and the virtual, and its multisensorial
outlook.’
In 2010 Hersmann Leeson received a ‘ddaa’ lifetime achievement award
from the Museum of Digital Arts, Berlin.
To quote the example that Glazier gives: ‘Jane is stuck in the woods, should
she go in the direction of that rock or follow that frog, and then you click on it.’
Martha Woodmansee commented, at the advent of the internet, as follows:
‘More significant… however is that hypertext can be interactive; and when
the reader begins actively to intervene in the text, adding to, subtracting
from, and modifying it from his or her keyboard, the boundaries between
author and reader disintegrate…. By contributing… the reader becomes
an overt collaborator…’ (Woodmansee, 1994, p. 26). Cf. in particular to Nechvatal, quoted above.
The passage continues: ‘A main thread in your new book, and the reason
that you stress the biographical details of the artists, I believe, is your desire
to show how technology is – or can be – humanized through art.’
Ricketson was considering the implications for authorship of the expansion
of copyright subject matter to include ‘computer programs’ as a category
of ‘literary work’ as well as the UK’s protection of ‘computer generated
works’ (defined under by s.178 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act
1988 as works for which there is ‘no human author’). He presented this as a
challenge of the ‘machine age’ and stemming from ‘a fundamental dispute
about the nature and meaning of the concept of authorship.’ (Ricketson,
1991-2, p.1 and 2). For a discussion of how the computer programmer was
presented in the interviews and how this compares to copyright concepts of
‘authorship’ of software, see Cooper (2012).
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‘And you say that you… feel that you have “ownership” over the work, why
do you feel that way? Well, because it is a product of my mind and something that I worked hard to produce. It is my labour… I do this work out of
interest and passion and it is incorrect and unethical to use the work if I am
not consulted or if it’s used against how I’ve chosen to license the work or
how I want it to be used. As far as I understand, under copyright law, it is
illegal as well.’
Speaking through his translator, Herbert Franke commented as follows:
‘does Herbert consider his work to be his property? Yes. It is his work and
in this sense it is his property, yes. And what is it that makes him feel that
it is his property? Because it is his creational work…. It’s his intellectual
property.’
Unlike Miltos Manetas (see above), Nelson accepted that these licensing
transactions were dependent on copyright.
Another example is Michael Mandiberg. He is well known for his ‘appropriation’ work www.afterSherrieLevine.com which enables visitors to the site
to print off copies of digital photographs which he took of photographs by
Walker Evans (1903-1975), as a means of playing with the concept of ‘reproduction’, explored in the analogue environment by Sherrie Levine. Yet, other
aspects of his work fall firmly within the copyright framework through his
use of attribution Creative Commons or GPL licences. This is well illustrated
by his response to a comment left on his page entitled ‘Michael Mandiberg
– Three Creative Commons Case Studies’ at http://vimeo/6303349 (accessed 19 August 2011) which complained that the problem of ‘open source’
projects was that others ‘use them “word for word”’ and then ‘credit themselves’. Mandiberg replied by invoking the legal framework: ‘but they have to
credit you, and keep the code GPL licensed. If they don’t they are breaking
the contract of the GPL. How you choose to remedy that situation is up for
debate (a polite email to their creative director, calling them out publicly, or
getting lawyered up)… it is imperative that these covenants are kept. And
that requires us to force the issue when someone breaks the covenant.’
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Creativity and the sense of collective
ownershipin theatre and popular music
Jostein Gripsrud
If one asks people what they think of when hearing the expression ‘the artist
at work’, the chances are overwhelmingly that they will picture a painter in
front of his (rather than her) canvas or a writer alone at a desk or table where
there is a piece of paper, a typewriter or a computer. What lies behind this, is
of course the Romanticist idea of the artist as an individual with particular
expressive needs and gifts. The simple historical fact that much or perhaps
even most art has routinely been created by more than one person – from
the work of Michelangelo’s assistants to the creation of performances and
orchestral concerts – has not significantly altered this standard image of
the lone creator. The image even pops up in recent arguments that digital
technologies are challenging it (cf., e.g. Woodmansee, 1994, p. 25) – as if it
had not been challenged already by actual artistic practices.
Clearly, to the extent that such an individualistic notion of creative
practice underlies copyright law, a critical look at how art is actually made
may be useful with a view to possible sensible revisions of such laws. On
the other hand, even when the production of art takes a collective form,
the individuals involved may still think of themselves and their work in
terms of the Romantic image of artistic creation, regardless of the extent
to which this is adequate.
With this as a background, the purpose of the research presented here
has been to investigate empirically how practising artists, in art forms where
production is predominantly of a collective nature, feel and think about the
nature of their contribution to the finished whole. More precisely, the idea
is to explore to which extent those involved in the collective production of
art have a sense or feeling of ownership vis-a-vis the outcome of the creative
process, and what they think this might entail in terms of financial and
other rewards. On this basis, I wish to raise some questions regarding the
role of current copyright law in relation to actual artistic practices.
Norwegian law closely follows copyright laws of other Nordic countries as
these have traditionally developed copyright policy in cooperation. Because
of Norway’s membership in EFTA, the large body of EU copyright norms
is also implemented in Norwegian copyright law (see G. Karnell, 2012).
Both in theatre and music the roles of creative contributors are governed
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by either copyright law (copyright in a play, set design, costume design,
choreographies, and other works of authorship) or so-called neighbouring
rights for performing artists (visual, musical, dance). Rights of performing
artists are typically limited and centre on their right to authorise the recording of their performance. Subsequent copying and distribution of such
recordings also requires their authorisation. Unlike authors protected under
copyright law proper however, the law does not give them a claim against
adaptations or copying of the performance by other performers. That is,
rights only rest in a particular recording of their performance, not in the
performance as such. The director of a play has, from a legal point of view,
a less clear position. In the intellectual property landscape, the director
seems situated between authorship (creating a work) and performance. The
details of the legal distinctions made in black letter laws do not necessarily
feature in contractual practices.
Imagining that perceptions of and practices relating to these matters
might vary from one form of collective art to another, I decided to look
more closely at production practices in two very different arts: Professional
theatre and popular music, both professional and semi-professional. Theatre
is an art form with ancient origins that still relatively low-tech in terms of
production, relying almost completely on live performances before a public
assembled in the same space at the same time. Popular music certainly also
has ancient origins, but it has to a much greater degree become a relatively
high-tech art form in several respects: Its history over the last 100 years is
closely related to modern (and changing) technologies of recording, reproduction and distribution and it now relies to a great extent on electronic
equipment also for the composing as well as for the live performance of
musical works. A comparison between the two arts may thus be interesting
also in terms of how very different forms of production, distribution and
consumption might influence how participants in the respective creative
processes experience their contributions and their relationship to them.
The data was gathered in two periods – October/November 2011 and
March/April 2013. The first of these periods was mainly devoted to the study
of theatre. I observed rehearsals of a play by Australian playwright Alan
Bovell, When the Rain Stops Falling, at the public repertory theatre in Bergen,
Norway, Den Nationale Scene (‘The National Stage’), and I did very loosely
structured interviews with a middle-aged male actor, Stig Amdam, and a
young female actress, Ida Cecilie Klem, the female art director (scenograf ),
Siri Langdalen, and the male director (regissør, iscenesetter) Svein Sturla
Hungnes. I also interviewed the theatre’s male director at the time, previously and currently a nationally prominent actor, Bjarte Hjelmeland, and an
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experienced playwright, who is also one of Norway’s most acclaimed poets,
Cecilie Løveid. As for popular music, I interviewed Mats Lyngstad Willassen
and Aksel Gaupås Johansen, two amateur musicians in their twenties with
some experience of contributions to the professional music scene (mainly
record productions) in October/November of 2011 and then, in March/April
of 2013 a leading, very internationally-oriented male owner of record labels
and a management agency in Bergen, Mikal Telle, plus two professional
musicians, Frank Hovland and Eirik Glambek Bøe, and a (female) singer
and producer with considerable professional experience, Kate Augestad. In
terms of genres, the interviewees represented a broad variety of popular
musical forms, including rap, r&b, largely acoustic pop, rock, electronica and
jazz. I further studied the media coverage of and documents pertaining to a
recent (February 2013) court case in Bergen over the rights to two electronic
pop songs associated with the internationally renowned group Röyksopp.
The following account of my findings is organised around three key
questions: (1) What is the nature of collaborative creative work in these two
art forms – how is it organised, which structures or relations of power can
be discerned? (2) What are the current copyright regimes like in theatre and
music respectively? (3) Do copyright issues influence creative processes,
and if so, how? But I will start out by sketching the Romantic notion of
artistic creation against which the specificities of collective authorship
are to be interpreted.

The Romantic notion of artistic creation
The modern understanding of artistic work as ‘creation’ has a long prehistory,
but basic elements in its present form were established in the 18th century
and decisively shaped by representatives of the Romantic movement in the
arts from the late 18th century on.
It is on the one hand tied to spiritual, i.e. religious, thinking, in that it links
artistic creation to the original divine creation of the world out of nothing
(cf. the notion of inspiration from above). According to the Romantic German author Novalis, for example, artistic creation is ‘as much an end in itself
as the divine creation of the universe, and one as original and grounded
on itself as the other: because the two are one, and God reveals himself in
the poet as he gives himself corporeal form in the visible universe’ (cited in
Taylor, 1985, p. 230). As once pointed out by Danish literary scholar Morten
Thing (1973), many portraits of poets in the Romantic period show them
looking upward into the air rather then downward on the piece of paper
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they are supposed to write on. The religious understanding lingers in the
many statements by much more current artists who describe themselves as
the mouthpieces of a muse or some other extra-worldly force. For instance,
John Lennon is said to have distinguished between the songs he wrote just
to complete an album, and the ‘real music … the music of the spheres, the
music that surpasses understanding … I’m just a channel … I transcribe it
like a medium’ (Negus and Pickering, 2004, p. 3, citing Waters, 1988).
On the other hand, the Romantic idea of authorship also attributed
creativity to the psychology of the artist. The voice of the spirit, also known
as the voice of Nature, was to be found within the individual artist. As put by
Keith Negus and Michael Pickering, the artist was seen ‘as someone whose
‘inner’ voice emerges from self-exploration and whose expressive power
derives from imaginative depth’ (ibid., p. 4). They argue that artistic creation
has since ‘become synonymous with this sense of exploration and expressive
power’, but also note that this understanding has exerted considerable
‘influence over the development of the trend towards subject-centredness in
modern culture, along with the accompanying ideal of authenticity’ (ibid.).
Importantly, it is also inextricably linked to the modern notion of the
individual, which underpinned not least the pioneering declarations
of human rights in the late 18th century. American historian Lynn Hunt
(2007) has convincingly argued that these declarations were fundamentally
marked by Western élites’ experience of reading epistolary novels such
as those by Samuel Richardson, primarily Pamela: Or, Virtue Rewarded
(1740) and Clarissa: Or, The History of a Young Lady (1748), and Jean Jacques
Rousseau: Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse (1761). These inspired empathy across
divisions between nations, classes and genders, based on an understanding
of an ‘inner life’ that all humans have in common in spite of differences.
Rousseau’s novel has, along with much else of his work, been regarded
as a source of inspiration for Romanticist criticism and thinking more
generally. What the understanding of the artist’s creativity is tied to is thus
no less than the tenets of our modern understanding of the individual, of
subjectivity, of the self. One cannot simply declare it dead – it won’t lie
down since it is thoroughly bound to fundamentals of (Western, at least)
civilization.
Even the structuralist and post-structuralist critiques of Romantic notions of authorship can be seen as moving around in the same old paradigm.
They have (officially) refused to accept that authors are ‘ventriloquists who
speak through their works’, i.e. the psychological dimension of authorship
according to Romanticism; instead they cast them ‘in the role of dummy,
manipulated by the hidden hands of language’ (Murdock, 1993, p.131). ‘Lan-
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guage’ or the total ‘Text’, in principle consisting of all texts ever produced,
has taken the place of the external, higher spiritual powers that inspired
artists in the Romantic understanding. I for my part think it is simply naïve
to take eminent French structuralist and post-structuralist writers such as
Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault in complete earnest when they argue
for ‘the death of the author’:
It is particularly ironic that Barthes, who insisted so forcefully on the
death of the author, should have taken so much care to develop a voice
that is instantly recognisable as his. While this is entirely understandable
in the context of Parisian intellectual life, where style is a decisive weapon
in the struggle for ascendency, it hardly squares with his stress on the
relative autonomy of textual codes. If Barthes served a life sentence in
the prison house of language, his works strive remarkably hard to give
the impression that he is out on parole’ (ibid.).

What all of this entails is that artistic creation is undeniably and irreversibly
tied to culturally ingrained notions of individuals and their interiority –
their experience, sentiments and knowledge – their subjectivity. We can
hardly envision it otherwise, in practice. We are moderns, and therefore
in a sense Romanticists, to some extent. However, if authorship, in the
Romantic understanding, remains fundamentally tied to the individual,
how can we then understand collective creativity, collective creation of
works of art? Is it possible at all?

Creation in the collective arts: theatre
The production of a theatre performance in today’s publicly funded repertory theatres in Norway is a rather complex affair, involving a number of
decisions made at different levels of the organisation. First, the theatre’s
director, who is responsible for its repertoire, selects a certain play from
the vast list of options, ranging from international and national classics to
current or recent pieces available in the market. In some rare instances, a
play might also be ordered from a particular playwright whose talent the
theatre director trusts. Having made a choice, and signed a contract, the
theatre director then chooses a director (regissør, iscenesetter – in French
‘metteur en scène’) for the play. The theatre director is thus a key person
in what appears like a pyramidal structure of power. In the context of
copyright, however, it is worth mentioning that theatres, contrary to film
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production companies, do not have any formal rights to their own productions in Norway, say, in the case of recordings or transmissions.1
The director of Den National Scene, born and raised in the Bergen area,
was near the end of his successful four-year term when he chose to have
When the Rain Stops Falling staged. He turned 41 in the autumn of 2011, and
could already look back on a long and varied career in Norwegian theatres.
Having decided already very young that he wanted to become an actor and
not a rock star as he originally had dreamed of (he played in a few bands as
a teenager and in fact released a country music CD recorded in Nashville,
Tennessee, in 2008), he chose a high school offering drama as a specialty
at 16. He entered the school but he almost immediately ‘ran away with
the circus’, as he put it, i.e. he left school and joined a touring group at the
regional theatre. He says he had set aside several years for preparing his
entry to the national school of acting in Oslo, but was accepted at his first
try when he was only 17 – much too early in his view: He was not mature
enough to make proper use of what the school offered. He ‘entered the school
as a natural talent and left it as a natural talent with a poor education’, he
said. But his barely cooked talent was evidently much appreciated and
he was given a variety of important roles early on. After only a few years
he ended up in the most prestigious of Norwegian theatres, the National
Theatre in Oslo.
After developing very much as an actor there, he was given together with
two other young actors, the responsibility of running the National Theatre’s
branch Torshovteatret, which is situated in a working class area of Oslo in
the process of being gentrified. They did so successfully, both in terms of
critical acclaim and audience numbers, for a few years. Having been warned
by friends not to get stuck in the safety of the grand old theatre institution,
he then joined a group of freelancing comedians, Lompelandslaget, where
he also contributed to the writing of sketches and gags, before returning
to Nationaltheatret where he again took on several high profile roles. He
was continuing the practice of participating in outside projects, including
at least one in Copenhagen, and also worked as a director of several plays.
Wanting to realise his interest in (and previous experience of) selecting a
repertoire in a regular repertory public theatre, he applied for the job of
Director at the Theatre in his hometown and got the job.
The point of telling this story in such detail is to show how this artist’s
successful career indicates the importance of a strong ‘natural talent’
combined with a daredevil’s taste for new challenges and risky choices – of
several sorts: Early on he went public with his being gay (useful not least
since his appearance is far from the stereotypes of gay men); and he is
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probably the only director of a high culture institution anywhere in the
world to have released a country music CD when in office. He has done
practically every possible type of role in the theatre, including drag show
characters. He said his engagement with every role probably made him a
demanding collaborator for directors, since he would argue quite hard for
his own conception of the character if it differed from the director’s. His
interest in directing came from his interest in the interpretation of a play
as a whole, and his interest in directing a whole theatre sprang in a related
way from his interest in public theatre as an institution, in negotiating the
demands for artistic quality on the one hand and popular entertainment on
the other. Typically, at the time I interviewed him, in January 2012, he was
in the process of co-writing a character-based one-man show with strong
elements of stand-up comedy – which ended up commercially successful.
What all of this also entails is that his choice, both of the play When the Rain
Stops Falling and the person who was to direct it, was very well informed.
While he had at other times chosen to give quite inexperienced people a
chance to direct a play, several times having to step in himself to make a
performance work toward the end of rehearsals, he knew this Australian
play was so demanding there was a need for a highly competent, strong
director.
A theatre director is as a rule of course not (unless there is some major
crisis) directly involved in the practical creative process leading to the
actual performance. Neither normally is the playwright: In my interview
with the experienced poet and playwright Cecilie Løveid, who started her
writing career in her teens, she described the organisation of the production of a play as a ‘Christmas tree’ where the director is the star at the
top – the playwright is expected only to look at the tree from a distance.
She or he is normally not consulted when changes are made in the original
manuscript.
The director of the play is the star of the Christmas tree because he or she
is expected to ‘translate’ the written text into an on-stage, live performance.
This involves developing a thorough, coherent interpretation of the text in
question as a whole, based on an analysis of its concrete motif(s), its thematic
content (i.e. its key conflict(s)), its narrative (if any) and its characters. It is
by way of this analytical and interpretive work that the director then arrives
at decisions on how to realise the text’s potentials in the most artistically
rewarding way: What are the play’s most important elements and how can
they best be communicated to the theatre’s public? What will this entail
in terms of the visual aspects of a performance, i.e. the décor, the ways in
which characters move and gesticulate, the way the stage is lit and so on?
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How should the play sound, i.e. what sounds are to be involved outside of
the characters’ voices, how should these voices be used?
The Norwegian Intellectual Property Law (Åndsverksloven) mentions
in its list of examples of protected works in section 1: ‘stage works, both
dramatic and musical-dramatic as well as choreographic works and pantomimes, and radio plays’ (my translation of ‘sceneverk, så vel dramatiske og
musikkdramatiske som koreografiske verk og pantomimer, samt hørespill’).
The specific roles of directors and scenographers are not mentioned in
the law. But according to the standard agreement concerning the work of
directors and scenographers/costume designers in Norwegian theatre2, any
particular staging of a play is the director’s ‘property’ and cannot be used
again after two years of the original staging unless the director agrees and is
compensated again. This agreement is between the national association of
orchestras and theatres (NTO) on the one hand and the national organisations of ‘stage directors’ and scenographers and applies to both categories
whether in permanent positions or hired for a particular staging. Amateur
theatres hiring professional directors and scenographers are to follow the
agreement as well. Interestingly, the director I interviewed seemed not
to be aware of his legal rights to his conception and solutions; he seemed
only to think of moral rights: He thought of what he regarded as a German
copy or near copy of his Norwegian outdoor staging of Ibsen’s Peer Gynt as
immoral rather than illegal.
In the course of this work, the director will most often make changes in
the playwright’s text. The current agreement between Norwegian theatres
and dramatists3 states in point C 5 (‘Alterations in the work’) that ‘[t]he
theatre cannot make significant changes in the work except by agreement
with the dramatist’. What ‘significant’ means is not clarified there, but
two of my informants mentioned what appears to be a rule of thumb: The
director may delete or otherwise change up to 30 per cent of the drama text
without consulting the playwright. In practice, the counting of percentages
never takes place, and in the production I studied, it is likely that much more
was deleted or altered in other ways – and this is not an extraordinary case.
I asked the director how he would react if the playwright showed up and
protested these changes. ‘I would lose all respect for him.’ The director was
very much convinced that the changes he had introduced vastly improved
the play.
This strong confidence in his own interpretation and aesthetic judgement
is also clearly useful when the set design is to be discussed with the scenographer. While the scenographer has her or his own artistic competence
and ideas, it is the director’s comprehensive vision of the performance as a
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whole that must guide the design job. It is most probably quite normal to do
as the director and scenographer did in the case at hand, i.e. meet early on
and several times later for discussions on how to solve questions raised by
the director’s interpretation. This may well entail forgetting much or most
of the playwright’s descriptions of the space in which the action takes place.
In the case I studied, the director selected an experienced scenographer
he knew and whose previous work he knew and liked. In other words, he
chose a scenographer he knew he could cooperate well with and whose
creative contributions would be likely to support and possibly improve his
own ideas. While the scenographer obviously contributes significantly in
her or his own right, it still seems reasonable to say the director has the
upper hand in this relationship.
The director also most certainly has the upper hand in the relationship
with the play’s actors. Not only is it the director who selects which actors
he wants to work with (choosing mostly from among the public repertory
theatre’s regular staff), the director also almost totally controls the interaction that takes place during rehearsals. As I followed two rehearsals on
When the Rain Stops Falling, I was very impressed with the thoroughness
of the director’s preparations – and his instructions to the actors addressed
their performance in minute detail.
The original manuscript had not only been cut and altered in other ways,
it had also been segmented in small bits, each of which seemed to carry a
particular significance related to the overall conception of the play. The
director required not only certain movements across the stage, not only
particular ways in which the actors should position themselves vis-à-vis
each other, not only particular intonations of lines – he also had particular
ideas on arm movements and other gestures much as a choreographer of a
dance performance would have.
Both the director himself and the actors I interviewed were well aware
that this directorial style would be located quite far toward an authoritarian
pole in an imaginable spectrum of such styles, which vary greatly from
one director to another. I was told stories of directors who would start the
rehearsal period with exercises reminiscent of psychodrama or related
practices – also instances of the power awarded to the directorial function,
one might add – but then, during the actual rehearsals would be much
more open to the creative contributions of the actors involved. This is not
to say, however, that the director in my case study did not allow for such
contributions, there were very short discussions and occasional signs of
disagreement, but on the whole the actors appeared to be held on a pretty
tight leash.
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Given the above, my interviews with actors were not least about the
ways in which they experienced their ability to actually contribute creatively to the final shape of the performance. Interestingly, it turned out
that both the young female and the middle-aged male actor I talked to
were also artistically active in other media – the female was painting and
the male was writing, predominantly drama. This gave them a basis for
comparing the space for creativity in the two artistic professions. They
both commented on the ways in which the very strict directorial style I had
observed limited their possibilities for co-creativity. But they still insisted
that there was a space for them (albeit minimal) in which to manoeuvre,
through ideas they had accepted by the director and through (attempted)
protests where their own understanding of their role conflicted with that of
the director. Still, compared with the freedom experienced when painting
or writing, they also agreed that the space for creativity was very limited
for an actor.
In fact, the limitations of the role of actor was a primary reason why the
director had decided to quit his long, varied and critically acclaimed acting
career in stage drama, film and television. He talked about his interest in
being an actor as if it were a youthful folly; it was definitely something he
‘grew out of’. He was for a while, he said, the sort of argumentative actor
he himself now hated to work with. The middle-aged male actor’s attitude
seemed akin to this – his artistic interest was increasingly in his activity
as a playwright. The acting was still of considerable interest, but it was
perhaps more importantly what paid for his bread and butter. The young
actress also treasured the freedom she experienced when painting, but she
was, not surprisingly, less inclined than the middle-aged actor to think of
an end to her acting career for this reason.
The scenographer (born 1957) had a solid education. She first studied at
the Academy of Fine Arts and Design in Oslo, originally in furniture design,
but early on oriented herself toward scenography, also doing stage design
for student productions at the Opera School in Oslo while still a student
herself. In order to perfect her skills she took a year of painting classes in
the same school after her diploma, before embarking on her career as a
scenographer at various Norwegian theatres. She also did work in film
and television and was, about 25 years ago, hired in a regular position in
the public broadcaster NRK’s drama division. Since then (2000–01), she
also studied film and production design in film and television in London.
Regularly taking unpaid leaves of absence between NRK productions she
has worked on a large number of theatre productions and other projects
over the years.
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The scenographer described her contribution to the production of When
the Rain Stops Falling as an original idea she arrived at having read the play.
She brought it to her first meeting with the director, who she knew well
from previous collaboration. He also brought some sketches and ideas to the
first meeting, but quickly agreed to work with her proposal. She saw their
relation as one between equals, but conceded that in case of a conflict, his
opinion would be decisive: ‘it was his production’. Somewhat surprisingly,
she seemed not to be aware she had any legal rights to her scenography,
which she has in accordance with the same agreement as directors. She had,
however, in fact exercised her (moral) rights, for example when refusing the
use of props she had designed for particular drama productions outside of
the original context in NRK television programs.
The scenographer thought of herself explicitly as an artist, doing creative
work much like any other visual artist. She was constantly working on
new ideas – also for plays not yet written! This free artistic work might
one day be exhibited. But she also saw some of her stage designs for actual
performances as installations that could well deserve exhibition as standalone visual art and might one day choose to concentrate on work as an
independent visual artist. She was, however, very content with her present
situation, especially since she was able to take on such different projects:
Between two major productions of television drama, she would soon after
my interview travel to Greenland to do the scenography for an Inuit dance
performance.
The two major differences between her work as a scenographer and work
as a free visual artist were first, that it involved a lot of communication
with other people involved in a production and might include that changes
to her original ideas were made necessary by other people’s opinions (the
director’s in particular) and, second, that she had to work within much
tighter time frames: a production process, whether in film, television or
theatre involves a large number of people and is very expensive – all of
these people can’t be asked to wait around while she refine her ideas. A
scenographer is simply a team member and must adapt her work to the
organisation of the production process.
As for the question of the relationship of copyright to artistic creativity
in the theatre, it is well worth noting the following: All of those interviewed
decided early on in their lives that they wanted a career in the theatre or
related arts. The issue of copyright law appears marginal at best to all, with
the possible exception of the playwright, while the copying – more or less –
of someone else’s work or ideas was morally condemnable, not comme il faut
in any of the involved arts or professions. An exception worth mentioning
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here is the theatre director’s opinion that if he saw a performance he liked
and someone said the staging had been stolen from London, he couldn’t
care less: What works well, works well. When I mentioned this position to
the CEO of the Association of Norwegian Theatres and Orchestras, he said
the theatre director thought like that because he is ‘a theatre animal’. What
the theatre director did, however, was take the point of view of the audience.
Maybe this ability is what basically defines a true ‘theatre animal’?
The alleged copying of the director’s staging of Peer Gynt in Germany did
not lead to his hiring a lawyer to punish those involved. The scenographer
said it would be damaging to the reputation of someone in her profession
to be caught replicating solutions successful in London or elsewhere. Both
seemed unaware of – or at least did not mention – the rights they had to any
performance they produced according to the standard agreement I referred
to above. I had myself, at the time of the interviews, the impression that
the director’s work did not have any copyright protection while the work
of the scenographer did. This misunderstanding was expressed in some of
my questions to the director, the scenographer and the theatre director
but not corrected by any of them. This low level of awareness, knowledge
and interest in copyright law, in addition to the strong impression they all
conveyed of being driven into the arts by wishes, desires and dreams that
were at work no matter what the legal status of their work would be, may
be said in itself to testify to the modest importance of copyright protection
of creative work in the arts for creativity itself.

Creaton in the collective arts: popular music
Music is as old as mankind, but popular music is a considerably younger
phenomenon if a distinction between folk and popular music is accepted. Common usage of the term popular music refers to music in the age of mass communication, and developed at first through the mass distribution of printed
songs and sheet music. In England, it has been estimated that popular music
in this sense replaced traditional folk music in many areas before the mid-19th
century.4 Since the introduction of recorded music in the early 20th century,
this has been a primary medium for the production and distribution of popular
music. The use of various kinds of sound technologies in live performances
has also been a characteristic of popular music, even if acoustic instruments
and singing has retained a place within the field. The recording of popular
music was for decades little more than the quite straightforward recording
of studio performances, but this changed decidedly in the mid-1960s when
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The Beatles – in an interesting sort of dialogue with serious contemporary
music’s experiments – made the studio itself a laboratory and instrument for
new sounds, new forms of musical expression. Technological developments
since then have made significant parts of modern popular music more or less
unimaginable without advanced electronic and digital technologies in composition processes, production, recording, distribution and live performances.
Over the last ten to fifteen years, digital technologies have radically
changed the ways in which most popular music is produced and especially
distributed. Outside of the folk and singer-songwriter genres, it has always
been a collective enterprise, but with digital technology the possibilities for
cooperation in a variety of forms grew tremendously. Music began to consist
of pieces assembled from a multitude of sources, anything from everyday
sounds, bass lines, rhythmic figures and melodic motifs could be voluntarily
or involuntarily contributed by a number of creators in the form of samples or
more or less sketchy drafts or complete elements of a final recorded product.
These developments challenged previously established notions of single artists
creating musical works, perhaps with the product of a similarly single lyricist
added in songs to be performed by a singer and/or an orchestra/band. However,
the lone creator was already a somewhat problematic character in popular
music, especially since the group or band format gained hegemony in the 1960s.
Which band members actually contributed what to which songs have been the
subject of innumerable quarrels in thousands of bands worldwide since then.
In order to have a closer look at the conditions of creativity in popular
music and the conundrum of copy- and other rights in this area, I interviewed people in Bergen, Norway involved in popular music in very different
ways at very different levels and the following is a report on what I was told.
My first two interviews were with two men in their twenties both of whom
had been involved in the production of music as amateurs who occasionally
contributed to concerts and/or recordings – also recordings which generated
significant sales internationally. They both discovered the joys of music
early on, including the joys of making music – composing and writing lyrics.
One of them, Johansen, talked about playing with cassette recorders with
friends, eventually composing music with them; the other, Willassen, talked
of playing in bands and eventually discovering hip hop music, especially rap,
to which he had since devoted his musically creative energies.
They had both in more mature years – late teens, early twenties – actually
contributed bits and pieces to professional productions, as mentioned above.
One of them had, for instance, contributed beats (a sound sequence of
chords and rhythm instruments to which one writes a melody and lyrics)
to two albums in a genre located somewhere between r&b and rap, by an
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originally Canadian artist, the former opera singer Kinny, who has been
living and recording on and off in Bergen and performing and selling records
internationally.5 The other had contributed to several hip hop recordings
and performances, including rapping and singing in his northern Norwegian
dialect on a successful record where the featured artist was a Norwegian artist living in Los Angeles (Big Ice: Trunk of Funk, 2010). The very international
nature of current popular music is something I will return to shortly.
Perhaps the most relevant information to be gained from these two
interviewees in relation to the issue of copyright is their confirmation of
the perception that the motivation for productive efforts in music is not
money or careers in the music business. The love of music, perhaps certain
genres or styles in particular, is what inspires the largely playful creative
activities that take a collective form from early on. Both talked about the
sharing of musical ideas and sketches between friends via mobile phones or
via computers hooked up to the Internet. G-mail was a very useful service,
since it allowed for very large (in term of bytes) attachments that could be
stored in people’s mailboxes if necessary. Bits and pieces communicated in
this way could later form the basis for the actual making or construction
of a finished piece in a professional studio. If others used these pieces the
answer to questions of rights could vary. In some cases it would just feel
good to know they had contributed something to a piece that sounded
good. In other cases they would feel that a mentioning of their names on
the cover of the record would be sufficient compensation, adding to their
‘cred’ and self-esteem. If they felt they had contributed considerably to a
production that became commercially successful, however, they would feel
entitled to a share of the profits. But such success is very hard to foresee,
and the money to be derived from a success at the level in question would
be limited anyway, so generally neither of the two were very concerned
about the issue of rights.
I also talked to a mature professional musician, Frank Hovland, born
1962, whose main instrument is the electric bass but who is also a singer
and songwriter who has worked extensively as a record producer. He has
been a leading member of a number of Bergen rock groups with national
reputation, he has participated in innumerable recording sessions and one-off
band constellations, and he has over the last fifteen years toured Europe
and North America with artists such as Chris Thompson (once member of
Manfred Mann’s Earth Band and a contributor to a large number of records,
concerts and international tours with celebrity artists besides his own career)
and Terje Rypdal (globally acclaimed Norwegian jazz guitarist with a rock
background). Hovland agreed with my two younger interviewees that money
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was not the motivation for his embarking on a musical career, and money or
sales would never be the basic motivation for his creation of songs and writing
of lyrics. Once a song was written, however, and especially when it had been
recorded, things were different. For Hovland, when music becomes a full-time
profession, money and issues of rights are certainly not without interest.
When playing the bass as a member of the orchestra at the city’s public
repertory theatre, or in recording sessions where other musicians realised
their projects, Hovland was okay with a regular salary or, in the latter case, a
one-off honorarium. He mentioned that this would be normal also for session
musicians in studios where world famous stars record their material, even if
it is often these musicians and their ideas that make these records interesting
and successful. But his work as a composer and writer of songs was something
else. In some cases, he did everything himself – and would of course expect
the complete rights to such a musical and lyrical piece of work. But he also
provided an example of a somewhat more complicated process: A friend had
approached him with something he had created – a drum pattern, a couple of
guitar riffs, a vague idea of a form. But there was no melody and no lyrics. My
interviewee wrote a melody and lyrics for the song and so wanted the rights
for music and lyrics attributed to him. The guy who came with the bits and
pieces actually only provided key elements of the arrangement of the song,
and so he should settle for arrangement rights, the bass player and songwriter
thought. But his collaborator protested: There would have been no song had he
not approached the bass player with his drum pattern, riffs and formal ideas,
or, perhaps there would have been a quite different song written by himself.
‘There was a bit of shouting and teeth-grinding, but we arrived at a 50/50 share
of all rights to the song.’ The reason for this was of course social – he referred
to this solution as ‘doing a Lennon-McCartney’: They both wanted to remain
friends and collaborators on future projects, and a struggle over who did what
on this particular song should not be allowed to jeopardise this.
This sort of solution is quite common in bands, since it is common knowledge that struggles over who contributes most to what in a production are
also among the most common reasons for bands – and friendships – breaking
up. I also interviewed one member of the Bergen based duo Kings of Convenience, Eirik Glambek Bøe, who have sold over one million copies of their three
first albums and are among the most streamed artists in services such as
Spotify6. Their success internationally has lead to their touring the world,
e.g. all over South America and in several Asian countries such as Indonesia
– and they recently received an invitation to do a gig in Ulan Bator: ‘You guys
should come to Mongolia, people love you here’. My interviewee admitted
there had been a lot of quarrelling between the two partners over the years,
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but that they had arrived at a 50/50 share of the rights for all songs – ‘even
if I would argue that the correct figures would be 60 for me and 40 for him,
and he would, given his character, probably say 70 for him and 30 for me’.
Income from the use of their recordings in movies and advertising would
consequently always be equally shared. Concert revenues, that constitute
the major part of the duo’s income, would of course always be split 50/50.
These musicians thus saw the issue of rights as partly distinct from the
question of who contributed what to the creation of a piece of music: They
may maintain a special feeling in relation to some songs as being their
offspring, so to speak, but handle the question of legal and economic rights
in a pragmatic manner.The actual act of artistic creation is one thing, rights
and income something else.
Further underlining this distinction is the complex area where the music
industry operates between musicians and their audiences. I interviewed a
key person in Bergen popular music, Mikal Telle, who started his career at
nineteen, in 1995, when he opened a shop in the city centre exclusively for vinyl records – the shop was called Primitive Records – some three years after
the CD had (seemingly) completely taken over the market. The shop became
a hangout for young people seriously interested in music and eventually,
in 1998, he started a record label – the first of several, one for each genre
or style. The background for this was that he discovered his international
suppliers of records could also function as distributors for vinyl records
produced in Bergen. He had no contracts and made only about 500 copies of
each. Working exclusively from his social capital (his economic capital was
close to zero) and his gut feeling for interesting music (he has no musical
education, plays no instrument) he became the key person behind a series
of Bergen-based bands and artists, several of which have had national and
not least international success – among the artists who originally launched
their international careers through his tiny labels are Röyksopp and Kings
of Convenience.7 He is currently concentrating mostly on the management
of a number of artists, mostly people who are up-and-coming.
The experience Telle has with negotiations on all levels and in all areas
of the music business makes him an interesting source on rights issues. He
talked, for instance, about the need for bands to accept very meagre deals
with major record companies in exchange for the distribution and attention
such deals may provide, crucial not least in today’s business where live
performance is the major source of income for most if not all musicians.
According to Telle, Norwegian musicians in general are inclined to be too inflexible in rights issues for their own good, i.e. they would intuitively refuse
record deals that give the lion’s share to an international record company
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even if the deal would move them up to a different league internationally.
Composers of a song would not always themselves think of sharing a bit, e.g.
a third, of their rights with the other members of their band for the sake of
peace and collective creativity. So a part of his job as a manager would be to
convince his clients through discussions of the benefits of strategic thinking
in this area. Still, as evidenced in my interview with Frank Hovland, the
bass player, as well as in the interview with Eirik Glambek Bøe, one of the
two members of Kings of Convenience, pragmatic solutions to such issues
are not at all alien to the musicians themselves: They mostly arrive at them
without the intervention of a manager.
Solutions such as an equal 50/50 split of revenues are probably easier to arrive at when there is (relatively) little money at stake, though. Furthermore
there may be cases where a composer may grant rights to someone because
he or she feels under pressure from a record producer or manager with
some sort of hold on them. This is indicated also by a high profile lawsuit
in Bergen in February 2013 concerning publishing rights to a particular
Röyksopp song. The history behind the case is complex and it is impossible
here to go into the details of the court proceedings and the decision. But
for our purposes the following summary, based on Röyksopp’s view of the
case, confirmed in court, should suffice.8
When the members of the duo Röyksopp were still teenagers and living
in the northern Norwegian city of Tromsø, they were perceived as electronica musicians with remarkable talents by a considerably older DJ, Rune
Lindbæk, who also participated in the popular music milieu there. They
formed a band/group where Lindbæk became a leading member because of
his contacts and management skills – he had ideas concerning sound and
marketing, but never produced a melody or anything else that was musically important. His younger partners later discovered that he had credited
himself as one of the composers for every piece of music he registered with
the Norwegian musical rights organisation TONO.
When living in Oslo in the late 90s, one of Röyksopp’s later members,
Torbjørn Brundtland, recorded songs for an album and Lindbæk was present
in the studio some of the time. A particular song, ‘Lift’, was already more or
less created in Brundtland’s head when he arrived at the studio one morning,
and the recording of it was almost done when Lindbæk showed up. Lindbæk
suggested there should be a ‘take off’ effect, with no further specification,
when the last part of the song started after a ‘breakdown’, but otherwise
contributed nothing. He used to repeat ‘nothing leaves this studio without
me being credited as composer’, and so the song ‘Lift’ was registered with
TONO with him as one of its creators. The real creator was at that point so
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tired of Lindbæk and his practices that he moved to Bergen where he teamed
up with his old Tromsø friend Svein Berge to form Röyksopp.
A first single, ‘So Easy’, was released on one of Mikal Telles’ local labels,
and led to Röyksopp being signed by the international company Wall of
Sound Recordings (according to Mikal Telle, he told Wall of Sound to talk to
the musicians directly, wanting nothing for himself). Eventually, their major
international hit, the album Melody AM was released. One of the tracks on
this album was called ‘A Higher Place’. Years later, Rune Lindbæk approached
Röyksopp and wanted to be paid for his composer’s rights in that track,
arguing that it was a near copy of the song ‘Lift’ that Brundtland had recorded
in Oslo back in 1998. He pointed to two elements in the song as his creations,
one of them the ‘take off’ before the last part of the song, the other a melodic
motif. After a number of attempts to get his way through e-mails and the like,
he had his story of ‘theft’ by Röyksopp told in a ten-page article in the weekend
magazine of a major national daily, DN, and then, finally, sued Röyksopp.
The court case in Bergen in February 2013 was highly publicised and
involved, among a number of witnesses and others present, Röyksopp demonstrating concretely, with all or much of their technical machinery in the
courtroom, how they go about composing a song/musical piece. The court
finally ruled in favour of Röyksopp on all accounts. The verdict contains a
highly informed and interesting piece of musical analysis that compares
the songs ‘Lift’ and ‘A Higher Place’ in detail, most probably written by one
of the two lay judges in the case, an internationally acclaimed composer of
contemporary serious electronic music, Asbjørn Schaathun.9 It concludes
that the two pieces are very different, that the idea of a ‘take off’ does not
constitute a significant contribution without any further specification, and
that the melodic motif Lindbæk claimed to have created, and which was
used in both recordings, in fact had been sampled from the work of Jean
Michel Jarre and thus was no product of Lindbæk’s.
What this case illustrates, I think, is the following points: 1) Popular music
is, at its highly creative, lower, local levels, marked by a shared, strong interest
in music and productive collaboration where the interest in issues of rights
and revenues are of anything from low to modest importance. 2) If sales take
off, though, these issues may become important. Strong feelings regarding the
moral ownership of a piece are at work also in battles that may take a juridical
form – Röyksopp had no interest in any compromise with Lindbæk. 3) Between
musicians, solutions are as a rule pragmatic, as evidenced in my interviews
with the bass player and the member of Kings of Convenience above – there has
not, to my knowledge, been a struggle over rights between the two members
of Röyksopp. 4) The verdict is of course based in copyright law, but would have
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been impossible without the solid musical competence of one of the lay judges,
since he was able to convincingly argue for the conclusion with reference to
the musical material itself. This is probably an example of the most important
place in copyright law for people in aesthetic academic disciplines: The best
of them have skills that can meaningfully analyse a piece of art and make
sustained arguments about the importance of this or that element.

Comparison and tentative conclusions
In spite of all the differences between a publicly funded repertory theatre
(‘high culture’) and the private enterprise-dominated (yet now also publicly
supported) field of popular music (‘low culture’), it seems to me that some
important similarities or parallels may be pointed out. They are tied to the
fact that both cultural arenas are marked by the persistence of a modified
version of the Romantic notion of creativity. But both are also marked by
a willingness to operate in pragmatic ways if real life conditions challenge
a clear-cut, dogmatic version of the ideal norm.
First, there are notions of talent (genius), self-realisation, self-expression
and recognition. All artists involved in both media have as a rule been drawn
to the art in question at an early age, i.e. in their teens or even as children. They
tend to experience their choice of profession as resulting from a particular gift
for such work and as something tied to quite intense pleasures experienced
when performing it. Being an artist is more so than most professions tied to
self-realisation and self-expression – and to gaining public recognition for
this. The traditional, romantic understanding of creativity lies behind this
and is further supported through its being practised in the arts.
Second, there is an undisputed distinction between creative and noncreative contributions to the realisation of a collective work of art. There
are office workers, artisans and people doing all kinds of necessary physical
labour involved who never get credited for their efforts (unlike film credits,
where every driver et cetera may be mentioned). In music, there may be
studio technicians and, ‘gofers’ and sound and lighting people at concerts
who basically do what they are told to do, and so are as a rule not counted
as creative. A record producer is mostly seen as creative, though, and there
are light designers who would be counted as creative personnel. In other
words, there are sliding scales involved in some technical functions in
spite of the apparent absoluteness of the creative/not creative distinction.
Third, related to the sliding scales just mentioned, there are hierarchies
of creativity in both fields. Actors are at or near the bottom of the theatre
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hierarchy, but are still seen as creative and in some cases highly important
to the end result of the collective process. This is roughly equivalent to the
role of ‘rank and file’ band members in a rock band where one or two people
do the writing of songs. Their creativity is invited and welcomed but they
also basically told what to do.
The scenographer is or at least may be much more independent in her or
his work than an actor and bases her or his work on an interpretation of the
dramatic text in question as a whole. The director is above the scenographer,
though, deciding which solutions the scenographer should work on or not.
It should perhaps be mentioned that the strong position of the director in
Norwegian theatre is due to it being tied to a strong continental European
tradition of a ‘director’s theatre’. Still, the tensions between the director and
the other obvious key person ‘behind’ a performance, the playwright, indicate
that the director is not necessarily at the top of the hierarchy. This may for
instance vary with the position of the playwright in the larger cultural field.
I know of no Norwegian court cases on the copyright of a director versus that
of the playwright, such as the British Brighton & Dubbeljoint v. Jones case.10
In popular music there is no exact parallel to the relation between the
director and the playwright, but there is quite a bit of similarity in the
tensions between those who created a song over who contributed the most
important part. And if, for example, the lead singer in a band also wrote
the song, he or she would be the undisputable top of the pyramid, even if
every other member of the band, as well as the producer, have thrown in a
variety of ideas as to the arrangement of the song in question.
Fourth, pragmatism in the handling of issues of rights is common in
both the theatre and in popular music. In the theatre, it was striking how
little the artists I interviewed seemed to know about their legal rights to
their work, and so they were not inclined to feel very bound by them either.
Neither were they seriously worried or irritated over a limited recognition
of their rights. The playwright’s say in the staging of a play would vary with
a number of factors, and especially with the extent to which he or she had
clout in the form of cultural and social capital.
Musicians for the most part knew more about rights than theatre people.
But this is understandable given the fact that they make a living by way
of copyright and people in the theatre don’t. Still, there is, as exemplified
above, considerable room for pragmatic solutions to disputes simply because
of the fact that maintaining friendship and productive cooperation is in
most cases seen as more important than the extra money gained from a
higher percentage of revenues from a particular song or record. A different
sort of pragmatism is involved in the negotiations between musicians and
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their administrative associates – management and record companies. This
is about strategic thinking about marketing – where the limits seem mostly
to be drawn on the basis of artistic integrity, much less on the basis of
percentages and up-front settlements.
This latter point actually leads to a final one, which concerns possible
future research in this area. It seems to me that the role of various kinds of
social power in the cultural fields is of great importance when it comes to
the actual handling of copyright issues both in theatre and in popular music,
and I see little reason why it would be much different in other art forms. The
ways in which stars can dictate conditions for their participation in both
artforms is one indication: The bass player I interviewed is highly competent
but has to accept a fixed honorarium for a job that an internationally famous
bass player might demand to be listed as co-composer for. The nature of
different kinds of bargaining power in the complex variety of music industry
contexts as well as the worlds of theatre, film and television, would be a
good topic for highly interesting and useful research both for copyright
scholars and the sociology of culture.

Notes
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

Point made by Director Morten Gjelten at Norsk Teater-og Orkesterforening
(Association of Noregian Theatres and Orchestras) in telephone interview,
22 April 2013.
The agreement can be found here: <http://spekter.compendia.no/kunder/
nto/avtaler.nsf/oversikt?ReadForm&kuni=COMW-7RZBU3>, a. ccessed
15 April 2013. This is the relevant part of the Norwegian text of the agreement’s § 9.1.: Sceneinstruktør og scenograf/kostymetegner har de rettigheter
til sitt verk som følger av lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk mv. av 12. mai 1961.
Verket er opphavsmannens eiendom, og denne overenskomst gir teatret
bare rett til (ikke enerett) i inntil 2 år (for Den norske Opera i 6 år) å fremføre verket på de av teatrets faste scener det er laget for.’
Agreement between Norsk Teater- og Orkesterforening and Norske Dramatikeres Forbund, dated 28 October 2012, downloaded from: <http://dramatiker.no/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Protokoll-og-avtale-26.10.2012.pdf>,
accessed 6 April 2013.
The historian Eric Hobsbawm suggested that the 1840s in England ‘marked
the end of an era when folksong remained the major musical idiom of
industrial workers’ (Chambers 1986, p.30).
One example: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?vv.=jECbrAoCXs4&list=RD
02WjTg8UtClNc>.
An example of their music: <http://vimeo.com/32738987>.
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7.
8.

9.
10.

Jostein Gripsrud

Cf.: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BergenWave>, and this recent piece from
The Guardian: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2013/mar/15/bergennorway-new-music-scene>..
The following is based on a 45-page document originally published on the
internet at royksoppsvarer.com, dated 20 April 2011 (on file with the author),
and the decision from Bergen Tingrett of 6 March 2013, published in the
database Lovdata, document no. TBERG-2012-86032-2.
Cf.: <http://www.schaathun.org/en/>
For an overview of the case, cf.: <http://www.5rb.com/case/brighton-dubbeljoint-v.-Jones>. http://www.5rb.com/case/Brighton--Dubbeljoint-v-Jones.
Reference: [2004] EWHC 1157 (Ch); [2004] EMLR 507; Court: Chancery Division; Judge: Park J; Date of Judgment: 18 May 2004.
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	Discontinuities between legal
conceptions of authorship and social
practices
What, if anything, is to be done?
Lionel Bently and Laura Biron

Authorship is central to the operation of copyright as a regulatory tool, but
copyright law’s conception of ‘authorship’ appears to be ‘out of sync’ with a
wide range of social practices: either copyright makes authors-in-law out of
social ‘non-authors’, or vice versa. After offering three examples (scientific
credit, conceptual art and literary editing)1 this contribution considers why
these differences have emerged and whether these discontinuities should
be thought of as a matter of concern. It appraises a number of academic
proposals as to what might be done about these discontinuities, and offers its own suggestion, namely, the deployment of a more open-textured
concept of authorship, one that is able to respond flexibly to varied contexts,
social understandings and practices, but limited in application to matters
of attribution.

Legal conceptions of authorship
Although there is no universal ‘copyright law’, so that statements about
copyright depend on the specific laws and jurisprudence of any given territory, ‘authorship’ typically plays a number of different roles in any particular
jurisdiction’s copyright law. These include circumscribing the term of
protection (by reference to a fixed period after the life of the last author
to die), and, perhaps most obviously, identifying the initial beneficiary of
economic rights. Although copyright laws take a single author model as the
paradigm, they also recognise the need to find rules for determining authorship of works to which more than one individual may have contributed.
One such set of rules relate to joint authorship (though many jurisdictions
also operate rules of collective authorship and some recognise notions of
corporate authorship).2 In determining claims to joint authorship, most
regimes consider three elements: the relationship between the participants;
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the level and kind of participation; and the degree of integration of the
contributions. For example, section 10 of the UK’s Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) defines a work of joint authorship as: ‘[a] work
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or authors’.
Here the relationship must be one of ‘collaboration’; the level and kind of
participation is referred to as a ‘contribution’; and the level of ‘integration’
is ‘non-distinctness’.
The ‘relationship’ dimension refers to the context of the putative joint
author’s creative activity. At the very least, it requires that the activity is
undertaken in coordination with the other author, as opposed to independent addition, alteration or improvement, which may create an original
derivative work of its own. Under British law, the requirement of ‘collaboration’ means that, when setting out to create a work, there must have been
some common design, cooperation or plan that united the authors, even if
only in a very loose sense (Levy v. Rutley, 1871, pp. 528–530; Cala Homes v.
McAlpine, 1995, p. 835; Beckingham v. Hodgens, 2003, pp. 389–90, [51] (CA)).
This is to be distinguished from the ‘subsequent independent alteration of
a finished work’, such as a translation or a serialisation, which would not
count as a collaboration (Beckingham v. Hodgens, 2002, p. 58, [44]). In some
other jurisdictions, the relationship aspect of joint authorship may require
something more than collaboration: for example, in the United States there
must be an intention to become joint authors.
The second requirement is that a putative joint author participate sufficiently in the creation of the work. Once again, the details vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to the precise kind and level of participation. In the United States there is a debate amongst scholars, reflected in
a division between circuits, as to whether the contribution must itself be
copyrightable. In the UK, the test demands that a co-author provides ‘a
contribution’, the nature of which case law has clarified in the following
ways. First, the contribution must be of ‘the right kind’ – to the creation
of the work, not to the performance or interpretation of the work (Tate v.
Thomas (1921), pp. 510–11; Hadley v. Kemp (1999), pp. 643–644; Brighton v.
Jones (2004), p. 304, [34]). Second, the author must contribute to expression,
not simply to ‘ideas’ or subject-matter (Evans v. E Hulton & Co Ltd (1923–8),
131 LT 534; Springfield v. Thame (1903), 89 LT 242; Nottage v. Jackson (1883),
pp. 632, 634, 636). Third, although the author need not literally put pen to
paper for their contribution to count (Cala Homes South v. Alfred McAlpine
Homes East Ltd (1995), p. 835), they must display ‘something akin to penmanship’ in the sense of being directly responsible for the expressive form of
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the work (Robin Ray v. Classic FM (1998), p. 636). Finally, the contribution
must be ‘significant and original’, as would be the case for a contribution
of single authorship (Godfrey v. Lees (1995), p. 325; Hadley v. Kemp (1999),
p. 643), though each author need not contribute an equal amount (Levy v.
Rutley (1871), pp. 528–530).
The third requirement for joint authorship is one of ‘integration’ of the
contributions of each author into some sort of whole. Article 7 of the Spanish
Copyright Act similarly defines a collaborative work as ‘a work that is the
unitary result of the collaboration of two or more authors’. Under UK law, it
is required that each author’s contribution is ‘not distinct’ from that of the
other contributors. In more positive terms, this means that the contributions
must merge to form an integrated whole, rather than a number of distinct
works (Beckingham v. Hodgens (2002), p. 59, [46]). In Italy, it is required
that the contributions are not only dependent upon one another, but are
‘indistinguishable’ (Perry and Margoni, (2012), p 23). In some legal systems,
most notably France, there is no such ‘integration’ requirement at all. Article
L. 113–2 of the French I.P. Code defines a ‘collaborative work’ as one ‘to
the creation of which several natural persons have contributed together’,
implying collaboration and contribution, but not necessarily integration
(Lucas and Kamina, in Geller, 2012, sec. 1[3]). The Belgian Copyright Law
explicitly distinguishes between two types of collaborative work – referred
to as ‘divisible’ and ‘indivisible’ – each category having particular rules as
to whose consent is required to exploit the contribution.3

Discontinuities between authorship in law and practice
A number of ‘social practices’ seem to be at odds with legal notions of authorship. These illustrate both the ways in which copyright law is unable to
recognise authors as such, turning ‘social authors’ into ‘legal non-authors’,
as well as copyright law’s capacity to turn ‘social non-authors’ into ‘legal
authors’, constructing authors-in-law out of practices that are conventionally self-defined as non-authorial. Here we highlight three examples.
Scientific authorship
The first example we consider is that of scientific authorship. 4 It is commonplace to think of scientific authorship as collaborative, and to expect
scientific publications to identify a number of named authors. Indeed, as
long ago as 1963, Derek de Solla Price described the dramatic increase in
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the numbers of authors as ‘one of the most violent transitions that can be
measured in recent trends of scientific manpower and literature’. Examining the trend for authors cited in Chemical Abstracts, Price found that the
number of articles with four or more authors had increased from about 2.7
percent in 1946 to about 9.5 percent in 1963, and he predicted that ‘if the
trend holds more than half of all papers will [have three or more authors]
by 1980 and we shall move steadily towards an infinity of authors per paper’
(de Solla Price, 1963, p. 89). While this predicted growth has of course
not occurred, the first paper to be issued from the collaboration over the
Large Hadron Collider at Cern, from the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS)
project, in 2009, is formally attributed to the CMS Collaboration, but also
contains an appendix listing over 2400 contributors. In the medical field,
one article in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1993 was attributed
to 976 authors, and another in Nature in 1997 to 151 (Smith and Williams
Jones, 2012, p. 201). Meanwhile, concern with the increase in scientific
authorship spread from chemistry to bio-medicine, astronomy and particle
physics, and from there, to ecology (Weltzin et al., 2006) and even the
social sciences.
There are, of course, many reasons for the expansion in scientific collaboration, and related increase in attribution. Most obvious is the changing
nature of scientific research which has often come to require massive teams
designing and building machines that ultimately produce information that
in turn will be analysed by others (Haeussler & Sauermann, 2013, p. 688;
Wuchty et al., 2007; Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1162). Many of these projects, such as
the Large Hadron Collider, involve co-operation between institutions and
academics from all around the world. (If author citations for the LHC look
extraordinary, it is worth bearing in mind that the LHC involves 111 nations
at a cost of over US$2.65 billion). However, even where the subject is more
modest, it has become more and more common for academics to collaborate
across disciplines, in recognition that the research goals can only be reached
with the benefit of multiple disciplines (Smith and Williams Jones, 2012,
p. 200). In addition to these, some responsibility for the shift in attribution
can also be explained by the ways in which research is funded, the ways
academics are appraised and rewarded, and changes in mechanisms of
appraisal (Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1190; Biagioli and Galison, 2003, pp. 2–7; Fisk,
2006, pp. 81–85).
These changes have been accompanied by transformations in notions
of ‘authorship’, such that the definition of authorship in science has come
to encompass a wide range of contributions, and this in turn has led to
intensification of attribution. As the ethical guidelines for publication
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issued by the Royal Society of Chemistry state, ‘[t]here is no universally
agreed definition of authorship’. Different fields, such as chemistry, particle
physics, astronomy, biological and medical science and ecology, it seems,
can and do define authorship differently and operate their own sets of
attribution practices (Smith and Williams-Jones, 2012, p. 200). As we will
see, many such definitions require authorship attribution to a wide range
of participants in the research process (many of whom will have had little
role in structuring, phrasing or editing the final paper).
For example, the guidelines issued by the Royal Society of Chemistry
further state that:
As a minimum, authors should take responsibility for a particular section of the study. The award of authorship should balance intellectual
contributions to the conception, design, analysis and writing of the
study against the collection of data and other routine work. If there is
no task that can reasonably be attributed to a particular individual,
then that individual should not be credited with authorship. All authors
must take public responsibility for the content of their paper. The
multidisciplinary nature of much research can make this diff icult,
but this may be resolved by the disclosure of individual contributions
(1995, p. 12A).

The guidelines seem to recognise that both intellectual contributors and
those involved in more routine work should be recognised. This no doubt
recognises the importance of cohesive teamwork, thereby avoiding the
development of divisions or cliques. There is no laboratory aristocracy.
Moreover, literary notions of authorship that focus on expression are sufficient, but by no means necessary. Pre-expressive intellectual contributions
that are recognised as equally sufficient include conception, design and
analysis. The only overarching requirement seems to be that authorship
is linked to responsibility (Biagioli, 2000, p. 90; Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1208;
Fisk, 2006, p. 83; Smith and Williams-Jones, 2012). If a contributor is not
prepared to stand by the paper, then they should not accept or permit
attribution. The American Chemical Society guidelines, which are similar
in their inclusiveness, equally emphasise responsibility, stating that ‘[t]he
co-authors of a paper should be all those persons who have made significant
scientific contributions to the work reported and who share responsibility
and accountability for the results’.
Another example is provided by the Ecological Society of America’s Code
of Ethics. This states that:
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[…] researchers will claim authorship of a paper only if they have made
a substantial contribution. Authorship may legitimately be claimed if
researchers
(a) conceived the ideas or experimental design;
(b) participated actively in execution of the study;
(c) analyzed and interpreted the data; or
(d) wrote the manuscript (ESA 2006, emphasis added).

The criteria suggested are alternative, so merely conceiving ideas, designing
a study, collecting or interpreting data might do. So, as with the Royal
Society of Chemistry, involvement in writing an article is a sufficient but not
a necessary condition of authorship. However, in contrast to the examples
from Chemistry, responsibility is not emphasised.
What is of interest to us is how widely some of these definitions vary
from the definition of authorship recognised in copyright law (Biagioli,
2012, pp. 454, 458; Fisk, 2006, p. 82). Indeed, from the perspective of
copyright law, the majority of co-authored scientific publications would
not, if challenged, meet the legal test for co-authorship. For example,
many of the contributions that count as authorial from the standpoint of
science – data collection, experiment planning, project supervising, and
so on – would not usually be considered to be ‘of the right kind’ to meet the
legal test of ‘contribution’, because they are contributions of ‘ideas’ rather
than to expression (see section 2 above). With copyright, authorship is a
matter of the work, i.e. the manuscript, rather than the research project,
and thus for copyright the focus is on the verbal expression, the choice
and ordering of the words, rather than generating the data or ideas (Anya
v. Wu, 2004). Moreover, copyright has nothing to say about the order in
which authors are to be credited, a topic which is, in contrast, of some
significance in many scientific fields, where in some cases the first author
is regarded as the primary contributor, and in others the f inal author
listed is assumed to be the senior author (Kwok, 2005, p. 554; Baerlocher
et al., 2007, p. 177; Tscharntke et al., 2007, p. 13; Smith and Williams-Jones,
2012, p. 200).
This disparity between legal and scientific authorship is even more
pronounced when it comes to mammoth collaborative ventures such as
CERN’s Large Hadron Collider, the LIGO Scientific Collaboration, the ALICE
(A Large Ion Collider Experiment) Nuclear Collaboration, the Belle Experiment (based in Tsukuba, Japan) or the collider detector at Fermi National
Accelerator Lab (Fermilab) project in Tevatron (near Batavia, Illinois). In
these situations, most of the publications emerging from the lab include the
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names of everyone who has put substantial work into the project, including
those who have left within a specified period (LIGO, [2A], sub-para 1). That
is, the default position is that the authorship is attributed to the complete
author list for the project as a whole, though it is usually possible for persons
to decline to be included (LIGO, [2A], sub-para 6; ALICE, [9.1]). The norm
is that names are cited in alphabetical order (LIGO, [2.B], para 1; ALICE,
[9.2]). In the ALICE guidelines each qualified author has to confirm that
he or she has read the paper and agree with the contents (ALICE, section
9). The LIGO policy recognises that ‘in keeping with the goal of the LSC to
promote the visibility of its members in the scientific community at large,
there may be cases where a limited author list is more appropriate’ (LIGO,
[2.B] sub-para 3).
As Mario Biagioli describes, in his discussions of Fermilab policies, the
sense of authorship at play here is ‘credit for accumulated labour’ (Biagioli,
2000, p. 101). All scientists and technicians, including the designers of the
machines that make the experiment, observation and analysis possible, are
all viewed as part of a corporate team. Each must input their labour and
expertise, usually for a minimum period of six months (though this will
vary with the status of the participant). Like employee-shareholders, or
employees who pay into a pension fund, when the project yields profits in
the form of journal publications, all participants are duly recognised. Such
recognition is granted for publications even after the contributor quits the
project, at least for some limited period. This is a far cry from copyright’s
conception of authorship as requiring actual skill or labour, understood in
terms of penmanship or expression.
Conceptual art
Our second example of discontinuity between copyright law and social
practice is that of conceptual art, in particular that in the United States
in the 1960s and 1970s. The conceptual art movement, if it can be called
a movement, in many ways sought to relocate the art object away from
individual instantiations (paintings, sculpture and so on), and to re-focus
attention on immaterial ideas, on thought, on language, on philosophy,
rather than on physical objects. As Le Witt explained:
When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the
planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a
perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art (Le
Witt, 1967, p. 79).
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In emphasising the ‘idea’, conceptual art also challenged the disciplinary
categories, which depend largely on form, and related ways of perception
and evaluation. In some ways itself an elaboration of the breakthrough
ideas of Marcel Duchamp, conceptual art both challenges the role of the
visual, and interrogates the notion of art itself (Joseph Kosuth, quoted in
Green, 2001, p. 7).
The range of conceptual art in this period was vast. The works of Joseph
Kosuth (1945–), often regarded as the pioneer of the movement, for example,
include many that comprise only text – such as the lists published in various
newspapers, for example: III, – Communication of Ideas (1969) or VI Time
(Art as Idea as Idea) (1969) from The Second Investigation (Green, 2001, pp. 2,
13, 16). Other works by Kosuth include a collection of books, Fifteen People
Present Their Favourite Book (1968), and a neon installation of the words
‘neon electrical light English glass letters white eight’, One and Eight: A
Description (1968) (Green, 2001, pp. 4, 11). Other conceptualists used more
conventional forms: Alighiero Boetti/Alighiero e Boetti (1940–1994), usually
associated with the movement Arte Povera, often used embroidery: Ordine e
Disordine (1973), for example, comprises one hundred embroidered squares,
each 7 x 7 inches squared, with each square divided into four, with each
quarter containing four letters. The embroidered squares were made by
Afghan women, each of whom chose at least some of the colours. Although
apparently simple, such works are frequently interrogating important questions as to the relationship between art and language (where meaning is
generated in ideas or form), the place and the role of the ‘artist’ (and the
artist’s ‘personal touch’), the significance of materiality and the place of
the object in processes of commodification.
In many cases, conceptual artists have operated by providing ideas in
written form, as sets of instructions, leaving their execution or instantiation
to others (Green, 2001, p. 10). Charles Green argues that this:
represented the elimination of a certain type of overinflated subjectivity
signified by the artist’s personal touch or signature. This was a type
of long-distance artistic collaboration – or delegation – in which the
assistant’s work was essential to the project’s very success and integrity
(Green, 2001, p. 10).

Green explains that the process of delegation was different for conceptual
artists than it had been in the past, under the atelier system, when artists
such as Paul Rubens and Jacques-Louis David had employed assistants,
because conceptualists such as Kosuth and Boetti ‘sought the co-operation
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of others to enable their authorship to be camouflaged so that the immateriality of the work would be stressed’. Importantly, the role of the
executants was not ‘itself revalued upward in order to create another artist’
(Green, 2001, p. 11).
Many examples of such conceptual art involved very general notions
(e.g. ‘a cube without a cube’, ‘straight lines in differing colors’). Some of the
best-known examples of such practices are the ‘wall drawings’ associated
with the American artist, Sol Le Witt (1928–2007). LeWitt’s wall drawings
consist of general guidelines or simple diagrams by LeWitt, which are drawn
or painted by assistants directly onto a gallery wall, then usually removed
after the exhibition has finished. For example, for Wall Drawing No 146,
there is a simple description: ‘All two-part combinations of blue arcs from
corners and sides, and blue straight, not straight and broken lines’. This is
accompanied by two diagrams, one which divides the wall into squares,
each containing two numbers, and the other indicating by numbers the
types of marking to be included in the square. The wall painting was first
installed in the Kunsthalle in Berne Switzerland in 1972 and LeWitt signed
a certificate identifying the first drawers as B. Blasi, E. Martin, B. Schlup,
P. Siegenthaler, S. Widmer and Sol LeWitt. A later version appears to have
been executed at Varese in Italy (Buskirk, 2003, pp. 50–51).
Readers who are unfamiliar with LeWitt’s work can view examples on
the website of the Massachussetts Museum of Contemporary Art, which in
2008 opened a twenty-five year Wall Drawing Retrospective. One example,
Wall Drawing 797, was derived from the following instructions:
The first drafter has a black marker and makes an irregular horizontal
line near the top of the wall. Then the second drafter tries to copy it
(without touching it) using a red marker. The third drafter does the same,
using a yellow marker. The fourth drafter does the same using a blue
marker. Then the second drafter followed by the third and fourth copies
the last line drawn until the bottom of the wall is reached’.

Evidently, a lot of discretion is left to the first drafter. When the work was
first executed at Amherst College, the drafter chose to base the line on
the nearby landscape (see http://www.massmoca.org/lewitt/walldrawing.
php?id=797).
Although Kimmelman reports that ‘characteristically, [LeWitt] would
then credit assistants or others with the results’, (cf. Kosuth, as reported in
Green, 2001, p. 22) and the MassMOCA exhibit does list the ‘initial drawers’, the wall drawings are, of course, primarily known as the works of
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LeWitt. As David Carrier has observed ‘presenting the idea for an artwork
suffices to get credit for making the work’ (Carrier, 1980, p. 192). Indeed,
the use of certificates, which had already been pioneered by the likes of
Carl Andre and Flavin, as guarantors of authorship, and thus authenticity
of their works (and can be traced back to Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. (1919)),
reinforced the unique place of the conceiver as artist (Alberro, 2003, p. 23).
In contrast, in many cases the actual executants are not identified (for
example, the drawers of the Varese version are not attributed in Buskirk,
2003, pp. 50–51). According to the authorship conventions of conceptual
art, then, it seems LeWitt’s assistants would not be regarded as co-authors
of the wall drawings.
From the standpoint of copyright, however, the reverse would appear to
be the case. The executants of the wall drawings would likely be treated
as making significant, original contributions to expression, something
certainly ‘akin to penmanship’ – and thus very likely to count as coauthors. This is particularly the case where choices that determine the
final expressive form have been left to the executants. According to Michael
Kimmelman:
With his wall drawing, mural-sized works that sometimes took teams of
people weeks to execute … he always gave his team wiggle room, believing
that the input of others – their joy, boredom, frustration or whatever –
remained part of the art (Kimmelman, 2007).

Another commentator confirms:
With these notes, LeWitt provided methods and techniques for the team
to follow – such as, for #613, “Rectangles formed by 3 in. (8cm) wide India
ink bands meeting at right angles” – while still allowing room for a certain
amount of self expression (Anon, 2010, p. 127).

More surprisingly still, LeWitt himself might be described as a legal nonauthor, at least in those cases where all he contributed was a very general
plan or idea for the execution of the work. As the Court of Appeal explained
in Nottage v. Jackson (1883), (when considering authorship of a photograph):
Certainly [the author] is not the man who simply gives the idea of a
picture, because the proprietor may say, “Go and draw that lady with a
dog at her feet, and in one hand holding a flower”. He may have the idea,
but still he is not there […] (Nottage, 1883, p. 632).
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Indeed, it is notable than many of the 105 wall drawings executed for
MASSMoCA were completed after LeWitt’s death by students, guided
by LeWitt’s assistants: (Anon, 2010, p. 128). In these cases it is almost
unthinkable that copyright law would treat LeWitt as an author of the
wall drawings, as there could be no relevant ‘collaboration’ between the
living and the dead.
Of course, there are some that were made in his lifetime in which he
was one of the ‘first drawers’, and might claim legal co-authorship on that
account. There are also some where the details in the instructions were
sufficient to control the detailed expression. One account explains:
LeWitt’s wall drawings were the products of the artist’s carefully conceived systems of lines and colours, which could then be executed by
others. A team of assistants that worked with the artist produced the
drawings according to detailed diagrams and written instructions […]
(Anon, 2010, p. 127).

Moreover, there are certain examples where LeWitt had exercised supervisory control over how the other drawers executed the work. Kimmelman
reported that ‘like many more traditional artists, he became more concerned
in later years that his works look just the way he wished’ and thus ‘he might
decide whether a line for which he had given the instruction “not straight”
was sufficiently irregular without becoming wavy’. In these cases, a claim
to co-authorship (or even sole authorship) is not out of the question. As
Laddie J. explained in the case of Cala Homes v. Alfred McAlpine Homes
(1995, p. 835), holding that an architect was a co-author of plans which had
been executed by his assistants:
In my view, to have regard merely to who pushed the pen is too narrow
a view of authorship […] It is both the words or lines and the skill and
effort involved in creating, selecting or gathering together the detailed
concepts, data or emotions which those words or lines have fixed in
some tangible form which is protected […] It is wrong to think that only
the person who carries out the mechanical act of fixation is the author.

This might allow us to describe some conceptual artists as authors-in-law,
but only where they oversaw the work of the executants, correcting it where
appropriate, and controlling the decision over when the work as expressed
was complete. As Laddie J. emphasises, what matters for copyright is who
authors the expression.
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Of course, works of conceptual art pose a range of problems for copyright
law, including the identification of anything that can be described as a
‘work’ in the first place – a problem particularly for copyright regimes
that identify a closed enumeration of subject-matter, as is the case in
the UK (Barron, 2002). Perhaps because revenue streams deriving from
reproduction of such works (and from high art more generally) remain of
relatively minor importance, compared with revenues deriving from the
sale of unique, material artefacts, the processes of certification developed
by the conceptualists have been sufficient to make a market for, and in some
ways effectively sustain, these practices. As a consequence, the difficult
questions that conceptual art raises for the existence of copyright seem
rarely to have been tested in litigation. However, when conceptual art pieces
are realised or materialised, as with LeWitt’s wall drawings, the question
of ‘authorship’ comes into play. Viewed from the perspective of copyright
law, a ‘conceptual artist’ such as LeWitt would not usually be regarded as
the author of the resulting artistic work (and certainly not the sole author).
In contrast, copyright law would likely regard the assistants as co-authors,
when conventionally they would not be viewed as such. The perspectives
are not merely ‘out of sync’, but outright contradictions.
Literary editors
It might be objected that the discontinuities between copyright law’s notion
of authorship and social practices that we have discussed so far come from
the ‘margins’ of what copyright law was ever intended to protect (and, in
the case of conceptual art, inevitably follows from the practices of an art
movement that sought to reject conventional understanding, and thus
inevitably developed in a manner that was inconsistent with the ways of
thinking necessarily incorporated within copyright law’s concepts). While
it might, in turn, be disputed that scientific writing was not at the heart of
copyright law’s thinking, at least in its early days, when the purpose was
described in terms of the ‘encouragement of learning’ (and, in the United
States Constitution ‘promoting science’), we want to suggest that the same
types of discontinuities can also be found right in the centre of copyright
law’s heartland, literary authorship. For our third example concerns literary
works, particularly works of fiction and the contributions of editors to what
are usually considered single-authored works.
Literary editors, of course, are not generally regarded as ‘authors’, nor
do they think of themselves as such. As Holman explains, an editor is
‘an indispensable recruiter, guide, friend, confessor and co-worker with
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writers of genius and a shaper of great literary careers’ – but not an author
or co-author (Holman, 1978, p. 572). Editors are facilitators, midwives assisting at the literary birth of each novel, but leaving no doubt as to whom
the parent is. One of the great American editors of the mid-20th century,
Maxwell Perkins, the literary editor at Scribners, who edited the works of
F. Scott Fitzgerald, Thomas Wolfe and Ernest Hemingway, was clear about
the non-authorial role of an editor:
An editor does not add to a book. At best he serves as a handmaiden to
an author. Don’t ever get to feeling important about yourself, because an
editor at most releases energy. He creates nothing (Perkins, in Berg, p. 6;
quoted by Inge, 2001, p. 626).

This belief has been acknowledged judicially. In the US case of Childress v.
Taylor, Judge Newman reasoned about the distinction between writer and
editor, and their respective intentions regarding authorship, as follows:
[…] a writer frequently works with an editor, who makes numerous useful
revisions to the first draft, some of which will consist of additions of
copyrightable expression. Both intend their contributions to be merged
into inseparable parts of a unitary whole, yet very few editors and even
fewer writers would expect the editor to be accorded the status of joint
author […] (Childress para. 38).

However, when examined more closely, literary editors have often done
much more than merely facilitate the creation of a particular work: they have
often contributed significantly to the structure, narrative, characterisation
and text, through suggested deletions and amendments. In his important
overview, The Myth of Solitary Genius, University of Illinois Professor of
English, Jack Stillinger, has drawn attention to the joint and collaborative
nature of many literary works that are often seen as works of single authorship. Even the most seemingly ‘romantic’ poets like John Keats (1795–1821)
relied greatly on suggestions and alterations from editors including Richard Woodhouse (1788–1834) and John Taylor (1781–1864) (Stillinger, 1991,
pp. 26–30). Another well-known example concerns the contribution of the
poet, Ezra Pound (1885–1972), to the writing of T. S. Eliot’s poem The Waste
Land (1922). Pound, through multiple suggestions, led Eliot to cut the poem
from over one thousand lines to 434 (Stillinger, 1991, Ch. 6, esp. pp. 127–8).
Other well-documented examples include the assistance given by Hiram
Haydn (1907–1973), literary editor at Bob-Merrill from 1950–54, to American
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novelist (and former student of Haydn’s) William Styron (1925–2006), which
include multiple suggested amendments to the structure, characterisation
and text of Styron’s first work, Lie Down in Darkness (Casciato, 1980).
Although Max Perkins’ relationship with authors has been described as a
‘departure from the traditional relationship of author, editor and publisher’
(Litz, 1968, p. 97), a closer look at his practices is revealing. For while Perkins
publicly denied his contribution to the authorship of the works produced by
Scribners under his supervision, surviving documents suggest he frequently
had a very significant involvement with the texts sent to him by his authors.
Sometimes Perkins initiated the ideas for works, such as his suggestion to
Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings (who had just finished South Moon Under) that
she write a book about ‘a child in the scrub’ (Berg, 1978, p. 212, p. 297–300)
or to Douglas Southall Freeman that, having completed a biography of
Robert E Lee, he write a biography of Washington (Berg, 1978, p. 181–2).
More frequently, he received a manuscript, immersed himself in it and
offered suggestions as to improvements. Some of these suggestions are clear
from the various collections of letters that survive between Perkins and his
authors, and they vary in type and extent. In some circumstances, as with
Fitzgerald’s famous novel The Great Gatsby (1925), various manuscripts
survive from different stages of the process leading to publication, including
the original handwritten manuscript at Princeton University Library. In the
case of Wolfe’s relationship with the process, significant insights are also
provided from his The Story of a Novel.
In the case of Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald submitted the
manuscript and Perkins suggested changes including most importantly
the elaboration of the James Gatz/Jay Gatsby character (Nov. 24, 1924 in
Kuehl & Bryer, 1971, p. 82; Buccoli & Baughman, 2004, p. 27; Berg, 1978,
p. 65). Fitzgerald reacted favourably to the suggestions and incorporated
the ideas including one that the character use the phrase ‘old sport’, which
Fitzgerald used a dozen times (Berg, 1978, p. 69). Moreover, Perkins rejected
many of Fitzgerald’s suggestions as to a title, such as ‘Among the Ash-Heaps
and Millionaires’, ‘Gold-Hatted Gatsby’, ‘The High-Bouncing Loner’, ‘On
the Road to West Egg’, ‘Trimalchio in West Egg’, ‘Trimalchio’, ‘Gatsby’ and
Fitzgerald’s ultimate choice, ‘Under the Red, White and Blue’ (Berg, 1978,
pp. 62, 64, 67; Bruccoli, 1974, p. 6 n. 4, pp. 31–32).
Perkins’ involvement in the finalisation of Tom Wolfe’s manuscripts for
Look Homeward, Angel (1929) and Of Time and the River (1935) is reputed
to have been much more substantial. According to Roger Shugg, ‘it is well
known that Perkins alone made Tom Wolfe publishable by helping him
to select from boxes and bales of manuscript the pages and sections that

legal conceptions of authorship

251

would have coherence as a book’ (Shugg, 1968, p. 11). Scott Berg describes
Perkins’ reaction to the 1114-page manuscript (some 330,000 words) of what
was provisionally called ‘O Lost’ when he first received it in 1928, and his
correspondence with Wolfe. Perkins thought it needed reorganisation and
substantial cutting, and Wolfe acknowledged this, admitting his inability to
criticise his own writing and his desire to get advice on the ‘huge monster’ of
a manuscript (ibid., pp. 128 ff). In this account, Perkins not only advised on
what needed to go, but what needed to be retained (in the face of Wolfe’s erratic inclinations). According to one account, the pair worked day-after-day
until over a quarter of the book (90,000 words) was cut, including the first
1377 lines, and the work reframed as seen through the memories of the boy,
Eugene (cutting sections where Wolfe spoke directly to the reader) (Berg,
1978, pp. 134–5). Ultimately, Perkins asked Wolfe to alter the title, approving
instead the alternative, Look Homeward, Angel (a phrase from John Milton’s
Lycidas) (ibid., p. 136). Subsequent scholars have gone over the same ground
and although Perkins’ contribution is diminished, it nevertheless remains
impressive. For example, Dr Park Bucker, from the University of South
Carolina Sumter, who has conducted a scrupulous analysis argues that some
of the claims as to Perkins’ contribution are exaggerated. He suggests that
in the case of Look Homeward, Angel, Perkins: ‘… moved one major episode,
Grant’s Homecoming, from Book II to Book I; recommended the cutting
of 60,000 words (22% of the work); and advised Wolfe to write connecting
passages bridging the cuts’ (Bucker, 2000, p. xvii).
In the case of Time and the River, Perkins was involved from the start.
Following the publication of Look Homeward, Angel, Perkins suggested to
Wolfe that he write about ‘a man’s quest for his father’ (Berg, 1978, pp. 137–8,
163, 167). Wolfe took the suggestion seriously and spent the next four years
writing. In 1933, Perkins called time on Wolfe, who delivered a manuscript
of over a million words twice the length of Tolstoy’s gargantuan War and
Peace (ibid., pp. 235–6). Importantly, Perkins identified that the manuscript
contained two distinct stories, each of which needed separate treatment,
so that one was carved off and published later (ibid., p. 236). Thereafter,
Perkins and Wolfe worked on the novel, in Perkins’ office in New York,
every evening, six days a week, for much of 1934 (ibid., 1978, p. 237). Perkins’
directions were often detailed (ibid., p. 237).
Perkins was thus an editor who was very close to the manuscripts of the
authors he worked with. In some situations, Perkins’ close involvement
in finalising manuscripts even led to suggestions that he was in fact a coauthor. This was most notoriously the case with Tom Wolfe’s Of Time and
the River, with one critic arguing that ‘[s]uch organizing faculty and critical
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intelligence as have been applied to the book have come not from inside the
artist, not from the artist’s feeling for form and esthetic integrity, but from
the office of Charles Scribner’s Sons’ (De Voto, 1936, p. 3ff). Indeed, some
were led to suggest that Wolfe left Scribners (for Edward Aswell at Harper’s)
because of the rumours that Perkins was, in effect, not his editorial mentor,
but a co-author (Shugg, 1968, p. 11). While Perkins asserted that ‘The book
belongs to the author’ (Maxwell Perkins to Tom Wolfe, 16 Jan 1937, in Bruccoli
and Bucker, 2000, pp. 235, xvii), the question that interests us is whether the
contributions by Perkins to the various manuscripts would – or could – have
been such as to render him a joint author in the eyes of copyright law?
First, we might ask whether an editor and a writer are collaborators for
the purposes of copyright? The British case law indicates that collaborators
pursue a ‘common design’. In relation to The Great Gatsby, for example,
Arthur Walton Litz notes: ‘Perkins and Fitzgerald obviously shared the same
vision of the finished novel, and as the title fluctuated among a half-dozen
alternatives they worked together to sharpen the narrative focus’ (Litz, 1968,
pp. 104–5). Bruccoli observed that Fitzgerald ‘trusted Perkins and counted
on him to attend to the mechanics of his prose’ (Bruccoli, 1974, p. 21).
There is some suggestion that collaboration goes further, and also requires
joint control: it is not enough that two persons contribute towards a shared
goal if one of them has control over which contributions are accepted and
which rejected. Thus in Hadley v. Kemp, one member of a band was regarded
as the songwriter because he controlled whether the contributions of the
others accorded with his ‘vision’ (in which case they were incorporated) or
did not (and thus were rejected). Perkins might well have sought to deny
that an editorial relationship involved an appropriate sort of ‘collaboration’,
arguing instead that the author was the ultimate decision-maker, and that
this element of control meant that an editor’s involvement could not be
described as collaboration.
Thus, for example, Perkins wrote to Fitzgerald: ‘Do not ever defer to my
judgment’ (Wheelock, 1950, p. 30; Bucker, 2000, p. xvii) and, to MarjorieKinnan Rawlings, that ‘a book must be done according to the writer’s
conception of it as nearly as possible’ (Berg, 1978, p. 298). Nevertheless, even
if one accepts that collaboration does require joint control, it is difficult to
regard an editor such as Perkins as lacking such control. Indeed, not only
did authors typically accept his suggestions, but the publication of a work
depended on his approval of the manuscript. The advice from Perkins that
the author should guard his or her expressive autonomy was made in the
face of the reality that the publisher called the shots. Elsewhere, Perkins
recognised that authors were pliable:
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Editors aren’t much, and can’t be … They can only help a writer realise
himself, and they can ruin him if he’s pliable. … That is why the editors
I know shrink from tampering with a manuscript and do it only when it
is required of them by the author (Bucker, 2000, p. xvii).

Yet, Perkins was not like those editors he describes – he did involve himself
intimately with the manuscript. And, individually, he was soon so highly
respected – ‘the sole and only excuse … for Fitzgerald having been as successful as he is’ (Madeleine Boyd, quoted in Berg, 1978, pp. 133–134) – that
it is difficult to see that any author could regard his ‘suggestions’ as really
optional. In the case of Wolfe, Perkins observed ‘Tom demanded help.
He had to have it’ (Shugg, 1968, p. 11), while Wolfe explained ‘I have great
confidence in him and I usually yield to his judgment’ (Berg, 1978, p. 134).
Second, we must consider the type and extent of the contributions. As we
have already noted, the provision of ideas is not enough. Thus Perkins clearly
has no claim on that account to be a co-author of Freeman’s seven-volume
life of Washington, nor Rawlings’ Pulitzer Prize winning The Yearling. And
even though he urged Janet Taylor Caldwell that she write a historical novel
(Berg, p. 400), Perkins is not a co-author of her successful works on Saint
Paul, Cicero or Pericles. Nor would merely helping to choose the title, as
Perkins often did, be likely to render a literary editor a joint author. The
titles – The Great Gatsby (which Perkins chose from a bunch of suggestions
from the indecisive Fiztgerald) (Bruccoli, 1991, vii), or The Yearling (which
Perkins selected from Rawlings’ other suggestions of The Fawn, The Flutter Mill and Juniper Island (Berg, pp. 297–299) et cetera – contain too few
creative choices to justify a co-authorship claim (cf. Newspaper Licensing
Agency v. Meltwater, CA, holding that some newspaper headlines might be
works of authorship).
For co-authorship in British copyright law, there must be significant and
original contributions to expression. While it does not appear that Perkins
provided any text to Fitzgerald or Wolfe (Bucker, 2000, xvii), it is clear in many
cases that he contributed to the deletion of large passages of text, and in the
case of Wolfe, the selection and arrangement of the manuscript. In the case
of Fitzgerald’s works, these changes were probably not substantial enough to
justify a claim to co-authorship under copyright’s rules. In the case of Time
and the River, the matter is less clear. It was Perkins who identified that the
manuscript contained two distinct stories, each of which needed separate
treatment. This process of ‘selection’ and ‘arrangement’ of texts has been
frequently recognised as relevant to the assessment of whether a work is
original for the purposes of deciding whether copyright subsists, though has
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been seldom discussed in the context of co-authorship disputes. Nevertheless, given its recognition as ‘the right kind’ of skill labour and judgment (or, in
European terminology ‘creative choice’), there can be little doubt that these
types of contributions (which Brucker, 2000, p. xvii, calls ‘structural skills’)
could warrant a finding of joint authorship under British law.
Were these contributions ‘significant’? Scholars of Fitzgerald, such as
Robert Emmet Long and Matthew Bruccoli, have sought to minimise the
importance of Perkins’ contribution. Long calls the changes prompted by
Perkins minor especially when viewed as part of Fitzgerald’s own ‘relentless
process of polishing’ (Long, 1979, pp. 188, 199–200). One way to assess significance is to pay attention to what the authors said. Fitzgerald acknowledged
the value of Perkins’s assistance to The Great Gatsby: ‘With the aid you have
given me’, he declared, ‘I can make Gatsby perfect’ (Fitzgerald to Perkins,
Dec 20, 1924, in Kuehl & Bryer, p. 89 and Buccoli and Baughman, p. 32;
Turnbull, 1963, p. 172). Another way to assess significance is to consider
the reaction of readers, and critics, regarded as valuable components of
the works. In the case of The Great Gatsby, which received praise for ‘its
structure’ Fitzgerald wrote to Perkins:
Max, it amuses me when praise comes in on the ‘structure’ of the book
– because it was you who fixed up the structure, not me. (Fitzgerald to
Perkins, July 10, 1925 in Kuehl & Bryer, pp. 117–118; Buccoli & Baughman,
p. 27; Inge, 2001, p. 626).

Bruccoli, who has closely analysed the various surviving manuscript and
proof versions says that, in so stating, Fitzgerald gave too much credit to
Perkins whose participation in re-writing the novel was ‘not intimate’
(Bruccoli, 1991, pp. x, xi). Nevertheless, it seems strange that he should
have been so effusive, and Bruccoli admits that one possible explanation
is that there may be a lost set of galleys on which Perkins made ‘detailed
recommendations’ (ibid, xii).
There is no suggestion that Perkins contributed substantial text to either
Fitzgerald or Wolfe. Other editors, however, have not been so restrained.
One example is Saxe Commins (1892–1958), a literary editor for American
publishing firm Random House from 1933 to his death, who famously acted
as editor to Eugene O’Neill, William Forster and W.H. Auden. His experiences were represented in his letters and journal entries, and were collected
and published after his death (Commins, 1978, pp. 153–169). One of his less
glamorous assignments was to assist novelist Parker Morell (1906–1943)
to put the finishing touches on his biography of the American actress and
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singer Lilian Russell (1860–1922), entitled Lillian Russell: The Era of Plush.
The book was being pushed out by the publisher to coincide with a film
about Russell. The publisher had provided Morell with a researcher who
had worked for eight weeks collecting materials on the actress in the New
York Public Library. As the deadline approached, Commins was sent to
assist Morell to whip it into shape or, as Commins wittily put it, to ‘gild
the lily’. Unfortunately for Commins, Morell was suffering from bouts of
dizziness, and had not even made a start on the biography. Commins set
about agreeing a table of contents with Morell, and for a week sought to
assist him to meet the deadline. Commins generously produced text, but
found that the author made no further progress, or that whatever he did
do was largely plagiarised (Commins, 1978, p.157). In his journal, Commins
described Morell as ‘psychotic, unstable, imbecilic. He simply cannot do
the job’ (ibid., p.155). By the first weekend, when Commins returned to New
York, determined to tell his employers what was going on, six chapters out
of 22 were complete. Apparently, Random House was uninterested in the
details and merely wanted the novel finished on time. Commins ended up
returning to help Morell complete the book. In effect, Commins had written
300 pages in two weeks. He was disgusted with himself and what he had
to do (ibid., pp. 155, 166), and became even more worried as Morell started
to recognise that Commins had written more of the book than he had.
Commins wanted nothing to do with suggestions that he be co-author or
receive half the royalties (ibid., pp. 163, 167). This was ‘a penalty, a sentence,
an expiation, a penance – anything but my book, it must be understood’.
Doubtless the author for copyright purpose, Commins wanted nothing to
do with being recognised as such.
Summation
We have now highlighted a number of examples in which the norms of social
and legal authorship point us in quite different directions. In each case there
is a disparity between social conventions of authorship and the question of
who counts as an author in law. Copyright law is supposed to be committed
to the proposition that authorship is a matter of fact, and it assumes that
authorship conventions are, generally speaking, fixed and stable across a
variety of social practices. With the above examples discussed and analysed,
we can now see some important ways in which this assumption might be
called into question. What has gone wrong? How might we explain this
conflict? Where might we look for solutions? The remainder of the paper
is devoted to these questions.
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Thinking about these discontinuities
Facilitating discontinuity
In thinking about the apparent differences between legal conceptions of
authorship, and how social and cultural practices identify authorship, the
first point to note is that the dichotomy between the ‘legal’ sphere and the
‘social’ sphere is itself artificial and problematic in a number of respects.
Perhaps most importantly, the social sphere does not exist ‘outside law’,
so the differences in legal and social conceptions are themselves, in some
respects, a product of law. In other words, while the legal system identifies
authorship according to specific criteria, it does not prohibit social practices
that attribute authorship in a different manner. On the other hand, in
applying its criteria, the legal system frequently invokes social practices as
important considerations in reaching legal conclusions about authorship.
Both points deserve elaboration.
At first glance, it may seem odd to claim that the existence of a dichotomy
between legal conclusions on authorship and social practices of attribution
are themselves, in part, the result of law. On reflection, the claim is not
strange at all. This is because the legal system requires the identification
of authorship as a mechanism for achieving certain functions, most obviously as regards the initial allocation of copyright, as well as determination
of the term of protection. However, traditionally the British and US legal
systems have not treated the legal definition of authorship as determining
of attribution practices. The latter have rather been treated as questions of
contractual agreement: a legal author (and first owner of copyright) can
transact with a publisher to be named, or not to be named, on the work as
published. Through these principles of freedom of contract, the legal system
allows for the emergence of the discontinuities between authorship in law,
and particular or more generalised practices of attribution. Although UK law
has recognised a right of attribution, vested in the legal author, since 1989, it
requires that this right be operationalised by an act of ‘assertion’, typically
in a contract, and provides that this right can be waived, for example, in a
contract. The effect of this is that the legal system specifically facilitates
not merely practices of non-attribution (as for example, of article writers in
The Economist), but even permits agreement that others – non-legal authors
– are attributed as authors. Social attribution of authorship to persons who
would not be regarded as authors-in-law is itself legally facilitated.5
Perhaps the most obvious example of such legal collaboration in the generation of these discontinuities is provided by the case of ghost authorship,
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that is the knowing, conscious writing by one person of a work that will be
attributed to another. Often, ghost-writing is used to overcome some of the
problems celebrities face in composing their own, ‘auto-biographies’, but the
practice extends well beyond that field (Erdal, 2004), as the Saxe ComminsParker Merell example indicates. Another instance of such ‘ghosting’ is of
the first Star Wars novel which was in fact written by Alan Dean Foster, but
was attributed to George Lucas. Lucas would likely have had neither the time
nor the energy to write the novel (which was published before the film was
complete and released), but the writer was happy to receive $5000 for the
job and apparently content to have his identity concealed. Indeed, when
asked as to whether he resented the attribution of the novel to Lucas, Foster
is reported to have said: ‘Not at all. It was George’s story idea. I was merely
expanding upon it. Not having my name on the cover didn’t bother me in
the least. It would be akin to a contractor demanding to have his name on
a Frank Lloyd Wright house’ (Pollock, 1999, p. 195).
‘Ghost writing’, however, is a good example of the way that copyright
law is complicit in the social practice of misrepresenting authorship. This
is not because copyright law would not recognise a ghost writer as the
author of the work – it would. Rather, it is because it would permit the
parties to attribute authorship to someone else. This might be possible,
in some legal systems, by agreement as to who constitutes the author, or
in the United States if the writer was an employee under the so-called
‘work-for-hire’ doctrine (Lastowka, 2005, pp. 1221–1228). However, even in
the United Kingdom, which has since 1989 recognised an author’s moral
right of attribution, the law allows the author to agree by contract to waive
that right. Matters are more complex in other European countries which
do not permit waiver of the ‘droit moraux’. For example, while French law
permits authors to consent to such misattribution, should the author change
their mind, they will then be permitted to assert their right of attribution
(but may have to indemnify the co-contractant).
Accommodating social practice
While copyright law thus might be said to be complicit in, or at least facilitative of, these discontinuities, in other respects the law does attempt to take
social practices seriously, and its search for factual marks of authorship is
inevitably influenced by authorship practices outside of the legal sphere.
Most legal systems reduce room for dispute in relation to determinations
of authorship by operating presumptions that a person designated as the
author on a published version of the work is in fact the author. Indeed,
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Article 5 of the EU’s Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property6
requires Member States to recognise a presumption that where ‘his/her
name … appear[s] on the work in the usual manner’, then the author of
a literary or artistic work is to ‘be regarded as such, and consequently to
be entitled to institute infringement proceedings’, in the absence of proof
to the contrary. Implementing this, the French IP Code, Article L. 113–1
provides: ‘Absent proof to the contrary, the status of author belongs to the
person or persons under whose names the work has been divulged’; while
the UK CDPA, s. 104(2) states that ‘where a name purporting to be that of the
author appeared on copies of the work as published or on the work when it
was made, the person whose name appeared shall be presumed, until the
contrary is proved … (a) to be the author of the work’. Although no such
presumption is included in the US Copyright Act, US law looks explicitly for
‘factual indicia’ of joint authorship in terms of attribution, such as billing
and crediting (Thomson v. Larson, 1998, at para. 32).
However, it remains the case that, when social facts about authorship
explicitly conflict with the legal test, copyright law will likely disregard the
social conventions. In the English case of Bamgboye v. Reed, for example,
the High Court rejected evidence that the claimant was not co-author of
the musical work Bouncing Flow on the basis that ‘he would not have been
thought of as a “collaborator”, in the way that the word might normally be
used in the industry’ – this was considered irrelevant to the legal question
of whether he had ‘creative input into the music … ’ (Bamgboye, 2002, para.
61). When it comes to factual questions about authorship, then, copyright
law is selective in its appeal to social facts, at least regarding linguistic
expectations about the use of the term ‘author’, and also the extent to which
these expectations reflect how the parties might agree to define their roles.
Would it be desirable to align legal and social understandings of
authorship?
Would it be (and, to the extent that it already occurs, is it) desirable for
copyright law to ascertain legal facts about authorship from social conventions? First, we might note that copyright law needs to put forward a
conception of authorship that is relatively stable and fixed. This is, first,
because copyright is a property right and its very existence often depends
on the identification of the author of a work. As Farwell L.J. put it in the
case of Tate v. Fullbrook: ‘The Act creates a monopoly, and in such a case
there must be certainty in the subject-matter of such monopoly in order to
avoid injustice to the rest of the world’ (p. 832).
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In contrast, social authorship conventions are far from stable, even
within specific cultural fields. For example, looking at the case of editors,
an interesting literature has developed about editorial principles, and the
extent to which editors do view themselves as taking on an authorial role
when they prepare works for publication. In our exposition of the role of
editors above, we took it for granted that editors would be considered social
non-authors. However, according to an approach Peter Schillingsburg calls
the ‘aesthetic orientation’, editing is described as producing a ‘best’ text of a
work, rather than the more traditional ‘authorial orientation’, which sees the
editor’s role as one of constructing ‘a purified authorial text’, capturing most
fully the author’s intentions prior to the intervention of editors or publishers.
The aesthetic orientation challenges certain views of editorial authorship
we took for granted, according to which ‘there is assumed to be an absolute
distinction between author and editor – the editor is supposed to be the
servant of the author’s intentions, not a co-writer’ (Eggert, 1990, p. 24). If the
editor is seen as a person who produces the ‘best’ text out of a number of
inferior versions attributed to the author, he becomes a ‘collaborator with
the author, doing better what the originating production crew did poorly’
(Schillingsburg, 1996 p. 42).
Similar points might be made about the changing social conventions
of authorship practices in the artistic, commercial and scientific spheres.7
Indeed, the question of the proliferation of attribution of authorship for
scientific publications became a matter of such concern that attempts were
made to codify social norms. The most widely adopted of these is the action
of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (Dreyfuss, 2000;
Fisk, 2006, p. 84). These rules state that:
Authorship should be based only on a substantial contribution to:
i) Conception and design or analysis and interpretation of data; and
ii) Drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual
content; and
iii) Final approval of the version to be published.

Although widely adopted, for example, by all PLOS journals, as well as the
Royal Society, the requirements have not gone without criticism (Kwok,
2005, p. 554; Smith and Williams-Jones, 2012, p. 202), in part because they
are a rather strict set of rules. Indeed, they might even deny attribution to
some who would be regarded as authors by copyright law (for example,
someone who wrote the article but did not conceive the project). Indeed,
there are suggestions that the rules have had no significant impact upon the
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rates of attribution (Baerlocher, 2009; Haeussler, 2013, p. 690). Regardless of
their effectiveness, we draw attention to the ICMJE rules here to highlight
the capacity for social norms to transform over time.
Second, we observe that copyright law needs a conception of authorship
that can be applied across a great diversity of cultural fields, which means
that its legal framework needs to be broad enough to accommodate the vast
differences between the various creative practices it proposes to protect.
Although there are discontinuities between copyright law’s conception of
authorship and the conceptions recognised in relation to conceptual art,
scientific authorship or literary editing, it should be clear that these three
‘social’ conceptions are themselves very different. When one factors in all
sorts of other spheres which copyright law seeks to regulate – music production, screenwriting, theatre (Gripsrud, 2014), film-making (Bently and
Biron, 2014; Lastowka, 2005, p. 1230), – one can see that discontinuities are
inevitable. When reflecting on the possibility of the introduction of a moral
right of attribution, these complexities led Rebecca Tushnet to observe that
‘[l]egitimate claims for credit are simply too varied and contextual, and
copyright law already too complex and reticulated, for an attribution right
to be a valuable addition to copyright’s arsenal’ (Tushnet, 2007a, p. 789).
Third, it might be argued that, even though it may produce discontinuities, copyright’s conception of authorship usefully limits the possibilities of
highly fragmented ownership. In limiting the types of contributions, and
requiring collaboration, copyright ensures the concentration of rights in few
hands (what, elsewhere, has been referred to as ‘agglomeration’). In some
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, no joint author (or co-owner)
can exploit the work without the consent of other joint authors, so multiple
ownership raises issues of potential ‘hold ups’ (as economists might say).
Take the example of the article in Nature with 151 attributed authors: if each
of these were really a legal joint author, all would have to grant permission
to publish (and if 150 had agreed, the 151st would have enormous power to
refuse to publish or exact modifications).
Although the ownership rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (see,
e.g., Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1207), and some copyright laws include provisions to
resolve disagreements between joint owners, courts appear to act on a desire
to simplify ownership by agglomerating ownership rights in as few persons
as possible. Such a tendency leads to a high threshold for joint authorship.
Writing about the United States, Rebecca Tushnet (Tushnet, 2007a, p. 807)
explains that ‘an important reason that courts have adopted restrictive
definitions of joint authorship’ lies in the implications for the exploitation
of the copyright, namely, the potential licensing problems associated with
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the requirement than an exclusive license be agreed by all co-authors (see
also La France, 2001, p. 194; Lastowka, 2005, p. 1217).
Fourth, it might be said that any attempt at alignment may also be regarded as futile because there will always be a section of the cultural world
that takes its function to be to interrogate the categories of contemporary
life, including law (its concepts and practices), by actions and interventions
that self-consciously excavate, expose and deliberately destabilise the ideas,
assumptions and ways of thinking with which law operates. However hard
law reformers work to locate a conception of authorship that is broad and
flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of social practices, there
will be some artists who nevertheless want to expose and challenge those
conceptions. Indeed, our example of conceptual art might be regarded as
precisely such a case. While perhaps not focused on challenging copyright
law’s conception of authorship, its explicit goal of eliminating the ‘overinflated subjectivity signified by the artist’s personal touch or signature’ that
was valued in previous art movements (Green, 2001, p. 10) was inevitably
going to produce discontinuities with a copyright law whose conception of
‘authorship’ had emerged in historical environments where such subjectivity and personal touch was regarded as the hallmark of ‘authorship’. Even
if copyright law could encompass many artistic practices, then, it seems
implausible to think it could align itself with every section of the artworld.
Fifth, it might be said that these divergences are unproblematic, possibly
even desirable. The discontinuities might be said to be unproblematic because
copyright law provides other mechanisms to adjust the initial allocation of
rights. The most obvious of these is contract law, as a result of which initial
allocations of rights can be varied (as we have seen above). If copyright law
designates one person as an author there is – in most laws at least – nothing
to stop an arrangement whereby that copyright can be assigned to another
(and, in the few cases where copyright law prohibits assignments, an arrangement with an equivalent effect can usually be achieved). Perhaps the
best illustration of the importance of contractual remedies to problems of
authorship can be seen in film practice: despite longstanding uncertainty
and confusion over who should count as a film author, the film industry has
nevertheless been able to flourish through contractual provisions that ensure
that all the necessary rights end up in a particular film production company.
Complicated questions of who is a film author as a matter of law typically only
arise in situations of amateur production (see, for example, Wimmer v. Slater).
Moreover, it might be suggested that the non-alignment of law’s conception of authorship with social practice is a by-product of the relative
autonomy of law, an autonomy that is desirable because it creates spaces
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that are free from prior social relations of power, especially economic
power. Legal non-authors cannot use economic or social power to transform themselves into legal authors, whereas the use of social power to gain
attribution in science has received widespread, and almost universally
critical, comment (Kwok; Smith and Williams-Jones, 2012, p. 205; and,
more generally, Fisk, 2006, p. 102). Most recently, Carolin Haeussler and
Henry Sauermann have studied attribution in relation to scientific works
and concluded that: ‘contributions in the form of carrying out technical
steps or laboratory work are more likely to be rewarded with authorship
when made by scientists with higher hierarchical status or prior scientific
accomplishment’ (Haeussler and Sauermann, 2013, p. 689). In fact, what they
show is that attribution practices reflect power relations. For copyright law,
authorship remains a matter of law, and such contributions would not be
relevant for copyright law’s assessment of authorship.
Equally, with authorship being a matter of law, the socially less powerful
should remain ‘authors’ if their contributions are in fact contributions to
authorship: an actor can become a co-author of a play (whatever the director
or playwright may think), a family member who contributes could become a
joint author of the resulting work. Consider, for example, the situation in the
United States during the 1950s when screen credit was determined not by
formal, public legal rules but by the rules and practices of the Screen Writers
Guild. While much that the Guild did might be thought of as beneficial to
writers, as is well known, a series of writers – Paul Jarrico, Dalton Trumbo,
Michael Wilson – who were blacklisted as a result of their ‘associations’
with Communism were not granted credit on the films (The Las Vegas
Story (1952), Roman Holiday (1954), The Friendly Persuasion (1956) to which
they had contributed (Fisk, 2006, p. 231–245). The Screen Writers Guild was
ineffective to resist the political pressure of the producers. In contrast, it
seems fair to assume that judicial designation of authorship would have been
less vulnerable to these politically-motivated exercises of economic power.
Of course, we should not overstate the social justice arguments in defence
of the legal control of the determination of authorship. For a start, as already
noted, these legal determinations do not stand outside power-relations, but
are, of course, deeply immersed in complex webs of power. This means that
when a court determines whether a contribution is original or substantial,
its conclusions will rarely be uncontaminated by social valorisations that
in turn reflect relations of power (Bently, 2009). Moreover, in so far as the
intention of the parties is relevant to determining questions of joint authorship, as in the United States, questions of self-perception and capacity to act
inevitably inform the actors’ capacities to form relevant intentions, however
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substantial their contributions in fact are. Does an editor, for example, ever
intend to become a joint author? Prevalent views of the role of the editor
may preclude the formation of the intention to co-author.
Despite all these good reasons to be skeptical about the desirability of
any attempt to align copyright’s conception of authorship with the varied
ideas deployed in specific fields of social practice, something important is
at stake in this failure to align copyright’s concept of authorship with the
understandings of authorship evinced in many – perhaps most – social
practices. What is at stake is the credibility and legitimacy of copyright law
itself. Copyright law relies heavily for its operation on widespread acceptance of its legitimacy (rather than the sporadic enforcement of its sometimes
hefty sanctions). That legitimacy lies in the idea that copyright law promotes
cultural flourishing, by giving the weight of law to ideas that artistic and
cultural activities warrant recognition, respect and reward. In turn, it is
important that different social operators feel a reasonable correspondence
between the social norms that underpin their practices and legal norms
embodied in copyright law.8 For this reason, we think it is at the very least
worth considering carefully whether the conception of authorship can be
made more consistent with social norms.

Three proposals
We are not alone in thinking that some exploration of whether copyright
law can be made more consistent with social norms. For example, Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss from New York University, one of the most
prominent intellectual property scholars in the United States, has proposed
the introduction of a whole new category of ‘collaborative authorship’, while
Professor Gregory Lastowka from Rutgers has suggested that US law regulate
authorial attribution to give effect to social interests in ‘truthful’ attribution.
Dreyfuss’s proposal can be seen as an attempt to make legal constructions
more consistent with changed social practices, while Lastowka seeks to
cabin ‘deviant’ (i.e., particularly misleading) social practices to make them
more consonant with legal ideas of authorship. We review these in turn,
before tentatively making our own suggestion.
Dreyfuss’s proposal for a concept of ‘collaborative work’
Dreyfuss suggests that copyright laws should recognise a new kind of
copyright work: a ‘collaborative work’ (distinct from ‘collective works’ or
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‘works of joint authorship’), which would arise where the parties indicated
an intention that the work should be so treated (either in writing or through
other actions) (Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1222). In so proposing, Dreyfuss consciously builds on some of the more open conceptions of co-authorship
that we have referred to above, such as that operative in France and the
Netherlands where contributions do not need to be integrated into a work
so as to become non-distinct. But Dreyfuss’s proposal goes further than
existing copyright regimes, conferring authorship status on ‘every participant who has contributed to such work’, including those who created
(non-copyrightable) ideas and facts, those who instigate, find funding, or
provide resources (ibid., pp. 1220, 1222–3). Many contributions that are not
usually counted as authorial in law would, on this proposal, count, and the
definition of contribution would be more expansive and accommodating
than on current joint authorship doctrine. Her proposal would ‘give each
author pecuniary interests in the work proportional to that party’s input’
(ibid., p. 1220) Building on the US rule on exploitation of jointly authored
works (as well as some provisions found in civil law regimes), each author
would be allowed to utilise and develop their own contribution, with an
implied licence to use that of the other contributors (with proportionate
obligations to remunerate those others), but their rights would be unenforceable unless and until all contributors were properly attributed (ibid.,p. 1221).
This proposal has a number of attractive features. It would potentially
encourage more collaboration between parties, as individuals not usually
accorded authorial status would be attracted by the prospect of greater
recognition. It would also encourage would-be single authors to think
carefully about the influences on their work, and to be clearer about the
demarcation of creative roles, and the need to give credit and recognition
to other contributing parties. It would work well for cases of legal nonauthorship such as scientific publishing, when authors contribute in ways
not usually recognised by copyright as contributions ‘of the right kind’.
The case of conceptual art is more difficult, however. On the one hand,
Dreyfuss’s proposal allows a contribution of an artist like Sol LeWitt to count
as authorial, but this is only on the proviso that his work be considered a
collaborative one, alongside the contributions of his assistants. Thus, it
does nothing to harmonise legal and social conceptions of authorship in
the artistic sphere, even if it gets around the difficulty of conceptual artists
being viewed as legal non-authors.
More generally, Dreyfuss’s proposal might be seen as problematic to the
extent that it actually highlights the disparity between legal authors and
social non-authors, providing a way not only for editors, friends and ghosts

legal conceptions of authorship

265

to count as legal co-authors when they might conventionally not be so
considered (it is arguable that current joint authorship standards already offer this prospect), but also for broader contributions – of publishers, funders
or even the public at large, to count as authorial. But why should we inflate
(legal) authorship to this extent? One concern is that enabling contributions
of ‘ideas’ to count as authorial could threaten to extend copyright protection
precisely at a time when scholars are worrying about its ‘over-expansion’.
Indeed, copyright law’s idea/expression dichotomy is often justified as
a technique which enables courts to balance the interests of copyright
owners against those of users, creators and the public at large, preventing
the monopolisation of ideas and facilitating a robust public domain. When
‘non-copyrightable ideas’ are viewed as contributions of authorship, as per
Dreyfuss’s proposal, this balancing act becomes harder to achieve, because
the scope of copyright infringement potentially increases. While a proposal
which enables ‘ideas’ to count as authorial has the potential to align legal
and social conceptions of authorship, then, we might wonder whether this
is too high a price to pay for such alignment.
Moreover, recognition of this problem could lead us to question one of
the potential strengths of Dreyfuss’s proposal in encouraging more collaborative ventures: although the proposal might encourage collaborative
authorship in one sense, it has the potential to stifle authorship in the
more traditional sense of building on the raw materials which copyright
law is supposed to safeguard. In our view, this tension could be avoided if
copyright law treated attribution rights separately from ownership rights
(see below).
Lastowka’s proposal to strengthen attribution
Gregory Lastowka’s starting point is the US Supreme Court in Dastar
Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp in 2003 which, at its broadest reading may preclude authors relying on trade mark law to prevent
misattribution of their work as others’, and possibly others’ work as theirs.
Lastowka is concerned that Dastar has unjustifiably removed a valuable
legal remedy, and proposes the reversal of the decision. In contrast to Dreyfuss, his proposal thus concerns purely questions of authorial attribution,
and the vehicle for giving effect to these duties to attribute is trade mark law.
Lastowka’s justification for so advocating is not the familiar moral rights
theory according to which ‘authors’ have a natural or moral right to attribution in relation to their works (for the mere reason that the works are the
products of the author’s personality). Rather, Lastowka argues that ‘accurate
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authorial attribution benefits society because it is a type of information that
has special social value’ (Lastowka, 2005, pp. 1176, 1180–85). Consequently,
Lastowka proposes that trade mark law – a form of intellectual property
which protects particular signs or marks that are used by traders to identify
their goods/services, to indicate the origin of their goods/services, and
distinguish them from goods/services produced by other traders – plays a
role in ensuring that there is appropriate authorial attribution.
Lastowka’s preference for trade mark over copyright is explained not
just by his public interest orientation, but also because he also sees US
copyright law’s conception of authorship as out of step with that in popular
understanding (ibid., pp. 1215–1216). As he observes:
If one believes there is a societal interest in accurate attribution, copyright’s scheme of authorship ordering is obviously problematic because
the legal author controlling attribution is not the person society views
as the author (ibid., p. 1216).

Nor would Lastowka want to make the matter one for individual authors.
Because he is concerned with promoting ‘truth’ (ibid., pp. 1193, 1233), leaving
policing of attribution to authors ‘has a glaring structural defect’, namely
that authors might agree to misattribution (either because of unfair bargaining, or because they willingly do so for alternative benefits) (ibid., p 1218,).
For Lastowka, ‘attribution must be bounded to some factual and socially
valuable truth about the identity of the true author’.
Thus, Lastowka wants to ensure that legal regulation prevents social
practices that misattribute the ‘true author’. In his view, for example,
ghostwriting should be actionable as a form of reverse passing off (i.e.,
misrepresentation of one person’s work as another’s) irrespective of the
consent of the author (ibid., pp. 1218, 1233). Such actions should be able to be
brought not just by the misattributed or unattributed author or contributor,
but also by the public (which, as Lastowka reports, had occurred in the US
in the 1990s when the pop duo Milli Vanilli purported to be singing on the
album (and single) Girl You Know Its True but in fact were lip-synched the
recording). Although Lastowka acknowledges that such regulation would
often prove ineffective (ibid., p. 1230), his aim is that socially deceptive
practices should be brought into line with legal norms, and those legal
norms are to reflect ‘socially important legal truth’.
But what is less obvious is quite what are the relevant ‘truths’ in the
sorts of situations that we have been discussing. Is the socially important
empirical truth that a work was ‘conceived by’ Sol LeWitt, or ‘executed by’
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various assistants? Is not the ‘truth’ more a product of attribution practices
than an ‘empirical reality’? Is the extent of Perkins’ role in editing Fitzgerald
and Wolfe such as to make it deceptive to describe the latter alone as the
authors? Unfortunately, Lastowka’s proposal offers too little guidance here
to be of value. Moreover, the case of scientific authorship would be left
entirely outside the field of legal regulation. This is because Lastowka takes
the view that social interests diminish ‘in cases involving more than two or
three authors who contribute to a single work’ (ibid., p. 1230), and contributor
attribution no longer provides factually meaningful information about a
product. As he explains, in ‘the case of collaborative authorship, it seems the
justification for the doctrine of reverse passing off falls away’ (ibid., p. 1232).
Yet the volume of literature concerning ‘scientific authorship’ suggests there
are important individual and social interests at stake here (Fisk, 2006, p. 50).
A more reflexive concept of authorship for attribution
Like Dreyfuss and Lastowka, we see problems with the discontinuities
between copyright law’s narrow conception of authorship and social practices. However, in contrast to Dreyfuss, but in common with Lastowka, we
think there may be reasons to focus attention on attribution, with a view
to considering whether some greater level of consistency between law and
social practice can be achieved at least in relation to this question. Thus
we suggest greater attention should be given to an idea raised by Rebecca
Tushnet – ‘a special type of “attribution authorship”’ (Tushnet, 2007a, p. 807)
– an idea we think she dismissed too quickly.
We suggest that a right of attribution – a right already recognised under
most copyright regimes (and indeed in a number of international obligations) – could be extended to all relevant contributors to the making of a
work (or perhaps to any intellectual endeavour). The notion of ‘contributor’
need not be synonymous with the notion of ‘authors’ as deployed for other
purposes within copyright law (in particular, ascribing first ownership).
This could be achieved either by recognising that ‘authorship’ has a different
meaning when considering rights or duties of attribution, or perhaps less
problematically by identifying the beneficiary of a right of attribution by a
distinct term such as ‘contributor’. Indeed, it might be that rights of attribution could be removed from the copyright system altogether, and instead
be treated as free-standing rights. Attribution itself is a feature not just of
copyright law, but of other fields of intellectual endeavour (Tushnet, 2007a,
p. 794). ‘Inventors’ and ‘designers’ already receive limited attribution rights
(Fisk, 2006, p. 70), and this proposal could also extend to them. Indeed such
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a right of contributors to attribution could easily be developed out of notions
of rights of personality, commonly recognised in civil law countries, but
more embryonically being developed in the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention
as requiring recognition of a right in one’s own name or image.
Re-thinking attribution in terms of ‘relevant contributions’ would have a
number of potential benefits. First, it would free the attribution right from
the proprietary logic of copyright, and thereby permit a greater number
of potentially qualifying contributions. Catherine Fisk has observed that
‘over the last generation there has been a tendency to expand the number of
people and the types of contributions that are attributed’ (Fisk, 2006, p. 101).
These contributions could (but would not necessarily) include contributions to ideas, generating data, even building machines that help generate
data as well as contributions to text or expression. Because recognition
of such contributions as entitling a person to attribution would not, in
turn, implicate questions of ownership, marketability or exploitation of
a work, there are no policy reasons for a court or tribunal arbitrarily to
exclude them from recognition. More positively, by allowing the broad array
of contributions to be taken into account, copyright law can incorporate
within its logic what matters, and what is valued, within specific fields
of endeavour. The contribution of the conceptual artist would at least be
recognised as entitling them to attribution.
Secondly, a ‘relevant contribution’ test would allow rights of attribution
to become more reflective of social norms. Indeed, ‘relevant’ could be expressly defined so as to take account of social norms in the particular sector.
Rebecca Tushnet has observed that there are ‘powerful attribution norms
throughout modern society, rather than a single norm that covers most
situations’ (Tushnet, 2007a, p. 795). Thus, where such norms are codified
textually, for example by industry agreement (as in the case, for example,
of the Screen Writers Guild of America) (Fisk, 2006, pp. 77–81; Fisk, 2011),
those norms would be determinative (and the resolutions of the relevant
dispute-machinery could be given presumptive force). A similar position
could be taken where such norms are socially developed, as for example
with various scientific societies’ statements on attribution, or indeed with
editorial practices. If individual literary editors do not wish to be attributed,
or editorial contributions – even to structure, sequence, organisation and
text – are not treated as relevant contributions under the relevant social
norms at the pertinent time, then they would not be entitled to attribution.
Of course, care would need to be taken to ensure that individual agreements and social norms do not become opportunities for unfair bargaining
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practices, but there are many circumstances in which one can imagine
parties giving their full and informed consent to a particular billing. This
might be because the billing has been collectively bargained, or because the
parties agree that it represents the best way to market the cultural work.
Thirdly, deferring to social norms also raises the possibility of differentiating between categories of relevant contributor. One could easily
imagine a legal system differentiating between categories of contributor,
such as between ‘principal authors’ and ‘ancillary authors’, or ‘authors’
and ‘contributors’. Indeed, this is precisely the solution to the problem of
attribution in ‘scientific authorship’ that has been proposed by the deputy
editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, Dr. Drummond
Rennie (Rennie, 1997; Rennie, 2000; Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1190). He has suggested that contributors receive credit for what they did, just as with film
credits. It also raises the possibility that contributors could be recognised
‘collectively’. As Catherine Fisk has ably demonstrated, such norm-based
regimes can be appraised in terms of transparency, participation, equality,
due process, efficiency, and substantive fairness (Fisk, 2006, pp. 73–76).
A fourth aspect of the proposed ‘contributor’s right’ would be that it
could be formulated to take advantage of the changes to the technological
environment within which works are now published. As Catherine Fisk has
observed, ‘context is everything in determining when credit is due’ (Fisk,
2006, p. 76). In contrast with copyright law’s concept of ‘authorship’, which
needs to be a stable grounding for exclusive rights that could last over 150
years (life of an author plus 70 years), contribution rights could be made
to reflect current social norms. Thus the assessment of whether there is a
‘relevant contribution’ could fall to be determined at the present time, so
that an online publisher could be required to modify attribution of works
for the future. Given that the costs of altering attribution information are
relatively low, a right of attribution that can respond in this way seems
much more feasible than it might ever have been hitherto.
Two commentators, Professors Catherine Fisk and Rebecca Tushnet,
have anticipated and critiqued a proposal of this sort. Fisk argues that ‘a
comprehensive and legally enforceable right of attribution … is neither
feasible nor probably desirable’ (Fisk, 2006, p. 109). One of her concerns
is that such a system would lack the flexibility of ‘norm-based systems’
(ibid.). Therefore, she proposes a very limited intervention, restricted
to the field of employment contracts. However, we are less pessimistic.
Although the United States has not, as yet, enacted attribution rights, most
copyright systems already include such rights as part of the system of ‘droits
moraux’. Indeed, Article 6 Bis of the Berne Convention, Article 5 of the WIPO
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Performers and Phonograms Treaty and Article 5 of the Beijing Treaty on
Audiovisual Performances already require that such rights be conferred on
authors of literary and artistic works and performers. We suggest that such
rights should be implemented in a way which draws on and is sensitive to
existing social norms.
Tushnet criticises the idea of a ‘right of attribution’ as one which would
‘increase the number of line-drawing problems substantially’ (Tushnet,
2007a, p. 807). She is, at least, partly right. If there are a greater number
of people with attribution rights, and a greater number of contributions
are recognised as entitling the contributor to attribution, the number of
instances where decisions need to be made will evidently increase. But
that does not mean that ‘problems’ will increase. Indeed, we would suggest
that the number of ‘problems’ might well decrease for two reasons. Firstly,
because with our suggestion, there would be greater alignment between
legal and social norms, and thus we would anticipate that contested claims
to attribution would be fewer. Secondly, because the right only relates to attribution, so that questions of ownership are not at issue, we would envisage
that the parties would likely be more ready to accommodate one another. By
reducing the practical effects of authorship ascription, we would anticipate
a corresponding reduction in the intensity of legal fights over authorship.
Of course, many details of this proposal remain to be worked out, and it
is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a detailed defence and analysis.
Rather, the purpose of this chapter has been to highlight the underlying
discontinuity between legal and social authorship that the proposal is
designed to address, to argue that re-aligning legal and social authorship
norms is important for the sake of copyright law’s legitimacy, and to suggest that current proposed solutions to this tension are in certain respects
problematic. We think the proposal outlined here is a more promising
alternative, and submit that it warrants further scholarly attention.

Notes
1.

This chapter does not specifically address examples of digital collaboration.
However, based on evidence from workshops that took place during the
HERA project (in particular, the papers by Eva Northup and Hendrik Spilker at
the HERA workshop on ‘Notions of and conditions for authorship and creativity in media production’, 2 November 2012, University of Bergen), our view is
that, whilst digital collaboration makes questions about authorship pertinent
and pressing, it does not fundamentally change the more general questions
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
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considered here about authorship norms and roles. For further discussion of
the norms of digital artistic collaboration, which relates to the example of
conceptual art, please see the chapter in this collection by Elena Cooper.
Many jurisdictions give protection to a collective or composite work (such
as an anthology) as a distinct category of work. See van Eechoud et al., 2009,
esp. ch. 6, for detailed discussion. For reasons of space, this chapter focuses
on copyright’s definition of joint authorship.
This chapter focuses on questions of joint authorship in terms of the
specific contributions and collaborations amongst individuals to a work
(a question that courts have been faced with when joint authorship is
contested); however, for discussion of how EU and Dutch Courts often
disregard these more specific questions about individual contribution when
deciding whether a ‘work’ counts as an ‘author’s own intellectual creation’
for the purposes of copyright protection, please see the chapter in this collection by Stef van Gompel.
Our focus here is largely on the written outcome of scientific research (e.g.
journal articles) as opposed to datasets or visualisations formed as part of
the publication process. Although we do not discuss the difficult question
of the copyright status of these other potential ‘works’ of authorship, we
note here that individuals who collect or manage data are often cited as
authors of scientific research articles on the basis of their contributions to
the former.
It is worth noting that many collaborative ventures such as Wikipedia rely
on open source and open content licensing agreements, and that such collaborative ventures are often facilitated by authorship agreements which
bypass questions about authorship attribution. It is beyond the scope of
this chapter to discuss such agreements in depth, but we draw the reader’s
attention to them as other examples of contractual agreements facilitating
collaborative authorship, often independently of copyright law.
EU directives are laws which all Member States must implement in their
national legal systems: here, we refer to the specific directive which indicates that attribution ought to be recognisedrecognized as an important
presumption in favour of authorship. However, it must be noted that, whilst
the process of copyright harmonisation is underway between EU Member
States, many differences still exist between different Member States with
regards to questions of authorship and moral rights. For an overview of the
complexity, see van Eechoud et al., 2009.
For an interesting example of how artistic and scientific authorship norms
can combine in certain cases, independently of copyright law, see the
examples of digital collaboration discussed in Elena Cooper’s contribution
to this volume: in particular, the Renaissance Team at the National Centre
for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign. In this example, all the different contributors to the data
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8.

visualisations are seen as equal players; Cooper argues that they appear
uninfluenced by copyright norms in their conceptions of authorship.
For discussion of this point with regards to the relationship between
copyright law and aesthetic judgments specifically, see the chapter in this
volume by Erlend Lavik.
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